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A careful and ftridl 



The 77todern prevailing Notions 



Which is fuppofed to be eflential 
T O 

Moral Agency^ T^ertue and VicCj 
Reward "^xi^ Punijhment^ Praife 
.and Blame. 


Pallor of the Church in Stsckbridge, 
Rom* ix. 16. // is not cf him that willeth — — 

B CIS TO N, N. E. 

Printed axid Sold hj S. Kt/Teland, m Qiieen-flreety, 





find much Fault with the callinp: 

S!2P 'i^Pp profeffing Chriftians, that differ one from 
W^^^^^ another in ibme Matters of Opinion, by 
ItmiSIM^ ^^^'^nd: Names-, efpecially calling them by 
m^i^illMI ^^^- Names of particular Men, who have 
didinguifhed themfelves as Maintainers and 
Promoters of thofe Opinions : as the calling fome pro- 
telling Chriilians Jrminians, from ArminiUs ; others Ari- 
ans, trom Arius ; others Socinians, from SocinuSy and the 
like. They think it unjufl in it felf -, as it feems to fdp- 
pofe and fuggeft, that the Perfons mark'd out by thefe 
Names, received thofe Do6trines which they entertain, 
out of Regard to, and Reliance on thofe Men after whom 
they are named ; as tho' they made them their Rule : in 
the fame Manner, as the Followers of Christ are called 
Chriftians \ after his Name, whom they regard & depend 
upon,^ as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is 
an unjud and groundlefs Imputation on thofe that go un- 
der the foremention'd Denominations, Thus (fay they) 
there is not the lead Ground to fuppofe, that the chief 
Divines, who embrace' the Scheme of Dodrine which is 
by many called Arminianifm, believe it the more becaufe 
Anninius believed it : and that there is no Reafon to 
think any other, than that they fincerely and impartially 
ftudy the holy Scriptures, and enquire after the Mind 
of Chrift, with as much Judgment and Sincerity, as any 
ol thole that call them by thcfe Names j that they feek 
after Truth, and are not careful whether they think ex- 
aaiy ^sArminius^id ; yea, that in fome Things they 
adualiy differ from him. This Pradice is alfo elteemed 

A 2 actually 


The P R E F ^ C E. 

adlnally injurious on this Account, that it is fuppofed na- 
turally ro lead the Multitude to imagine theDifference be- 
tween Perfons thus named & others,to be greater than it is •, 
^a, as tho' it were lb great, that they muft be as it were, 
another Species of Beings. And they objedl againflic' 
as arifing from an uncharitable, narrow,conTradled Spirit ; 
which, they fay, qommonly inclines Perfons to confine 
all thax is good to themfelves and their own Party, and 
to make a wide Diftinction between themfelves and \ 
others, and ftigmatize thofe that differ from them with ' 
odious Names. They fay moreover, thac the keeping 
up fuch a Diitindlion of Najnes has a diredt Tendency 
to uphold Diliance 3c Difaffedion, and keep alive mutual 
Hatred among Chriftians, who ought all to be united in \ 
Friendfhip and Charity, however they can't in allThings j 
think alike. i 

I confefs, thefe Things are very plaufible. And I will ' 
not deny, that there are fome unhappy Confcquences of j 
this Diftinvflion of Narnes^ and that Men's Infirmities and i 
evil Difpofitions oFten make an ill In-iprovement of it. ^ 
But yet I humbly conceive, thefe Objections are carried < 
far beyond Reafon.- The Generality of Mankind are J 
difpofed enough, and a great Deal too much, to Uncha- ; 
ritablenefs, and to be cenforious and binter towards thefe i 
thac differ from them in religious Opinions : which evil \ 
Temper of Mind will take Occafion to exerc it felf, from • 
many Things in themfelves innocent, ufeful & necelfiry. \ 
hut yet there is no NeceiTuy to fuppofe, that the thus j 
didingulfhing Perfons of different Opinions by different j 
Names, arifes mainly from an uncharitable Spirit. Ic i 
niay arife from the Difpofition there is in Mankind ^ 
(whom God has dillinguifhed with an Ability and In- § 
clination for S})eech) to improve the Benefit of Language, .' 
in the proper Ufe and Defign of Nanies, given to I'hings \ 
which they have often Occafion to fpeak of, or fignify i 
their Minds about ; v-'hich is to enable them to exprefs ^ 
their Ideas with Eafe and Expedition, v^ithout being in- j 
cumber'd v/ith an ohfcure and diiiicuk Circumlocution. ' 
j\nd the thus di(l:inr^uin"iint^ Pcrf-^^ns ofdifi-crenc Opinions ! 
^ '• " " hi] 

i:\ic P R E F A C E. 


in religious Matters, may not imply, nor infer any more 
than that there is a Difference, and that the Difference 
is fuch as we find we have often Occafion to take Notice 
of, and make Mention of. That which we have frequent 
Occafion to fpeak of ('whatever it be„ that gives the Oc- 
cafion) this wants a Name : and 'tis always a. Defe<5t in 
Language, in fuch Cafes, to be obliged to make ufe of a 
Defcription, inftead of a Name. Thus we have often 
Occafion to fpeak of thofe who are the Defcendants of 
rhe ancient Inhabitants of France^ who were Subjeds or 
Heads of the Government of that Land, and fpake the 
Language peculiar to it ; in Diftindion from the Dc- 
fce^ndants of the Inhabitants of Spaifj, V;ho belonged to 
that Community, and fpake the Language ot that Coun- 
try. And therefore we find the great Need of diftinifb 
Names to fignify thcfe different Sorrs of People, and the 
great Convenience of thofe dillinguifhing Words, French^ 
and Spaniards •, by which the Signification of our Minds 
is quick and eafy, and our Speech is delivered from the 
Burden of a continual Reireration of diffufe Defcrip- 
tions, with which if mud otherwife be embarafs'd. 

I'hat the Difference of the Opinions of thofe, who in 
their general Scheme of Divinity agree with thefe two 
noted Men, Calvin^ and Jrmbnus^\s a'l^hing there is often 
Occafion ro fpeak of, is what the Pradice of the latter, in 
felf confeffes ; who are often, in their Difcourfes and 
Writings, taking Notice of the fup^)ofed abfurd and 
pernicious Opinions of the former Sort. And therefore 
the making Ufe of different Names in this Cafe can't rea- 
fonably beobjededagainff,or condemned, as aXhing which 
mufi: come from fo bad a Caufe as they alTign. It is 
eafy to be accounted for, without fuppofing it to arife 
from any other Source, than the Exigence and natural 
Tendency of the State of Things ; considering theFaculty 
and Difpofition God has given Mankind, to expsefs 
Things which they have frequent Occafion to mention, 
by certain diftingiiifning Names. It is an Effed that is 
fimilar to what we fee arife, in innumerable Cales -which 
•are parallel, where cheCaufe is not ai all blame-wonhy. 


iv The PREFACE. 

Neveithelefs, at firft I had Thoughts of carefully a- the Ufe of the Appellation, JrmMa^, in this 
i reatile. But I foon found 1 Ihould be put to greacDiffi- 
culty by It ; and that myDifcoiiife would be fo incumber'd 
with an otren repeated Circumlocution, inftead of a ' 
JName. -which would exprefs the Thing intended, as well-: 
r!^L l"V^^' ^ altered niy Purpofe. And therefore I ' 
muftafttheExcufeot fuch as are apt to be offended 
wi£h Things of this Nature, that I have fo freely ufed the 
i erm JrmmiM in the following Difcourfe. 1 profcfs it 
to be without any Defign, to ftigmatize Perfons of any 
Sort with a Name of Reproach, pr at all to make theti 
appear more odious. If when I had Occafion to fneak ' 
of tnofc Divines who are commonly called by this nLc,. - 
Ihad ..nfteadof fty ling them ^n;;i;;/.«, called :h,m 
thee Ma,, as Dr. Whitby does Cahtniftic Divines ; it nrc^ 
bably would not have been taken any better, ^r tho'c 

lfj.7 ^ t'"" "^.TP""' ""' ™°''^ g"'''^ Manners. I 
bave,done as I would be done by, in thisMatter. How- 
ever the Perm Cahinift is in thefe Days, among moft, a 

vef iV ,f "'"■ i^'P™'''' ^''^" the Term °m/«4 ; 
^ I r r"L"°i "''^ " ^' ^" «"^''"«'to be called a Cahi. 
^¥, for Dirtinaion's Sake : tho' I utterly difclain, a 
Dcpenaance on C,hi„, or believing the Dodrines which 
I k,K]Decau<e he believed and taught thein ; and can- 
not juflly be charged with believing in every Thin<. jull 
TiS he taught. ^ o J^^^ 

But left I fliould really be an Occafion of Injury to 
fome Perfons I would here give Notice, that tho' 1 au- 
rally fpeak of tnat Doftrine, concerning Free-will a°nd 
moral Agency, which I oppofe, as an Jr%ima, Doftrine 
^•et 1 would not be underftood. that every Divine o^ 
Author whom I haveOccafion to mention as maintaini,!^ 
that Doanne, was properly an .^rmimar,, or one of thai 
Sort which IS commonly called by that Name. Some 
of them went far beyond the Jnm>ua>is : And I would 
by no Cleans charge ^r«;M/^w in general with all tlie 
corruprDoitnne, which thefe maintain'd. Thus for In- 
stance. V. would be very injurious, it I ihould rank Jr. 

%. mtmart 

The PRE F A C E. v 

minian Divines in general, with fuch Auihors as. Mr. 
Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have fome of his 
Dodrines in Abhorrence •, tho' he agrees, for the mod 
Part, v;ich /Irminiam^ in hisi Notion of the Freedom of 
the Will. And on the other Hand, tho' I fuppofe this 
Notion to be a leading Article in the Aiininian Scheme, 
that which, if pUrfued in it's Confequences, will t:ru]y 
infer, or naturally lead to all the reft -, yet 1 don't charge 
all that h^ve. held this Dodrine, with being Arm fiians. 
For whatever may be the Confequences of the Doftrine 
really, yet fome that hold this Dodrine, may not own 
nor fee thefe Confequences -, and it ^would be unjuft, ia 
many Inftances, to charge every Author v/ith believing 
and maintaining all the real Confequences of his avowed 
Dodrines. And I defire it may be particularly noted, 
that tho' I have Occafion in the following Difcourfe, 
often to mention theAuthor of the Book cninkdyJpi EJTay 
en tbeFreedom of the tVill^ in God & the Creature^z.^ holding 
that Notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppofe \ yec 
I don't mean to call him an Arminian : however in that 
Dodrine he agrees with Jrminians, and departs from the 
current and general Opinion of Calvimjls, If the Author 
of that Eflay be the fame as it is commonly afcribed to, 
he doubtlefs was not one that ought to bear that Name. 
But however good aDivine he was in many RefpedSjyeC 
that-particular Arminian Dodrine which he maintain'd, 
is never the better for being held by fuch an One : nor 
is there lefs Need of oppofing it on that Account ; but 
rather is there the more Need of it j as it v^^ill be likely 
to have the more pernicious Influence, for being taught by 
a Divine of his Name and Charader ; fuppofing the 
Dodrine to be wrong, and in it lelf to be of an ill Ten- 

I have Nothing further to fay by Way of Preface; 
but only to befpeak the Reader's Candour, and calm At- 
tention to what I have written. The Subjcd is of fuch 
Importance, as to demand Attention, and the mod tho- 
rough Confideration. Of all Kinds of Knowlege that 
we can ever obtain, the Knowledge of God, and the 




Knowlege of our felves, are the molt importanr. As 
Religion is the great Bufinefs, Tor which we are created, 
and on which our Happinefs depends -, and as Religion 
confids in an Intercourfe between our felves and our 
Maker •, and fo has it's Foundation in God's Nacure and 
-our's, and in the Relation that God and we iiand in to 
each other ; therefore a true Knowledge of both mull 
be needful in Order to true Religion. But the Know- 
ledge of our felves confilts chiefly in right Apprehen- 
fions concerning thofe two chief Faculties ot our Na- 
ture, the Under/} anding and fFilL Both are very impor- 
tant : yet the Science of the latter mull be confefs'd to 
be of greateft Moment •, in as much as all A^ertue and 
Religion have their Seat more immediately in the Will, 
confiding more efpecially in right Ads and Habits of 
this Faculty. And the grand Queftion about the Free- 
dom of the Will, is the main Point that belongs to the 
Science of the Will, l^herefore I fay, the Impor- 
tance of this Subjed greatly demands the Attention ofj 
Chriftiafks, and efpecially of Divines. But as to myi 
Manner of handling the Subjed, I will be far from pre- S 
fiuning to fay, that it is fuch as demands the Attention \ 
of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to : 
own, that in this Matter I depend on the Reader'sC(j«r/<f/5'. i 
But Qnly thus far I may have fome Colour for putting in j 
a Claim ; that if the Reader bedifpofed to pafs his Cen- j 
fere on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently ^j 
heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. | 
However, this is what 1 Would humbly a/k of myReaders ; \ 
together with the Prayers of all fincere Lovers of Truths ■ 
that I may have much of that Spirit which Chrift pro- i 
mifed his Difciples, which guides into ail Truth ; and j 
that the bleffed and powerful Influences of this Spirii^ 
would make Truth vidorious in the World. _1 


■J« 1 »ii » r j i*— ■ — «l»r » I . I ,1 , : iw r' fci m I 

General TABLE 
Oi the CO NT E NTS. 


Wherein are explain'd various Terms and Things belonging to 
the Subject of the enfuing Difcourfe. 

SECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the //-?//, Pag. i,^r. 
SECT. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. 
Pag. 5. 
SECT. III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Nc" 
cejfity^ Impojfibility^ Inability ^ &c. and of Contingence, Pag. 1 3. 
SECT. IV. Of theDirtindionof «^/«r«^/andw2<?r^^/Necei^lty 
and Inability. Pag. 20. 
SECT. V . Concerning the Notion of Liberty^ and of ?n{jral 
Agency, Pago 27. 

P A R T II. 

Wherein it is confidered, Whether there is, or can be any 
fuch Sort of Freecom of Will, as that wherein Arminians 
place the EfTence of the Liberty of all moral Agents ; and 
whether any fuch Thing ever was^ or can be conceived of. 

OECT. I. Shewing the manifeft Incondftence of the Ar7ni^ 
^ nian Notion of Liberty of Will, confifting in the Will's 
[df-determining Power. Pag. 31. 

SECT. II. Several fuppofed Ways of evading the foregoing 
Reafoning confidered. Pag. 35. 

SECT. III. Whether any Event whatfocvci, and VoUttQn 
%\ particular, caci come to pals w' hut a Caujc of it's Exiftence. 

Jr. Pag. 41. 

a ^ Necffj SECl' 

r/5g C O N T E N T S. 

SECT. IV. Whether Volition can arife without aGaufe,thro' 
the A£livity of the Nature of the Soul. Pag. 47. 

SECT. V. Shewing that if the Things alTerted in thefc 
Evafions fhould be fuppofed to be true, they are altogether 
impertinent, and can't help the Caufe of Arminian Liberty ; 
and how this being the State of the Cafe, Arminian Writers are 
obliged to talk inconfiflently. Pag. 51. 

SECT. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things 
which are perfecflly indiffererit^ in the View of theMind. Pag. 55. 

SECT. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will 
conlifting in Indifference. Pag. 63. 

SECT. VIII. Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will, 
as oppofite to all NeceJJtty, Pag. 73. 

SECT. IX. Of the Connexion of the Ads of the mil 
with the Didlates of the Underjlanding. Pag. 76, 

SECT. X, Volition necefianly connedled with the Influ- 
ence of Motives. With particular Obfervation of the great In- 
confiftence of Mr. Chubh''s Affertions and Reafonings, about- 
the Freedom of the Will. Pag. 84 

SECT. XI, The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of^ 
the Volitions of moral Agents. Paa;. 98. 

SECT. XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Vo- . 
litions of moral Agents, inconjiflent with fuch a Contingence of 1 
thole Volitions, as is without all Neceffity. Pag. 117. "^ 

And infers a Neceffity of Volition, as much as an alfolute \ 
Decree. Pag. 122, ] 

SECT. XIII. Whether we fuppofe the Volitions of moral \ 
Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, ^ 
yet they muft be necejfary^ m fuch a Senfe, as to overthrow \ 
Arminian Liberty. Pao". 131. 1 


Wherein is enquired. Whether any fuch Liberty of Will as \ 
Ar?fiinians hold, be ncccfTary to moral Agency, Vertue and ^ 
Vice, Praife and Difpraife, ^c. \ 

CECT. I. God's ?noral Excellency necejfary^ yet veriuous and 1 

^^ Praife-worthy. Pag. 13c. \ 

SECT. IL The A^s of the Will of the human Soul of ^ 

Jesus Christ mccffarily holy^ yet veriuous^ praife-ivorthy^ rezvar- ] 

^'^k\^.^: ^ P^g- 13?- \ 

SECT. III. The QiS&- ' fuch as are ^iven up cfGsd to Sin^ \ 

i. • ' 1 


and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Necejftty and Inahiliff 
to be confident with Blame-worthinefs. Pag. 153, 

SECT. IV. Command^ and Obligation to Obedience^ con- 
Jijient with moral Inability tO obey. Pag. 1 59; 

• SECT. 'V. That iSzWn'/y of Defires and Endeavours, which 
is fiippofed to excufe in the Non-performance of Things in 
themfelves good, particularly confidered. Pag. 170. 

' SECT. VI. Liberty of Indifference^ not only not necejfary to 
Vertue, but utterly inconfiftent with it : and all, either vertuous, 
or vicious Habits and Inclinations^ inconfiftent with Arminian 
Notions of Liberty, and moral Agency. Pag. 178. 

SECT. VII. Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconfiftent 
with all Influence of Motive and Inducement^ in either vertuous 
or vicious Adions. Pag. 185. 


Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafonings of Arminians^ in 
Support and Defence of their Notions of Liberty, moral 
Agency, ^^. and againft the oppofiteDodrine, are confidered. 

OECT. I. The EJfence of the Vertue and Vice of the Difpo- 
^ fitions of the Heart, and A6ts of the Will, lies not in their 
Ca^e^ but their Nature, Pag. 192. 

. Sect. II. The Falfenejs and Inconfiflence of that metaphy- 
fical Notion of ASiion and Agency^ which feems to be generally 
entertain'd by the Defenders of the foremention'd Notions of 
Liberty, moral Agency, ^c. Pag. 198. 

' SECT. III. The Reafons why fome think it contrary to 
common Senfe^ to fuppofeThings which are necejjary^ to be worthy 
of cither Praife or Blame. Pag. 206. 

SECT. IV. It is agreable to common Senfcy and the natural 
Notions of Mankind., to fuppofe moral Necefiity to be confident 
with Praife and Blame, Reward and Punilhment. Pag. 212. 

SECT. V. Concerning thofe0.y.^^wij, That this Scheme of 
NecefTity renders all Means and Endeavours for the avoiding of 
Sin, or the obtaining Vertue and Holinefs, vain and to noPur-. 
pofe ; And that it makesMen no more than meer Machines., in 
Affairs of Morality and Religion. Pag. 220. 

SECT. VI. Concerning that Objefficn againft the Dodrine 
which has been maintain'd,That it agrees with the StoicalDoC' 
%ine of Fate^ and the Opinion of Mr. Hohbes. Pag. 227, 

SECT. VII. Concexning the Neciffity of the diifine Jfill, 
.Pa^. 230. SECT. 


• SECT. VIII. Some further Ohje5lions againft the moral 
Necefjjty of God's Volitions^ confidered. Pag. 239. 

SECT. IX. Concerning that Qbjecilon againft the Do6trine 
which has been maintain'd. That it makes God the Author of 
Sin. ' Pag. 252, 

SECT. X. Concerning Sin's fir ft Entrance into the World, 

Pag. 268. 

SECT. XI. Of a fuppofed Inconfijience of thefe Principles 
with God's moral CharaSier. Pag. 270. 

SECT. XII. Of a fuppofed Tendency of thefe Principles 
to Atheifm^ and Licentioufmfs, Pag. 274. 

SECT. XIII. Concerning that ObjeSiion againft the Rea- 
foaing by which the Cahini/ii cDo^irinQ is fupported, That it is 
metaphyfical and ahjlrufe. Pag. 278, 


X JITHAT Treat?nent this Difcourfe may probably meet with, 

' ^ from fome Perfons. Pag. 285. 

Confequences concerning feveral Cahini/iic Do6lrines ; fuch as 

an univerfal^ decifwe Providence, Pag. 286. \ 

"^ThQ X.ot2i\ Depravity 2ind Corruption of Man* s Nature. Pag. 287. \ 
Efficacious Grace. Pag. 288. { 

An univerfal and abfolute Decree ; and abfolute, eternal, [ 

perfonal Ele5lion. Pag. 28c, 1 

Particular Redemption. Pag. 290. ;i 

Perfeverance of Saints. Pag. 291. '. 

Concerning the Treatment which Cahinifiic Writers and i] 

Divines have met with. Pag. 292. 'i 

The Unhappinefs of the Change lately in many Proteftant I 

Countries. Pag. 293. ij 

The Boldnefs of fome Writers. Ibid. \] 

The cxcdkntfFi/do/n appearing in the holy Scriptures. P.ult;. 


jp<ii# ^ ^i##f#.f #®##'#f###i^«'-*^""-*' 

iilit. r^^fo c^^ fS^ cS% c9Sn cfJfo ^fe ^^j .^^ S^^ Sjt S^h ^fe'$^^; #fe T^ ^k/ 


Wherein are explained and ftated various 
Terms and Things belonging to the Sub- 
jed of the enfuing Difcourfe, 

^r^ *jy* %C^ 

•VBf •^j^ "VB^* 

«VV •W ^JtV* •\A/* "MV* •\A/' WTUt 'W* '\J0^* *^ 'W 

Section I. 
Concerning the Nature of the Will* 

illlim^'^ n^ay polTibly be thought, that there Is na 
^v^^^dj^^^'^^i^ great Need of going about to define or delcribs. 
Sh%^ T d^<^ the Will \ this Word being generally as v/ell 
ll^^ll^ underftood as any other Words we can ule to 
^^lllf 1^ explain it : And fo perhaps it would be, had 
^^P^S'^^^^ not Philofophers, Metaphyikians and Polemic 
Divines brought the Matter into Obfcurity by the Things 
they have faid of it. But fmce it is fo, I think it may be of 
fome Ufe, and will tend to the greater Clcarnefs in the fol- 
lowing Difcourfe, to fay a few Things concerning it. 

And therefore I obferve, that the IVill (without ariy meta- 
phyfical Refining) is plainly, That by which the Mind chufes any 
Thing. The Faculty of the JVill is that Faculty or rower 
or Principle of Mind' by which it is capable oi chufing : AnA(ft 
of the Will is the fame as an A&. of Chujmg or Choice, 

B If 

2 The Nature of the Will Part L 

If any think 'tis a more perfe<5l Definition of the Will, to 
fay, that it is that by which the Soul either chufei or refufes ; 
I am content with it : tho' I think that 'tis enough to fay, It's 
that by which the Soul chufes : For in every A(5t of Will 
"whatfoever, the Mind chufes one Thing rather than another ; 
it chufes fomething rather than the Contrary, or rather than 
the Want or Non-Exiflence of that Thing. So in every A61 
cf Refufal, the Mind chufes the Abfence of the Thing re- 
fufed J The Pofitive and the Negative are fet before the Mind 
for it's Choice, and it chufes the Negative ; and the Mind's 
making it's Choice in that Cafe is properly the A61 of the 
Will : The Will's determining between the two is a volun- 
tary determining ; but that is the fame Thing as making a 
Choice. So that whatever Names we call the A6t of theWill 
by, Chufing^ Refufing^ Approving^ Difapprovtng^ Likings Dijliking^ 
Embracing^ RejeLiing^ Deterfniningy DireSf'tng^ Commanding^ Por^ 
biddings hidming or being averfe^ a being pkafed or dtfpleas' d with i 
all may be reduced to this of Chuftng, For the Soul to adl vo- 
hntarily^ is evermore to ac^ eleiiively. 

Mr. Loch * fays, " TheWill fignifies Nothing but a Power 
** or Ability to prefer or chufe" And in the foregoing Page 
fays, *' The Word Preferring feems bed to exprefs the A6t of 
Volition ;" But adds,that " it does it not precifely ; For (fays 
he) " tho' a Man would prefer Flying to Walking, yet who 
*' can fay he ever wills it f" But the Inftance he mentions 
don't prove that there is any Thing elfe in Willing^ but meerly 
Preferring : For it fhould be confidered what is the next and 
immediate Obje6t of the Will, with refpecft to a Man's 
Walking, or any other external A6tion ; which is not his be- 
ing removed from one Place to another -, on the Earth, or 
thro' the Air ; thefe are remoter Objeds of Preference ; but 
fuch or fuch an immediate Exertion of himfelf. The Thing 
nextly chofen or prefer'd when a Man wills to walk, is not his 
being removed to fuch a Place where he would be, but fuch 
an Exertion and Motion of his Legs and Feet &c. in order to 
it. And his willing fuch an Alteration in his Body in the pre- 
fent Moment, is nothing elfe but his chufmg or preferring 
fuch an Alteration in his Body at fuch a Moment, or his lik- 
ing it better than the Forbearance of it. And God has fo 
made and eftablifti'd the human Nature,the Soul being united 
to a Body in proper State, that the Soul preferring or chufing 
fuch an immediate Exertion or Alteration of the Body, fuch 
an Alteration inftantaneoufly follows. There is nothing elfe 


^ Human Underftandirg. F.dit. 7. Vol. LP. 1974 

Se<a. I. The Nature of th£ Will 3 

in the A<5llngs of my Mind, that I am confcious of while I 
walk, but only my preferring or chufmg, thro' fucceffive Mo- 
ments, that there fhould be fuch Alterations of my external 
Senfations and Motions ; together with a concurring habitual 
Expectation that it will be fo ; having ever found by Experi- 
ence, that on fuch an immediate Preference, fuch Senfations 
andMotions do adually inftantaneouny,& conftantly arife. But 
it is not fo in the Cafe of Flying : Tho' a Man may be faid 
remotely to chufe or prefer 1* lying ; yet he don't chufe or pre- 
fer, incline to or defire, under Circumftances in View, any- 
immediate Exertion of the Members of his Body in order to 
it ; becaufe he has no Expedation that he fliould obtain the 
defired End by any fuch Exertion ; and he don't prefer or in- 
cline to any bodily Exertion or Effort under this apprehended 
Circumftance,of it's being wholly in vain. So that if we care- 
fully diftinguifh the proper Objeds of the feveral Ads of the 
Will, it will not appear by this, and fuch-like Inftances, that 
there is any Difference between Volition and Preference ; or that 
a Man's chufmg, liking befl, or being beft pleafed with a 
Thing, are not the fame with his willing that Thing ; as they 
feem to be according to thofe general and more natural Noti- 
ons of Men, according to which Language is formed. Thus 
an A(5t of the Will is commonly exprefs'd by it'spleaftngaMan 
to do thus or thus ; and a Man's doing as he wills^ and doing 
"as he pleafesy are the fame Thing in common Speech. 

Mr. Locke fays, f " TheWill is perfecSlly diftinguifh'd from 
*' Defire ; which in the very fame Action may have a quite 
•' contrary Tendency from that which our Wills ht us uporu 
*' A Man (fays he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to 
*' ufe Perfwafions to another, which, at the fame Time I am 
" fpeaking, I may wilh may not prevail on him. In this 
" Cafe 'tis plain the Will and Defire run counter." I don't 
fuppofe, that JVill and Defire are Words of precifely the fame 
Signification; /iF/7/feems to be aWord of a more generalSigni- 
fication, extending to Things prefcnt and abfent, Defirs rc- 
fpeds fomething abfent. I may prefer my prefent Situation 
and Poflure, fuppofe fitting flill, or having my Eyes open, 
and fo may will it. But yet I can't think they are fo 
entirely diflinct, that they can ever be properly faid to rua 
counter. A Man never, in any Inftance, wills any Thing 
contrary to his Defires, or defires any Thing contrar)^ to his 
Will. The foremention'd Inflance, which Mr. Locke pro- 
duces, don't prove that he ever .does. He may, on fomeCon- 
^deration or other, will to utter Speeches which have a T'ea- 
B 2 deucy 

f HaiB. Und, Vo!. L F. 205, 204,,. 

4 the Nature oftSeW^. Part I. 

dency to perfwade ancFther, and ftill may defire that they may 
not perfwade him : But yet his Will and Defire don't run 
counter at all : The Thing which he wills, the very fame he 
defires ; and he don't will a Thing, and defire the contrary' 
in any Particular. In this Inftance, it is not carefully obferv- 
ed, what is the Thing will'd, and what is the Thing defired : 
If it were, it would be found that Will and Defire don't clalh 
in the leaft. T]ie Thing will'd on fome Confideration, is to 
utter fueh Words ; and certainly, the fame Confideration fo 
influences him, that he don't defire the contrary \ all Things 
confidered, he chufes to utter fuch Words, and don't defire 
not to utter 'em. And fo as to the Thing which Mr. Locke 
fpeaks of as defired, viz. that the Words, tho' They tend to 
perfwade, fhould not be efte<ftual to that End, his Will is 
not contrary to this ; he don't will that they fhould be efFed- 
ual, but rather wills that they fhould not, as he defires. In 
order to prove that the Will and Defire may run counter, it 
fhould be fhown that they may be contrary one to the other 
in the fame Thing, or v^'ith refpe6l to the very fame Objed of 
Will or Defire : But here the Objedls are two ; and in each, 
taken by themfelves, the Will and Defire agree. And 'tis no 
Wonder that they fhould not agree in different Things, how- 
ever little diftinguifhed they are in their Nature. The Will 
may not agree with the W^ill, nor Defire agree with Defire, in 
different Things. As in this very Inftance which yix,- Locke 
mentions, a Perfon may, on fome Confideration, defire to ufe 
Perfwalions, and at the fame Time may defire they may 
not pn^vail ; But yet no Body will fay, that Defire runs coun- 
ter to Defire ; or that this proves that Defire is perfectly a " 
diflin6t Thing from Defire.—— The like might be obfervecl of 
the other Inftance Mr. Locke produces, of a Man's defiring tci 
be eafed of Pain &c. 

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether Defire and 
W'lU^ and whether Preference and Volition be precifely the fame 
Things or no ; yet, I truft it will be allowed by all, that in 
every A6t of Will there is an A61 of Choice ; that In 
every Volition there is a *Preference,or a prevailing Inclination 
of the Soul, whereby the Soul, at that Inftant, is out of a 
State of perfect Indifference, with refped to the direct Object 
of the Volition. So that in every Acf , or going forth of the 
Will, there is fomePreponderation of the Mind or Inclination, 
one Way rather than another ; and the Soul had rather have 
or do one Thing than another, or than not to have or do that 
Thing ; and that there, where there is -abfolutely no prefer- 
ring or chuilng, but a perfed continuing Equilibrium, therein 
uo Volition. 


Se<a.II. Of the Determination of the Will. 5 

Section II. 
Concerning the Determination of the WilL 

T^ determining the IViU^ if the Phrafe be ufed with any Mean-. 
*-^ ing, mull be ivXtx^^t^^caufing that the A£i of theWill or Choice 
Jhould be thus, and not otherwife : And the Will is faid to be de- 
termined, when, in Conlequence of feme Adion, or Influence, 
its Choice is d^fecSted to, and fix'd upon a particular Objecft. 
As when we fpeak of the Determination of Motion, we mean 
cauiing the Motion of the Body to be fuch a Way, or in fuch 
a Diredion, rather than another. 

To talk of the Determination of the Will, fuppofes an 
EfFed, which muft have a Caufe. If theWill be determined, 
there is a Determiner. This mud be fuppofed to be intend- 
ed even by them that fay, theWill determmes itfelf. If it be 
fo, the Will is both Determiner & determined ; it is a Caufe 
that ads and produces Effeds upon it feif, and is the Objed 
of its own Influence and Adion. 

With refped to that grand Enquiry, IFhat determmes th$ 
IVill, it would be very tedious and utineceilary at prefent to 
enumerate and examine all the various Opinions, which have 
been advanced concerning this Matter ; nor is it needful that 
I ihould enter into a particular Difquifition of all Points deba- 
ted in Difputes on that Quefl:ion, Whether the Will always fol^ 
lozvs the laji Dilate of the Underjlanding, It is fuflicient to my 
prefent Purpofe to fay, — - It is that Motive, zvhich, as it ftands 
in the View of the Mind, is thejirongejl, that determims the Will: — 
But it may be neceffary that I (hould a little explain my 
Meaning in this. 

By Motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites 
or invites the Mind to Volition, whether that be one Thing 
fmgly, or many Things conjundly. Many particular Things 
may concur and unite their Strength to induce the Mind ; 
•and when it is fo, all together are as it were one complex 
Motive. And when I fpeak of the Jirongeft Motive, I have 
Refped to the Strength of the whole that operates to induce 
to a particular Ad of Volition, whether that be the Strength 
of one Thing alone, or of many together. 

-^ I What- 

6 What determines the Will Part I. 

Whatever is a Motive, in this Senfe,muft be fomething that 
is extant in the View or Apprehenfton of the Vnderjianding^ or per- 
ceiving Faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the Mind to 
will or a(5t any Thing, any further than it is perceived, or is 
feme Way or other in the Mind's view ; for what is wholly 
unperceived, and perfe<5tly out of the Mind's view,can't afFea 
the Mind at all. 'Tis moft evident, that nothing is in the 
Mind, or reaches it, or takes any Hold of it, any otherwifc 
than as it is perceiv'd or tho't of. 

And I think it muft alfo be allowed by all, that every Thing 
that is properly called a Motive, Excitement €r Inducement 
to a perceiving willmg Agent, has fome Sort and Degree of 
Tendency y or Advaniuge to move or excite the Will, previous to 
the Effect, or to the A6t of the Will excited. This previous 
Tendency of the Motive is what I call the Strength of the Mo- 
tive, That Motive which has a lefs Degree of previous Ad- 
vantage or Tendency to move the Will, or that appears lefs 
inviting, as it ftands in the View of the Mind, is what I call 
a weaker Motive. On the contrary, that which appears moft 
inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the Un- 
derftanding or Apprehenfion, the greateft Degree of previous 
Tendency to excite and induce the Choice, is what I call the 
Jirotigejl Motive. And in this Senfe, I fuppofe the Will is al- 
ways determined by the ftrongeft Motive. 

Things, that exift in the* View of the Mind, have their 
Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, 
from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Cir- 
cumftances of the T^hing view'd^ the Nature and Circumftances 
of the Mind that viewsy and the Degree &Manner of its Fieiu ; 
which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect Enumeration 
of. But fo much I think may be determin'd in general,with- 
out Room for Controverfy, that whatever is percei|^d or ap- 
prehended by an intelligent & voluntary Agent, which has the 
Nature and Influence of a Motive to Vplitipn or Choice, is 
confider'd or view'd as good ; nor has it any Tendency to in- 
vite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree 
than it appears fuch. For to fay otherwife, would be to fay, 
th'dt Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance 
they make, to engage the Mind to ele6t them, fome other 
Way than by their appearing eligible to it ; which is ab- 
furd. And therefore it muft be true, in fome Senfe, that the 
^il/ always is as the greate/? apparent Good is. But only, for the 
right underftanding of this, two Things muft be well and 
di^linctly obferved, 

I. It 

Se<a. IL What determines the Will 7 

I. It muft be obferved in what Senfe lufe the Term Goodi 
tiamcly, as of the fame Import with Agreahle. To appear 
good to the Mind, as I ufe the Phrafe, is the fame as to appear 
agreahle^ or feem pkafing to the Mind. Certainly, nothing ap- 
pears inviting and eUgible to the Mind, or tending to engage 
il's Ire ination and Choice, confidered 2iS evil or difagreabk i 
nor indeed, as 'indifferent^ and neither agreable nor difagrea- 
ble. But if it tends to draw the Inchnation, and move the 
Will, it muft be under the Notion of that which /tt//i the 
Mind. And therefore that muft have the greateft 1 endency 
to attrad and engage it, which, as it ftands in the Mind's 
View, fuits it beft, and pleafes it moft ; and in that Senfe, is 
the greateft apparent Good : to fay otherwife, is little, if any 
Thing, fhort of a dire6l and plain Contradidion. 
■ ■ The Word Good^ in this Senfe, includes in its Signification, 
the Removal or Avoiding of Evil, or of that which is difa- 
greab.'e & uneafy. 'Tis agreable and pleafmg, to avoid what 
is difagreable and difpleafing, and to have Uneafinefs remo- 
ved. So that here is iacluded what Mr. Lpcke fuppofes deter- 
mines the Will. For when he fpeaks of Uneaiinefs as de- 
termining the Will, he muft be underftood as fuppofing that 
the End or Aim which governs in the Volition orA6t of Prefe- 
rencCjis the Avoiding or Removal of that Uneafinefs ; and that 
is the fame Thing as chufing and feeking what is more eafy 
and -agreable. 

2. When I fay, the Will i« as the greateft apparent Good 
is, or (as I have explain'd it) that Volition has always for its 
Objcd: the Thing which appears moft agreable ; it muft be 
carefully obferved, to avoid Confufion and needlefs ObjecStion, 
that I fpeak of the dire^ and immediaU Obje6l of the A6t of 
Volition ; and not fome Objedl that the A6t of Will has not 
an immediate, but only an indire6t and remote Refpe<5t to. 
Many Ads of Volition have fome remote Relation to an Ob- 
je6t, that is different from the Thing moft immediately wiird 
and chofen. Thus, when a Drunkard has his Liquor before 
him, h he has to chufe whether to drink it,or no ; the proper 
and immediate Objeds, about which his prefent Volition is 
converfant, and between which his Choice now decides, are 
his own Ads, in drinking the Liquor, or letting it alone ; and 
this will certainly be done according to what, in the prefent 
View of his Mind, taken in the whole of it, is moft agreable 
to him. If he chufes or wills to drink it, and not to let it 
alone ; then this Adion, as it ftands in the View of 
his Mind, with all that belongs to its Appearance there, is 
more agreable and pkafing than letting it alone. 

B^4. But 

8 What determines the WilL Part I. 

But the Objecls to which this Aft of Volition may relate 
more remotely, and between which his Choice may determine 
more indire6tly, are the prefent Pleafure the Man expe6ts by 
drinking, and the future Mifery which he judges will be the 
Confequence of it : He may judge that this future Mifery, 
when it comes, will be more difagreable and unpleafant, than 
refraining frorn drinking now would be. Byt thefe two 
Things are not the properObjeds that theAdl of Volition fpo- 
ken of is nextly converfant about. For the A^ of Will fpo- 
ken of is concerning prefent Drinking or Forbearing to drink. 
\i he wills to 4nnk, then Drinking is the proper Objedt of the 
Act of hisWill J and drinking, on fomeAccount or other, now 
appears moft agreable to him, & fuits him beft. If he chufes 
to refrain, then Refraining is the immediate Obje6t of his 
Will, and is mofi: pleafing to him. If in the Choice he 
makes in the Cafe, he prefers a prefent Pleafure to a future 
Advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes } 
then a leffer prefent Pleafure appears more agreable to hini 
than a greater Advantage at a Diftance. If on the contrary a 
future Advantage is prefer'd, then that appears moft agreable, 
and fuits him beft. And fo ftill the prefent Volition is as 
the greateft apparent Good at prefent is, 

I have rather chofen to exprefs my felf thus, that the JPlli 
always is as the greatcji apparent Good^ or as what appears moft a- 
greahk^ is^ than to f.iy that the Will is determined by the greateft 
apparent Good, or by what feems moft agreable ; becaufe 
an appearing moft agreable or pleafmg to the Mind, and the 
Mind's preferring and chufmg, feem hardly to be properly 
^nd perfc6tly diftind:. If ftri6t Propriety of Speech be inlifted 
on, it may more properly be faid, that tlje voluntary 
Miion which is the immediate Confequence and Fruit of 
the Alind's Volition or Choice, is 4eter7nined by that which 
appears moft agreable, than the Preference or Choice it felf ; 
t>ut that the A6t: of Volition it {t\i is always determin'd by 
that in or about the Mind's View of the Object, which caufes 
it to appear moft agreable. I fay, in or about the Mi?-id's View 
of the Obje6t, becaufe what has Influence to render an Objedt 
in View agreable, is not only what appears in the Objedl | 
view'd» h\i\. ^\{o the Manner oi the View, and the State and ' 
Circumftances of the Mind that views.— Particularly to enume- ' 
rate all Things pertaining to theMind'sView of theObjecSts of 
Volition, which have Influence in their appearing agreable to 
the Mind, would be a Matter of no fmall Difficulty, and ! 
might require a Treatife by it felf, and is not neceflary to my 
prefent Purpofe. I ftiall therefore only mentioa fome Things ., 
ijfi general, L Oni' 

Seft.II. What determines the Will. . 9 

I, One Thing that makes an Obje6t propofed to Choice 
agreable, is the apparent Nature and Circumjiayices of the Ohje^^ 
And there are various Things of this Sort, that have an Hand 
in rendring the Obje<5l more or lefs agreable ; as, 

I. That which appears in the Objed, which renders it 
'lieautiful and pleafant, or deformed and irkfom to the Mind^; 
viewing it as it is in it felf 

I 2. The apparent Degree of Pleafure or Trouble attending 
the Objedt, or the Confequence of it. Such Concomitants and 
Confequents being view'd as Circumftances of the Obje6t, are 
to be confidered as belonging to it, and as it were Parts of it; 
as it ftands in the Mind's View, as a propofed Obje6t of 

3. The apparent State of the Pleafure or Trouble that ap- 
pears, with Refpe6t to Dijlance of Time ; being either nearer 
or farther off. 'Tis a Thing in it felf agreable to the Mind, 
to have Pleafure fpeedily ; and difagreable, to liave it delayed : 
So that if there be two equal Degrees of Pleafure fet in the 
Mind's View, and all other Things are equal, but only one 
is beheld as near, and the other far off ; the nearer will ap- 
pear moft agreable, and fo will be chofen. Becaufe, tho' the 
Agreablenefs of the Objedls be exa6tly equal, as view'd in 
Themfelves, yet not as view'd in their Circumftances ; one 
of them having the additional Agreablenefs of the Circum- 
ilance of Nearnefs. 

II. Another Thing that contributes to the Agreablenefs of 
an Object of Choice, as it ftands in the Mind's View, is the 
Manner of the View, If the Obje6l be fomething which ap- 
pears connecfted with future Pleafure, not only will the Degree 
of apparent Pleafure have Influence, but alfo the Manner of 
the View, efpecially in two Refpecfts. 

1 . With refpe6l to the Degree of Judgment^ or Firmnefs 
of Affent^ v^ith which the Mind judges the Pleafure to be fu- 
ture. Becaufe it is more agreable to have a certain Happinefs, 
than an uncertain one ; and a Pleafure view'd as more proba- 
ble, all other Things being equal, is more agreable to the 
Mind, than that which is view'd as lefs probable. 

2. With refpe6l to the Degree of the Idea of the future 
Pleafure. With Regard to Things which are the SubjeA of 
our Thoughts, either paft, prefent or future, we have much 
more of an Idea or Apprehenfion of fomeThings than others ; 
that is, our Idea is much more clear, lively and ftrong.- 
Thus, the Ideas we have of fenfible Things by immediate 
Senfation, are ufually much more lively than thofe we have 
by meer Imagination, or by Contemplation of them when ab- 


lo What determines ty^^ Will. Part I. 

fent. My Idea of the Sun, when I look upon it, is more 
vivid, than when I-only think of it. Our Idea of the fweet 
Rehfh of a dehcious Fruit is ufually ftronger when we tafte it, 
than when we only imagine it. And fometimes,the Ideas we 
haveof Things byContempIation,are much ftronger & clearer, 
than at other Times. Thus, a Man at one Time has a 
muchftronger Idea of the Pleafure which is to be enjoyed in 
mating fome Sort of Food that he loves,than at another. Now 
the Degree, or Strength of the Idea or Senfe that Men have 
of future Good or Evil, is one Thing that has great Influ- 
ence on their Minds to excite Choice or Volition. When of 
two Kinds of future Pleafure, which the Mind confiders of, 
and are prefented for Choice, both are fuppofed exa6tly equal 
^ the Judgment, and both equally certain, and all other 
Things are equal, but only one of them is what the Mind 
has a far more lively Senfe of, than of the other ; this has the 
greateft Advantage by far to aiFect and attradl: tlie Mind, and 
move theV/ill. HTis now more agreable to the Mi»d, to take 
the Pleafure it has a ftrong and lively Senfe of, than that 
which it has only a faint Idea of. The View of the former 
is attended with the ftrongeft Appetite, and the greateft Unea- 
finefs attends the Want of it ; and 'tis agreable to the Mind, 
to have Uneafuiefs removed, and it's Appetite gratified. And 
if feveral future Enjoyments are prefented together, as Com- 
petitors for the Choice of the Mind, fome of them judged to 
be greater, and others lefs ; the Mind alfo having a greater 
Senfe and more lively Idea of the Good of fome of them, and 
of others a lefs ; and fome are viewM as of greater Certainty 
or Probability than others ; and thofe Enjoyments that appear 
moft agreable in one of thefe Refpeds, appears leaft fo in 
others : In this Cafe, all other Things being equal, the A- 
greablenefs of a propofed Objedlof Choice will be in a De- 
gree fome Way compounded of the Degree of Good fuppofed 
by the Judgment, the Degree of apparent Probability or Cer- 
tainty of that Good, and the Degree of the View or Senfe, or 
Livelinefs of the Idea the Mind has, of that Good ; becaufe 
all together concur to conftitute the Degree in which the Ob- 
je(5l appears at prefent agreable ; and accordingly Volition 
will be determined. 

^ I might further obferv^e, the State of the Mind that 
views a propofed Objeift of Choice, is another Thing that 
contributes to the Agreablenefs or Difagreablenefs of that 
Object ; the particular Temper which the Mind has by Na- 
ture, or that has been introduced and eftablilhed by Educa- 
idon, Example, Cuftom, or fome other Means 3 or theFrame 


Sed. li. What determines the WilL 1 1 

or State that the Mind is in on a particular Occafion. 
That Object which appears agreable to one, does not fo to 
another. And the fame Object don't always appear alike agre* 
able to the fame Perfon, at different Times. It is moft a- 
greable to fome Men, to follow their Reafon ; and to others, 
to follow their Appetites : To fome Men, it is more agreable 
to deny a vicious Inclination, than to gratify it ; Others it 
fuits bcft to gratify the vileft Appetites. 'Tis more difagrea- 
bJe to fome Men than others, to counter-a6t a former Refo- 
Jution. In thefe Refpe<5ts, and many others which might be 
mention'd, different Things will be moft agreable to different 
Perfons ; and not only fo, but to the fame Perfons at diffe- 
rent Times. 

But pofTibly 'tis needlefs and improper, to mention the 
Frame and State of the Mind, as a diftin^ Ground of the 
Agreablenefs of Objeds from the other two mentioned be- 
fore ; 'z;/z. The apparent Nature and Circumftances of the 
Objeds view'd, 'and the .Manner of the View : Perhaps if 
we ftri6tly confider the Matter, the different Temper and 
State of the Mind makes no Alteration as to the Agreable- 
nefs of Objects, any other Way, than as it makes the Ob- 
jedts themfelves appear differently beautiful or deformed, 
having apparent Pleafure or Pain attending them ; And as it 
occalions the Manner of the View to be different, caufes the 
Idea of Beauty or Deformity, Pleafure or Uneafmefs to be 
more or lefs lively. 

However, I think fo much is certain, that Volition, In no 
one Inftance that can be mentioned, is otherwife than the 
greateft apparent Good is, in the Manner which has been 
explained. The Choice of the Mind never departs from that 
which, at that Time, and with Refpedl to the dired: and 
immediate Objeds of that Decifion of the Mind, appears 
moft agreable and pleafmg, all Things confidered. If the im- 
mediate Objedts of the Will are a Man's own A6lions, then 
thofe Anions which appear moft agreable to him he wills. If 
it be now moft agreable to him, all Things conridered,to walk, 
then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of 
what at prefent appears to him,moft agreable to fpeak, then he 
choofes to fpeak : If it fuits him beft to keep Silence, then 
he choofes to keep Silence. There is fcarcely a plainer 
and more univerfal Didate of the Senfe and Experience of 
Mankind, than that, when Men acSl voluntarily, and do what 
they pleafe, then they do what fuits them beft, or what is 
Cjoft agrmhk to them. To fay, that they do what they pleafe, 


1 2 What determines the Will Part I. 

or what pleafes them, , but yet don't do what is agreahh to 
them, is the fame Thing as to fay, they do what they pleafej 
but don't adl their Pleafure ; and that is to fay, that they, 
do what they pleafe, and yet don't do. what they pleafe. 

It appears from thefe Things, that in fome Senfe, the WtU> 
always follows the loft Diclate ef th^ Under/landing. But then the; 
Underjianding muftbe taken in a large Senfe, as including the 
whole Faculty of Perception or Apprehenfion, and not meerly 
what is called Re af on ox Judgment. If by the Dictate of the; 
Underftanding is meant what Rcafon declares to be beft or 
moft for the Perfon^'s Happinefs, taking in the whole of his 
Duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the laft 
Di(5late of the Underftanding. Such a Dictate of Reafon is 
quite a different Matter from Things appearing now moft 
agreahle ; all Things being put together which pertain to 
the Mind's prefent Perceptions, Apprehenfions or Ideas, in 
any Refpect. Altho' that Didate of Reafon, when it takes 
Place, is one Thing that is put into the Scales, and is to be 
confidered as a Thing that has Concern in the compound In- 
fluence which moves & induces the Will ; and is one Thing 
that is to be confidered in eftimating the Degree of that Ap- 
pearance of Good which the Will always follows ; either as 
having its Influence added to other Things, or fubduded 
from them. When it concurs with other Things, then its 
Weight is added to them, as put into the fame Scale j but 
when it is againft them, it is as a Weight in the oppofite 
Scale, where it refifts the Influence of other Things : yet 
it's Refiftance is often overcome by their greater Weight,and 
fo the Ad of the Will is determined in Oppofition to it. 

The Things which I have faid may, I hope, ferve, in fome 
Meafure, to illuftrate and confirm the Pofition I laid down 
in the Beginning of this Sedion, viz. That the IVill is always 
determined by thejlrongeji Motive^ or by that View of the Mind 
which has the greateft Degree of previous Tendency to ex- 
cite Volition. But whether I have been fo happy as rightly 
to explain theThing wherein conlifts the Strength of Motives, 
or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the Pofition 
it felf 5 which carries much of its own Evidence with it, and 
is the Thing of chief Importance to the Purpofe of the en- 
fuing Difcourfe : And the Truth of it, I hope, will appear 
•with greater Clearnefs, before I have flnifhed what I have to 
fay on the Subjed of human Liberty. ^ # 


Sed. III. The Nature of Neceffity. 1 3 

Section III. 

Concer?ting the Meaning of the Tenns Ne- 
ceffity, Impoffibility^ Inability, &c ; and 
^Contingence. . ^ ^^ - -^ 

THE Words iy^-f^ry, Lnpoffihle he. arc abundantly ufed 
in Controverfies about Free-will and moral Agency ; 
and therefore the Senfe in which they are ufed, Ihould 
be clearly underftood. 

Here I might fay, that a Thing is then faid to, be necejjaryy 
when it mull be, and cannot be otherwife. . But this would 
not properly be a Deiinition of NeceiTit)', or an Explana- 
tion of the Word, any more than if I explain'd the Word 
nmji^ by there being a Neceffity. The Words mujiy can^ 
and cannot^ need Explication as m.uch as the Words neceffary^ 
and unpojfihle -, excepting that the former are Words that 
Children commonly ufe, and know fomething of the Mean- 
ing; of earlier than the latter. 


The Word yieceffary^ as ufed in common Speech, is a rela- 
tive Term ; and relates to fome fuppofed Oppofition made 
to the Exiftence of the Thing fpoken of, which is overcome, 
or proves in vain to, hinder or alter it. That is neceffary, ia 
the original and proper Senfe of the Word, which is, or will 
be, notwithftanding all fuppofable Oppofition. To fay, that 
a Thing is neceffary, is the fame Thing as to fay, that it is 
impoITible ihould not be : But the Word impojfible is mani- 
feftly a relative Term, and has Reference to fuppofed Power 
exerted to bring a Thing to pais, which is infufficient for the 
Effea ; As the Word utiable is relative, and has Relation to 
Ability or Endeavour which is infufficient ; and as the 
Word Irrefifiahle is relative, and has always Reference to 
Refiftance which is made, or may be made to fome Force 
or Power tending to an Eflfe6t, and is infufficient to withftand 
the Power, or hinder the EfFecl. The common Notion oi^ 
Neceffity and Impoffibility implies fomething that fruftrates 
Endeavour or Deiirc, 


14 7^^ Nature Part L 

Here feveral Things are to be noted. 

1. Things arefaid to be neceflary in general^ which are or 
will be notwithftanding any fuppofable Oppofition from us or 
othersy or from whatever Quarter. But Things are faid to be 
neceflaiy to us, which are or will be notwithftanding all Op- 
pofition fuppofable in the Cafe from us. The fame may be 
obferved of the Word impofftble^ and other fuch like Terms. 

2. Thefe Terms necejfary, impojfible, irrefijiihle Sec, do efpeci- 
ally belong to the Controverfy about Liberty and moral A- 
gency, as ufed in the latter of the two Senfes now mention'd, 
viz. as neceffary or impoffible to us, and with Relation to any 
fuppofable Oppofition or Endeavour of ours. 

3. As the Word Necejftty, in it's vulgar and common Ufe, 
is relative, and has always Reference to fome fuppofable in- 
fufficient Oppofition ; fo when we fpeak of any Thing as ne- 
ceffary to us, it is with Relation to fome fuppofable Oppofition 
of our TVills, or fome voluntary Exertion or Effort of ours to 
the contrary. For we don't properly make Oppofition to 
an Event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily oppofe it. 
Things are faid to be what mujl be, or necejfarily are, as to us, 
^htn they are, or will be, tho' we defire or endeavour the 
contrary, or try to prevent or remove their Exiftence : But 
fuch Oppofition of ours always either confifts in, or implies 
Oppofition of our Wills. 

^Tis manifeft that all fuchlike Words & Phrafes, as vulgarly 
ufed, are ufed and accepted in this Manner. A Thing is 
faid to be neceffary, when we can't help it, let us do what we 
will. So any Thing is faid to be impoffible to us, when we 
would do it, or would have it brought to pafs, and endea- 
vour it ; or at leaft may be fuppofed to defire and feek it ; 
but all our Defires and Endeavours are, or would be vain. 
And that is faid to be irrefiflibk, which overcomes all our 
Oppofition, Refiftance, and Endeavour to the contrary. And 
we are to be faid Unable to do a Thing, when our fuppofable 
Defires and Endeavours to do it are infufficient. 

We are accuftomed, in the common Ufe of Language, to 
apply & underftand thefe Phrafes in this Senfe : We grow up 
t^ith fuch a Habit j which by the daily Ufe of thefe Terms, 
in fuch a Senfe, from our Childhood, becomes fix'd and 
fettled } fo that the Idea of a Relation to a fuppofed W^iil, 
Defire and Endeavour of ours, is ftrongly conne<5ted with 


SedJII. r/'Neceflity. 15 

thefe Terms, and naturally excited in our Minds, whenever 
we hear the Words ufed. Such Ideas, and thefe Words> are 
fo united and aflbciated, that they unavoidably go together ; 
one fuggefts the other, and carries the other with it, and ne-- 
ver can be feparated as long as we live. And if we ufe the 
Words, as Terms of Art, in another Senfe, yet, unlefs we 
are exceeding circumfpe6t and wary, we fhall infenfibly flide 
into the vulgar Ufe of them, and fo apply the Words in a very 
inconfiftent Manner : this habitual Connexion of Ideas will 
deceive & confound us in ourReafonings & DifcourfeSjwhere- 
in we pretend to ufe thefe Terms in that Manner, as Terms 
of Art. 

4. It follows from what has been obferved, that when thefe 
Terms neceffary^ impojfible^ irreJi/Uhle^ imahle kc. are ufed in 
Cafes wherein no Oppofition, or infufficient Will or Endea- 
vour, is fuppofed, or can be fuppofed, but the very Nature of 
the fuppofed Cafe it felf excludes and denies any fuch Oppofi- 
tion,Will orEndeavour ; thefeTerms are then not ufed in their 
proper Signification, but quite befide their Ufe in common 
Speech. The Heafon is m.anifeft ; namely, that in fuch 
Cafes, we can't ufe the Words with Reference to a fuppofa- 
ble Oppofition, Will or Endeavour. And therefore if any 
Man ufes thefe Terms in fuch Cafes, he either ufes them 
nonfenfically, or in fome new Senfe, diverfe from their ori- 
ginal and proper Meaning. As for Inftance ; If a Man fhould 
affirm after this Manner, That it is neceffary for a Man, and 
what muft be, that a Man fliould chufe Virtue rather than 
Vice, during the Time that he prefers Virtue to Vice 5 and 
that it is a Thing impoffible and irrefiftablc, that it fliouid be 
otherwife than that he fhould have this Choice, fo long as this 
Choice continues ; fuch a Man would ufe thefe Terms mu/^p 
irrejijiible Sec. v/ith perfe<5t Infignificence and Nonfenfe, or in 
fome new Senfe, diverfe from their common Ufe ; which is 
with Reference, as has been obferved, to fuppofable Oppo- 
fition, Unwiilingnefs and Refiftance ; whereas, here, the very 
Suppofition excludes and denies any fuch Thing ; for the 
Cafe fuppofed is that of being willing, and chufmg. 

5. It appears from what has been faid, that thefe Terms 
necejfary^ hnpoffihk &c. are often ufed by Philofophers^ and Me- 
taphyficians in a Senfe quite diverfe from their common Ufe 
and original Signification : For they apply them to many 
Cafes in which no Oppofition is fuppofed or fuppofable. Thus 
they ufe them with Refpedl to God's Exiftence before tha 
Creation of the World, when there was- no pther Being but 


'1 6 The Nature ■ Part L 

He : fo with regard to many of the Difpofitlons and A<5ls oif 
-the divine Being, fuch as his loving Himfelf, his loving 
•Righteoufners, hating Sin &c. So they apply thefe Terms to 
many Calcs ot the Inclinations and Adions of created intel- 
ligent Beings, Angels and Men \ wherein all Oppofition of 
the Will is fliut out and denied, in the very Suppofition of 
the Caie. • 

MefapJjyfical or Philofophkal NecefTity is nothing different 
from their Certainty. I fpeak not now of the Certainty of 
Knowledge, but the Certainty that is in Things themfelves, 
which is the Foundation of the Certainty of the Knowledge 
of them ; or that wherein lies the Ground of the Infallibility 
of the Proportion which affirms them. 

What is fometimes given as the Definition of Philofophical 
NecelTity, namely. That by which a Thing cannot but be, or whereby 
it cajinot be otherwifey fails of being a proper Explanation of it, 
on two Accounts : i^fV/?, the Words Ca?2, or Cannot, need 
Explanation as much as the Word Necejjity ; and the former 
may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the 
former. Thus, if any one afked us what we mean, when we 
fay, a Thing cannot but be, we might explain our felves by fay- 
ing, we mean, it muft neceffarily be fo ; as well as explain 
Neceirity,by faying,it is that by which aThing cannot but be. 
And Secondly, this Definition is liable to the fore-mention'd 
great Inconvenience : The Words cannot, or unable, are pro- 
perly relative, and have Relation to Power exerted, or that 
may be exerted,in order to the Thing Ipoken of; to which,as 
I have now obferved, the Word Necejjity, as ufed by Philofo- 
phers, has no Reference. 

Philofophical Neceffity is really Nothing elfe than the full 
and fix'd Connexion between the Things iignified "hy the 
^ubje(^ ^TPredicate of a Propofi tion» which affirms Something 
jo he true. TVlien there" is luch a Connediou,then theThing 
affirmed in the Propofition is neceiTary, in a Philofophical 
Senfe ; whether any Oppofition, or contrary Effort be fup- 
pofed, or fuppofable in the Cafe, or no. When the Subject 
and Predicate of the Propofition, which affirms the Exiftence 
of any Thing, either SublIance,Quality, A(5t or Circumftance, 
have a full and certain Connexion, then the Exiftence ot 
Being of that Thing is faid to be neceffary in a metaphyfical 
Senfe. And in this Senfe I ufe the Word Necejjity, in the fol- 
lowing Difcourfe, when I endeavour to prove that Neceffity is 
not iiiconjj/ifnt with Liberty, 


Sea.IJI. of Neceffity. 17 

The Subje6t and Predicate of a Pfopofitioa, which affirms 
Exiftence of Something, may have a full, iixd, and certain 
Connection fever al Ways. 

(i.) They may have a full and perfe^ CdnnecStidn m and 
sfthemfehjes j becaufe it may imply a Contradiaion, or grofs 
Abfurdity, to fuppofe them not conneded. Thus many 
Things are neceffary in their owti Nature. So the eternal 
Exiftence of Being generally confidered, is necefTary In itfilf: 
becaufe it would be in it felf the gfeareft Abfurdity, to deny 
the Exiftence of Being in general, or to fay there was abfo- 
lute and univerfal Nothing ; and is, as it were the Sum of all 
Contradiaions ; as might be ftieWn, if this were a proper 
Place for it. So God's Infinity, and other Attributes are 
riecefiary. So it is necefiary in its otvn Nature, that two and 
two fliould be four ; and it is neceffary, that all fight Linej 
drawn from the Center of a . Circle" to the Circumference 
ft-.ould be equal. It isneceffaryj fit andfuitable, that Meri, 
(hould do to others, as they would 'thlt they iliouid do to 
them. So innumerable Metaphyfical and Mathematical 
Truths are neceffary in Themfdves j'The Subj eft and Predicate 
of the Propofition w hich affirms theiii, are perfqdly conneacd 
cfthe?nj elves, ' " ' ' ': 

(2.) The Connedion of the Subje(5l and Predicate of ai 
Proportion, which affirms the Exiftence of Something, may 
be tix'd and made certain, becaufe the Exiftence of that 
Thing is already come to pafs ; and either now^ is, or has 
been ; and To has as it were made fure of Exiftence. And 
therefore, the Propofition which affirms prefent and paft Ex- 
iftence of it, may by this Meaiis be mlde certain, and ne- 
ceffirily and unalterably true ; the paft Event 'has fix'd and 
decided the Matter, as to it's Exiftence ; and has made it 
impoflible but that Exiftence (hould be. truly predicated of if. 
Thus the Exiftence of whatever is already come to pafs, i| 
liow become neceffary ; 'tis become impoffible it fhould bet 
othcrwife thaii. true, that fudh a Thing has been* 

(3.) The"^^t^^'^a-?(d ffedicate of at Propofition which 
affirms Something to be,, may have a real and certain Con- 
fieaioh confequeniially ; and fo the Exiftence of the Thing may 
be confequentially neceffary ; as it may b^ furely and lirmly; 
cdnneded with fomething ehe, that is neceffar}^ in one of 
the former Refpcds! As it is either fully and thoroughly 
conuedcd with that which is abfdlutely neceffai^ in. its owrt 

C ' Nature, 

i8 The Nature Part L 

Njitufe,'6r with fomething which has already received and 
made furc of Exiftence: This Neceffity hes /«, or may be 
explained by the Connexion of two or more Propofitions one 
with another, lliings which are perfedly conneded with 
other Things that are neceilary, are neceflaryThemfelves, by 
a NecefTity of Confequence. 

And here it may be obferved, that all Things which are 
future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be 
faid to be neceirary,are neceiTary only in this laft Way. Their 
Exiftence is not neceflary in it felf ; for if fo, they always 
would have exifted. Nor is their Exiftence become ne- 
ceiiarv by being made fure, by being already come to pafs. 
Therefore, the only Way that any Thing that is to come to 
pafs hereafter, is or can be neceffary, is by a, Conne6Hon 
with fomething that is neceffary in it's own Nature, or fome- 
thing that already is, or has been ; fa that the one being 
fuppofed, the other certainly follows. And this alfo is the 
only Way that all Things paft, excepting thofe which were 
from Eternity, could be neceffary before they came to pafs^ or 
could ccme to pafs neceffarily j and therefore the only Way 
in which any Effefl or Event, or any Thing whatfoever that 
ever has had, or will have a Beginning, has come into Being 
neceffarily, or will hereafter neceffarily exift. And therefore 
this is the Neceffity which efpecially belongs to Contraverfies 
about the Ads of the Will, 

It may be of fome Ufe in thefe Controverftes, further to 
obferye concerning ?Nefaphy/ical'NcceiT\ty^ that (agreable to the 
Diftinftion before obferved of Neceffity, as vulgarly under- 
fcood) Things that exift may be faid to be neceffary, either 
Vi\th 2. general or particular Neceffity. The Exiftence of a 
Idling may be faid to be neceftary witli a general Neceftlty, 
when all Things whatfoever being conlidered, there is a 
f^oundation for Certainty of their Exiftence ; or when ii> 
the moft general and univerfal View of Things, the Subjecfl 
and Predicate of the Propolition, which affirms its Exift- 
ence, would appear with an infallible Conne6lion. 

, An Event, or the Exiftence of a Thing, may be faid to be 
neceffary with a particular Neceffity, or with Regard to a par- 
ticular Perfon, Thing or Time, when Nothing that can be 
taken into Confideration, in or about" that Perfon, Thing 
or. Time, alters the Cafe at all, as to the Certainty of that 
Eyent> or the Exiftence of that Thing j or can be of any 
* " AccouiU 

ScdJII. c/NeccfTity. 19 

Account at all, in determining the Infallibility of the Con- 
rkec!:lion of the Subjed and Predicate in the Propofition which 
affirms the Exiftence of the Thing ; fo that it is all one, as 
to that Perfon, or Thing, at leaft, at that Time, as if the 
Exiftence were necefTary with a NeceiTity that is moft urn- 
verfal and <^hfolute. Thus there are many Things that H ap- 
peal to particular Peribns, which they have no Hand in, and 
in ihe Exiftence of which noWiil of theirs has any Concern, 
at leaft, at that Time ; which, whether they are ne- 
ceflar)^ or not, with Regard to Things in general, yet are ne- 
ceflary to them, and with Regard to any Volition of theirs 
at that Time ; as they prevent all A(5ls of the Will about: 
the Affair. — I fliall have Occafion to apply this Obferva- 
tion to particular Infrances in the following Difcourfe.— Whe- 
ther the fame Things that are neceflary with 3. particular Ne- 
ccfiity, be not alfo necclTary with a ^<?/7^r^/ NeceiTity, may be 
a Matter of future Confideration. Let that be as it will, it 
alters not the Cafe, as to the Ufe of this Diftinclion of 
the Kinds of Neceffity. 

Thefe Things may be fufficient for the explaining of the 
Terms Necejfary and Kccejftty^ as Terms of Art, and as often 
ufed by Metaphyficians, and controverfial Writers inDivinity, 
in a Senfe diverfe from, and more extenfive than their origi- 
nal Meaning, in common Language, which was before ex- 

What has been faid to Ihew the Meaning of the Terms 
NeccJJary and Necejfity^ may be fufficient for the Explaining of 
the oppofiteTerm.s, hnpoffiblc and Impojjibil'ity. For tliere is no 
Difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former 
pofitive. Impojjibility is the fame as negative Neceffity^ or a 
NecefTity that a Thing fliould not be. And it is ufed as a 
Term of Art in a like Diverfity from the original and vulgar 
Meaning, with Neceffity. 

The fame may be obferved concerning the Words Unahky 
and Inability. It has been obferved, that thefeTerms, in their 
original and common Ufe, have Relation to Will and En- 
deavour, as fuppofable in the Cafe, and as infufncient for 
the bringing to pafs the Thing will'd and endeavoured. But 
as thefe Terms are often ufed by Philofophers and Divines, 
efpecially Writers on Controverfies about Free-Wili, they 
are ufed in a quite different, and far more extenfive Senfe i 
and are applied to many Cafes wherein no Will or Endea- 

C 2 vour 

.20 0/" natural and Part !• 

voiir for the bringing of the Thing to pafs, is or can be fup- 
pofec, but is adualiy denied and excluded in the Nature of 
the C^fe. 

As the Words necejjary^ impojfihle ^unable Sec. are ufed by pole- 
mic Writers, in a Senfe diverfe from their common Significa- 
tion, the hke has happen'd to the Term Contingent. Any 
7'hing is faid to be contingent, or to come to pafs by Chance, 
or Accident, in the original Meaning of fuch Words, when 
its Conne6lion with its Caufes or Antecedents, according to 
the eftablifti'd Courfe of Things, is not difcerned ; and fo 
is what we have no Means of the Forelight of. And efpe- 
cially is any Thing faid to be contingent or accidental with 
regard to us, when any Thing comes to pafs that we are con- 
cerned in, as Occafions or Subjeds, without our Foreknow- 
ledge, and befide our Defign and Scope. 

But the Word Contingent is abundantly ufed in a very diffe- 
rent Senfc ; not for That whofe ConnecStion with the Series of 
Things we can't difcern, fo as to forefee the Event ; but for 
fomething which has abfolutely no previous Ground or Rea- 
fon, with v.hich it's Exillence has any iix'd and certaui Con- 

Section IV. 

Of the DiJlinSlion of natural afid moral 
Neceffity, ^W Inability. 

THAT NccefTity which has been explained, confifting in 
an infallible Connexion of the Things fignified by the 
Subjed and Predicate of a Propofition, as intelligent 
Beings arc the Subjeds of it, is diftinguilh'd into moral and 
natural Necellity. 

I fhall not novv' ftand to enquire whether this Diftincflion be 
a proper and perfea Diflin6ticn ; but fliall only explain how 
thefe two Sorts of Neceffity are underftood, as the Terms are 
fometimcs ufed, and as they arc ufed in the following Dif- 

tX'Urfe. • ■ • 


Sefl. IV. moral Neceffity. 2t 

The Phrafe, moral Necejity^ is ufed varioudy : fometimes 'tis ■ 
ufed for a Neceffity of moral Obligation. So we fay,a Man is 
under Neceffity, when he is under Bonds of Duty and Con-- 
fcience, which he can't be difcharged from. So the Word 
Neceffity is often ufed for great Obligation in Point of Intereft. 
Sometimes by moral Neceffity is meant that apparent Con- 
nedlion of 1 hings, which is the Ground of ?noral Evidence ; 
and fo is diftinguifh'd from abfohite Neceffity^ or that fure Con^ 
necftion of Things, that is a Foundation for infallible Certainty, 
In this Senfe, moral Neceffity fignihes much the fame as that 
high Degree of Probability, which is ordinarily fufficicnt to 
fatisfy, and be relied upon by Mankind, in their Condud and 
Behaviour in the World, as they would confult their own 
Safety and Intereft, and treat others properly as Members of 
Society. And fometimes by moral Neceffity is meant that 
Neceffity of Connexion &Confequence,which arifes from fuch 
moral Caufes^ as the Strength of Inclination, or Motives, and 
the Connection which there is in many Cafes between thefe, 
and fuch certain Volitions and A6tions. And it is in this 
Senfe, that I ufe the Phrafe, moral NeceJJlty^ in the following 

By natural Neceffity,, as applied to Men, I mean fuch Ne- 
ceffity as Men are under through the Force of natural Caufcs ; 
as diihnguifh'd from what are called moral Caufes, fuch as 
Habits and Difpofitions of the Heart, and moral Motives and 
Inducements. Thus Men placed in certain Circumftances, 
are the Subje6ls of particular Senfations by Neceffity : They 
feel Pain when their Bodies are wounded ; they fee the Ob- 
je6ls prefented before them in a clear Light, when their Eyes 
are open'd : fo they afient to the Truth of certain Propofiti- 
ons, as foon as the Terms are underftood ; as that two and 
two make four, that black is not white, that two parallelLines 
can never crofs one another : fo by a natural Neceffity Men's 
Bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to fupport 

But here feveral Things may be noted concerning thefe 
two Kinds of Neceffity. 

I , Moral Neceffity may be as abfolute, as natural Neceffity. 
That is, the Effect may be as perfectly connected with its mo- 
ral Caufe, as a naturally necelTary Effc6t is with it's natural 
Caufe. Whether the Will in every Cafe is neceffarily deter- 
mined by the ftrongeil Motive, or whether the Will ever 
makes any Refitlance to fuch a Motive, or can ever oppofe 
the flrongert prefent Inclination, or not ; if that Matter (hould 
be controverted, yet I fappofe none will deny, but that, in 

22 Of natural and Part I. 

fome Cafes, a previous Bias and Inclination, or the Motive 
pfelentcd, may be fo powerful, that the A61 of the Will may 
be certainly and indifTolubly conneded therewith. When 
Motives or previous Bias are very ftrong, all will allow that 
there is fome Difficulty in going againft them. And if they 
■were yet ftronger, the Difficulty would be ftill greater. And 
therefore, if more were ftill added to their Strength, to a cer- 
tain Degree, it would make the Difficulty fo great, that it 
would be wholly impoffihle to furmount it ; for this plain Rea- 
fon, becaufe whatever Power Men may be fuppofed to have 
to furmount Difficulties, yet that Power is not infinite ; and fo 

foes not beyond certain Limits. If a Man can furmount ten 
)egrees of Difficulty of this Kind, with twenty Degrees of 
Strength, becaufe the Degrees of Strength are beyond theDe- 
grees of Difficulty ; yet if the Difficulty be increafed to thirty, 
or an hundred, or a thoufand Degrees, and his Strength not 
alfo increafed, his Strength will be wholly infufficient to fur- 
mount the Difficulty. As therefore it muft be allowed, that 
there may be fuch a Thing as a fure and perfeSf Conne6tion 
between moral Caufes and Effiscfts ; fo this only is what I call 
by the Name of msral NeceJJity. 

2. V/hen I ufe this Diftindion of moral and yiatural Ne- 
ifjfuy^ I would not be underftood to fuppofe, thr^t if any 
'Ihing comes to pafs by the former Kind of Neceffity, the 
'Nature of Things is not concerned in it, as well as in the 
latter. I don't mean to detcrmine,that when a moral Habit or 
Motive is fo ftrong, that the A(5l of the Will infallibly follows, 
this is not owing to the Nature of Things. But thefe are the 
Names that thefe two Kinds of Necellity have ufually been 
called by ; and they muft be diftinguiftied by fome Names or 
other ; for there is a Diftindion or Diff'erence between them, 
that 'is very important in its Confequences. Which Diffe- 
rence does not lie fo much in theNature of the ConneSiion^-SiS in 
the two Terms connected. The Caufe with which the Effe^ 
is connecfted, is of a particular Kind ; vix. that which is of a 
moral Nature ; either fome previous habitual Difpofition, or 
fome Motive exhibited to the Underftanding. And the Effect 
is alfo of a particular Kind j being likewife of a moral Nature ; 
confifting in fome Inclination or Volition of the Soul, or vo- 
luntary Adion. 

I fuppofe, that Neceffity which is called natural, in Diftinc- 
tion from fnoral Neceffity, is fo called, becaufe 7neer Nature, as 
the Word is vulgarly ufed, is concerned, without any Thing 


Sed. IV. moral Neceffity. 23 

of Choice. The Word Nature is often ufed In Oppofition to 
Choice ; not becaufe Nature has indeed never any Hand in our 
Choice .; But this probably comes to pafs by Means that 
we firft get our Notion of Nature from that difcernable and 
obvious Courfe of Events, which we obCerve in many Things 
that our Choice has no Concern in ; and efpecially in the 
material World ; which, in very many Parts of it, wc eafily 
perceive to b€ in a fettled Courfe ; the ftated Order and Man^ 
ner of Succeflion being very apparent. But where we don't 
readily difcern, the Rule and Connexion, (tho* there be a 
Connexion, according to an eftablifli'd Law,truly takingPlace) 
we fignify the Manner of Event by fome other Name, Eveii 
in many Things which are feen in the material and inanimate 
World, v/hich don't difcernably and obvioufly come to pafs 
according to any fettled Courfe, Men don't call the Maimer 
of the Event by theName of Nature .,huthy fuchNames asy/m- 
dent^^Chaticefimtingeme kc. So Men make aDiftindion between 
Nature and Choice ; as tho' they were compleatly and uni- 
verfally diftind. Whereas, I fuppofe none will deny but that 
Choice, i?i many Cafes, arifes from Nature, as truly as other 
Events. But the Dependance & Connection between A61:s of 
Volition or Choice, and their Caufes, according to eftablifhed 
Laws, is not fo fenfible and obvious. And we obferve that 
Choice is as it were a new Principle of Motion and A<5tion, 
different from that eftablilh'd Law k Order of Things which 
is moft obvious, that is (een efpecially in corporeal and fenfi- 
ble Things ; And alfo that Choice often interpofes, interrupts 
and alters the Chain of Events in th«fe external Objects, and 
caufes 'em to proceed otherwife than they would do, if let a-r 
lone, and left to go on according to the Laws of Motion 
among themfelves. Hence it is fpoken of, as if it were a 
' Principle of Motion entirely diftind from Nature, and pro- 
perly fet in Oppofition to it. Names being commonly given 
to Things, according to what is moft obvious, and is fuggefted 
by what appears to the Senfes without Refle(5tion & Refearch, 

"' 3. It muft be obferved, that in what has been explained, as 
fignified by the Name of uMoral NeceJJityy the Word Necejjity is 
not ufed according to the original Defign and Meaning of the 
Word : For, as was obferved before, fuch Terms necejjhry^ int" 
pojjible, irreftjiihle Sic. in common Speech, and their moft pro- 
per Senfe, are always relative ; having Reference to fome fup- 
pofable voluntary Oppofition or Endeavour, that is infufficient. 
But no fuch Oppofition, or contrary Will and Endeavour, is 
fuppofable in the Cafe of moral Neceffity ; which is a Cer- 

^4- .0/* natural and Parti 

tainty of the Inclination and Will it felf ; which does not 
admit of the Suppofition of a Will to oppofe and refift it. 
For 'tis abfurd, to fuppofe the fame individual Will to oppof^ 
it felf, in its prefent Ad ; or the prefent Choice to be oppo- 
-fite to,and refifting prefentChoice : as, abfurd as it is to talk of 
two contrary Motions, in the fame moving Body, at the fame 
Time. And therefgre, the very Cafe fuppofed never admits 
of any Trial, whether an oppofmg or refilling Will can over- 
come this Neceflity. 

What has been faid of natural and moral Neceflity, may 
ferve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inal?ir 
lity. We are faid to be naturally unable to do a Thing, w4ien 
we can't do it if we. will, becaufe what is moft commonly 
called Nature don't, allow of it, or becaufe of fome impeding 
■Defed or Obstacle that is extrinfic to the Will ; either in 
the Faculty of Underftanding'j Conftitution of Body, or ex- 
ternal Objeds. Moral Inability confifis not in any of thefe 
Things. ; but either in theWant of Inclination ; or theStrength 
of a contrary Inclination ; or the want of fufficient Motives in 
View, to induce and excite the Act of theWill,orthe Strength 
of apparent Motives to the contrary. Or both thefe may be 
refolved into one ; and it may be faid in one Word, that mo- 
jal Inability coniifis in the Oppofition or Want of Inclination. 
For when a Perfon is unable to will or chufe fuch a Thing, 
tlirough a Defecft of Motives^ or Prevalence of contrary Mo- 
tives, 'tis the fame Thing as his being unable through the 
Want of an Inclination, or the Prevalence of a contrary Incli- 
nation, in fuch Circumftancep,and under the Influence of fucli 
Views. .: .? V .: 

- To give fome Infl:ances of this 7nQral Jnabllity, A Woman 

of great Honour and Chaflity may have a moral Inability to 
proftitute her felf to her Slave. A Child of great Love and 
Duty to his Parents, may b^e unable to be willing to kill his 
Father, ' A very lafcivious Man, in Cafe of certain Opportu-, 
nities and Temptations, and in the Abfence of fuch and fuch 
Restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying- his Luft. A 
Drunkard, under fuch and fuch Circumftances, may be una-r 
ble to forbear taking of ftrong Drink. A very malicious 
Man may be unable to exert benevolent A(5ts to an Enemy,o'r 
to defire his Profpcnty : Yea, fome may be fo under the Power 
of a vile Difpolition, that they may be unable to love thofc 
who are mofl: worthy of their Efleem & Afi'cdion. A ftrong 
Habit of Virtue and great Degree of Holinefs may caufe a 
moral Inability to love VVickednefs in. general, may render a 



Sed. IV. moral Inability. 25 

Man unable to takeComplacence in wicked Pcrfons orThings; 
ortochufe a wicked Life j and prefer 'it to a vertuous Lffe. 
And on the other Hand, a great Degree of habitual Wicked- 
ncfs may lay a Man under an Inability to love and ckoofe Ho- 
linefs ; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely 
■»holy Being, or to choofe and cleave to him as his chief Good. 

- Here it may be of Ufe to obferve this Diftindion of moral 
Inabilitvs w'z. of that which is general and habitual., and that 
which is particular and occaftonal. By a general and habitual mo- 
ral Inability, I mean an Inability in the Heart to all Exercifes 
or Acls of Will of that Nature or Kind, through a lix'd and 
habitual -Inclination, or an habitual and Itated Defedl, 
or Want of a certain Kind of Inclirtation, Thus a very 
ill-natur'd Man may be unable to exert fuch Ads of 
Benevolence, as another, who is full of £:ood Nature, com- 
monly exerts ; and a Man, whofe Heart is habitually void of 
Gratitude, may be unable to exert fuch and fuch grateful AcSIs, 
through that ftated Defed of a grateful Inclination. Byparti^ 
cular and occaftonal moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the 
Will or Heart to a particular Acl,thro' the Strength or Defecfl: 
of prefent Motives, or of Inducem.ents prefented to the View 

of the Underftanding, on this Occafion. If it be fo, that the 

Will is always determined by the ftrongefl Motive, then ifr 
mufl always have an Inability,in this latter Senfe,to a6l other- 
wife than it does ; it not being polTible, in any Cafe, that the 
Will lhould,at prefent, go againft the Motive which has now, 
allThings confidered, the greatell Strength & Advantage to ex- 
cite and induce it.— The former of thefe Kinds of moral Ina- 
bility, conlilling in that which is ftated habitual and general, 
is moft commonly called by the Name of Inability ; becaufe 
the Word Inability., in its molt proper and original Significa- 
tion, has Refpe6t to fome Jlated Defecf. And this efpecially 

obtains the Name oi Inability alio upon another Account : 

I before obferved, that the Word Inability in its criminal and 
moft common Ufe, is a relative Term 3 and has Refped: to 
Will 2nd Endeavour, as fappolabie in the Cafe, and as in- 
fufficient to bring to pafs the Thing deiired and endeavoured. 
Now there may be more of an Appearance h Sh:5dov/ of thisj 
with Refpecl to the Acts which arife from a tixM and flrong 
Habit, than others that arife only from tran(icnt Occtilons and 
Caufes. Indeed Will and Endeavour againfl, or diverfe from 
frejent A6ts of the Will, are in no Cafe fjppofable, vv^hether , 
thofe Afts be occafional or habitual ; for liiat v/ould be to ^ 
fuppofe the "Will, atpref:at, to be othcrv/ifv^ than, at rref^nt,' 

D * ;t 

26 (ytooral Inability. PartJ. 

it is. But yet there may be Will and Endeavour againfl/«/«r/ 
A(5ts of the Will, or Volitions that are likely to take Place, as 
view'd at a Diftance. 'Tis no Contradidion, to fuppofe that 
the A6ts of the Will at one Time, may be againft the Adts 
of the Will at another Time ; and there may be Defires and 
Endeavours to prevent or excite future Ads of the Will ; But 
fuch Defires and Endeavours are, in many Cafes, rendered 
infufficient & vain, thro' Fixednefs of Habit : When the Oc- 
cafion returns, the Strength of Habit overcomes, and baffles 
all fucji Oppofition. In this Refpedl, a Man may be in mife- 
rable Slavery and Bondage to a ftrong Habit. But it may be 
comparatively eafy to make an Alteration with Refpe6t to fuch 
future Ads, as are only occafional and tranfient ; becaufe the 
Occafion or tranfient Caufe, if forefeen, may often eafily be 
prevented or avoided. On this Account, the moral Inability 
that attends fix'd Habits, efpecially obtains the Name of Ina- 
hility. And then, as the Will may remotely and indiredly re- 
lift it felf, and do it in vain, in the Cafe of ftrong Habits ; fo 
Heafon may refift prcfent Acts of the Will, and it's Refiftance 
be infufficient ; and this is more commonly the Cafe alfo, 
"when the Acts arife from ftrong Habit, 

But It mtift be obferved concerned moral Inability, in each 
Kind of it, that the Word Inability is ufed in a Senfe very di- 
verfe from its original Import. The Word fignifies only a 
natural Inability, in the proper Ufe of it ; and is applied to 
fuch Cafes only wherein a prefent Will or Inclination to the 
Thing, with Refped to which a Perfon is faid to be unable, 
is fuppofable. It can't be truly faid, acccrding to the ordi- 
nary Ufe of Language, that a mahcious Man, let him be 
never fo malicious, can't hold his Hand from ftriking, or that 
he is not able to fliew his Neighbour Kindnefs ; or that a 
Drunkard, let his Appetite be never fo ftrong, can't keep the 
Cup from his Mouth. In the ftndeft Propriety of Speech, a 
Man has a Thing in his Power, if he has it in his Choice, 
or at his Election : And a Man can't be truly faid to be una* 
able to dti.a Thing, when he can do it if he will, 'Tis im- 
properly faid, that a Perfon can't perform thofe external Ac- 
tions, which are dependent on theAd of the Will, and which 
^ould be eafily performed, if the Ad of the Will were pre- 
fent. And if X be improperly faid, that he cannot perform 
thofe external voluntary Adions, which depend on the Will, 
tis in fome RefpcX^ more improperly faid, that he is unable ta 
:xert the. Acts of \\q Will themfelves ; becaufe it is more 
videmly falfe, with ^^^efpect to thefe, that he caiVt if he will ; 

Scd-IV. Of Liberty ^;/(^ moral Agency. 27 

Tor to fay fo, is a down-right Contradiction : It is to fay, he 
<afit will, if he does will. And in this Cafe, not only is it 
true, that it is eafy for a Man to do the Thing if he will 
but the very willing is the doing ; when once he has will'd, 
the Thing is performed ; and nothing elfe remains to be 
■done. Therefore, in thefe Things to afcribe a Non-perfor- 
Tti ance to the want of Power or Ability,is not juft ; becaufe the 
Thing wanting is not a being ahle^ but a being willing. There 
are Faculties of Mind, and Capacity of Nature, and every 
Thing elfe, fnfficient, but a Difpofition : Nothing is wantin''- 
but a WilL "* 

Section V. 
Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of. 
moral Agency, 

THE plain and obvious Meaning of the Words Freedom 
and Liberty^ in common Speech, is Poiuer, Opportunity^ 
or Advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleafes. Or in 
other Words, his being free from Hindrance or Impediment 
in the Way of doing, or conducting in any Refpecl, as he 
wills. * And the contrary to Liberty, whatever Name we 
call that by, is a Perfon's being hinder'd or unable jto con- 
duct as he will, or being necelTitated to do otherwife. 

If this which I have mentioned be the Meaning of the 
Word Liberty, in the ordinary Ufe of Language ; as I trult 
that none that has ever learn'd to talk, and is unprejudiced, 
will deny ; then it will follow, that in Propriety of Speech, 
neither Liberty, nor it's contrary, can properly be afcribed ta 
any Being or Thing, but that which has fuch a- Faculty, 
Power or Property, as is called Will. For that which i.«i 
pofTeffed of no fuch Thing as JViU, can't have any Power or 
Opportunity of doing according to ifs Will, nor be necelhtated 
to ad: contrary to its Will, nor be reftrained from acfling agrea- 
biy to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, 
as belonging to the very Will it fclf, is not to fpeak good Senfe ; 
if we judge of Senfe, and Nonfenfe, by the orighial & proper 
Signification of Words. For the Will it felf is not an Agent 
that has a Will : The Power of choofing, it felf, has not a 

D 2 Power 

* I fay not only doing,hut comiuBing ; becaufe a voluntary fc^rbearing 
to do, fitting ftilijkeeping Silence &c.are Inftanccs of PerfonsCoWz^^?, a- 
bout whichLiberi)' is exercived i tiio' they are nqt (o properly calledirW//^. 

2 8 Th Notion «?/* Liberty, Parti. 

Power of chuTmg. That which has the Power of 
Volition or Choice is the Man or the Soul, and not 
the Power of VoHtion it felf. And he that has the Li- 
berty of doing accordino; to his Will, is the Agent or Doer 
who is poffefTed of the Will ; and not the Will which he is 
pofTeffed of. We fay with Propriety, that a Bird let loofe has 
Power'& Liberty to fly ; but not that the Bird's Power of 
flying ' has a Power ^v Liberty of flying. To be free is the 
Property of an Agent, who is pofieflTed of Powers & Facul- 
ties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zea- 
lous. But thefe Qiialities are the Properties of Men or Per- 
fons ; and not the Properties of Properties. 

Tliere arc two Things that are contrary to this which is 
' calledLiberty in commonSpeech. One is Conjiraint ; the fame 
is otherwife called Force^ CoJupulftony & CoaSiion ; which is a 
Pel fon's being necelTitated to do a Thing contrary to his Will. 
'^Phe other \%~Re[iramt \ which is his being hindred, and not 
tiaviiig Power to do according to his Will. But that which 
lias no W^ill, can't be the Subject of thefe Things. — I 
need fay the lefs on this Head, Mr. Locke having fet the fame 
Thing iforth, with fo great Ciearnefs, in his EJ^y on the human 

But one Thing more I would obferve concerning what is 
vulgarly called Liberty ; namely, that Power h Opportunity 
for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his 
Choice, is all that is meant by it ; w^ithout taking into the 
Meaning of the Word, any Thing of the Caufe or Original 
of that Choice ; or at all confidering how the Perfon came 
to have fuch a Volition ; whether it was caufed by foine ex- 
ternal Motive, or internal habitual Bias ; whether it was de- 
term in'd by fome internal antecedent Volition, or whether it 
happen'd witlu)ut a Caufe ; whether it was necefiarily con-. 
nec5Vcd with fomething foregoing, or not conneded. Let the 
Perfon come by his Volition or Choice how he will, yet, if 
he is able, and there is Nothing in theWay to hinder his pur- 
fuing and executing his Will, tlic Man is fully & perfec1:ly 
free,, according to the primary and commoa Notion of Free- 

What lias been faid may be fuflicient to fhew what is 
meant by Libcrtyy according; to the common Notions of Man- 
kind^ arid in the ufual $i primary Acceptation of the Word : 
But the Word, as ufed by Arminlans^ Pelagians h others, who 
oppofc the Cahinijh^ has an entirely different Signification,— 
7'hcfif; fevcral Things belong to their Notion of Liberty. 

I. That 

'Sed.V. and of moral Agency. 29 

f> That it confifts in a Self-detenmning Power in the Will, or 
a certain Sovereignty the Will has over it felf, and it's own 
A6ls, whereby it determines it's own Volitions ; fo as not to 
be dependent in it's Determinations, on any Caufe without 
it felf, nor determined by any Thing prior to it's own A6ls. 

2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their Notion of it, or that 
the Mind, pre\'ious to the A6t of Volition be, in iquilibriG, 

3. Contifigence is another Thing that belongs and is effential 
to it ; not in the common Acceptation of the Word, as that 
has been already explained, but as oppofed to all Neceffity, 
or any fixed Sz certain Connecflion with fome previous Ground 
or Reafon of it's Exiftence. They fuppofe the EfTence of Li- 
berty fo much to confift in thefe Things, that unlefs the 
Will of Man be free in this Senfe, he has no real Free- 
dom, how much foever he may be at Liberty to a<5l ac- 
cording to his Will. 

A moral Jgent is a Being that Is capable of thofe Adlions 
that have a moral Quality, and which can properly be de- 
nominated good or evil in a moral Senfe, vertuous or vici- 
ous, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a 
moral Faculty^ or Senfe of moral Good & Evil, or of fuch a 
Thing as Defert or Worthinefs of Praife or Blame, Re- 
ward or Punifl-.ment ; and a Capacity which an Agent has 
of being influenced in his A6lions by moral Inducements or 
Motives, exhibited to the View of Underftanding & Rea- 
fon, to engage to a Condu6t agreable to the moral Faculty. 

The Sun is very excellent & beneficial in it*s A<51:Ion and 
Influence on the Earth, in warming it, and caufmg it to 
bring forth it's Fruits ; but it is not a moral Agent : It's 
A(5tion, tho' good, is not vertuous or meritorious. Fire 
that breaks out in a City, and confumes great Part of it, is 
very mifchievous in its Operation ; but is not a moral A- 
gent : what it does is not faulty or finful, or deferving of 
any Punifliment. The brute Creatures are not moral Agents : 
the A6lions of fome of 'em are very profitable & pleafant ; 
others are veiy hurtful : yet, feeing they have no moral Fa- 
culty, or Senfe of Defert, and don't a6l from Choice guided 
by Underftanding, or with a Capacity of reafoning and re- 
fleding, but only from Inftincft, and are not capable of be- 
ing influenced by moral Inducements, their Actions are not 
properly finful or vertuous ; nor are they properly the Sub- 
jeds of any fuch moral Treatment for what they do, as mo- 
ral Agents are for their Faults or good Deeds. 


3© 0/ Moral Agency. Part I. 

Here it may be noted, that there Is a circumftantial Diffe- 
rence between the moral Agency of a Ruler and a Subje^, 
I call it drcumftantial^ becaufe it lies only in the Difference 
of moral Inducements they are capabk of being influen- 
ced by, arifing from the Difference of Circumflances. A 
Ruler ailing in that Capacity only, is not capable of being 
influenced by a moral Law, and it's Sanations of Threat- 
nings and Promifes, Rewards and Punifliments, as the SubjeSf 
is ; tho' both may be influenced by a Knowledge of moral 
Good and Evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the 
Supreme Being, who a6ts only in the Capacity of a Ruler to- 
wards his Creatures, and never as a Subje^^ differs in that 
Refpedl: from the moral Agency of created intelligent Be- 
ings. God's A6iions, and particularly thofe which he ex- 
erts as a moral Governour, have moral Qualifications, are 
morally good in the higheft Degree. They are moft per- 
fectly holy & righteous ; and we muft conceive of Him as 
influenced in the higheft Degree, by that which, above all 
others, is properly a moral Inducement ; vix, the moral Good 
which He fees in fuch and fuch Things : And therefore He 
is, in the moft proper Senfe, a moral Agent, the Source of all 
moral Ability & Agency, the Fountain and Rule of ail Ver- 
t\ie and moral Good ; tho' by Reafon of his being Supreme 
over all, 'tis not poffible He ihould be under the Influerx^ of 
Law or Command, Promifes or Threatnings, Rewards or Pu- 
nifhments, Counfels orWarnings. The effential Qualities of 
a moral Agent are in God, in the greateft polfible Perfedlion ; 
fuch as Underftanding,to perceive the Difference-between mo- 
ral Good & Evil ; a Capacity of difcerning that moral Wor- 
thinefs and Demerit, by which fome Things are Praife-wor- 
thy, others defcrving of Blame and Puni{hment ; and alfo 
a Capacity of Choice, and Choice guided by Underftanding, 
and a Power of ading according to his Choice or Pleafure,and 
being capable of doing thofe Things which are in the highefi: 
Senfe Praife-worthy. And herein does very much conflft that 
Image of God wherein he made Man, (which we read of Gen, 
I. 26,27. & Chap. IX. 6.) by which God diftinguiflied Man 
from the Beafts, viz. in thofe Faculties & Principles of Na- 
ture, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very 
much confifts the natural Image of God ; as his fpiritual and 
moral Image, wherein Man was made at firft, confifted in that 
moral Excellency, that he was endowed with. 


( %t ) 

PART 11. 

Wherein it is confidered whether there is 
or can be any fuch Sort of Freedom of 
Will, as that wherein Arminiam place 
the Eflence of the Liberty of all moral 
Agents ; and whether any fuch Thing 
ever was or ca7^ be conceived of. 

Section L 

Shewing the manifejl Inconjtjience of the 
Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, 
confifting in the JVilFs felf-determining 


Aving taken Notice of thofe Things which may be 
neceffary to be obferved, concerning the Meaning of 
the principal Terms and Phrafes made ufe of in Con- 

troverfies concerning human Liberty, and particularly ob- 
ferved what Liberty is, according to the common Language, 
and general Apprehenfion of Mankind, and what it is as 
underftood & maintained by Arminians ; I proceed to confider 
the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of the Will^ and the fup- 
pofcd NecejQity of it in Order to moral Agency, or in Order 
to any One's being capable of Vertue or Viee, aad properly 


3 2 ^e Inconfifience Part II. 

the Subjea of Command or Counfel, Praife or Blame, Pro- 
mifes or Threatnings, Rewards or Punifhments ; or whether 
that which has been defcribed, as the Thing meant by Li- 
berty in common Speech, be not fufficient, and the only Li- 
berty, which makes, or can make any one a moral Agent, 
and fo properly the Subjedt of thefe Things. In thh Part^ I 
ihall confider whether any fuch Thing be poffible or concei- 
vable,as that Freedom of Will which Jrminians infift on ; and 
Ihall enquire whether any fuch Sort of Liberty be neceffary 
to moral Agency ^c. in the next Part. 

And Firft of all, I (hall confider the Notion of a Self^ 
determining Power in the Will : wherein, according to the 
Jrminians^ does moft efientially confift the Will's Freedom ; 
and fliall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly ab- 
furd, and a manifeft Inconliftence, to fuppofe that the Will it 
felf determines all the free A£fs of the Will. 

Here I fhall not infift on the great Impropriety of fuch 
Phrafes, and Ways of fpeaking, as the Wilts determini?ig it 
felf ; becaufe Actions are to be afcribed , to Agents, and not 
properly to the Powers of Agents j which improper W^ay of 
ipeaking leads to many Miftakes, and much Confufion, as 
Mr. Locke obferves. But I fhall fuppofe that the Jrminians^ 
when they fpeak of the Will's determining it felf, do by the 
JVill mean the Soul willing, I fhall take it for granted, that 
■when they fpeak of the Will, as the Determiner, they mean 
the Soul in the Exercife of a Power of Willing^ or acSting volun- 
tarily. I fhall fuppofe this to be their Meaning, becaufe No- 
thing elfe can be meant, without the groffeft and plaineft Ab- 
furdity. In all Cafes, when we fpeak of the Powers or Prin- 
ciples of Ading, as doing fuch Things, we mean that the A- 
fents which have thefe Powers of ading, do them, in the 
ixercife of thofe Powers. So when we fay. Valour fights 
courageoufly, we mean, the Man who is under the Influ- 
ence of Valour fights courageoufly. When we fay. Love 
feeks the Objcdt loved, we mean, the Perfon loving feeks that 
Objedt. When we fay, the Underftanding difcerns, we mean 
the Soul in the Exercife of that Faculty. So when it is faid, . 
the Will decides or determines, the Meaning muft be, thae 
the Perfon in the Exercife of a Power of Willing & Chufing, 
or the Soul acting^ voluntarily, determines. 


Se(S.I. Of Self-determining Yovjtu 33 

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free A6ls, 
the Soul determines all the free Ads of the Will in the Ex- 
ercife of a Power of Willing and Chuiing ; or^ which is the 
fame Thing, it determines them of Choice ; it determines 
it's own AxSs by chuiing it's own Ads. If the Will deter- 
mines the Will, then Choice orders and determines the 
Choice : and Ads of Choice are fubjed to the Decifion, 
and follow the Conduct of other Ads of Choice. And 
therefore if the Will determines all it's own free Ads, then 
every free Ad of Choice is determined by a preceeding Ad 
of Choice, chuHng that Ad. And if that preceeding Ad of 
the Will or Choice be alfo a free Ad, then by thefe Princi- 
ples, in this Ad too, the Will is Self-determined ; that is, 
this, in like Manner, is an Ad that the Soul voluntarily chu- 
fes ; or which is the fame Thing, it is an Ad determined ftill 
by a preceeding Ad of the Will, chufing that. And the like 
may again be obferved of the laft mentioned Ad. Which 
brings us diredly to a Contradidion : for it fuppofes an Ad of 
the Will preceeding the firft Ad in the whole Train, direding 
and determining the reft ; or a free Ad of the Will, before 
the firft free Ad of the Will. Or elfe we muft come at laft 
to anAd of theWill, determining the confequent Ads,wherein 
the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is not a free Ad, in 
this Notion of Freedom : But if the firft Ad in the Train,de- 
termining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all 
can be free ; as is manifeft at firft View, but fhall be demon- 
ftrated prefently. 

If the Will, which we find governs the Members of the 
Body, and determines and commands their Motions and 
Adions, does alfo govern it felf, and determine it's own Mo- 
tions and Ads, it doubtiefs determines them the fame Way, 
even by antecedent Volitions. The Will determines which 
Way the Hands and Feet fhall move, by an Ad of Volition 
or Choice : and there is no other Way of the Will's deter- 
mining, direding or commanding any Thing at all. Whatio- 
ever the Will commands, it commands by an Ad of the Will. 
And if it has it felf under it's Command^ and determines it 
felf in it's own Adions, it doubtiefs does it the fame Way that 
it determines other Things which are under it's Command. 
So that if the Freedom of the Will confifts in this, that it 
has it felf and it's own Adions under it's Command and 
Diredlon, and it's own Volitions are determined by it fcif, 
k will follow, that every free Volition ariles from another an- 
tecedent Volition, direding and commanding that ; And it 

£ that 

34 Of Self-detenni7tingVovjtx. Part IL 

that dtreaing Volition be alfo free, in that alfo the Will is de- 
termined ; that is to fay, that directing! Volition is deter- 
mined by another going before that ; and fo on, 'till we 
come to the firft Volition in the whole Series : And if that 
firft Volition be free, and the Will f elf- determined in it, then 
that is determined by another Volition preceeding that 
Which is a Contradiction ; becaufe by the Suppofition, it can 
have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the firft in 
the Train. But if that firft Volition is not determined by any 
preceeding Ad of the Will, then that A6t is not determined 
by the Will, and fo is not free, in the Arm'mian Notion of 
Freedom, which confifts in the Will's Self-determination. 
And if that firft A6t of the Will, which determines and 
fixes the fubfequent A6ts, be not free, none of the following 

Acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we 

fuppofe there are five A6ts in the Train, the fifth and laft de- 
termined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third 
by the fecond, and the fecond by the firft ; If the firft is not 
determined by the Will, and fo not free, then none of them 
are truly determined by the Will : that is, that each of them 
are as they are,and not otherwife,is not firft owing totheWill, 
but to the Determination of the firft in the Series, which is not 
dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no 
Hand in the Determination of. And this being that which 
decides what the reft ftiall be, and determines their Exift- 
ence ; therefore the firft Determination of their Exiftence 
is not from the Will. The Cafe is juft the fame, if inftead 
of a Chain of five A6ts of the Will, we Ihould fuppofe a 
Succeffion of Ten, or an Hundred, or ten Thoufand. If 
the firft A6t be not free, being determined by fomething out 
of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to 
it felf, and that the next, and fo on ; They are none of them 
free, but all orignally depend on, and are determined by 
fome Caufe out of the Will : and fo all Freedom in the Cafe 
is excluded, and no Ad of the Will can be free, according 
to this Notion of Freedom. If we ftiould fuppofe a long 
Chain, of ten Thoufand Links, fo conne6ted, that if the firft 
Link moves, it will move the next, and that the next ; and fp 
the whole Chain muft be determined to Motion, and in the 
Direction of it's Motion, by the Motion of the firft Link ; 
and that is moved by fomething elfe : In this Cafe, tho' all 
the Links, but one, are moved by other Parts of the fame 
Chain ; yet it appears that the Motion of no One, nor the 
Diredlion of it's Motion, is from any Self-moving or Self- 
determining Power in the Chain, any more than if every 


Seft. II. Some Evafions conjidered. 3 5 

Link were immediately moved by fomething that did not be- 
long to the Chain. If the Will be not free in the firft Act, 

which caufes the next, then neither is it free in the next, 
which is caufed by that firft A6t : for tho' indeed the Will 
caufed it, yet it did not caufe it freely ; becaufe the preceeding 
Acft, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the 
Will ben't free in the fecond Ad:, fo neither can it be in the 
third, which is caufed by that ; becaufe, in like Manner, that 
third was determined by an Act of the Will that was not free. 
And fo we may go on to the next Adl, and from that to the 
next J And how long foever the Succeflion of A6ls is, it is all 
one ; if the firft on which the whole Chain depends, and 
which determines all the reft, ben't a free Ac5t, the Will is 
not free in caufing or determining any one of thofe A6ts ; 
becaufe the A(5t by which it determines them all, is not a free 
Ad ; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining 

them, than if it did not caufe them at all. Thus, this Ar^ 

fninian Notion of Liberty of the Will, confifting in the Will's 
Self-Determination^ is repugnant to itfelfjand (huts it felf wholly 
out of the World. 

Section IL 

Several fufpofed Ways ^p/' evading the fore-- 
r4 K^^^S R^^foningj conjidered. 

IF to evade the Force of what has been obferved, it (hould 
be faid, that when the Arminiam fpeak of the Will's deter- 
niining it's own Ads, they don't mean that the Will de- 
termines it's A6ts by any preceeding Ad, or that one Ad of 
the Will determines another j but ^only that the Faculty or 
Power of Will, or the Soul in the 13 fe of that Power, de- 
termines it's own Volitions ; and that it does it without any 
Ad going before the Ad determined ; fuch an Evafion would 

be full of the moft grofs Abfurdity. 1 confefs, it is an Eva- 

fion of my own inventing ; and I don't know but I fnould 
wrong the Jrminians, in fuppofing that any of them would 
make ufe of it. But it being as good a one as I can in- 
vent, I would obferve upon it a few Things, 

E 2 Firji^ 

36 Suppofed Evafions Part II. 

Firf, If the Faculty or Power of the Will determines aa 
A6t of Volition, or the Sonl in the Ufe or Exercije of that 
Pcu'cr, determines it, that is the lame Thing as for the Soul 
to determine V'^olltion by an Mf of Will. For an Exerdfe of 
the Power of "^ill, and an Acl of that Power, are the fame 
Thing. Therefore to fay, that the Power of Will, or the 
Soul in the Vfc or Exemfe of that Power, determines Voli- 
tion, without an y/^ of Will preceeding the Volition deter- 
mined, is a Contradi6lion. 

Strom^y If a Powder of Will determines the A(5l of theWill, 
then a Power of Chufmg determines it. For, as was before 
obfcrved, in every AS: of Will, there is Choice, and a Power 
of Willing is a Power of Chufmg. But if a Power of Chufmg 
determines the Ad of Volition, it determines it by chufmg it. 
For 'tis moil abfurd to fay, that a Power of Chufmg deter- 
mines one Thing rather than another, without chuling any 
Thing. But if a Power of Chufmg determines Volition by 
chufine it, then here is the A6t of Volition determined by 
an antecedent Choice, chufmg that Volition. 

77;/7yA)', To fay, the Faculty, or the Soul, determines it's 
owm Volition, but not by any, A6t, is a Contradiction, Be- 
caufe for the Soul to dire<^, decide, or determine any Thing, 
is to ad ; and this is fuppofed ; for the Soul is here fpoken 
of as being a Caufe in this Affair, bringing fomething to 
pafs, or doing fomething ; or, which is the lame Thing, ex- 
erting It felt in order to an Effe6t, which Efied is the Deter- 
mination of Volition, or the particular Kind and Manner of 
an Ati of Will. But certamiy, this Exertion or Action is 
not the fame with the Effe6t, in order to the Production of 
which it IS exerted j but mud be fomething prior to it. 

J^ain, The Advocates for this Notion of the Freedom of 
the Wj]], ipeak of a certain Sovereignty in the Will, whereby 
it has Power to determine it's own Volitions. And there- 
jore the Determination of Volition muil itfeif be an Ad of 
the Will ; ibr otherwite it can l^e no Exercife of that fuppofed 
Power and Sovereignty. ^ 

J^alti, If the Will determines it felf, then either the Will 
is acYive in determining it's Volitions, or it is not. If it be 
adive in it, then the Determination is an Adl gf the Will ; 
^\\d 10 there is one Ad of the Will determining another. 
But if the Will is not a^ii'ie in the Determination, then how 
- ^ does 

Sea. II. confidered. 37 

does it exerdfe any Liberty in it ? Thefe Gentlemen fuppofe 
that the Thing wherein the Will exerdfes Liberty, is 
in it's determining it's own Ads. But how can this 
be if it ben't active in determining ? Certainly the Will, 
or the Soul, can't exerdfe any Liberty in that wherein it dont 
aa, or wherein it don't exerdfe it felf So that if either Part 
of this Dilemma be taken, this Scheme of Liberty, confift- 
inff in Self-determining Power, is overthrown. If there be 
an Aa of the Will in determining all it's own free htXsy 
then one free Aa of the Will is determined by another ; and 
fo we have the Abfurdity of every free Aa, even the very 
fir ft, determined by aforegoing tree Aa. But if there be 
no Aa or Exercife of the Will in determining it s own Aas, 
then no Liberty is exercifed in determining them. From 
whence it follows, that no Liberty confifts in the Will s Power 
to determine it's own Aas : Or, which is the fame Thing, 
that there is no fuch Thing as Liberty coniifting in a belt-de- 
termining Power of the Will. 

If it (hould be faid, That altho' it be true, if the Soul de- 
termines it's own Volitions, it muft be aaive in fo doing, 
and the Determination it felf muft be an Aa ; yet there is 
no Need of fuppofing this Aa to be prior to the Volition de- 
termined i But the Will or Soul determines the Acl of the 
Will in IVilling ; It determines it's own Volition, in the very 
Aa of Volition ; It direas and limits the A61 of the Will, 
caufing it to be fo and not otherwife, in exerting the Aa, 
without any preceeding Aa to exert that. . If any fhould fay 
after this Manner,they muft mean one of thefe three Things : 
Either, (i.j That the determining Aa, tho' it be before the 
Aa determined in the Order of Nature, yet is not before it 
in the Order of Time. Or (2) That the determining Aa is 
not before the Aa determined, either in the Order of Time 
or Nature, nor is truly diftina from it ; But that the Soul^s 
determining the Aa of Volition is the fame Thing with it s 
exerting the Aa of Volition : The Mind's exerting fuch a 
particular Aa, is it's caufing and determining the Aa. Or, 
(3.) That Volition has no Caufe, and is no Effea ; but 
comes into Exiftence, with fuch a particular Determination, 
without any Ground or Reafon of it's Exiftence and Deter- 
mination. I ftiall confider thefe diftinaiy. 

(i.j If all that is meant, be, that the determining Aa is 
not before the Aa determined in Order of Time, it will not 
help the Cafe at all, tho' it lliould be allowed. If it be be- 

38 Suppo/ecl Evafions PartIL 

fore the <5etfermin'd A61 in the Order of Nature, being the 
Caufe or Ground of it's Exiftenee, this as much proves it to 
Be dil^in(5l from it, and independent on it, as if it were be- 
fore in the Order of Time. As the Caufe of the particular 
Motioh of a natural Body in a certain Direcftion, may have 
fto Diftance as to Time, yet can't be the fame with the Mo- 
tion effeded by it, but muft be as diftin6t from it, as any 
other Gaufe, that is before it's Effecfl in the Order of Time : 
as the Archited is diftindl from the Houfe which he builds, 
or the Father diftind from the Son which he begets. And if 
the Acfl of the Will determining be diftin<5l from the A61 de- 
termined, and before it in the Order of Nature, then we can 
go back from one to another, 'till we come to the firil in the 
Series, which has no Ad of the Will before it in the Order 
of Nature, determining it ; and confequently is an A61 not 
determined by the Will, and fo not a free Ad, in this Notion 
of Freedom. And this being the Acft which determines all 
the Reft, none of them are free Ads. As when there is a 
Chain of many Links, the firft of which only is taken hold 
of and drawn by Hand ; all the reft may follow and be mov- 
ed at the fame Inftant, without any Diftance of Time ; but 
yet the Motion of one Link is before that of another in the 
Order of Nature ; the laft is moved by the next, and that 
by the next, and fo 'till we come to the firft ; which not 
being moved by any other, but by fomething diftindt from 
the whole Chain, this as much proves that no Part is moved 
by any Self-moving Power in the Chain, as if the Motion 
of one Link followed that of another in the Order of Time. 

(2.) If any ftiould fay, that the determining Ad is not be- 
fore the determined Ad, either in the Order of Time, or of 
Nature, nor is diftinct from it ; but that the Exertion of the 
Ad is the Determination of the Ad ; That for the Soul to 
exert a particular Volition, is for it to caufe and determine 
that Act of Volition : I would on this obferve, that the 
Thing in Queftion feems to be forgotten, or kept out of 
Sight, in a Darknefs and Unintelligiblenefs of Speech 5 un- 
lefs fuch an Objedor would mean to contradid himfelf. The 
very Ad of Volition it felf is doubtlefs a Determination of 
Mind ; i. e. it is the Mind's drawing up a Conclufion, or 
coming to a Choice between two Things, or more, propofed 
to it. But determining among external ObjeSis of Choice, is 
not the fame with determining the JSf of Choice it felf,among 
various poffible Ads of Choice. The Queftion is, What 
infiuences, direds, or determines the Mind or Will to come 


Se(3:.II. conjidered. 39 

to fuch a Conclufion or Choice as it does ? or whajt is the 
Cauie, Ground or Reafon, why it concludes thus, and not 
Qtherwife ? Now it muft be anrwered,according to theyirminian 
Notion of Freedom, that the Will influences, orders ancl 
determines it felf thus to a6t. And if it does, I f^y, it muft 
be by fome antecedent A^. To fay, it is caufed, influencec| 
and determined by fomething, and yet not determined by any 
Thing antecedent, either in Order of Time or Nature, is a 
Contradi6tion. For that is what is meant by a Thing's be- 
ing prior in the Order of Nature, that it is fome Way the 
Caufe or Reafon of the Thing, with Refped to which it is 
faid to be prior. 

If the particular A(5t or Exertion of Will, which comes 
into Exiftence,be anyThing properly determined at all,then ij 
has fome Caufe of it's exifting, and of it's exifting in fuch ^ 
particular determinate Manner, and not another ; fome 
Caufe, whofe Influence decides the Matter : which Caufe i$ 
diftindt from the EfFe6l, and prior to it. But to fay, that the 
Will or Mind orders, influences and determines it felf to ex- 
ert fuch an A6t as it does, by the very Exertion it felf, is to 
make the Exertion both Cauie & EfFed: j or the exerting fuch 
an A(5t, to be a Caufe of the Exertion of fuch an A6t. Fo]^ 
the Queftion is. What is the Caufe and Reafon of the Soul'^ 
exerting fuch an h&i ? To which the Anfwer is, the Soul ex- 
erts fuch an A(5t,and that is the Caufe of it. And fo, by this, 
the Exertion muft be prior in the Order of Nature to it felf, 
and diftind from it felf. 

(3.J If the Meaning be, that the Soul's Exertion of fuch 
a particular Adt of Will, is a Thing that comes to pafs of it 
felf without any Caufe ; and that there is abfolutely no 
Ground or Reafon of the Soul's being determined to exert 
fuch a Volition, and make fuch a Choice, rather than ano- 
ther ; I fay, if this be the Meaning of Jrmimans^ when they 
contend fo earneftly for the Will's determining it's own Acts, 
and for Liberty of Will confifting in Self-determming Power ; 
they do nothing but confound Themfelves and others with 
Words without a Meaning. In the Queftion, fP^hat determines 
the JVill f and in their Anfwer, that the Will determines it felf^ 
and in all the Difpute about it, it feems to be taken for grant- 
ed, that fomething determines the W^ill ; and the Controverfy 
on this Head is not, whether any Thing at all determmes it, 
or whether it's Determination has any Caufe or Foundation 
at all ; But where the Foundation of it is, whether in the 


40 Evafions conjidered. Part IL 

Will it felf, or fomewhere elfe. But if the Thing intended 
be what is above-mention'd, then all comes to this, that No- 
thing at all determines the Will ; Volitio i having abiblutely 
no Caufe orFoundation of it'sExiflence,either within, or with- 
out. There is a great Noife made about Self-determining 
Power, as the Source of all free A6ts of the Will : But when 
the Matter comes to be explained, the Meaning is, that no 
Power at all is the Source of thefe Ads, neither Self-deter- 
mining Power, nor any other, but they arife from Nothing ; 
no Caufe, no Power, no Influence, being at all concern'd in 
the Matter. 

However, this very Thing, even that the free Ads of the 
Will are Events which come to pafs without a Caufe, is cer- 
tainly implied in the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will ; tho' 
it be very inconfiftent with many other Things in their 
Scheme, and repugnant to fome Things implied in their No- 
tion of Liberty. Their Opinion implies, that the particular 
Determination of Volition is without any Caufe ; becaufe 
they hold the free Ads of the Will to be Contingent Events ; 
and Contingence is effential to Freedom in their Notion of it. 
But certainly, thofe Things which have a prior Ground and 
Reafoa of their particular Exiftence, a Caufe which antece- 
dently determines them to be, and determines them to be 
juft as they are, don't happen contingently. If fomething 
foregoing, by a caufal Influence and Connedion, determines 
and fixes precifely their coming to pafs, and the Manner of 
it, then it don't remain a contingent Thing whether They 
ihali come to pafs or no. 

And becaufe it is a Quefl:ion, in many Refpeds, very im- 
portant in this Controverfy about the Freedom of Will, 
Whether the free A6ls of the Will are Events which come to pafs 
without a Caufe ? I (hall be particular in examining this 
Point in the two following Sedions. 


Sfea^.ill. No Event without a Caufe. 41 

Section III. 

Whether any Event whatfoeve?\andV oWtxon 
in particular^ can co77ie to pajs without 
a Caufe of it's Exijience. 

i'r . ■ ■■ , ; 

BEfore I enter on any Argument on this Subje^, I would 
explain how I would be underftood, when I ufe the 
Word Caufe in this Difcourfe : fince, for want of a 
better Word, 1 fliall have Occafion to ufe it in a Senfe which 
is more extenfive, than that in which it is fometimes ufed* 
The Word is often ufed in fo retrained a Senfe as to fignify 
only that which has a pofitive Efficiency or Influence to produce 
a Thing, or bring it to pafs. But there are many Things 
tvhich have no fuch pofitive productive Influence ; which yet 
are Caufes in that Refpe6t, that they have truly the Nature 
of a Ground or Reafon why fome Things are, rather than 
others ; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwife. 
Thus the Abfence of the Sun in the Night, is not the Caufe 
of the falling of the Dew at that Time, in the fame Manner 
as it's Beams are the Caufe of the Afcending of the Vapours 
in the Da) -Time ; And it's Withdrawment in the Winter, is 
not in the fame Manner the Caufe of the Freezing of the 
Waters, as it's Approach in the Spring is the Caufe of their 
Thawing. But yet the Withdrawment or Abfence of the 
Sun is an Antecedent, with which thefe EfFe(ffs in the Night 
and Winter are connected, and on which they depend ; and 
is one Thing that belongs to the Ground and Reafon why 
they come to pafs at that Time, rather than at other Times ; 
, tho' the Abfence of the Sun is Nothing pofitive, nor has 
atiy pojGitive Influence. 

It may be further obferved, that when I fpeak of ConneSiion 
■ef Caufes and Effeds^ I have Refpect to moral Caufes, as well 
as thofe that are called natural in Diftindion from 'em. 
Moral Caufes may be Caufes in as proper a Senfe, as any 
Caufes whatfoever ; may have as real an Influence, and may 
as truly be the Ground and Reafon of an Event's coming to 

Therefore I fometimes ufe theV/ord Caife^ in this Enquiry^ 
to fignify any AntHidm>i either natural or moral, pofitive or 

F negative, 

42 No Event without a Caufe. Part IL 

negative, on which an Event, either a Thing, or the Manner 
and Circumftance of a Thing, fo depends, that it is the 
Ground and Reafon, either in Whole, or in Part, why it is, 
rather than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwife j 
Or, in other Words, any Antecedent with which a confeqiient 
Event is fo connected, that it truly belongs to the Reafoa 
why the Proportion which affirms that Event, is true ; whe- 
ther it has any pofitive Influence, or not. And in an Agrea- 
blenefs to this, I fometimes ufe the Word Effe^^ for the 
Confequence of another Thing, which is perhaps rather an 
Occafion than a Caufe, moft properly fpeaking. 

I am the more careful thus to explain my Meaning, that I 
may cut off Occafion, from any that might feek Occafion to 
cavil and object againft fome Things which I may fay con* 
cerning the 'Dependance of all Things which come to pafs, 
on fome Caufe, and their Connection with their Caufe, 

Having thus explained what I mean by Cauje^ I afTert, that 
Nothing ever comes to pafs without a Caufe. What is Self- 
exigent muft be from Eternity, and mull be unchangeable : 
But as to all lliings that begin to hc^ they are not belf-ex- 
iftent, and therefore muft have fome Foundation of their Ex- 
tftence without themfelves. — That whatfoever begins to be, 
which before was not,muft have a Caufe why it then begins to 
cxift, fccms to be the firfi: Dictate of the common and natural 
Senfe which God hath implanted in the Minds of all 
Mankind, and the main Foundation of all our Reafonings 
about the Exiftence of Things, paft, prefent, or to come. 

And this Didate of common Senfe equally refpects Sub- 
fiances and Modes, or Things and the Manner and Circum- 
flances of Things. Thus, if we fee a Body which has hither- 
to been at Reft, ftart out of a State of Reft, and begin 
to move, we do as naturally and neceffarily fuppofe there is 
fome Caufe or Reafon of this new Mode of Exiftence, as 
of the Exiftence of a Body it itM which had hitherto not 
exifted. And fo if a Body, which had hitherto moved in a 
certain Direction, fhould fuddenly change the Direction of 
its Motion ; or if it ftiould put off it's old Figure, and take 
a new one ; or change it's Colour : the Beginning of thefe 
new Modes is a new Event, and the Mind of Mankind 
neceffiarily fuppofes tiiat there \% fome Caufe or Reafon of 


Seil.III. No Eve?tt without a Caufe. 43 

■ If this grand Principle of common Senfe be taken away, all 
Arguing tromEffects to Caufes ceafethjand fo all Knowlege of 
any £x;itence, befides what we have by the moft direct and 
immediate Intuition. Particularly all our Proof of the Being 
of God ceafes : We argue his Being from our own Being, 
ana the Being of othtr Things, which we are fenfibie once 
were not, but have begun to be ; and from the Being of the 
World, with all it*s conftituent Parts, and the Manner ot 
their Kxirtcnce 5 all which we fee plainly are not neceffary in 
their own Nature, and fo not Self-exiftent, and therefore 
muil have a Caufe. But if Things, not in themfelves ne- 
celTary, may begin to be without a Caufe, all this arguing is 

Indeed, I will not afErm, that there is in the Nature of 
Th ngs no Foundation for the Knowledge of the Being of 
God Without any Evidence of it from his Works. I do fup- 
pofe there is a great Abfurdity, in the Nature of Things fun- 
p!y confidered, in fuppofing that there fhould be no God, 
or in denying Being m general, and fuppofmg an eternal, 
abfolute, univerfal Nothing : And therefore that here would 
be Foundation of intuitive Evidence that it cannot be, and 
that eternal infinite moft perfect Being muft be ; if we had 
Strength and Compreheniion of Mind fafficient, to have a 
clear Idea of general and univerfal Being, or, which is 
the fame Thing, of the infinite, eternal, moft perfed di- 
vine Nature and Eftence. But then we fhould not properly 
come to the Knowledge of the Being of God by arguing ; 
but our Evidence would be intuitive : We Ihould fee it, as 
we fee other Things that are necelTary in themfelves, the 
Contraries of which are in their own Nature abfurd and con- 
tradiilory ; as we fee that twice two is four ; and as we fee 
that a Circle has no Angles. If we had as clear an Idea of 
univerfal ini'nite Entity, as we have of thefe other Things, I 
fuppoie we ihould moft intuitively fee the Abfurdity of fuppo- 
fing fuch Being not to be ; fhould immediately fee there 
is no Room tor the Queftion, whether it is pofTible that 
Being, in the moft general abftraded Notion of it, fliould 
not be. But we have not that Strength and Extent of Mind, 
to know this certainly in this intuitive independent Man- 
ner : But the Way that Mankind come to the Knowledge of 
the Being of God, is that which the Apoftle fpeaks of, Rom. 
,\. 20. 77?^ ifjvifihle Things of Him, from the Creation of the IVcrld^ 
are clearly fe en ; being under fiood by the Things that are made ; even 
his eternal Power and Godhead, VVe firjl afcend^ and prove a 

F 2 Pojleriorip 

44 J^o 'Event without a Caufe. Part 11. 

Pofteriorly or from Effedls, that there muft be an eternal 
Caufe ; and then fecondly^ prove by Argumentation, not In- 
tuition, that this Being muft be necefTarily ejciftent ; and 
then thirdly^ from the proved NeceiTity of hisExiftencejWe may 
defccnd^ and prove ^any of his Perfedlions a Priori, 

But if once this grand Principle of common Senfe be given 
up, that what is not necejfary in it felf^ mufl have a Caufe ; an(J 
•we begin to maintain, that Things may come into Exiftence, 
and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of them- 
felves, without any Caufe \ all our Means of afcending in 
our arguing from the Creature to the Creator, and all our 
Evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one Blow. In 
this Cafe, we can't prove that there is a God, either from 
the Being of the World, and the Creatures in it, or from the 
Manner of their Being, their Order, Beauty and Ufe. For 
if Things may come intp Exiftence without any Caufe at all, 
then they doubtlefs may without any Caufe anfwerable to the 
Effed. Our Minds do alike naturally fuppofe and determine 
both thefe Things j namely, that what begins to be has a 
Caufe, and alfo that it has a Caufe proportionable and 
agreable to the EfFea. The fame Principle which leads us to 
determine, that there cannot be any Thing coming to pafs 
without a Caufe, leads us to determine that there cannot be 
more in the Effea than in the Caufe. 

Yea, if once it fhould be allowed, that Things may come 
to pals without a Caufe, we Ihould not only have no Proof 
of the Being of _ God, but we (hould be without Evidence of 
the Exiil:cnce of any Thing whatfoever, but our own imme- 
diately prefent Ideas and Confcioufnefs. For we have no 
Wa^ to prove any Thing elfe, but by arguing from Effeas 
to Caules : from the Ideas now immediately in View, we ar- 
gue other Things not immediateiy in View : from Senfations 
now excited in us, we infer the Exiftence of Things without 
us, as theCaufes of thefe Senfations : And from the :£x- 
iftence of thefe Things, we argue other Thiigs, which they 
depend on, as Eflfeas on Caufes. We infer the paft Exift- 
ence of our Selves, or any Thing elfe, by Memory ; only 
as we argue, that the Ideas, which are now in our Minds, 
5ire the Confequences of paft Ideas and Senfations. We im- 
piediately perceive nothing elfe but the Ideas which are this 
Moment extant in our Minds. W^e perceive or know other 
Things only hy Meam qf thefe, as neceflarily conneaed with 

othersj No Event without a Caufe. 45 

others, and dependent on them. But if Things may b^ 
without Caufes, all this neceflary Connecftion and Depen- 
iience is dilTolved, and fo all Means of our Knowledge is 
gone. ' If there be no Abrurdity or Difficulty in fuppofing 
one Thing to Hart out of Non-Exiftence, into Being, of ^t 
felf without a Caufe ; then there is no Abfurdity or Difficulty 
in fuppofing the fame of Millions of Millions. For Nothing, 
or no Difficulty multiplied, ftill is Nothing, or no Difficulty : 
Nothing multiplied by Nothing don't increafe the Sum. 

And indeed, according to the Hypothefis I am opppfin^, 
of the A6ts of the Will coming to pafs without a Caufe, it 
is the Cafe in Fad, that Millions of Millions of Events are 
continually coming into Exiftence Contingently^ without any 
Caufe or Reafon v/hy they do fo, all over the World, every 
Day and Hour, thro' all Ages. So it is in a conftant Suc- 
ceffion, in every moral Agent. This Contingency, this 
efficient Nothing, this effectual No-Caufe, is always ready 
at Hand, to produce this Sort of EfFeds, as long as the 
Agent exifts, and as often as he has Occalion. 

If it were fo, that Things only of one Kind, wz. AcSVs of 
the Will, feem'd to come to pafs of Themfelves'j but thofe 
of this Sort in general came hito Being thus 5 and it were 
an Event that was continual, and that happen'd in a Courfe, 
wherever were capable Subjeds of fuch Events ; this very 
Thing would demonflrate that there was fome Caufe of theni, 
which made fuch a Difference between this Event and others, 
^nd that they did not really happen contingently. For Con- 
tingence is blind, and do^s not pick and choofe for a particu- 
lar Sort of Events. Nothing has no Choice. ThisNo-Caufe, 
which caufes no Exiftence, can't caufe the Exiftence which 
comes to pafs, to be of one particular Sort only, diftmguifli'd 
from all others. Thus, that only one Sort of Matter drops 
out of the Heavens, even Water, and that this comes fo 
often, fo conflantly and plentifully, all over the World, in all 
Ages, Ihows that there is fome Caufe or Reafon of the falling 
of Water out of the Heavens ; and that fomething beiides 
meer Contingence has a Hand in the Matter. 

If we fliould fuppofe Non-entity to be about to bring forth ; 
and Things were coming into Exiftence, without any Caufe 
or Antecedent, on which the Exiftence, or Kind or Manner 
of Exiftence depends ; or which could at all determine whe- 
ther the Things (hould be 5 Stones, or Stars, or Beafts, or 


46 Volition arifes not Part 11. 

Angels, or human Bodies, or Souls, or only fome new Mo- 
tion or Figure in natural Bodies, or fome new Senfations in 
Animals, or new Ideas in the human Uoderftanding, or new 
Volitions in the Will J or any Thing elfe of all the infinite 
Number of Poflibles ; then certainly it would not be expect- 
ed, altho' many Millions of Millions of Things are 
coming into Exiftence in this Manner, all over the Face of 
the Earth, that they fhould all be only of one particular 
Kind, and that it fliould be thus in all Ages, and that this 
Sort of Exiftences fliould never fail to come to pafs where 
there is Room for them, or a Subjecft capable of them, and 
that conftantly, whenever there is Occafion for them. 

If any fhould imagine, there is fomething in the Sort of 
Event that renders it poffible for it to come into Exiftence 
without a Caufe ; and fhould fay, that the free Acfts of the 
Will are Exiftences of an exceeding different Nature from 
other Things ; by Reafon of which they may come into Ex- 
iftence without any previous Ground or Reafon of it, tho* 
other Things cannot ; If they make this Objedion in good 
Earneft, it would be an Evidence of their ftrangely forget- 
ing themfelves : For they would be giving an Account of 
fome Ground of the Exiftence of a Thing, when at the fame 
Time they would maintain there is no Ground of it's Exift- 
ence. Therefore I would obferve, that the particular Nature 
of Exiftence, be it never fo diverfe from others, can lay no 
Foundation for that Thing's coming into Exiftence without a 
Caufe ; becaufe to fuppofe this, would be to fuppofe the 
particular Nature of Exiftence to be a Thing prior to the 
Exiftence ; and fo a Thing which makes Way for Exift- 
ence, with fuch a Circumftance, namely without a Caufe or 
Reafon of Exiftence. But that which m any Refpe6t makes 
Way for a Thing's coming into Being, or tor any Manner 
or Circumftance of iv's firft Exiftence, muft be prior to the 
Exiftence. The diftinguiftiM Nature of the EfFea, which 
is fomething belonging to the Effe6t, can't have Influence 
backward, to ad before it is. The peculiar Nature of that 
Thing called Volition, can do Nothing, can have no Influ- 
ence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for it's 
Influence : for then the Thing has made fure of Exiftence 
already, without it's Help. 

So that it is indeed as repugnant to Reafon, to fuppofe 
that an Adl of the Will ftiouid come into Exiftence without 
a Caufe, as to fuppofe the human Soul, or an Angel, or 


§e6l.IV. withmt a Caufe. 47 

the Globe of the Earth, or the whole Univerfe, (hould come 
into Exigence without a Caufe. And if once we allow, that 
fuch a Sort of Effed as a Volition may come to pafs without 
a Caufe, how do we know but that many other Sorts of 
Effe<5ls may do fo too ? 'Tis not the particular Kind of 
EfFedt that makes the Abfurdity of fuppofmg it has being 
without a Caufe, but fomething which is common to all 
Things that ever begin to be, viz, that they are not Self- 
exiftent, or ncceflary in the Nature of Things. 

Section IV. , 

Whether Volition can arife without a Caujhy 
through the Activity of the Nature of 
the SouL 

THE Author of the Efay on the Freedom of the TFilI in 
God and the Creatures^ in Anfwer to that ObjecStion 
againft his Dodrine of a Self-determining Power in the 
Will, (P. 68,69.) ThatNothlng is,or cvmes to fafs^without afuffident 
Reafon why it is, and why it is in this Manner rather than another ^ 
allows that it is thus in corporeal Things, which are -properly 
ond philofophically fp caking pajjive Beings ; but denies that it is 
thus in Spirits^ which are Beings of an aSfive Nature^ who have 
the Spring of ASiion within thejnfelveSy and can determine them-- 
felves. By which it is plainly fuppofed, that fuch an Event 
as an Ad of the Will, may come to pafs in a Spirit, without 
^ fufficicnt Reafon why it comes to pafs, or why it is after 
this Manner, rather than another ; by Reafon of the Acti- 
vity of the Nature of a Spirit.—— But certainly this Author, 
in this Matter, mull be very unwary and inadvertent. For, 

I. The Objedion or DifRculty propofed by this Author, 
feems to be forgotten in his Anfwer or Solution. The very 
Difficulty, as he himfelf propofes it, is this ; How an Event 
can come to pafs witiwut a fufpcient Reafcn why it is, or why it 
is in this Manner rather than another f Inftead of folving this 
Difficulty, or aniwenng this Queflion with Regard to Voli- 
tion, as he propofes, he forgets himfelf, and anfwers ano- 
ther Queftjon quite divcrfe, and wholly inconfiftent with 
this, vis:.. What is a fufficient Reafon why it is, and why it is 


48 Volition not without a Caufe Part II. 

in this Manner rather than another ? And he afTigns the 
Active Being's own Determination as the Caufe, and a 
Caufe fufficient for the EfFe6t ; and leaves all the Difficulty 
ilrirefolved, and the Queftion unanfwered, which yet returns, 
^ven, How the Soul's own Determination, which he fpeaks 
of, came to exift, and to be what it was without a Caufe ? 
The Adivity of the Soul may enable it to be the Caufe of 
Efffedts' ; but it doA't at all enable or help it to be the Sub- 
je<5t of Effedts which have no Caufe ; which is the Thing 
this Author fuppof^s concerning A6ls of the Will. Activity 
of Nature will no more enable a Being to produce Effeds, 
and determine the Manner of their Exiftence, within it felf, 
without a Caufe, than out of it felf, in fome other Being. 
But if an adive Being (hould, through it's Adivity, produce 
and determine an Effedl in fome external Objecl, how abfurd 
would it be to fay, that theEffedt was produced without a Caufe ! 

2. The Queftion is not fo much. How a Spirit endowed 

with Adivity comes to acSt, as why it exerts fuch an A61, \ 

and not another ; or why it ads with fuch a particular De- ;; 

termination ? If Adivity of Nature be theCaufe why a Spirit '' 

(the Soul of Man for Inltance) ads, and don't lie ftill ; yet j 

that alone is not the Caufe why it's Adion is thus and thus ( 

limited, directed and determined. Adlive Nature is a general \ 
Thing ; 'tis an Ability or Tendency of Nature to Adion, 

generally taken ; which may be a Caufe why the Soul ,j 

ads as Occafion or Reafon is given ; but this alone ■■. 

can't be a fufficient Caufe why the Soul exerts fuch ' 

a particular Ad, at fuch a Time, rather than others. ' 

In order to this, there muft be fomething befides a general \ 

Tendency to Adion ; there muft alfo be a particular Ten- ] 

dency to that individual Adion. If it ftiould be afked, I 

why the Soul of Man ufes it's Adivity in fuch a Manner as 1 

it does ; and it ftiould be anfwered, that the Soul ufes it's ■; 

Adivity thus, rather than otherwife, becaufe it has Adivity ; \ 

would fuch an Anfwer fatisfy a rational Man ? Would it ] 

not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one I 'i 

3. An adive Being can bring no Effeds to pafs by his ' 
Adivity, but what are confequent upon his ading : He pro- I 
duces Nothing by his Adivity, any other Way than by the \ 
Exercife of his Adivity, and fo Nothing but the Fruits of i 
it's Exercife : He brings Nothing to pafs by a dormant I 
Adivity. But the Exercife of his Adivity is Adion ; and fo ' 
his Adion, or Exercife of his Adivity, roufi; be prior to the , 

Sedl-IV. thro the SouTs Adlivity. 49 

EfFe(5ts of his Acclivity. If an a6live Being produces an 
EfFe6l in another Beings about which IiiSJ*' Activity is convcr- 
fant, the EfFe6l being the Fruit of his Ailivity, his A6ti- 
vity muft be firft exercifed or exerted, and the Effect of it 
muft follow. So it murt: be, with equal Reafon, if the 
a6live Being is his own Objev5t, and his Acflivity is conver- 
fant about Himfelf, to produce and determine fome Eifedl 
in himfelf ; ftill the Exercife of his AvStivity muft go before 
the Effect, which he brings to pafs and determines by it. 
And therefore his A6tivity can't be the Caufe of the Deter- 
mination of the firft A6lion, or Exerciie of Adivity it feJf, 
whence the Effeds of A6livity arife \ for that would imply 
aContradi6tion ; It would be to fay,the firft Exercife of Adivity 
is before the firft Exercife of A6tivity, and is the Caufe of it. 

4. That the Soul, tho' an a6live Subftance, can't dherjify 
it's own Ads, but by firft a6ting ; or be a determinmg 
Caufe of different Ads, or any different Effeds, fometimes 
of one Kind, and fometmies of another, any other Way 
than in Confequence 6f it's own diverfe Ads, is manifeft by 
this ; That if fo, then the faine Caufe, the fame caufal 
Power, Force or Influence, ivkhout Variation in any Refpe£fy 
would produce different Effeds at different Time's. For the 
fame Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and the fame 
adive Nature of the Soul before it is exerted (i, e. before in 
the Order of Naturej would be the Caufe of different 
Effeds, "uiz, different Volitions at diff'erent Times. But the 
Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and it's adive Nature 
before it is exerted, are the fame without Variation. For 'tis 
fome Ad that makes the firft Variation in the Caufe, as to any 
caufal Exertion, Force or Influence. But if it be fo, that 
the Soul has no different Caufality, or diverfe caufal Force 
or Influence, in producing thefe diverfe Effeds , then 'tis 
evident, that the Soul has no Influence, no Hand in the 
d'iverfity of the Effed ; and that the Difference of the Effed 
can't be owing to any Thing in the Soul ; or which is the 
fame Thing, the Soul don't determine the Diverfity of the 

Effed ; which is contrary to the Supp9fition. 'Tis true, 

the Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and before there is 
any Difference in that Refped, may be in a different State 
and Circumftances : But thofe whom I oppofe, v/ill not: 
allov/ the diff"erent Circumftances of the Soul to be the de- 
termining Caufes of the i\ds of the Vv^'ill • as being con- 
trary to tiieir Notion of Self-detenninatiou and Self-motiou, 

50 Volition not without a Caufe &c. Part IL 

5. Let us fuppofe, as thefe Divines do, that there are no 
Aas of the Soul, ftriaiy fpeaking, but free Volitions ; 
Then it will follow, that the Soul is an a^ive Being in 
Nothing further than it is a voluntary or ele6tive Being ; 
and whepever it produces EfFeds aaively, it produces Effeds 
voluntarily and eledively. But to produce Effeds thus, is 
the fame Thing as to produce Effects in Confequence of^ and 
according to it's own Choice. And if fo, then furely the 
Soul don't by it's Adtivity produce all it's own Ads of Will 
or Choice themfeives : For this, by the Suppofition, is to 
produce all it's free A6ls of Choice voluntarily and eledive- 
ly, or in Confequence of it's own free Ads of Choice, which 
brings the Matter diredly to the fore-mentioned Contra- 
diction, of a free A6t of Choice before the tirft free Ad of 

Choice. According to thefe Gentlemen's own Notion of 

Adion, if there arifes in the Mind a Volition without a free 
Ad of the Will or Choice to determine and produce it, 
the Mind is not the adive voluntary Caufe of that Voli- 
tion ; becaufe it don't arife from, nor is regulated by Choice 
or Defign» And therefore it can't be, that the Mind fliould 
be the adive, voluntary, determining Caufe of the lirft and 

leadmg Volition that relates to the Affair. The Mind's 

htv!\% 2i dcfigning Q-^wit^ only enables it to produce Effeds in 
Confequence of it's Defign ; it will not enable jit to be the 
defigning Caufe of all it's own Defigns. The Mind's being 
an ele^live Caufe, will only enable it to produce Effeds in 
Confequence of it's Ele£iions^ and according to them ; but 
can't enable it to be the eledive Caufe of all it's own Elec- 
tions ; becaufe that fuppofes an Eiedion before the firft E- 
ledion. So tli£ Mind's being an .ja^ive Caufe enables it to 
produce Effeds in Confequence of it's own ASfs^ but can't 
enable it to be the determining Caufe of all it's own Ads ; 
for that is ftill in the fame Manner a Contradidion ; as it 
fuppoles a determining Act converfant about the firft Act, 
and prior to it, having a caufal Influence on it's Exiftence, 
and Manner of Exiftence. 

I can conceive of Nothing elfe that can be meant by the 
Soul's having Power to caufe and determine it's own Voli- 
tions, as a Being to whom God has given a Power of 
Adion, but this j that God has given Power to the Soul, 
fometimes at leaft, to excite Volitions at it's Pleafure, or 
according as it chufes. And this certainly fuppofes,- in all 
fuch Caics, a Choice preceeding all Volitions which are 


Sedt. V. Thefe Evaftons imdertinent. 5 1 

thus caufed, even the very firft of them. Which runs into 
the fore-mentioned great Abfurdity. 

Therefore the Activity of the Nature of the Soul affords 
no Rehef from the Difficulties which the Notion of a Self- 
determining Power in the Will is attended with, nor will it 
help, in the leaii, it's Abfurdities and Inconfiftences. 

I . 

Section V, 

Shewing^ that if the Things ajferted in thefc 
-Eva/tons JJjould be fuppofed to be true ^ 

they are altogether imperti7unty and can t 
\ help the Caufe ^Arminian Liberty ; And 

how f this being the State of the Cafe ) 

Arminian Writers are obliged to talk in- 


WHAT was lad obferved in the preceeding Se(5Vion 
may {hew, not only that the adive Nature of the 
Soul can't be a Reafon why any AcSt of the Will is, 
or why it is in this Manner, rather than another ; but alio 
that if it could be fo, and it could be proved that Volitions 
are contingent Events, in that Senfe, that their Being and 
Manner of Being is not fix'd or determined by any Caufe, 
or any Thing antecedent -, it would not at all ferve the Pur- 
pofe of Armimans^ to eftablifh the Freedom of the Will, ac- 
cording to their Notion of it's Freedom, as confilting in the 
Will's Determination ofit'i felf; which fuppofes every free 
Aa of the Will to be determined by fome Ad of the W^ill 
going before to determine it ; in as much as for the Will to 
determine a Thing, is the fame as for the Soul to determine 
a Thing by Willing ; and there is no ^Vay that the Will can 
determine an A<51 of the Will, than by xc77/;;z^ that A6t of 
the Will, or, which is the fame Thing, chufing it. So that 
here muft be two Ads of the Will in the Cafe, one goin^ 
before another, one converfant about the other, and the lat- 
ter the Objedt of the former, and chofen by the former. 

G % If 

52 Thefe EvaJ^om impertinent. Pattll. 

If the Will don't c^ufe and determine the Act by Choice, 
it don't caufe or determine it at all ; for that which is hot. 
determined by Choice, is not determined voluntarily or' 
nx-iIUngly : And to fay, that the Will determines fomething. 
>^/hich the Soul don't determine willingly, is as much as to 
fiy, that fomething is done by the Will, which the Soul 
don't do with it's Will. 

So that if Armiman Liberty of Will, confifting in the 
Will's determining it's own Ads, be maintained, the old 
Abfurdity and Contradiction muft be maintained, that every 
free A61 of Will is caufed and determined by a foregoing free 
Aa of Will. Which don't confift with the free Aa's anfing 
'yvithout any Caufe, and being fo contingent, as not be fix'd 
by any Thing fore-going. So that this Evafion muft be given 
i/p, as not at ail relieving, and as that which, inftead of fup- 
porting this Sort of Liberty, diredly deflroys it. 

And if it {hould be fuppofed, that the Soul determines it's 
own Acfts of Will fome other Way, than by a foregoing 
A6t of Will ; ftill it will not help the Caufe of their Liberty 
of Will. \{ it determines them by an Act of the Under- 
flanding, or fome other Power, then the IVtll don't deter- 
mine it J elf ', and fo the S:lf-deter?nming Power of the Will is 
given up. And what Liberty is there exercifed, according to 
their own Opinion of Liberty, by the Soul's being deter- 
mined by fomething befides ifs own Choice P The Acts pf 
the WilJ, it is true, may be directed, and effe(5laally deter- 
mined and lix'd ; but it is not done by the Soul's own Will 
and Pleafiire : There is no Exercife at all of Choice or Will 
in producing the Effect ; And if If^i/l and Choice are not 
exercifed in it, how is the Liberty of the Will exercifed in it ? 

So th at \ct Jnnimans turn which Way they pleafe with their 
Notion of Liberty, confuting in the Will's determining it's 
own ASsy their Kotion deftroys it felf. If they hold every 
free Act of Will to be determined by the Soul's own free 
Choice, or foregqing free A6t of Will 5 foregoing^ either in 
the Order of Time, or Nature ; It implies that grofs Contra- 
diction, that the tirft free A<Si belonging to the Affair, is de- 
termined by a free A(5t which is before it. Or if they fay 
thot the free Acts of the Will are determined by fome other 
>^<:? of the Soul, and not an ACt of Will or Choice, Tl is 
aifodefcroys their Notion of Liberty, confining in the A6ts 
of the Wiil being determined by the fVill it felf \ Or 
. • ■ if 

^ci:.V. Arminians talk inconfiftently. 53 

if they hold that the A6ls of the Will are determined by 
Nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contin- 

fent in that Senfe, that they are determined and fixed by no 
'aufe at all ; this alfo deftroys their Notion of Liberty, con- 
fifting in the Will's determining it's own Ads. 

This being the true State of the Jr?nwia7i Notion of Li- 
berty, it hence coines to pafs, that the Writers that defend 
it are forced into grofs Liconfidences, in what they fay upon 
this Subje61:. To inftance in Dr. JVhitby ; he in hisDifcourfe 
on the Freedom of the Will, * oppofes the Opinion of the 
Cahinifis^ who place Man's Liberty only in a Poiuer of doing 
what He w'lll^ as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. 
Hohbes. And yet he himfelf mentions the very fame Notion 
of Liberty, as the Didate of the Senfe and coinmon Reafon of 
Mankind^ and a Rule laid down by the Light of Nature ; viz. That 
Liberty is a Power of aofing from our Selves^ or DOING WHAT 
WE IflLL. t This is indeed, as he fays, a Thing agreable 
to the ^enfe and comrnon R:afcn of Mank'.nd ; 'and therefore 'tis 
not To much to be v^7ondered at, that he unawares acknow- 
ledges it agaiaft himielf : For if Liberty don't confift in this, 
what ejfe can be deviled that it fliould confift in ? If it be 
faid, as Dr. Whitby elfewhere iniifts, That it don't only con- 
fiil in Liberty of doing zvhat we will^ but alfo a Liberty of 
Willing without Neceflity ; dill the Queftien returns. What 
does that Liberty of willing without Necefuty coniift in, but 
in a Fovver of willing as we pleafe^ without being impeded by 
a contrary Neceillty ? or in other Words, A Liberty for the 
Soul in it's wiliing to acft according to it's own Choice P Yea, 
this very Thing the fame Author feems to allow, and fup- 
pcfi again and again, in the Ufe he makes of Sayings of the 
Fathers, whom he quotes as his Vouchers. Thus he cites 
thefe Words of Origen, which he produces as a Teftimony 
on his Side ; j| The Soul aSfs By HER OJl^ CHOICE, and 
it is free for her to incline to zvhat ever Part SHE WILL. ,And 
thofe Words of fujiin Martyr ; % ^'^^ Do^rine of the ChrijVians 
is this. That Nothing is dons or ftijfered according to Fate, but that 
eim-y Man doth Good or Evil ACCORDING TO HIS OWN 
FREE CHOICE. And from Eufebius, thefe Words ; 4- If 
Fate be ejlablifh'd, Philofophy and Piety are overthrown. — Ail 
thefe Things depending upon the NeceJJity introduced by the Stars^ 


* In his Book on the five Points, 2d Edit. P. 350, 35i,3>-- 
+ Ibid. p. 325, 326. jl Ibid, P. 342. % Ibid. P.3 6o. \Itid. 
^' 363- 

54 Arminians talk inconfiftently. Part II. 

md not upon Meditation and Exertife PROCEEDING FROM 
OUR Om^ FREE CHOICE. And again, the Words- of 
Macaritis^ || God^ to preferve the Liberty of Mali's TVill^ Juffered 
their Bodies to die^ that it might he IN THEIR CHOICE to turn 
to Good or Evil. — They who are aSied by the Holy Spirit^ are 
not held under any Nccejjity^ hut have Liberty to turn themfelves^ 
^md DO WHAT THEY WILL in this Life. 

Thus, the Do<5lor in EfFe6l comes into that very No- 
tion of Liberty, which the Calvinijis have ; which he at 
the fame Time condemns, as agreeing with the Opinion of 
Wx. HohbeSy namely, the Soul's Aciing by it's oivn Choice, Aden's 
doing Good or Evil according to their own free Choice^ Their being 
in that Exertife which proceeds from their own free Choice, Having 
it in their Choice to turn to Good or Evil, and doing what they zvilL 
So that if Men exercife this Liberty in the Acts of the Will 
themfelves, it muft be in exerting A6ts of Will as they will, 
or according to their own free Choice ; or exerting Acts of Will 
that proceed frcin their Choice. And if it be fo, then let every 
one judge whether this don't fuppofe a free Choice going be- 
fore the free kdi of Will, or whether an Acl: of Choice don't 
go before that A6t of the Will which proceeds from it. And 
if it be thus with all free Ads of the Will, then let eveiy 
one judge, vv'hether it won't follow^ that there is a free 
Choice or Will going before the firft free A61 of the Will 
exerted in the Cafe. And then let every one judge, whetlier 
this be not a Contradicftion. And finally, let every one 
uidge whether in the Scheme of thefe Writers tliere be any 
rolfibility of avoiding thefe Abfurdities. 

If Liberty confifts, as Dr. Whiiby hinifelf fays, in a Man's 
doing what He will ; and a Man exercifes this Liberty, not 
only in external A(5lions, but in the Ads of the Will 'them- 
felves ; then fo far as Liberty is exercifed in the latter, it 
confifts in willing what he wills : And if any fay fo, one of 
thefe two Things muft be meant, either i. That a Man has 
Power to Will, as he docs will ; becaufe w^hat he wills, he 
wills ; and therefore has Power to will what he has Power 
to will. If this be their Meaning, then all this mighty Con- 
troverfy about Freedom of the Will and Self-determining 
Power, comes wholly to Nothing ; all that is contended 
for being no more than this, That the Mind of Man does 
>ijvhat it does, and is the Subjed of w^hat it is the Subjed of, 


X Ibid. 369, 370. . 

^QiN\. Of chujing in Things indifferent, 55 

©r that what is, is ; wherein None has any Controverfy v/ith 
them. Or, 2. The Meaning muft be, that a Man has 
Power to will as he J)leafes or chufcs to will : That is, he 
has Power by one A61 of Choice, to chufe another ; by an 
antecedent Ad of Will to chufe a confequent A(5t ; and 
therein to execute his own Choice. And if this be their 
Meaning, it is Nothing but Shuffling with thofe they difputc 
with, and baffling their own Reafon. For ftill the Queftion 
returns, wherein lies Man's Liberty in that antecedent Adi 
of Will which chofe the confequent A61. The Anfwer ac- 
cording to the fame Principles muft be, that his Liberty in 
this alio lies in his willing as he would, or as he chofe, or 
agreable to another A(5t of Choice preceeding that. And fo 
the Queftion returns in infinitu?n^ and the like Anfwer muft be 
made in infinitum : In order to fupport their Opinion, there 
muft be no Beginning, but free Ads of Will muft have 

• been chofen by foregoing free Ads of Will, in the Soul of 
every Man, without Beginning ; and fo before he had a 

' Being, from all Eternity. 

Section VI. 

Concerning theWilPs determining inT'hings 
which are perfeBly indifferent, in the 
V , J^iew of the Mind. 

A Great Argument for Self-determining Power, is the 
fuppofed Experience we univerfally have of an Ability 
to determine our Wills, in Cafes wherein no prevail- 
ing Motive is prefented : The Will (as is fuppofed) has 
It's Choice to make between two or more Things, that are 
perfedly equal in the View of the Mind ; and the Will is 
apparently altogether indifferent ; and yet we find no Diffi- 
culty in coming to a Choice ; the Will can inftantly deter- 
mine it felf to one, by a fovereign Power which it has over 
it felf, without being moved by any preponderating Induce- 


56 Of chujing in Things mdi&xQnt. PartIL 

Thus the forementioned Author of an Effay on the Freedom 
cfthe Will &c. P. 25, 26, 27, fuppofes, ^' That there are 
*' many Inftances, wherein the Wiil is determined neither 
" by prefcnt Uneafinefs, nor by the greatefi: apparent Good, 
'' nor by the laft Didate of the Underfiand ng, nor by 
'' any Thing elfe, but meerly by it feif, as a Sovereign Self- 
*' determining. Power of the Soui ; and that the Soul does 
" not will this or that A(5tion, in fome Cafes, by any other 
^' Influence, but becaufe it will. Thus (fays he) I can turn 
*' my Face to the South, or the North ; I can point with my 

'' Finger -upward, or downward. And thus, in fome Ca- 

*' fes, the Will determines it felf in a very fovereign Man- 
>* ner, becaufe it will, without a Reafon borrowed from the 
*' Underftanding : and hereby it diicovers. it's own perfe6t 
*' Power of Choice, riling from within it felf, and free from 
'' all Influence or Reftraint of any Kmd." And in Pages 66, 
70, ^73, 74. This Author very exprcfly fuppofes the Will 
in many Cafes to be determined by no Motive at all^ and aSls 
altogether without Motive, or Ground oj Preference, — Here I 
would obferve, 

I. The very Suppofltion which is here made, dire^lly con- 
tradicSts and overthrows it felf. For the Thing fuppofed, 
wherein this grand Argument confifl:s,is. That among feveral 
Things the Will a6hial]y chufes one before another, at the 
fame Time that it is perfectly indiflferent ; which is the very 
fame Thing as to fay, the Mind has a Preference, at the 
fame Time that it has no Preference. What is meant can't 
be, that the Mind is indifferent before it comes to have a 
Choice, or 'till it has a Preference ; or, which is the fame 
Thing, that the Mind is indifferent until it comes to be not 
indifferent. For certainly this Author did not fuppofe he 
had a Controverfy with any Perfon in fuppofing this. And 
then it is Nothing to his Purpofe, that the Mind which 
chufes, was indifferent once ; unlefs it chufes, remaining in- 
different ; for otherv^^ife, it don't chufe at all in that Cafe of 
Indifference, concerning which is all the Qiief^ion. Befides, 
it appears in Fa6f, that the Thing which this Author fup- 
pofes, is not that the Will chufes one Thing before ano- 
ther, concerniiig which it is indifferent before it chufes ; but 
alfo is indifferent when it chufes \ and that it's being otherwife 
than indifferent is not 'till afterwards, in Confequence of 
'it's Choice ; that the chofen Thing's appearing preferable 
and more agrcable than anotherj arifes from it's Choice 
His Words are fP. 30.J *' Where the Ob- 

Sed.VI. Ofchujing inThings indifferent. 57 

*« je(5ts which are propofed, appear equally fit or good, the 
" Will is left without a Guide or Diredor ; and therefore 
" mull make it's own Choice, by it's own Determination ; it 
" being properly a Self-determining Power. And in fuch 
*< Cafes theWill does as it were make a Good to it felf by it's 
*'~ own Choice, /. e. creates it's own Pleafure or Delight 
** in this Self-chofen Good. Even as a Man by feizing 
*' upon a Spot of unoccupied Land, in an uninhabited 
*' Country, makes it his own Poffeffion and Property, and 
*l as fuch rejoyces in it. Where Things were indifferent 
" before, the Will finds Nothing to make them more agrea- 
** ble, confidered meerly in themfelves ; but the Pleafure it 
« feels ARISING FROM IT'S OWN CHOICE, and it's 
" Perfeverance therein. We love many Things which we 
« THEM." 

This is as much as to fay, that we firft begin to prefer many 
Things, now ceafmg any longer to be indifferent with 
Refpe6l to them, purely becaufe we have prefer'd and chofen 

them before. Thefe Things muil needs be fpoken incon- 

fiderately by this Author. Choice or Preference can't be 
before it felf, in the fame Inftance, either in the Order of 
Time or Nature : It can't be the Foundation of it {^iiy or 
the Fruit or Confequence of it felf. The veryAdl of chufing 
one Thing rather than another^ is preferring that Thing, and 
that is fetting a higher Value on that Thing. But that the 
'Mind fets an higher Value on oneThing than another,is not, 
in the firil Place, the Fruit of it's fetting a higher Value on 
that Thing. 

This Author fays, P. 36. " The Will may be perfectly In- 
f** different, and yet the Will may determine it felf to chufe 
*' one or the other." And again in the fame Page, " I am 
*' entirely indifferent to either ; and yet my Will may de- 
*' termine it felf to chufe." And again, ''Which I fhall chufe 
*' muft be determined by the meer A6t of my Will." If 
the Choice is determined by a meer A€t of V/ili, then 
the Choice is determined by a meer A(fl of Choice. And 
concerning this Matter, vi%. that the Ad of the Will it felf 
is determined by an A6t of Choice, this Writer is exprefs, in 
P.72. Speaking of the Cafe, where there is no fuperiour Fit- 
nefs in Objedls prefented, he has thefe Words : " There it 
« muft aa by it's own CHOICE, and determine it k\i as 
it PLEASES." Where it is fuppofed that the very Deter- 

II jmnation^ 

38 Of the Will's determinhig Part II. 

mination^ which is the Ground and Spring of the WilFs Ad, 
\% Tin KQi oi Choice 2iW^ Plea jure ^ wherein one A(5t ,is more 
agreable, and the Mmd better pleafed in it than another ; 
and this Preference^ and fuperiour Pleafednefs is the Ground of " 
all it does in the Cafe. And if fo, the Mind is not indiffe- 
rent when it determines it k\^, but had rather do one Thing 
than another, had rather determine it felf one Way than 
another. And therefore the Will don't ad at ail in In- 
difference ; not fo much as in th^ firft Step it takes, or the " 
firft Rife and Beginning of it's ading. If it be poffible foi* 
the Underftanding to a6l in Indifference, yet to be fure the 
Will never does ; becaufe the Will's beginning to ad is the 
very fame Thing as it's beginning to chufe or pr fer. And 
if in the very iirlt Ad of the Will, the Mind prefers fome- 
thing, then the Idea of that Thing prefer'd, does at that 
Time preponderate, or prevail in the Mind ; or, which is 
the fame Thing, the Idea of it has a prevailing Influence on 
the Will. So that this wholly deftroys the Thing fuppofed, 
'vix. That the Mind can by a fovereign Power chufe one of 
two or more Things, which in the View of the Mind are, 
in every Reiped, pcrfedly equal, one of which does not at 
all preponderate, nor has any prevailing Influence on the 
Mind above another. 

So that this Author, in his grand Argument for the Abi- 
lity of the Will to chufe one of two, or more Things, 
concerning which it is perfedly indifferent, does at the fame 
Time, in Effed, deny the Thing he fuppofes, and allows 
«nd aflerts the Point he endeavours to overtlirow ; even that 
the Will, in chufing, is fubjed to no prevailing Influence 
of the Idea, or View of the Thing chofen. And indeed it 
is im;:)offibl& to offer this Argument without overthrowing it ; 
the Thing fuppofod in it being inconfiftent with it felf, 
and that which denies it felf. To fuppofe the Will to ad 
at all in a State of perfcd Indifference, either to determine 
it felf, or to do any 'I^hing elfej is to affert that the Mind 
chufe s without chufing. To fay that when it is indifferent, 
it can do as it pleafes, is to fay that it can follow it's Plea- 
fure, when it has no Pleafure to follow. And therefore if 
there be any Difficulty in the Inftances of two Cakes, or two 
Eggs kc. which are exactly alike, one as good as another ; 
concerning which this Author iuppofes the Mind in Fad has 
a Choice^ and fo in Puffed fuppofes that it has a Preference ; 
it as much concern'd Himfeif to folve the Difliculty, as it 
"does thofe whom he oppofes. For if thefe Inftances prove 

Sed.VI. in Things indifferent. 59 

any Thing to his Purpofe, they prove that a Man chufes 
without Choice. And yet this is not to his Purpoie ; be- 
caufe if this is what he allerts, his own Words are as much 
^gainft him, and do as much contradidl him, as the"* Words 
of thofe he difputes againft can do. 

2. There is no great Difiicuhy in (liewing, in fuch Inftan- 
ces as are ailedged, not only that it mhfi needs he fo^ that tlie 
Mind muft be influenced m it's Choice, by fomething that has 
a preponderating Influence upon it, but aUb how it is Jo. 
A little Attention to our own Experieace, and a diftincft 
Confideration of the Ads of our own Minds in fuch Cafes, 
will be fuflicient to clear up the Matter. 

Thus, fuppoling T have a Chefs-board before me ; and 
becaufe I am required by a Superiour, or defired by a Friend, 
■or to make fome Experiment concerning my own Ability and 
Jyiberty, or on fome other Coniideration, I am determined 
-to touch fome one of the Spots or Squares on the 2oard with 
,my Finger ; not being limited or directed in the firit Propo- 
fal, or my own firfl: Purpofe, which is general, to any one 
Jn particular ; and there being nothing in the Squares in 
themfelves confidered, that recommends any one of all the 
fixty four, more than another : In this Cafe, my Mind de- 
termines to give it felf up to what is vulgarly called Accident^ f 
;by determining to touch that Square which happens to be 
^mofl: in View, which my Eye is efpecially upon at that Mo- 
.ment, or which happens to be then moll in my Mind, or 
.which I fliali be directed to by fome other fuch-like Accident. 
:Here are feveral Steps of the Mind's proceeding (tho' all 
jmay be done as it were in a Moment) the firji Step is it's 
.^^;z<?r<?/ Determination that it will touch one 6f the Squares. 
'The next Step is another general Determination to give it felf 
'up to Accident, in fome certain Way ; as to touch that 
•which fhall be mofl in the Eye or Mind at that Time, or to 
fome other fuch-like Accident. The third and laif Step ^is a 
.^rtr//W<?r Determination to touch a certain individual Spot, 
even that Square, which, by that Sort of Aocident the Mind 

H 2 has 

I have elfewhere obferved what that is which is vulgarly called 
Accident; That it is Nothing akin to the Arm'mian metaphyseal 
Notion of Contingenccy fomething not conneded wuh anyThirg 
foregoing ; Bat that it is fomething that comes to pafs in the 
Courle of Things, in fome Affair that Men arc loncerned in, 
unforqfeen, and not owing t<j their Defign. 

6o Of the WilTs determining Part II. 

has pitched upon, has adually offered it felf bevond others. 
Now 'tis apparent that in none of thefe feveral Steps does 
the Mind proceed in abfolute Indifference, but in each of 
them is influenced by a preponderating Inducement. So it is 
in the/r/? Siep ; The Mind's general Determination to touch 
one of the fixty four Spots : The Mind is not abfolutely in- 
different whether it does fo or no : It is induced to it, for 
the Sake of making fome Experiment, or by the Defire of a 
Friend, or fome other Motive that prevails. So it is in the 
fccond Step, The Mind's determining to give it felf up to 
Accident, by touching that which fhall be moft in the Eye, 
or the Idea of which (hall be moil prevalent in the Mind &c. 
The Mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it proceeds 
by this Rule or no \ but chufes it, becaufe it appears at 
tiut Time a convenient and requifite Expedient in order 
to fulhl the general Purpofe aforefaid. And fo it is in the 
third and laft Step, It's detennining to touch that indivi- 
dual Spot which actually does prevail in the Mind's View. 
The Mind is not indifferent concerning this ; but is influ- 
enced by a prevailing Inducement and Reafon ; which is, 
that this is a Proi'ecution of the preceeding Determination, 
which appeared requifite, and was hx'd before in the fecond 

Accident will ever ferve a Man, without hindring him a 
Mmiciii, in fuch a Cafe. It will always be fo among a 
Nii:;bcr of Objects in View, one will prevail in the Eye, 
or n Idea beyond others. When we have our Eyes open in 
the clear Sun -fnme, many Gbjeds flrike the Eye at once, 
and innumf r.^ble Images may be at once painted in it by the 
Kays of Light ; but the Attention of the Mind is not 
equal to feveral of them at once ; or if it be, it don't conti- 
nue fo for any Time. And fo it is with Refped to the 
Ideas Of the Mind in general : Several Ideas are not in 
equal Strcn^^th in the Mind's View and Notice at once ; or 
at icafl,Gon-t remain fo for any fenfible Continuance. There ! 
is nothing in the World more conftantly varying, than the \ 
Ideas of the Mind : They don't remain precifely in the 
fame Str.te" for the leaft perceivable Space of Time : as is ^ 
evident by this. That all perceivable Time is judged and 
perceived by the Mind only by the Succeffion or the fuc- J 
ceffive Changes of it's own Ideas. Therefore while the J 
Views or Perceptions of the Mind remain precifely in the 1 
fame State, there is no perceivable Space or Length of Time, j 
tecaufe" no fenfible Succeffion at all. 


Sed.VI. in Things indifferent. 6i 

As the A<5ls of the Will, in each Step of the fore-men- 
tioned Proceedure, don't come to pafs without a particular 
Caufe, every Ad is owing to a prevailing Inducement ; fo 
the Accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in 
the unfearchable Courfe of Things, to which the Mind 
yields it felf, and by which it is guided, is not any Thing 
that comes to pafs without a Caufe ; and the Mind in de- 
termining to be guided by it, is not determined by fomething 
that has no Cauie ; any more than if it determined to be 
guided by a Lot, or the calling of a Die. For tho' the Die's 
falling in fuch a Manner be accidental to him that cafts it, 
yet none will fuppofe that there is no Caufe why it falls as 
it does. The involuntary Changes in the Succeffion of our 
Ideas, tho' the Caufe may not be obferved, have as much 
a Caufe, as the changeable Motions of the Motes that float 
in the Air , or the continual, infinitely various, fucceflive 
Changes of the Unevenneiles on the Surtacc of the Water. 

There are two Things efpecially, which are probably th? 
Occafions of Confuiion in the Minds of them who infift up- 
on it, that the Will ads in a proper Indifference, and with- 
out being moved by any Inducement, in it's Determinations 
in fuch Cafes as have been mentioned. 

I. They feem to miftake the Point in Queflion, or at leaft 
not to keep it diflincSlly in View. The Queflion they difputc 
about, is. Whether the Mind be indifferent about the Obje£fs 
prefented, one of which is to be taken, touch'd, pointed to 
&c. as two Eggs, two Cakes, which appear equally good. 
Whereas the Queftion to be confidered, is, Whether the 
Perfon be indifferent with Refpedl to his own J^iom ; whe- 
ther he don't, on fome Confideration or other, prefer one 
Act with Refpedl to thefe Obje6ts before another. The 
Mind in it's Determination and Choice, in thefe Cafes, is 
not moll immediately and diredlly converfant about the 
ObjeSls prefented \ but the A£is to he done concerning thefe Ob- 
jeds. The Objects may appear equal, and the Mind may 
never properly make any Choice between them : But the 
next A6t of the Will being about the external Adlions to 
be performed. Taking, Touching &c. thefe may not ap- 
pear equal, and one A6lion may properly be chofen before 
another. In each Step of the Mind's Progrefs, the Deter- 
mination is not about the Obje^ls, unlefs mdiredly and im- 
properly, but about the Anions, which it chufes for other 
Reafons than any Preference of the Objeds, and for Rea- 
fons not taken at all from the Objeds. 


62 Of chtifmg in Things indifferent. Part II. 

Therp is no NoceiTity of fuppofing, that the Mind does 
ever at all properly chii[e one of the Objefts before ano- 
ther J either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the 
Man chufes to /^?>^^ or /^z^^/' one rather than another; but 
not becaufe it chufes the Thing taken^ cv touch' dy but from 
foreign Confiderations. The Cafe may be fo, that of two 
Things offered, a Man may, for certain Reafons, chufe 
and prefer the taking of that which he undervcdues^ and 
chufe to negle6t to take that which his Mind prefers, Ii> 
fuch a Cafe, chufmg the Thing taken, and chufing to take, 
are diverfe : and fo they are in a Cafe where the Things 
prefented are equal in the Mind's Eileem, and neither of 
them preferred. All that Fad and Experience makes evi- 
dent, is, that the Mind chufes one Adion rather than ano- 
ther. And therefore the Arguments which they bring, in 
order to be to their Purpofe, ought to be to prove that the 
Mind chufes the A6lion in perfedt Indifference, with Refpecl 
to that Action \ and not to prove that the Mind chufes the 
A6tion in perfed Indifference with Refpe6t to the 0hje5f 5 
which is very poffible, and yet the Will not ad at all with- 
out prevalent Inducement, and proper Preponderation. 

2. Another Reafon of Confufion and Diihcuity in this 
Matter, feems to be, not diflinguilhing between a general 
Indifference, or an Indifference with Refped to what is to 
be done in a more diilant and general View of it, and a par- 
ticular Indifference, or an Indifference with Refped to the 
next immediate Ad, view'd with it's particular and prefent 
Circumftances. A Man may be perfectly indiffer-ent with 
Refped to his own Aciions^ in the former Refped ; and yet 
not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing Inftance of touch- 
ing one of the Squares of a Chefs-board ; when 'tis firfl. 
propofed that I fhould touch one of them, I may be per- 
fedly indifferent which I touch ; becaufe as yet I view 
the Matter remotely and generally, being but in the firfl 
Step of the Mind's Progrefs in the Affair. But yet, when, 
I am adually come to the lafl Step, and the very next Thing 
to be determined is, which is to be touch'd, having already 
determined that I will touch that which happens to be. 
mofl: in my Eye or Mind, and my Mind .being now fix'd on \ 
a particular one, the Ad of touching that, confidered thus ^ 
immediately, and in thefe particular prefent Circumflances^ 
is not what my Mind is abfolutely indifferent about. 


Sedl.VII. Of Liberty ^t/" Indifference. 63" 

Section VII. 

Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will 
confft'ing in Indifference. 

X Tt 7 HAT has been faid in the foregoing Section, has a 
\/ 1/ Tendency in feme Meafure to evince theAbfurdity 
» ^ of the Opinion bf fuch as place Liberty in Indiffe- 
rence, .or in that Equilibrium whereby the Will is without 
all antecedent Determination or Bias, and left hitherto free 
from any prepoffeffing Inclination to one Side or the other ; 
that the Determination of the Will to either Side may be 
entirely from it felf, and that it may be owing only to it's 
own Power, and that Sovereignty which it has over it felf, 
that it goes this Way rather than that. || 

But in as much as this has been of fuch long ftanding, and 
,has been fo generally received, and fo much infilled on by 
Pelagians^ Semi-Pelagians^ Jefuits^ Socin'ianSy Jrminians^ and 
others, it may delerve a more full Confideration* And 
therefore I ihall now proceed to a more particular and tho- 
rough Enquiry into thjs Notion. 


I Dr. Whithy, and fome other Arminiam^ make a Diftinftion of dif- 
ferent Kinds of Freedom ; one of God, and perfeft Spirits above; 
another of Perfons in a State of Trial. The former Dr. Whlthy 
allows to confill with Necefliiy ; the latter he holds to be without 
Neceffity : And this latter he fuppofes to be requifite to our being 
the Subje^ls of Praife or Difpraife, Rewards or Punifhments, Pre- 
cepts and Prohibitions, Promifes and Threats, Exhortations and 
Dehortations, and a Covenant-Treaty. And to this Freedom he 
fuppofes Indifference to be requifite. In Kis Difcourfe on the iivc 
Points, P. 299, 300, he fays ; *' It is a Freedom (fpeaking of a Free- 
** dom not only from Co-a61ion,but from NeceiTity) requifite,as we 
" conceive, to render us capable of Trial or Probation, and to 
" render our Anions worthy of Praife or Difpraife, and our Per- 
" fons of Rewards or Punifhments." And in the next Page,fpeak- 
5ng of the fame Matter, He fays, " Excellent to this Purpofe, 
•* are the Words of Mr. l^horndike : We fay noty that Indifference is 
*' requifite to a' I Freedom y but to the Freedom of Man alone in this 
** State of Trwvail and Froficience : theGround of <which isGod's Ten' 
*' der of a Treaty, and Conditions of Pe.jce and Reconcilement to fallen 
" Man, together ^vith thofe Precepts and ProhibifionSj thofe Promifes 
'* and Threat Sf thofe 'Exhortations 6* Dihrtatiom, it is er/orced'witiJ* . 


64 0/ Liberty conftjiing Part II. 

Now left fomc fhould fuppofe that I don't underftand thofe 
that place Liberty in Indifference, or (hould charge me with 
mifreprefenting their Opinion, I would fignify, that I am 
fenfible, there are fome, who when they talk of the Liberty 
of the Will as confifting in Indifference, exprefs themfelves 
as tho' they would not be underftood of the Indifference of 
the Inclination or Tendency of the Will, but of, I know 
not what. Indifference of the Soul's Power of Willing ; or 
that the Will, with Refpe^ to it's Power or Ability to chufe, 
is indifferent, can go either Way indifferently, either to the 
right Hand or left, either a6t or forbear to a6t, one as well 
as the other. Tho' this feems to be a Refining only of 
fome particular Writers, and newly invented, and which 
will by no Means confift with the Manner of Expreffion ufed 
by the Defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. 
And I wi(h fuch Refiners would thoroughly confider,whether 
they diftinclly know their own Meaning, when they make a 
Diltindlicn between Indifference of the Soul as to it's Power 
or Ahiuty of Willing or Chufing, and the Soul's Indiffe- 
rence as to the Preference or Choice it felf ; and whether 
they don't deceive themfelves in imagining that they have 
any diftin6f Meaning at all. The Indifference of the Soul 
as to it's Ability or Power to Will, muft be the fame Thing 
as the Indifference of the State of the Power or Faculty of 
the Will, or the Indifference of the State which the Soul 
it felf, which has that Power or Faculty, hitherto remains 
in, as to the Exercife of that Power, in the Choice it (hall 
by and by make. 

But not to infift any longer on the Abftrufenefs and 

Inexplicabienefs of this Diftindion ; let what will be fup- j 

pofed concerning the Meaning of them that make Ufe of it, i 

thus much muft at leaft be intended by Anniniam^ when j 

they talk of ladiffersnce as effential to Liberty of Will, . if ' 

they intend any Thing, in any Refpedt to their Purpofe, i 

^/z. That it is fuch an Indifference as leaves the Will not | 

determined already ; but free from actual Poffeffion, and j 

vacant of Predetermination, fo far, that there may be j 

Room for tlie Exercife of the ^ elf -determining Power of the i 

Will ; and that the Will's Freedom confifts in, or depends 1 

upon this Vacancy and Opportunity that is left for the Will i 

it felf to be the Determiner of the A<ft that i;> to be the free i 

A<51. ] 

And 3 

Seft.VL in IndiiFerence. 65 

And here I would obferve in Xhtfrji Place, that to make 
out this Scheme of Liberty, the Indifference mull be per-* 
fe£l and abfolute ; there muft be a perfect Freedom from all 
antecedent Prepondcration or Inclination. Becaufe if the 
Will be already inchned, before it exerts it's own fovereign 
Power on it felf, then it's Inclination is not wholly owing 
to it felf : If when two Oppofites are propofed to the Soul 
for it's Choice, the Propofal don't find the Soul wholly in a 
State of Indifference, then it is not found in a State of Li-^ 

berty for meer Self-determination. The leaft Degree of 

antecedent Bias muft be inconfiftent with their Notion of 
Liberty. For fo long as prior Inclination poffeffes the Will, 
and is not removed, it binds the Will, fo that it is utterly 
impoffible that the Will ffould a6l otherwife than agreably 
to ft. Surely the Will can't a6t or chufe contrary to a re- 
maining prevailing Inclination of the Will. To fuppofs 
otherwife, would be the fame Thing as to fuppofe, that the 
Will is inclined contrary to it's prefent prevailing inclination^ 
or contrary to what it is inclmed to. That which the Will 
chufes and prefers, that, all Things confidered, it prepon- 
derates and inchnes to. It is equally impoffible for the 
Vv^iil to chufe contrary to it's own remaining and prefent 
preponderating Inclination, as 'tis to prefer contrary to it's 
own prefent Preference^ or chufe contrary to it's own prefent 
Choice. The Will therefore, fo long as it is under the 
Influence of an old preponderating Inclination, is not at 
Liberty for a new free x^ct, or any Act that (hall now be 
an A61 of Self-determination. The A<5t which is a Self- 
determin'd free A6t, muft be an A61 v/hich the Will de- 
termines in the Poffeffion and Uib of fuch a Liberty, as con- 
fifts in a Freedom from every Thing, which, if it were 
there, would make it impoffible that the Will, at that 
Time, Ihould be othervvife than that Way to which it 

If any one fhould fay, there Is no Need "that the In- 
difference ftiould be perfect ; but altho' a former Inclina- 
tion and Preference ftill remains, yet, if it ben't very ftron^ 
and violent, poffibly the Strength of the Will may oppofc 
and overcome it : 

This is grofty abfur'd ; for the Strength of the WilU let 
it be never (o great, does not at all enable it to ad one Way, 
and not the contrary Way, both at the fame Time. It. 
gives it no fuch Sovereignty and Commaad, aS' to eaufe it 

66 OfUhcxiyofWill Part II. 

felf to prefer and not to prefer at the fame Time, or to 
chufe contrary to it's own prefent Choice. 

Therefore, if there be the lead Degree of antecedent Pre- 
ponderation of the Will, it mufl be perfedly abolilhed, 
before the Will can be at Liberty to determine it k\i the 
contrary Way. And if the Will determines it 4clf the 
fame Way, it was not a free Determination^ becaufe the 
Will is not wholly at Liberty in fo doing : It's Deter- 
mination is not altogether /r^w it felf but ,it was partly de- 
termined before, in it's prior Inclination : And all the Free- 
dom the Will exercifes in the Cafe, is in an Increafe of In- 
clination, which it gives it felf, over and above what it had 
by foregoing Bias ; fp much is from it felf, and fo much 
is from perfed Indifference. For tho' the Will had a pre- 
vious Tendency that Way, yet as to that additional Degree 
of Inclination, it had no Tendency. Therefore the previ- 
ous Tendency is of no Confideration, with Refpe<5l to the 
A61: wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the fame 
Thing which was faid at firft, that as to the A6f of the Will, 
wherein the Will is free, there muft be perfect Indifferencey 
or EquiUhriu7n. 

To illudrate this ; If w^e fhould fuppofe a fovereign Self- 
moving Power in a natural Body : But that the Body is in 
Motion already, by an antecedent Bias ; for Inilance, Gra- 
vitation towards the Center of the Earth ; and has one De- 
gree of Motion already, by Vertue of that previous Ten- 
dency ; but by it's feif-moving Power it adds one Degree 
more to it's Motion, and moves fo much more fwiftly to- 
wards the Center of the Earth than it would do by it's Gra- 
vity only : It is evident, that all that is owing to a felf-mov- 
jng Power in this Cafe, is the additional Degree of Motion ; 
and that the other Degree of Motion which it had from 
Gravity, is of no Coniideratien in the Cafe, don't help the 
Effe^ft ot the free felf-moving Power in the leaft ; the EiTecl 
is juH: the fame, as if the Body had received from it itli 
one Degree of Motion from a State of perfe6t Reft. So if 
we Ihouid fuppofe a felf-moving Power given to the Scale of 
a Balance, which has a Weight of one Degree beyond the 
oppofite Scale ; and Vv'e afcribe to it an Ability to add to it 
it\i another Degree of Force the fame Way, by it's felf- 
moving Power ; This is juft the fame Thing as to afvribe 
to it a Power to give it felf one Degree of Preponderation 
Irom a pcrfed Equilibrium ^ and fo much Power as the 
*' Scale 

Sed.VII. conjtjling in IndifFerence. 67 

Scale has to give it felf an Over-balance from a perfed E- 
quipoife, fo much felf-movlng felf-preponderatina; Power it 
has, and no more. So that it's free Power this Way is al- 
ways to be meafured from perfe6t Equilibrium. 

I need fay no m.ore to prove, that, if Indifference be 
effen lal to Liberty, it mull: be perfe6l Indifference ; and 
that fo far as the Will is deftitute of this, fo far it is defti- 
tute of that Freedom by which it is it's own M after, and in 
a Capacity of being it's ov/n Determiner, without being at 
all pafiive, or fubjed to the Power and Sway of fomething 
elfe, in it's Motions and Determinations. 

Having obferved thefe Things, let us now tr^^ whether 
this Notion of the Liberty of Will conliiling in Indiffe- 
rence and Equilibrium, and the Will's Self-determination 
in fuch a State, be not abfurd and inconfiftent. 

And here I would lay down this as an Axiom of undoubt- 
ed Truth ; That every free Ad is do7ie i:i a State of Freedom^ and 
not only after fuch a State. If an A6t of the Will be an A6t 
wherein the Soul is free, it mull be exerted in a State of 
Freedom^ and in the Fime of Freedom. It Vs^ill not fuflice, that 
the Acl immediately follows a State of Liberty ; but Li- 
berty muft yet contmue, and co-exift with the Acl: ; the Soul 
remaining in Poifeffion of Liberty. Becaufe that is the No- 
tion of a free Act of the Soul, even an A6t wherein the Soul 
ufes or exercfes Liberty. But if the Soul is not, in the very 
I'ime of the A61:, in the Foffeffion of Liberty, it can't at 
that Time be in the Vfc of it. 

Now the Quedion is, whether ever the Soul of Man puts 
forih any Act of Will, while it yet remains in a State of Li- 
berty, in that Notion of a State of Liberty, vi%. as implying 
a State of Indifference ; or whether the Soul ever exerts an 
Act of Choice or Preference, while at that very Time 
the Will is in a perfe6t Equilibrium, not inclining one Way 
more than another. The very putting of the Queftion is 
fufficient to ftiew the Abfurdity of the affirmative Anfwer : 
For how ridiculous would it be for any Body to infift, that 
the Soul chufe? one Thing before another, when at the 
very fame Inftant it is perfectly indifferent with Refpect to 
each. ! This is the fame Thing as to fay^ the Soul prefers 
one Thing to another, at the very fame I'ime that it has no 

Preference. Choice and Preference can no more be in a 

I 2 S^'^^^ 

65 Of Liberty of Will Part 11. \ 

State of Indifference, than Motion can be in a State of Red, 
or than the Preponderation cf the Scale of a Balance can be j 
in a State of Equilibriunn, Motion may be the next Moment | 
afterRell ; but can't co-exift with it,in a7iy,^vtn the %^Part of ' 
it. So Choice may be immediately after aState of Inditference, | 
but has no Co-exiftence with it : Even the very Beginning of • 
it is not in a State of Indifference. And therefore if this be 
Liberty, no Acl of the Will, in any Degree, is ever per- 
formed in a State of Liberty, or in the Time of Liberty. . 
Volition and Liberty are fo far from agreeing together, and 
being effential one to another, that they are contrary one to 
another, and one excludes and deftroy? the other, as much 
as Motion and Reft, Light and Darknefs, or Life h Death. 
$0 that tlie Will ads not at all, does not fo much a^ begin 
to ad in the Time of fuch Liberty : Freedom is perfectly 
fit an End, and has ceafed to be, at the lirft Moment of 
Adion ; and therefore Liberty can't reach the Action, to I 
affecl, or qualify it, or give it a Denomination, or any Part of | 
i|:, any more than if it had ceafed to be twenty Years before | 
the Adion began. The Moment that Liberty ceafes to be, | 
it ceafes to be a Qualihcation of any Thing. If Light and ^ 
Darknefs fucceed one another inftantaneouily. Light qualifies ; 
Nothing after it is gone out, to make any^ thing lightfome : 
or bright, any more- gt the firft Moment of perfect Darknefs, J 
than Months or Years after. Life denominates Nothing | 
vital at the lirft Moment of perfect Death. So Freedom, if it ^| 
confifts in, or implies Indifference, can denominate Nothing '\ 
free, at the firft Moment of Preference or Preponderation. i 
Therefore 'tis manifeft, that no Liberty which the Soul is pof- ; 
feffed of, or ever ufes, in any of it's Acts of Volition, con- - 
fifts in Indifference ; and that the Opinion of fuch as lup- ' 
pofe, that Indifference belongs to the very Effence of Liberty, 
is to the higheft Degree abfurd and contradictory. 

If any one ftiould imagine, that this Manner of arguing 
ing is Nothing but Trick and Delufion ; and 'to evade the 
Reafoning, fliould fay, that the Thing wherein the Will ex- 
ercifes it's Liberty, is not in the Act of Choice or Prepon- 
deraticn it felf, but in determining it felf t9 a certain Choice 
or Preference ; That the Act of the Will wherein it is free, 
iand ufes it's own Sovereignty, conlifts in it's caufing or de^ 
ter mining the Change ox Tranjnion from a State of Indifference 
to a ccriain Preference, or determining to give a certain^ 
Turn to the Balance, which has hitherto been even ; ancH 
t'lat this Ad the Will exerts in a State of Liberty, or while '^ 
the Will yet remains in Equilibrium, and perfect Mafter o' 


Scd.VII. conjifltng in Indifference. 69 

it felf : I fay, if any One chufes to exprefs his Notion 

of Liberty after this, or fome fuch Mjfnner, let us fee if he 
can make out his Matters any better than before. 

What is afferted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in 
perfect Equilibrium, without Preference, determines to change 
it felf from that State, and excite in it felf a certain Choice 
or Preference. Now let us fee whether this don't come 
to the fame Abfurdity we had before. If it be fo, that 
4he Will, while it yet remains perfedly Indifferent, deter- 
mines to put it felf out of that State, and give it felf a cer- 
tain Preponderation ; Then I would enquire, whether the 
Soul don't determine this of Choice ; or whether the Will's 
coming to a Determination to do fo, be not the fame Thing 
as the Soul's coming to a Choice to do fo. If the Soul don't 
determine this of Choice, or in the Exercife of Choice, 
then it don't determine it voluntarily. And if the Soul don't 
determine it voluntarily, or of it's own Will^ then in what 
Senfe does it's Will determine it ? And if the Will don't 
determine it, then hovs^ is the Liberty of the Will exercifed in 
the Determination ? What Sort of Liberty is exercifed 
by the Soul in thofe Determinations, wherein there is 
no exercife of Choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein 
the Will is not concerned ?— - But if it be allowed, that this 
Determination is an Act of Choice, and it be infilled on, that 
the Soul, while it yet remains in a State of perfect Indiffe- 
rence, chufes to put it felf out of that State, and to turn it 
felf oneWay ; then the Soul is already come to a Choice,and 
chufes that Way. And fo we have the very fame Abfurdity 
which we had before. Here is the Soul in a State of Choice, 
and in a State of Equilibrium, both at the fame Time : the 
Soul already chufing one Way, while it remains in a State 
of perfe6t Indifference, and has no Choice of one Way 
more than the other.—- And indeed this Manner of talking, 
tho' it may a little hide the Abfurdity, in the Obfcurity of 
Exprelhon, is more nonfenfical, and increafes the Inconfift- 
cnce. To fay, the free A61 of the Will, or the A6t which 
the Will exerts in a State of Freedom and Indifference, does 
not imply Preference in it, but is what the Will does in 
Order to caufing or producing a Preference, is as much as to 
fay, the Soul chufes (for to Will and to Chufe are the fame 
1^^ Thing) without Choice, and prefers without Preference, in 
border to caufe or produce the Beginning of a Preference, or 
the firfl: Choice. And that is, that the firft Choice is ex- 
pened without Choice, in order to produce it i^\L 

70 OflAh^xty'slyinginaPower Part II. 

If any, to evade thefe Things, fhould own, that a State of 
Liberty, and a State di Indifference are not the fame, and 
that the former may be without the latter ; But fliould fay, 
that Indifference is fcill ejfential to the Freedom of an Act of 
Will, in fome Sort, namely, as 'tis neceffary to go imme- 
diately before it ; It being efiential to the Freedom of an A6t 
of Will that it fhould directly and nnmediately 'arife out of 
a State of Indifference : ftill this Vvrili not help the Caufe of 
JrmimanUihtviy^ or make it confiftent with it felf. For if 
the AS. fpnngs immediately out of a State of Indifference, 
then it do's not arife from antecedent Choice or Preference. But 
if the A6t arifes directly out of a State of Indifi^rence, with- 
out any intervening Choice to chufe and determine it, then 
the Act not being determined by Choice, is not determined 
ty the Will ; the Mind exercife^ no free Choice in the 
Affair, and free Choice and free Will have no Hand in the 
Determination of the Act. Which is entirely inconfiilent 
with their Notion of the Freedom of Volition. 

If any fnould fuppofe, that thefe Difficulties and Abfurdi- 
ties may be avoidec^, by faying, that the Liberty of the Mind 
confifts in a Power X.o fufpend the A6t of the Will, and fo to 
keep it in a State of Indifference^ 'till there has been Oppor- 
tunity for Confideration ; and fo Ihall fay, that however 
Indifference is not effential to Liberty in fuch a Manner, that 
the Mind mufr make it's Choice in a State of Indifference, 
which is. an Inconfiftency, or that the A6t of Will mull 
fpring immediately out of Indifference ; yet Indifference may 
be effential to the Liberty of Acts of the Will in thisRefpect \ 
viz. That Liberty confifts in a Power of the Mind to for- 
bear or fufpend the A6t of Volition, and keep the Mind in 
a State of Indifference for the prefent, 'till there has been 
Opportunity for proper Deliberation : I fay, if any one 
imagines that this helps the Matter, it is a great Miftake : It 
reconciles no Inconfiftency, and reiieves no Difficulty 

which the Affair is attended with. For here the following 

Things muil be obferved, 

I. That \\\\s fufpcnding of Volition, if there be properly any 
fuch Thing, is it lelf an AS. px Volition. If the A/Iind de- 
termines to fufpend it's A<ft, it determines it voluntarily ; it 
chufes, on fome Confideration, to fufpend it. And this 
Choice or Determination, is an Act of the Will : And in- 
deed it is fuppofed to be fo in the very Hypothefis ; for 'tis 
fuppofed, that the Liberty of the Will confifls in it's Power 


Sed.VlI. to fufpend Volition. 7 1 

to do thus, and that it's doing it is the very Thing wherein 
the TVill exercifes it's Liberty. But how can the Will exercife 
Liberty in it, if it ben't an A(5l of the Will ? The Liberty 
of the Will is not exercifed in any Thing but what the Will 

2. This determining to fufpend a6ting is not only an A61 
of^the Will, but 'tis fuppoled to be the only free Act of 
the Will ; becaufe it is laid, that this is the Thing wherein the 
Liberty of the TVill confi/h.—^ ow if this be fo, then this is 
all the Ad of Will that we have to confider in this Contro- 
verfy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our Enquiries, 
wherein the Liberty of Man confifts. And now the fore- 
mentioned Difficulties remain : the former Qiieftion returns 
upon us ; z'iz. Wherein confifts the Freedom of the Will in 
thofe ASis wherein it is free ? And if this Adt of determining 
a Sufpenfion be the only A(5t in which the Will is free, then 
wherein confifts the Will's Freedom with Refpe6l to this A6t 
of Sufpenfion ? And how is Indifference eflential to this A61 ? 
The Anfwer muft be, according to what is fuppofed in the 
Evalion under Confideration, That the Liberty of the Will 
in this Kdi of Suipenfton, conftfts in a Power to fufpend even 
this A61:, 'till there has been Opportunity for thorough Deli- 
beration. But this will be to plunge dirediy into the grofleft: 
Nonienfe : for 'tis the A6t of Sufpenfion it felf that we are 
fpeaking of ; and there is no Room for a Space of Delibe- 
ration and Sufpenfion, in order to determine whether we 
will fufpend or no. For that fuppofes, that even Sufpenfion 
it felf may be deier'd : V/hich is abfurd ; for the very de- ' 
ferring the Determination of Sufpenfton, to confider whe- 
ther we will fufpend or no, will be actually fufpending. For 
during the Space of Sufpenfion, to confider whether to fuf- 
pend, the Ad is ipfofa^o fufpended. There is no Medium 
between fufpending to ad, and immediately ading ; and 
therefore no Poffibility of avoiding either the one or the other 
one Moment ; and fo no Room for Deliberation before we 
do either of them. 

And befides, this is attended with ridiculous Abfurdity 
another Way : For now it is come to that, that Liberty con- 
I lifts wholly in the Mind's having Power to fufpend it's Deter- 
I mination whether to fufpend or no ; that there may be 
I Time for Confideration, whether it be beft to fufpend. And 
if Liberty confifts in this only, then this is the Liberty under 
u Confideration ; We have to enquire uov/, how Liberty with 

72 Of fufp^nding F'oluion. Part II. \ 

Refpe(5l to this A6t of fufpending a Determination of Suf- '] 

penfion, confifts in Indifr'ercnce, or how Indifference is |^ 

cfiential to it. The Anfwer, according to the Hypothtfis we ^ 

are upon, mud be, that it confifts in a Power oi fufpending ■} 

even this laft mentioned A6t, to have Time to confider whe- ^ 

ther to fufpend that. And then the fame Difficulties and IfS 

Enquiries return over again with Refpe6l to that ; and fo on .c 

forever. Which, if it would ihew any Thing, would fhew ^ 

only that there is no fuch Thing as a free A(5f. It drives the i 

Exercife of Freedom back in hifiniium 3 and that is to drive j 

it out of the World. | 

And befides all this, there is a Delufion, and a latent grofs . 'i 
Contradidion in the Affair another Way ; in as much as in 1 
explaining how, or in what Refpedt the Will is free with I 
Pvcgard to a particular A6f of Volition, 'tis faid, that it's 
Liberty confifts in a Power to determine to fufpend that ASiy j 
"which places Liberty not in that Act of Volition which the ' \ 
Enquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent h.$i, \ 
Which contradicts the Thmg fuppofed in both the Queftion \ 
and Anfwer. The Quefi:ion is, wherein confifts the Mind's i 
Liberty in any -particular A^ of Volition ? And the Anfwer, in | 
pretending to fliew wherein lies the Mind's Libert) in that I 
ASi^ in Effe6t fays, it don't lie in that Ad at all, but in ano- -< 
ther, vi%, a Volition to fufpend that A£i. And therefore the ,ii 
Anfwer is both contradidor)', and altogether impertinent and 3 
befide the Purpofe. For it don't fhew wherein the Liberty { 
of the Will confifts in the A6t in Qiieftion ; Inft:ead of that, J 
it fuppofes it don't confift in that Act at all, but in another t 
diftin6t from it, even a Volition to fufpend that A6t, and take >] 
Time to condder of it. And no Account is pretended to be; )i 
given wherein the Mind is free with Refpedi to that A6t, \ 
wherein this Anfwer fuppofes the Liberty ef the Mind in- 1 
deed confifts, w'z. the Ad of Sufpenfion, or of determining, ^ 
the Sufpenfion. / 

On the whole, 'tis exceeding manifefl:, that the Liberty of i 
the Mind docs not confjft in Indifference, and that Indiffe- ^ 
rence is not effential or neceffary to it, or at all belonging to »1 
it, as the Arjninians fuppofe ; that Opinion being full of No- C 
thing but Abfurdity and Seif-Contradidion. t 

S E C T 1^1 


5e(3:.VlIL Of Liberty without ^CQt{^ity . 73 

Section VIIL 

Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will^ 
as oppofite to all Neceffity. 

ilS a Thing chiefly infifted on by Arminians^ In this 
Controverfy, as a Thing moft important and effen- 
tial in human Liberty, that Volitions, or the A<:^ts of 
the Will, are contingent Events ; underftanding Contingence as 
oppofite, not only to Conilraint, but to all Neceffity. There- 
fore I would particularly confider this Matter. And 

1. I would enquire, w^hether there is, or can be any fuch 
Thing, as a Volition which is contingent in fuch a Senfc, 
as not only to come to pafs without any Neceffity of Con- 
ftraint or Co-adion, but alfo without a Necejfity of Confequence^ 
or an infallible Conne6tion with any Thing foregoing. 

2. Whether, if it were fo, this would at all help the Caufe 
of Liberty. 

L I would coniider whether Volition is a Thing that ever 
does, or can come to pafs, in this Manner, contingently. 

And here it muft be remembred, that it has been already 
(hewn, that Nothing can ever come to pafs without a Caufe, 
or Reafon why it exiils in this Manner rather than another 5 
and the Evidence of this has been particularly applied to 
the A(5ts of the Will. Now if this be fo, it wuU demon- 
ftrably follow, that the Atfls of the Will are never contingent, 
or without Neceffity, in the Senfe fpoken of j in as much as 
thofe Things which have a Caufe, or Reafon of their Exift- 
ence, muft be connected with their Caufe. This appears by 
the following Confiderations. 

I. For an Event to have a Caufe and Ground of it's Ex- 
iftence, and yet not to be conneded with it's Caufe, is art 
Inconfiftence. For if the Event ben't connected With the 
Caufe, it is not dependent on t'e Caufe ; it's Exift- 
ence is a« it were ioofe from it's Influence, and may at- 
tend it, or may not ; it being a meer Contingence, whe- 
ther it follows or attends the Influence of the Caufe, 
Qr not : And that is the fame Thing as not to be depen- 

K dent 

74 0/ thefuppofed Liberty Part II. 

dent on it. And to fay, the Event is not dependent on it's 
Caufe, is abfurd : 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, it is not it's 
Caufe, nor the Event the Effe6t of it : For Dependence on 
the Influence of a Caufe, is the very Notion of an Eftea. If 
there be no fuch Relation between one Thinj^ and another, 
confiding in the Connecftion and Dependence of one Thing 
on the Influence of another, thea it is certain there is no 
fuch Relation between them as is fignified by the Terms 
Caufe and Effed. So far as an Event is dependent on a Caufe, 
2nd conne6ted with it, fo much Caufahty is there in the Cafe, 
and no more. The Caufe does, or brings to pafs no more in 
any Event, than is dependent on it. If we fay, the Con- 
necftion and Dependence is not total, but partial, and that the 
EfFe(5l, tho' it has fome Connection and Dependence, yet is 
not entirely dependent on it ; That is the fame Thing as to 
fay, that not all that is in theEvent is an EfFe6t of that Caufe, 
but that only Part of it arifes from thence, and Part fome 
other Way. 

2. If there are fome Events which are not necefl^arily con- 
nected with their Caufes, then it will follow, that there are 
fome Things which come to pafs without any Caufe, contra- 
ry to the Suppofition. For if there be any Event which was 
not necefl^arily conneded with the Influence of the Caufe un- 
der fuchCircumftances,then it was contingent whether it would 
attend or follow thelnfluence of theCaufe,orno ; It might have 
followed, and it might not, when the Caufe was the fame, 
it's Influence the fame, and under the fame Circumftances. 
And if fo, why did it follow, rather than not follow ? There, 
is no Caufe or Reafon of this. Therefore here is fome- 
thing without any Caufe or Reafon why it is, viz. the follow- 
ing of the Effe<5l on the Influence of the Caufe, with which 
it was not necefliurily conneded. If there be a necefl^ary 
ConnecSiion of the Effed on any Thing antecedent, then we 
may fuppofe that fom^times the Event will follow the Caufe, 
and fomctimes not, when the Caufe is the fame, and in 
every RefpeCl: in tlie fame State h Circumftances. And what 
can be tiie Caufe and Reafon of this flrange Phenomenon, 
even this Diveriity, that in one Inftance, the ElTecl ftiould 
follow, in another not ? 'Tis evident by the Suppofition, 
that this is wholly without any Caufe or Ground. Hare is. 
fometiiing in the prefent Manner of the Exiflence of Things, 
and State of the World, that is abfolutely without a Caufe. 
Which is contrary to the Suppofition, and contrary to what 
has beea before demonfcrated. 

P To 

Seil.VIIL without all Neceffity. 75 

3. To fuppofe there are fome Events which have a 
Caufe and Ground of their Exiftence, that yet are not ne- 
cefTarily connected with their Caufe, is to fuppofe that they 
have a Caufe which #not their Caufe. Thus ; If the EiFeA 
be not necellarily connected with the Caufe, with it's Influ- 
ence, and influential Circumftances ; then, as I obferved 
before, 'tis a Thing poflible and fuppofable, that the Caufe 
may fometimes exert the fame Influence, under the fame 
Circumrtances, and yet the Eff;:6l not follow. And if this 
aduaily happens in any Inftance, this Inflance is a Proof, in 
Fad, that the Influence of the Caufe is not fuflicient to pro- 
duce the Effe6l. For if it had been fuilicient, it would have 
done it. And yet, by the Suppofition, in another Inflance, 
the fame Caufe, with perfecStly the fame Influence, and 
when all Circumflances which have any Influence, are the 
fame, it Wc^i /J//^w<?J with the Eftecl. By which it is mani- 
fell, that the Effe6t in this lafl: Inftance was not owing to 
the Influence of the Caufe, but mufl: come to pafs fome 
other Way. For it was proved before, that the Influence 
of the Caufe was not fufficient to produce the Effe^l. And 
it it was not fufficient to produce it, then the Produdion 
of it could not be ov/ing to that Influence, but mud be 
owing to fomcthing elfe, or owing to Nothing. And if the 

^pffedt be not owing to the Influence of the Caufe, then it 
is not the Caufe. Which brings us to the Contradidion, 
of a Caufe, and no Caufe, that which is the Ground and 
Reafon of the Exiflence of a Thing, and at the fame Time 
is not the Ground and Reafon of it's Exiftence, nor is 

1 fuiEcient to be fo. 

If the Pvlatter be not already fo plain as to render any 
further Reafoning upon it impertinent, I would fay, that 
I that which feems to be the Caufe in the fuppofed Cafe, can 
j be no Caufe ; it's Power and Influence having, on a full 
Trial, proved infuflicient to produce fuch an Effect : and it 
it be not fufiicient to produce it, then it don't produce it. 
To fay otherwife, is to fay, there is Power to do that which 
there is not Power to do. If there be in a Caufe fufficient 
Power exerted, and in Circumftances fufficient to produce an 
Effed, and fo the EfFecl: be adually produced at one Time ; 
Thefe Things all concurring, will produce the Efl^ed at ail 
Times. Andfo we may turn it the other Way ; That which 
proves not fufficient at one Time, cannot be fufficient at 
another, with precifely the fame influential Circumftances. 
And therefore if the EfFed follows, it is not owing to that 

K 2 Cauie ; 


76 Of the Connexion of the Will Part II. 

Caufe ; imlefs the different Time be a Circumftance which 
has Influence : But that is contrary to the Suppofition ; for 
'tis fuppofed that all Circumftances that have Influence, are 
the fame. And befides, this would l^to fuppofe the Time 
to be the Caufe ; which is contrary to the Suppofition of 
the other Thing's being the Caufe. But if meerly Diverfity 
of Time has no Influence, then 'tis evident that it is as 
much of an Abfurdity to fay, the Caufe was fufficient to 
produce the Effed at one TiAie, and not at another ; as to 
fay, that it is fufiicient to produce the Effe6t at a certain 
Time, and yet not fuflicient to produce the fame EffecT: at 
that fame Time. 

On the whole, it is clearly manifefl, that every Effe6t has 
a neceflary Connexion with it's Caufe, or with that wliich 
is the true Ground and Reafon of it's Exifl;ence. And 
therefore if there be no Event without a Caufe, as was 
proved before, then no Event whatfoever is contingent in 
the Manner that Arminians fuppofe the free Ads of the Will 
to be contingent. 

Section IX. 

Of theQonn^&xow of the ASts of the Will 
with the DiBates of the Undcrftanding. 


IT is manifeft, that the Ads of the Will are none of i 

them contingent in fuch a Senfe as to be without all ■• 

Necelfity, or fo as not to be neceflary with a Ne- i 

(reflity of Confequence and Connection ; becaufe every Ad ' 

of the Will is fome Way conneded with the Underfl:anding, j 
^nd is as the greateft apparent Good is,in the Manner which 
has already been explained ; namely, that the Soul always ^ 
wills or chufes that which, in the prefent View of the Mmd, 
confiderecj in the whole of that View, and all that belongs : 

to it, appears mofl: agreable. Becaufe, as was obferved be- 'I 

fore. Nothing is more evident than that, when Men ad vo- i< 

hintarily, ^nd do what they pleafe, then they do what -ap- v 

pears racft agreable to thejji ^ and to fay otherwife, would ; 

be' f] 

Sed. IX. with the Underftanding. 77 

be as much as to affirm, that Men don't chufe what ap- 
pears to fuit them beft, or what feems moft pleafmg to 
them ; or that they don't chufe what they prefer. Which 
brings the Matter to a Contradi6tion. 

As 'tis very evident in it felf, that the A<5ls of the Will 
have fome Connection with the Dilates or Views of the 
Underftanding, fo this is allowed by fome of the chief of 
the Arminian Writers : Particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. 

Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull^ tho' a great Enemy to the 

Do6tnnc of NecefTity, allows the fame Thing. In his 
Chriftian Phihjophy (P. 196.) He with much Approbation 
cites another Philofopher, as of the fame Mind, in thefc 
Words ; " No Man (fays an excellent Philofopher) fets 
" himfelf about any Thing, but upon fome View or other, 
" which ferves him for a Reafon for what he does ; and 
" whatfoever Faculties he employs, the Underftanding, with 
" fuch Light as it has, well or ill informed, conftantly 
'' leads ; and by that Light, true or falfe, all her operati"\fe 
" Powers are dire6ted. The Will it felf, how abfolute and 
" incontroulable foever it may be thought, never fails in 
'* it's Obedience to the Didates of the Underftanding. 
" Temples have their facred Images ; and we fee what In- 
" fiuence they have always had over a great Part of Man- 
" kind ; Bui in Truth, the Ideas and Images in Men's 
" Minds are the invilible Powers that conftantly govern 
** them ; and to thefe they all pay univerfally a ready Sub- 
« million." 

But whether this be in a juft Confiftence with Themfelves, 
and their own Notions of Liberty, I defire may now be im- 
partially confidered. 

Dr. Whitby plainly fuppofes, that the A6ls and Determina- 
tions of the Will always follow the Uriderftanding's Appre- 
henfion or View of the greateft Good to be obtain'd, or Evil 
to be avoided ; or in other Words, that the Determinations 
of the Will conftantly and infallibly follow thefe two Things 
in the Underftanding : i. The Degree of Good to be obtained, 
and Evil to be avoided, propofed to the Underftanding, 
and apprehended, viewed, and taken Notice of by it. 
2. The Degree of the Underftanding s VieWy Notice or Appre- 
hcnfion of that Good or Evil ; which is increafed by Atten- 
• tion and Confideration. That this is an Opinion he is ex- 
ceeding peremptory in ( as he is in every Opinion which he 
maintains in his Gontroverfy wuh the Calvinijis) with Dif- 


78 Of the Connteion of the Will Part II. 

dain of the contrary Opinion, as abfurd and felf-contra- 
di^tor)', will appear by the following Words cf his, in his 
Difcourfe on the five Points.* 

" Now, 'tis certain, that what naturally makes the Un- 
" derftanding to perceive, is Evidence propofed, and appre- 
«^ hended, confidered or adverted to : for Nothing elfe can 
"• be requifite to make us come to the Knowledge of the 

" Truth. Again, what makes the Will chufe, is fome- 

" thing approved by the Underftanding ; and confequently 
" appearing to the Soul as Good. And whatfoever it re- 
" fufeth, is fomething reprefented by the Underftanding, 
" and fo appearing to the Will, as Evil. Whence all that 
" God requires of us is, and can be only this ; to refufe the 
" Evil, and chufe the Good. Wherefore, to fay that Evi- 
«■' dence propofed, apprehended and confidered, is not fuffi- 
" cient to make the Underftanding approve ; or that the 
*' greateft Good propofed, the greateft Evil threatned, \^'hen 
" equally believ'd and refleded on, is not fufficient to en- 
" gage the Will to chufe the Good and refufe the Evil, is 
" in Efred to fay, that which alone doth move the Will to chufe 
'« or to refufe^ is not fufficient to engage it fo to do ; which 
<•' being ccntradiaory to it felf, muft of NecefTity be falfe. 
*' Be it then fo, that we naturally' have an Averfation to 
" the Truths propofed to us in the Gofpel ; that only can 
" make us indifpofed to attend to them, but cannot hinder 
" our Convidion, when we do apprehend them, and attend 

" to them. Be it, that there is in us alfo a Renitency to 

*< the Good we are to chufe ; that only can indifpofe us to 
*' believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefeft Good. Be 
" it, that we are prone to the Evil that we fliould decline ; 
«' that only can render it the more difficult for us to be- 
" lieye it is the worft of Evils. But yet, what we do really 
*' believe to he our chiefiji Good^ willjiill 'be chofen ; and what we 
" apprehend to he the zvorjl of Evils ^ will, zvhilfl we do continue 
" under that Ccnvi£lion, be refufed by la. It therefore can be 
" only requifite, in order to thefe Ends, that the good Spi- 
" rit fhould fo illuminate our Underftandings, that we at- 
" tendmg to, and confidering what lies before us, fhould 
•' apprehend, and be convinced of our Duty ; and that the 
*' Bleffings of the Gofpel (hould be fo propounded to us, as 
" that we may difcern them to be our chiefeft Good ; and 
" the Miferies it threatcneth, fo as we qwy be convinced 
" they are the worft of Evils s that we may chufe the one, 
" and refufe the other." Here 

* Edit. 2d P. 211, 212, 213. 

Seft.IX. "With the Underftanding. 79 

Here let it be obferved, how plainly and peremptorily it is 
afferted, that the greatejl Good propofed, and the great>iji Evil 
threatned^ when equally believed and rcfie5led on, is fufficient tj 
engage the Will to chufe the Good, and refiife the Evil, and is that 
alone which doth move the Will to chufe or to refufe ; and that it is. 
contradiSfory to it felf, to fuppofe otherwife ; and therefore nmft of 
NeceJJity he falfe ; and then ivhat ive do really believe to be our chief- 
ejl Good willjTill he chofen, and what we apprehend to he the worfl 
9 f Evils, will, whilj} we continue under that Conviclion, be refufed 
by us. Nothing could have been faid more to the Purpofe, 
fully to fignify and declare, that the Determinations of the 
Will muft evermore /ollow the Illumination, Convi6lion and 
Notice of the Underftanding, with Regard to the greateft 
Good and Evil propofed, reckoning both the Degree of 
Good and Evil underftood, and the Degree of Underftand- 
ing, Notice and Conviction of that propofed Good and Evil ; 
and that it is thus neceffarily, and can be otherwife in no In- 
ftance : becauie it is afferted, that it implies a Contradidion, 
to fuppofe it ever to be otherwife. 

I am fenfible,the Do6lor's Aim in thefe Aftertions is againlr 
the CalviniJIs ; to ftiew, in Oppofition to them, that there is 
no Need of any phyfical Operation of the Spirit of God on 
the Will, to change and determine that to a good Choice, 
but that God's Operation and Afliftance is only moral, 
fuggefting Ideas to the Underftanding ; which he fuppofes to 
|r be enough, if thofe Ideas are attended to, infallibly to ob- 
tain the End. But whatever his Defign was. Nothing can 
more dire6tly and fully prove, that every Determination of 
the Will, in chufing and refufing, is neceffary ; directly con- 
trary to his own Notion of the Liberty of the Will. For if 
tlie Determination of the Will, evermore, in this Manner, 
follows the Light, Convidion and View of the Underftand- 
ing, concerning the greateft Good and Evil, and this be that 
alone which moves the Will, and it be a ContradicSlion to 
fuppofe otherwife ; then it is neceffarily fo, the Will neceffarily 
follows this Light or View of the Underftanding, not only 
in fome of it's Ads, but in every A6t of chufing and refu- 
fing. So that the Will don't determine it felf in any one of 
it's own A6ls ; but all it's A6ls, every A61 of Choice and Re- 
fufal, depends on, and is neceffarily conneded with fome an- 
tecedent Caufe ; which Caufe is not the Will it felf, nor any 
A6t of it's own, nor any Thing pertaining to that Faculty, 
but fomething belonging to another Faculty, whofe Ads go 
before the Will, in all it's Ads, and govern and determine 
them every one. 


So Of the Connexion of the Will Part II, 

Here, if it (hould be replied, that altho' it be true, that 
according to the Dodor, the final Determination of the Will 
always depends upon, and is infallibly conneded with the 
Ijnderftanding's Convi(5lion, and Notice of the greateft 
Good ; yet the Ads of the Will are not neceffary ; becaufe 
that Convidion and Notice of the Underftanding is firft de- 
pendent on a preceeding A61 of the Will, in determining to 
attend to, and take Notice of the Evidence exhibited ; by 
which Means the Mind obtains that Degree of Convi6tioa 
which is fufficient and tffedual to determine the confequent 
and ultimate Choice of the Will ; and that the Will with 
Regard to that preceeding A6t, whereby it determines whe- 
ther to attend or no, is not neceffary ; and that in this, the 
Liberty of the Will confifis, that when God holds forth 
fufficient objedive Light, the Will is at Liberty whether to^ 
command the Attention of the Mind to it. 

Nothing can be more weak and inconfiderate than fuch a 
Reply as this. For that preceeding Ad of the Will, in de-y 
termining to attend and confider, ftill is an A£i of the Will, 
(it is fo to be fure, if the Liberty of the Will confifts in it, as 
is fuppofed) and if it be an Ad of the Will, it is an Ad 
of Choice or Refufal. And therefore, if what the Dodor 
afferts be true, it is determined by fome antecedent Light iri 
the Underftanding concerning the greateft apparent Good or 
Evil. For he afferts, it is that Light which alone doth ?tiove the 
Will to chufe or refufe. And therefore the Will muft be moved 
by that in chufing to attend to the objedive Light offered, in 
order to another confequent Ad of Choice : fo that this Ad 
is no lefs neceffary than the other. And if we fuppofe ano- 
ther Ad of the Will, ftill preceeding both thefe mentioned, to 
determine both,ftill that alfo muft be an Ad of the Will,& an 
Ad of Choice ; and fo muft,by the famePrinciples,be infallibly 
determin'd by fome certain Degree of Light intheUnderftanding 
concerning the greateft Good. And let us fuppofe as many 
Ads of the Will, one preceeding another, as we pleafe, yet 
they are every one of them neceffarily determined by a cer- 
tain Degree of Light in the Underftanding, concerning the^ 
greateft and moft eligible Good in that Cafe ; and fo, not 
one of them free according to Dr. Whith/s Notion of Free- 
dom. And if it be faid, the Reafon why Men don't attend 
to Light held forth, is becaufe of ill Habits contracted by 
evil Ads committed before, whereby their Minds are in- 
difpofed to attend to, and confider of the Truth held forth 


j Sed.IX. with the Underftandlng. 8i 

to them by God, the Difficulty is not at all r.voided : fiili 
: the Queftion returns, What determined the - Will in thofe 
^ preceeding evil A6ts ? It mufl, by Dr. IVhitbys Principles, 
ftill be the View of the Underftandlng concerning the 
greateft Good and Evil. If this View of the Underllanding 
be that alone which doth move the Will to chufc or refufe^ as the 
i Do6lor aflerts, then every Acl of Choice or Refit fal^ from a 
i Man's tirft Exiftence, is moved and determined by thisView j 
and this View of the Underftandlng exciting and governing 
the Ad, muft be before the A6t : And therefore the Will is 
neceftarily determined, in every one of it'sAcls, from a Man's 
firftExiftence,by a Caufe befide theWill, & a Caufethat don't 
proceed from,or depend on any A6t of the Will at all. Which 
at once utterly abohfties the Dodor's whole Scheme of Li- 
berty of Will ; and he, at one Stroke, has cut the Sinews 
of all his Arguments from the Goodnefs, Righteoufnefs, 
Faithfulnefs and Sincerity of God, in his Commands, Pro- 
mifes, Threatnings, Calls, Invitations, Expoftulations ; 
\ which he makes Ufe of, under the Heads of Reprobation, 
Eledion, Univerfal Redemption, fufficient and effedual 
Grace, and the Freedom of the Will of Man ; and has 
enervated aad made vain all thofe Exclamations againft: 
the Dodrine of the Calvinijls^ as charging God with mani- 
feft Unrighteoufnefs, Unfaithfulnefs, Hypocrify, Fallaci- 
oufnefs, and Cruelt}' ; which he has over, and over, and over 
again, numberlefs Times in his Book. 

Dr. Samuel Clark^ in his Demonftration of the Being and 
Attributes of God, f to evade the Argument to- prove the 
NeceiTity of Volition, from it's necelTary Connexion with the 
laft Di6tate of the Underftandlng, fuppofes the latter not 
to be diverfe from the Act of the Will it feif. But if it be 
fo, it will not alter the Cafe as to the Evidence of the Ne- 
ceffity of the Ad: of the Will. If the Didate of the Under- 
ftandlng be the very fame with the Determination of the 
Will or Choice, as Dr. Clark fuppofes, then this Determi- 
nation is no Fruit or Effe6i of Choice : And if fo, no Liberty 
of Choice has any Hand in it : As to ^Volition or Choice, it 
is neceftary ; That is. Choice can't prevent it. If the iaft 
Dictate of the Underftandlng be the fame with the Deter- 
mination of Volition it felf, then the Exiftence of that De- 
termination muft be neceffary as to Volition ; in as much 
as Volition can have no Opportunity to determine whether 
it ihall exift or no, it having Exiftence already before VoJi- 

L tioa 

^ Mt. 6. P. 93. 

82 Of the Conn&daon of the TFill Part II. 

tion has Opportunity to determine any Thing. It is it felf 
the very Rile and Exiftence of Volition. But a Thing, af- 
ter it exilfs, has no Opportunity to determine as to it's own 
Exiftence -, it is too late for that. 

If Liberty confifts in that which Armmiam fuppofe, wz. 
in the Will's determining it's own A6ts, having free Oppor- 
tunity, and being without all NecefTity ; This is the lame 
as to fay, that Liberty confifts in the Soul's having Power 
and Opportunity to have what Determmations of the Will 
it pleales or chufes. And if the Determinations of the Will, 
and the laft Di6tates of the Underftanding be the fame 
Thing, then Liberty confifts in the Mind's having Power to 
have what Di6tates of the Underflanding it pleafes, having 
Opportunity to chufe it's own Dictates of Underflanding. 
But this is abfurd j for it is to make the Determination of 
Choice prior to the Di6late of Underftanding, and the 
Ground of it ; which can't confifl with the Di&ate of Un- 
derftanding's being the Determination of Choice it felf. 

Here is no Way to do in this Cafe, but only to recur to 
the old Abfurdity, of one Determination before another, 
and the Caufe of it ; and another before that, determining 
that ; and fo on in infinitum. If the laft Dictate of the Un- 
derftanding be the Determination of the Will it felf, and the 
Soul be free with Regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian 
Notion of Freedom ; then the Soul, before that Di6tate of 
it's Underftanding exifts, voluntarily and according "to it's 
own Choice determines, in every Cafe, what that Didate 
of the Underftanding ftiall be ; otherwife that Di6late, as to 
the Will, is neceiTary \ and the Ads determined by it, muft 
ahb be neceflary. So that here is a Determination of the 
Mind prior to that Dictate of the Underftanding, an A(5l of 
Choice going before it, chufing and determining what that 
Di6tate of the Underftanding (hall be : and this preceeding 
Aa of Choice, being a free Aa of Will, muft alio be the 
fame with another laft Didtate of the Underftanding : And 
if the Mind alfo be free in that Di6tate of Underftanding, that 
muft be determined ftill by another ^ and fo on forever. 

Befides, if the Dictate of the Underftanding, and De- 
termination of the Will be the fame, this confounds the Un- 
derftanding and Will, and makes them the fame. Whether 
they be the fame or no, I will not now difpute ; but only 
would obferve, that if it be io^ and the Arminian Notion of 



Sed.IX. with the Underftanding. 83 

Liberty confifts in a Self-determining Power in the Under- 
ftanding, free of all Neceflity ; being independent, unde- 
termined by any Thing prior to it's own Acfts and Determi- 
nations ; and the more the Underftanding is thus indepen- 
dent, and fovereign over it's own Determinations, the more 
free. By this therefore the Freedom of the Sou', as a moral 
Agent, muft confift in the Independence of the Underftand- 
ing on any Evidence or Appearance of Things, or any 
Thing whatfoever that ftands forth to the View of the Mind, 
prior to the Underftanding's Determination. And what a 
Sort of Liberty is this ! conlifting in an Ability, Freedom 
and Eafmefs of judging, either according to Evidence, or a- 
gainft it ; having a fovereign Command over it felf at all 
Times, to judge, either agreably or difagreably to what is 
plainly exhibited to it's own View. Certainly, 'tis no Li- 
berty that renders Perfons the proper Subjeds of perfwafive 
Reafoning, Arguments, Expoftulatlons, and fuch moral 
Means and Inducements. The Ufe of which with A4ankind, 
is a main Argument of the Armimans^ to defend their Notion 
of Liberty without all NecelTity. For according to this, 
the more free Men are, the lefs they are under the Govern- 
ment of fuch Means, lefs fubjedt to the Power of Evidence 
and Reafon, and more independent on their Influence, in 
their Determinations. 

And whether the Underftanding and Will are the fame or 
no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe, yet in order to maintain 
^he Arminian Notion of Liberty without Necelfity, the free 
Will is not determined by the Ln'-'erftandin^^-, nor neceftarily 
connected w th the Underftanding ; and the further from 
iuch Connection, the greater the Freedom. And when 
the Liberty is full and compleat, the Determinations of the 
Will have no Connexion at all with the Dictates of the 
Underftanding. And if fo, in vain are all Applications to 
the Underftanding, in order to induce to any free vertuous 
Ad ; and fo in vain are all Inftrudions, Counfels, Invitati- 
ons, Expoftulations, and all Arguments & Perfwafives what- 
soever : For thefe are but Applications to the Underftanding, 
and a clear and lively Exhibition of the Objects of Choice 
to the Mind's View. But if, after all, the" Will muft be 
ifelf-d^termined, and independent on the Underftanding, to 
what Purpofe are Things thus reprefented to the Underftand- 
ing, in order to determine the Choice ? 


84 ABs of the Will PartIL 

Section X. 

Volitio7t neceffarily conneEiedwith the Influ-- 
ence <?/ Motives ; %mth particular Ohfer-- 
nations on the great Inconfifience of Mr. 
Chubb's Afertions andReafonings^ about 
the Freedc7n of the WilL 

THAT every Act of the Will has fome Caufe, and con- 
fequently (by what has been already proved) has a 
neceiTary Connexion with it's Caufe, and fo is ne- 
Ccflary by a Neccffity of Conne61:ion and Confequence, is 
evident by ihis, That every Ad of the Will whatfoever, is • 
excited by fome Motive : Which is manifeft, becaufe, if the 
Will or Mind, in willing and chufing after ^he Manner that 
it does, is Excited fo to do by no Motive or Inducement, 
then it has no End which it prcpofes to it felf, or purfues 
in fo doing ; it aims at Nothing, and feeks Nothing, And 
if it feeks Nothing, then it don't go after any Thing, or ex- 
ert any Inclination or Preference towards any Thing. 
Which brings the Matter to a Contradjclion ; Becaufe for 
the Mind to will.fomething, and for it to go after fomething 
by an A61 of Preference and Inclination, are the fameThing, 

But if every Acft of the Will Is excited by a Motive, then 
that Motive is the Caufe of the A61 of the Will. If the Ads 
of the Will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the 

Caufes of their being excited ; or, which is the fame 'i 

Thing, the Caufe of their being put forth into A6t and Ex- '\ 

iftenc^. And if fo, the Exiftence of the A<5ls of the Will is i 

properly the Effect of their Motives. Motives do Nothing ;j 

as Motives cr Inducements, but by their Influence ;' and fo 3 

much as is done by their Influence, is the EfFe6t of them, j 

For that is the Notion of an Efled, fomething that is bro*t i 

to pafs«by the Influence of another Thing. \ 

And if Volitions are properly the EfFe^s of their Motives, :^ 
then they are neceffarily conneded with theirMotives. Every i 
Effect and Event being, as was proved before, neceflarily \ 
connected with that which is the proper Ground and Reafon i( 
of it's Exiflencc. Thus it is tnanifeft^ that Volition is ne- \ 

ceflary, i 

Sed.X. conneEled with Mo\\vt^. 85 

ceflary, and is not from any Self-determining Power in the 
Will : The Volition which is caufed by previous Motive and 
Inducement, is not caufed by the Will exercifmg a fovereign 
Power over it felf, to determine, caufe and excite Volitions 
in it felf. This is not confiftent with the Will's ading in a 
State of Indifference and Equilibrium, to determine it felf to 
a Preference ; for the Way in wl^ich Motives operate, is by 
biafTmg the Will, and giving it a certain Inclination or Pre-. 
ponderation one Way. 

Here it may be proper to obferve,'that Mr. Chubby in his 
Colle6lion of Tra6ts on various Subjects, has advanced a 
Scheme of Liberty, which is greatly divided againft it felf, 
and thoroughly fubverfive of it felf ; and that many Ways. 

I. He is abundant in afTerting, that the Will, in all it's 
A(5fs, is influenced by Motive and Excitement ; and that 
this is the previous Ground and Reafon of all it's Acts, and 
that it is never otherwife in any Inftance. He fays, ('P.262.^ 
No JSlion can take Place without fome Motive to excite it. And 
in P. 26 3. Volition cannot take Place without fome PREVIOUS Rea- 
fon or Motive to induce it. And in P. 3 10. A£lion would not take 
Place zuithout fome Reafon or Motive to induce it ; it being abjurd to 
fuppofe.^that the aSiive Faculty would be exerted without JomePREVI- 
OUS Reajon to difpofe the Mind to Adion. So alfo P. 257. And 
he fpeaks of theleThings as VN^hat we may be abfolutely certain 
■ of, and which are the Foundation, the only Foundation we 
have of a Certainty of the moral Perfe6tions of God. P. 252, 
253» 254, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264. 

And yet at the fame Time, by his Scheme, the Influence 
of Motives upon us to excite to Action, and to be actually a 
Ground of Volition,isf^w/^^2/^«^ on the Volition or Choice of the 
Mind. For he very greatly infifts upon it,that in all freeA6tions, 
before theMind is the Subje<5t of thofe Volitions whichMotives 
excite, it chufes to be fo. It chufes whether it will comply 
with the Motive, which prefents it felf in View, or not ; and 
when various Motives are prefented, it chufes which it will 
yield to, and which it will rejed. So P. 256. Every Man has 
Power to a5i., or to refrain from a£iing agreably with^ or contrary 
to., any Motive that prefents. P. 257. Every Man is at Liberty it 
ff^, or refrain from a£iing agreably with^ or contrary to., what each 

§f thefe Motives^ conftderedfingly^ would excite him to. Man has 

^Power^ and is as much at Liberty to rejeSf the Motive that does 
^revaily as he has Power ^ and is at Liberty to reje^ thofe Motives 


86 Inconjtfience of Mr. C\mh\ys Part II. 

that do not. And foP.310, 311. hi order to conji'itute amoral 
Jgent^ it is neceffary^ that he Jhould have Power to aSi^ or to re- 
frain from a^ingy upon fuch moral Motives as he pleafes. And to 
the like Purpole in many other Places. According to thefe 
Things, the Will ads lirft, and chuies or refufes to com- 
ply with the Motive that is prefented, before it falls under 
it's prevailing Influence : And 'tis iirfl determined by the 
Mind's Pleafure or Choice, what Motives it will be induced 
bvj before it is induced by them. 

Nowjhow can thefe Things hang together ? How can the 
Mind firfl: ad, and by it's Ad of Volition and Choice determine 
what Motives (hall be the Ground and Reafon of it's Volition 
and Choice f For this fuppofes, the Choice is already made, 
before the Motive has it's EfFed ; and that the Volition is al- 
ready exerted, before the Motive prevails, fo as adually to be 
the Ground of the Volition ; and makes the prevailing of the 
Motive, the Confequence of the Volition, which yet it is the 
Ground of. If the Mind has already chofen to comply with 
a Motive, and to yield to it's Excitement, it doa't need to 
yield to it after this : for. the Thing is effeded already, that 
the Motive would excite to, and the Will is before-hand 
with the Excitement ; and the Excitement comes in too late, 
and is needlefs and in vain afterwards. If the Mind has 
already chofen to yield to a Motive which invites to a Tiling, 
that implies and in Fad is a chufing the Thing invited to ; 
and the very Ad of Choice is before the Influence of the 
Motive which induces, and is the Ground of the Choice ; 
the Son is before-hand with the Father that begets him : 
The Choice is fuppofed to be the Ground of that Influence 
of the Motive, which very Influence is fuppofed to be the 
Ground of the Choice. And fo Vice verfa. The Choice is 
fuppofed to be the Confequence of the Influence of ^-the Mo- 
tive, which Influence of the Motive is the Confequence of 
that very Choice. 

And befidesjif the Will ads firfl: towards the Motive before 
k falls under it's Influence, and the prevailing of the Motive 
■upon it to induce it to ad and chufe, be the Fruit and Con- 
fequence of it's Ad and Choice, then how is the Motive a 
PREVIOUS Ground and Reafon 0} the AB and Choice^ fo that 
in the Nature of the Things^ Volition cannot take Place without fc?ne 
PREVIOUS Reafon and Motive to induce it , and that this Ad 
is confequent upon, and follows the Motive ? WhichThings 
Mr. Ch'uhb often aflerts, as of certain and undoubted Truth. 


SccSl.X. Scheme of Liberty^ &ۥ 87 

So that the very fame Motive is both previous and confequent^ 
both before and after, both the Ground and Fruit of tkc 
very fame Thing ! 

II. Agreable to the fore-mention'd inconfiftent Notion of 
the Will's tirll acting towards the Motive, chufmg whether 
it will comply with it, in order to it's becoming a Ground of 
the Will's acting, before any A6t of Volition can talc^ 
Place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and Excitements 
to the Action of the Will, the pajftve Ground or Reafon of that 
Adion. Which is a remarkable Phrafe ; than which I pre- 
fume there is none more unintelligible, and void of diftincS: 
and confident Meaning, in all the Writings of Duns^ Scotus, 
or Thomas Jquinas. When he reprefents the Motive to 
Adion or Volition as paflive, he muil mean— pafTive in that 
Affair, or paflive with Refpe6l to that A6tion which he 
fpeaks of; otherwife it is Nothing to his Purpofe, or relating 
to the Delign of his Argument ; He mull mean (if that 
can be called a Meaning) that the Motive to Volition is firil 
acfted upon or towards by the Volition, chufing to yield to it, 
making it a Ground of A6lion, or determining to fetch it's 
Influence from thence ; and fo to make it a previous 
Ground of it's own Excitation and Exiftence. Which is 
the fame Abfurdity, as if one fliould fay, that the Soul of 
Man, or any other Thing fliould, previous to it's exifting, 
chufe what Caufe it would come into Exiftence by, and 
fhould ad upon it's Caufe, to fetch Influence from thence, 
to bring it into Being ; and fo it's Caufe fliould be a paflive 
Ground of it's Exiftence ! 

Mr. Chubb does very plainly fuppofe Motive or Excitement 
to be the Ground of the Being of Volition. He fpeaks of it as 
the Ground or Reafon of the EXERTION of an A61 of 
the Will, P. 391, & 392. and exprefly fays, that Volition 
cannot TAKE PLaCE without fome previous Ground or Mq- 
live to induce it^ P. 363. And he fpeaks of the Acft as FROM 
the Motive^ and FROM THE INFLUENCE of the Motive^ 
P. 352. and from the Influence that the Motive has on the 
Man, for the PRODUCTION of an ASiion, P. 317. Certain- 
ly, there is no Need of multiplying Words about this ; 
'Tis eafily judged, whether Motive can be the Ground of 
Volition's being exerted and taking Place, fo that the 
very Produdion of it is from the Influence of the Motive, 
and yet the Motive, before it becomes the Ground of the 
Volition, is palfive, or a6ted upon by the Volition. But 


88 Inconftjience of Mr. CtmWs Part II. 

this I will fay. That a Man who infifts fo much on Clear- 
nefs of Meaning in others, and is fo much in blaming 
their Confufion and Inconfiftence, ought, if he was able, to 
have explained his Meaning in this Phrafe of p^j^^f GV^z/W 
ef ASiioTiy fo as to (hew it not to be confufed and incon- 

If any fhould fuppofe, that Mr. Chubby when he fpeaks of 
Motive as a pajfive Ground of J^fion^ don't mean palTive 
with Regard to that Volition which it is the Ground of, but 
fome other antecedent Volition (tho' his Purpofe and Ar- 
gument, and whole Difcourfe, will by no Means allow of 
fuch a Suppoiition) yet it would not help the Matter in the 
leaft. For, (i.) If we fuppofe there to be an A6t of Volition 
or Choice, by which the Soul chufes to yield to the Invi- 
tation of a Motive to another Volition, by which the Soul 
chufes fomething elfe ; both thefe fuppofed Volitions are in 
Effect the very fame. A Volition, or chufmg to yield to 
the Force of a Motive inviting to chufe fomething, comes to 
juft the fame Thing as chufing the Thing which the Mo- 
tive invites to, as I obferved before. So that here can be no 
Room to help the Matter, by a Diftin6tion of two Volitions. 
(2.) If the Motive be pallive with Reiped, not to the fame 
Volition that the Motive excites to, but one truly diftindt 
and prior 5 yet, by Mr. Chubb., that prior Volition can't 
take Place, without a Motive or Excitement, as a previous 
Ground of it's Exiftence. For he infifts, that // is ahfurd to 
fuppofe any Volition fl?ould take Place without fome previous 
Motive to induce it. So that at laft it comes to juft the fame 
Abfurdity : for if every Volition muft have a previous Mo- 
tive, then the very /ry? in the whole Series muft be excited 
by a previous Motive ; and yet the Motive to that firft Vo- 
lition is paffive ; but can't be paflive with Regard to ano- 
ther antecedent Volition, becaufe, by the Suppofition, it is 
the very firft : Therefore if it be paflive with Refpecft to 
any Volition, it muft be fo with Regard to that very Vo^ 
lition that it is the Ground of, and that is excited by it. 

III. Tho' Mr. Chubb aflerts, as above, that every Volition 
has fome Motive, and that, in the Nature of the Thing., n$ 
Volition can take Place without fome Motive to induce it \ yet he 
aflerts, that Volition does not always follow the ftrorg:ft Mo- 
tive ; or in other Words, is not governed by any laperiour 
Strength of the Motive that is follov^^ed, beyond Motives to 
the contrary, previous to the Volition it feif. His own 


Scd.X. Scheme of Liberty y Uc. 89 

Words,?. 258, are as follows : " Tho' with regard to phyfi- 
*' cal Caufes, that which is ftrongeft always prevails, 
<• yet it is otherwife with regard to moral Caufes. Of 
" thefe, fometimes the ftronger, fometimes the weaker, 
*' prevails. And the Ground of this Difference is evident, 
*' namely, that what we call moral Caufes, flriclly fpeak- 
'' ing, are no Caufes at all, but barely paffive Reafons 0^ 
*' or Excitements to the A<5fion, or to the refraining from 
*' a(5ting : which Excitements we have Power, or are at 
« Liberty to comply with or reje6t, as I have fhewed above." 
And fo throughout the Paragraph, he, in a variety of 
Phrafes, infifls, that the Will is not always determined by the 
ftrongeft Motive, unlefs by ftrongeft we prepofteroully meaa 
adually prevailing in the Event ; which is not in the Mo- 
tive, but in the Will 5 but that the Will is not always de- 
termined by the Motive which is ftrongeft, by any Strength 
previous to the Volition it felf. And he elfewhere does a- 
bundantly affert, that the Will is determined by no fuperiouf 
Strength or Advantage that Motives have, from any Conftitu- 
tion or State of Things, or any Circumftances whatfoever, 
previous to the adual Determination of the Will. And in- 
deed his whole Difcourfe on human Liberty implies it, his 
whole Scheme is founded upon it. 

But thefe Things cannot ftand together. There is 

fuch a Thing as a Diverfity of Strength in Motives to Choice, 
previous to the Choice it felf. Mr. Chuhb himfelf fuppofes^ 
that they do previoiifly invite^ h^duce^ eix'ite and difpofe the Mind 
to ASfion. This implies, that they have fomething in them- 
felves that is inviting, fome Tendency to induce and difpofe 
to Volition, previous to Volition it itlL And if they have 
in themfelves this Nature and Tendency, doubtlefs they have 
it in certain limited Degrees, which are capable of Diver- 
fity ; and fome ha\'^ it in greater Degrees, others in lefs ; 
and they that have moft of this Tendency, conlidered with 
all their Nature and Circumftances, previous to Volition, 
they are the ftrongeft Motives ^ and thofe that have leaft, are 
the weakeft Adotives. 

Now if Volition fometimes don't follow the Motive v/hich 
is ftrongeft, or has moft previous Tendency or Advantage, ail 
Things confidered, to induce or excite it, but follows the 
"Weakeft, or that which as it ftands previoufty in the Mind'» 
View, has leaft Tendency to induce it ; herein the Will ap- 
parently a6ts wholly without Motive, without any previous 
keafon to difpofe the Mind to it, contrary to what the fani:; 

M AutU.oif 

90 Inconjipnce of Mr. Chuhh\ Part II.. 

Author fuppofes The Aa wherein the Will muft proceed 
Whout previous Motive to induce it, is the Act ■ of prefer- 
ring the weakert Motive. For how abfurd is it to fayf The 
Mind fees previous Reafon in the Motive, to pre/er that 
-Mot ve before the other ; and at the fame Time to fuppofe, - 
that there is Nothing m the Motive, in it's Nature, State, or 
any Circumftances of it whatfoever, as k (lands in the pre- 
vious View of the Mind, tliat gives it any Preference : but 
on the contrary the other Motive that ftands in Comprtition 
with It, in all thefe Refpeas, has moft belonging to it, tha" 
IS inviting and moving, and has moft of a Tendency to 
Choice and Preference ? This is certainly as much as o 
Z'aa'VpT'""' G'-o^nd and Reafon in the Motive for 
the Aa of 1-reterence, and yet no previous Reafon for it. Bv 
theSuppofition astoall that is m the two rival Motives 
which tenas to Preference, previous to the Aa of Preference, 
It IS not m tnat which is prefer'd, but wholly ,n the other • 
becaufe appearing fupenour Strength, and all appearing Pre- 

Aa of 1 reference is from ^rmWx Ground, and Reafin in the 
Motive which IS preferred. But are thefe Thines confiftent ? 
Can there be previous Ground in a Thing for an Event 
that takes Place, and yet no previous Tendency in it to that 
Event? If one Thing folio .vs another, without any previ- 
ous 7 endency to it s following, then I fhould think" it very- 
piain, that it lollows it without any Manner of previous Rea- 
fon why It fhould follow. 

Yea, in this Cafe, Mr. Chulb fuppofes, that the Event 
follows an Antecedent or a previous Thin;., as the Ground' 
oi it s txiftence, not only that has no Tendmcy to it, but a 
cmtrary Tendency 1 he Event is the Preference which the 
Mind gives to that Motive which is weaker, as it ftands in 
the previous View of the Mind ; the immediate Antecedent 
IS the View the Mind has of the two rival Motives con- 
junaiy ; m which previous View of the Mind, all the Pre- 
terablenefs or prev.ous Tendency to Preferenoe, is fuppofed 
to be on the other Side or in the contrary Motive ; and alt 
the Lnworthmef^ of Preference, and fo previous Tendency 
to Comparative Neglecl, R.yeaion or Undervaluing, is on 

It- i'^%'^'"'^f P"'*^"'''^ '■ ^"'ly<^t '"*is Viev? of the 
Mind js fuppofed to be the previom Ground or Reafon of this • 
Aa or Prererence, exciting itf and diffofmg the Mnd to it. 
\'vhich, I leave the Reader to judge, whether it be abfurd- 
or not. It It be not, then it is not abfurd to fay, that the \ 


Sed.X. Scheme of Libefy^ ^c. 91 

i)revioiis Tendency of an Antecedent to a Confequent, is the 
Ground and Reafon why that Confequent docs not follow ; 
^nd the Wart of a previous Tendency to m Event, yea, a 
Tendency to the Contrary^ is the true Ground and Reafon 
^hy that Event does follow. 

An Aa of Choice or Preference is a comparative ^ Aa, 
jwherein the Mind ads with R.eference to two or moreThings 
that are compared,- and fiand in Competition in the Mind's 
View. If the Mind, in this comparative A6t, prefers that 
which appears inferiour in the Comparifon, then the Mind 
herein ads abfolutely without Motive, or Inducement, or 
any Temptation whatfcever. Then, if a hungry Man has 
the Offer of two Sorts of Food, both which he finds an Ap- 
petite to, but has a ftronger Appetite to one than the other ; 
and there be no Circumftances or Excittm.ents whatfoever in 
the Cafe to induce him to tske either one or the other, but 
meerly his Appetite : If in the Choice he makes between 
them, he chufes that which he has leaft Appetite to, and 
refuies that to which he has the ilrongeft Appetite, this is 
a Choice made abfolutely without previous Motive, Excite- 
ment, Reafon or Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly 
without ali Appetite to either : Becaufe his Volition in 
this Cafe is a comparative A6f, attending and following a 
comparative \ iew of the Food which he chufes, viewing it 
as related to, and compared with the other Sort of Food, in 
which View his Preference has abfolutely no previous 
Ground, yea, is againft all previous Ground and Motive. 
And if there be any Principle in Man from v/hence an Act 
of Choice may arife after this Manner, from the fame 
Principle Volition may arife wholly without Motive on ei- 
ther Side. If the Mind in it's Volition can go beyond Mo- 
tive, then it can go without Motive : for when it is be- 
yond the Motive, it is out of the Reach of the Motive, 
, out of the Limits of it's Influence, and fo without Motive. 
If Volition goes beyond the Strength and Tendency of Mor 
tive, and efpecially if it goes againit it's Tendency, this 
dciiionftrates the Independence of Volition or Motive. 
And if fo, no Reafon can be given for what Mr. ChiM 
fo often afferts, even that in the Nature of Things Volition 
, cannot take Place without a Motive to induce it. 

If the mod High fliould endow a Balance with Agency 

or A6tivity of Nature, in fuch a Manner, that when une- 

quaiWeights are put into the Scales, it's Agency could enable 

' . M 2 .1^ 

92 Inconjijlence of Mr. Chubb's Part 11. 

it to caufe that Scale to defcend which has the lead "Weight, 
and fo to raife the greater Weight ; this would clearly de- 
jnonftrate, that the Motion of the Balance do's not depend 
on Weights in the Scales, at lead as much, as if the Ba- 
lance fhould move it felf, when there is no Weight in ei- 
ther Scale. And the Acftivity of the Balance which is 
Sufficient to move it felf againft the greater Weight, muft 
certainly be more tlian fufficient to move it when there is 
no Weight at all. 

Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the Will can't ftir at all without 
fome Motive ; and alfo fuppofes, that if there be a Motive 
to one Thing, and none to the Contrary, Volition will in- 
fallibly follov/ that Motive. This is vertually to fuppofe an 
entire Dependence of the Will on Motives : If it were not 
wholly dependent on them, it could furely help it felf a httle 
•without them, or help it felf a little againft a Motive, with- 
out help from the Strength and Weight of a contrary Mo- 
tive. And yet his fuppofing that the Will, when it has be- 
fore it various d|>porite Motives, can ufe them as it pleafes, 
and chufe it's own Influence from them, and negledl the 
ftrongefl:, and follow the weakeft, fuppofes it to be wholly 
independent on Motives. 

It further appears, on Mr. Chubvs Suppofition, that Vo- 
lition muft be without any previous Ground in any Motive, 
thus : If it be as he fuppofes, that the Will is not deter- 
mined by any previous fuperiour Strength of the Motive, 
but determines and chufes it's cwn Motive, then, when the 
rival Motives are exactly equal in Strength and Tendency to 
induce, in all Refpedfs, it may follow either ; and may in 
fuch a Cafe, fom.etimes follow one, fometimes the other. 
And if fo, this Diverfity which appears between the A6l« 
of the Will, is piaiply without previous Ground in either 
of the Motives ; for all that is previoully in the Motives, is 
fuppofed precifely and perfe6f ly the fame, without any Di- 
verfity whatfoever. Now perfed Identity, as to all that is 
previous in the Antecedent, can't be the Ground and Rea- 
fon of Diverfity in the Confequent. Perfect Identity in the 
pround can't bp a Reafon why it is not followed with the 
fame Confequence. And therefore the Source of this Diver- 
fity of Confequen<;e muft be fought for eifewhere. 

And laftly, it may be obferved, that however Mr. Chubb 
^oes much infift that no Volition can tgke Fiace without 



Sed.X. Scheme of Liberty y 8cc. 93 

fome Motive to induce it, which previoufly difpofes the 
Mind to it ; yet, as he alfo iniifts that the Mind without 
Reference to any previous fuperiour Strength of Motives, 
picks and chufes for it's Motive to follow ; He himfelf here* 
in plainly fuppofes, that with Regard to the Mind's Prefe- 
rence of one Motive before another, it is not the Motive 
that difpofes the Will, but the Will difpofes it felf to fol- 
low the Motive. 

IV. Mr. Chubb fuppofes NecelTity to be utterly inconfill- 
cnt with Jgtncy ; and that to fuppofe a Being to be an Agent 
in that which is neceiTary, is a plain Contradiction. P. 311. 
And throughout his Difcourfes on the Subjed of Liberty, he 
fuppofes, that NecelTity cannot confift with Agency or Free- 
dom ; and that to fuppofe otherwife, is to make Liberty and 
NepelTity, A6tion and Paffion, the fame Thing. And fo he 
feems to fuppofe, that there is no A6tion ftriclly fpeaking, 
but Volition ; and that as to the Effects of Volition in 
Body or Mind, m themfelves confidered, being neceiTary, 
they are faid to be free, only as they are the Etfe6ts of an 
A61 that is not neceiTary. 

And yet, according to him. Volition it felf is the Eff^ 
if Volition ; yea, every A(5t of free Volition : and therefore 
every Adl of free Volition muft, by what has now been ob • 
ferved from Him, be neceflary. That every A(5t of free 
Volition is it felf the Effect of Volition, is abundantly fup- 
pofed by Him. In P. 341, he fays, " If a Man is fuch a 
*' Creature as I have above proved him to be, that is, if he 
" has in him a Power or Liberty of doing either Good or 
" Evil, and either of thefe is the Subject of his own free 
" Choice, fo that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, 

. *^ have CHOSEN and done the contrary." Here He fup- 
pofes, all that is Good or Evil in Man is the EfFecft of his 
Choice ; and fo that his good or evil Choice it felf is the 
Effect of his Pleafure or Choice, in thefe Words, He might 
if he had PLEASED^ have CHOSEN the contrary. So in P.356. 
" Tho' it be highly reafonable, that a Man fhould always 
" chufe the greater Good, —yet he may, if he PLEASE, 
" CHUSE oltherviife." Which is the fame Thing as if he 
had faid, He may^ if he chufes^ chufe otherwife. And then he 
goes on, "— that is, he may, if he pieafes^ chufe what is 
good for himfelf &c." And again in the fame Page, " The 
^ Will is not confined by the Underftanding to any parti- 

., " cular Sort of Ggod, whether greater or lefs -, but is at 

" Liberty 

94 Inconftjlence of Mr. Chubb's Part IL 

** Liberty to chufe what Kind of Good it pleafes."—!^ there 
be any Meaning in thele laft Words," the Meaning mull be 
this', that the Will is at Liberty to chufe what Kind of Good it 
chujes to chufe ; fuppofing the A61 of Choice it felf deter- 
mined by an antecedent Choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb 
fpeaks of, is not only a Man's having Power to move his 
Body agreably to an antecedent Ad of Choice, but to ufe 
or exert the Faculties of his Soul. Thus, in P. 379.fpeaking 
of the Faculties of his Mind, he fays, " Man has Power,and 
*' is at Liberty to neglect thefe Faculties, to ufe them aright, 
*' or to abufe them, as he pkafesy And that he fuppofes an 
Adi of Choice^ or Exercife of Pleafure, properly dijflincl 
fromy and antecedent to thofe Ads thus chofen, directing, 
commanding and producing thii chofen Ads, and even the 
Ads of Choice themfelves, is very plain in P. 283. " He 
" can command his JSfions ; and herein confifts his Liberty ; 
" He can give or deny himfelf that Pleafure as he plcafesS* 
And P. 377. " It the Adions of Men — are not the Pror- 
*' dzice of a free Choice^ or Eledion, but fpring from a Neceffity 

" of Nature, he cannot in Reafon be the Objed of Re- 

" ward or Punifhment on their Apcount. Whereas, if 
*' Adion in Man, whether Good or Evil, is the Produce of 
*' Will or f-ee Choice ; fo that a Man in either Cafe, had it 
«' in his Power, and was at Liberty to have CFIOSEN the 
" contrary, he is the proper Objed of Reward or Punifli- 
*' ment, according: as he CHUSES to behave Himfelf." 
Here in thefe laft Words, be fpeaks of Liberty ofCHUSING, 
according as he CHUSES, So that the Behaviour which he 
fpeaks of as fubjed to his Choice, is his chuftng it iQ\{^ as 
"well as his external Condud confequent upon it. And 
therefore 'tis evident, he means not only external AdionSjbut 
the Ads of Choice themfelves, when he fpeaks of all f-ee 
Jaions^ as the PRODUCE of free Choice, And this is abun- 
dantly evident in what he fays in P. 372^ & 373. 

Now thefe Things imply a twofold great Abfurdity and 

I. To fuppofe, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every 
free Ad of Choice is commanded by^ and is the Produce of 
free Choice^ is to fuppofe the firft free Ad of Choice belong- 
ing to the Cafe, yea, the firft free Ad of Choice that 
ever Man exerted, tohtthe Produce of an antecedent Ad 
of Choice. But I hope I need not labourat all to convince 
my Readers, that 'tis an Abfurdity to fay, the very firji Ad 
is the Produce of another Ad that went befon it. 

2. If 

I Sed.X. Scheme of Liberty ^ &c. 95 


i 2. If it were both pofTible and real, as Mr. Chicbh infifts, 

T ^ that every free A<51 of Choice were the Produce or the EfFe(5t 

of ' a free A(5t of Choice ; yet even then, according to 

his Principles, no one A61 of Choice would be free, but every 

one neceriary ; becaufe, every Ad of Choice being the Effect 

of a foregoing Ad, every Ad would be necelTarily con- 

'j neded with that foregoing Caufe. For Mr. Chubb himfelf 

I fays? P- 3^9- " When the Self-moving Power is exerted, it 

" becomes the neceilary Caufe of it's Effeds." — So that his 

\ Notion of a free Ad, that is rewardable or punifhable, is a 

y Heap of Contradictions. It is a free Act, and yet, by his 

I own Notion of Freedom, is neceflary ; and therefore by him 

|j it is a Contradidion, to fuppofe it to be free. According to 

jit him, every free Ad i$^he Produce of a free Act ; fo that 

there mull be an infinite Number of free Ads in Succeffion, 

without any Beginning, in an Agent that has a Beginning. 

And therefore here is an infinite Number of free Ads, 

every one of them free ; and yet not any one of them free, 

i but every Ad in the whole infinite Chain a neceflary EfFed. 

I'! All the Ads are rewardable or punifliable, and yet the Agent 

I cannot, in Reafon^be the Objed of Reward or Punilhment,on 

I Account of any one of thefe Adions. He is adivc in them 

all, and paffive in none ; yet adive in none, but pafTive in 

t| all, b'r. 

M; V. Mr. Chubb does moft flrenuoufly deny, that Motives 
are Caufes of the Ads of the Will ; or that the moving 
Principle in Man is moved^ or caufed to be exerted by Motives.. 
His Words P. 388 & 389. are, " If the moving Principle in 
'' by Ibmething external to Man, zvh'ich all Motives are^ then, 
" it would not be a Self-moving Principle, feeing it would be 
" moved by a Principle external to it felf. And to fay, that a 
" Self-moving Principle is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE 
" EXERTED, by a Caufe external to it felf, is abfurd and 
*' a Contradidion &c."— And in the next Page, 'tis particu- 
larly and largely infifted, that Motives are Caufes in no Cafe, 
that they are meerly pajfftve in the ProduSlion of Aciion^ arid havd 
no Caitjality in the ProduSiion of it, — no Caufality, to be the Caufe 
$fthe Exertion of the Will. 

Now I defire it may be confidered, how this can pollibly 
confifis with what he fays in other Places. Let it be noted 


96 Inconfiftence of Mr. Chubb's Part II. 

1. Mr. Chuhh abundantly fpeaks of Motives as Ex- 
mtements of the J^'s of the Will ; and fays, that Motives d» 
excite Volition, and induce it, and that they are necelTary to 
this End ; that in the Reafo?i and Nature of Things, Folition can- 
not take Place without Motives to excite it. But nov/ if Motives 
excite theWill, they move it ; and yet he fays, 'tis abiurd to fay, 
the Will is moved by Motives. And again (if Language is 
of any Significancy at all) If Motives excite Vohtion, then 
they are the Cauje of it's being excited ; and to caufe Voh- 
tion to be excited, is to cauie it to be j>ut forth or exerted^ - 
Yea, Mr. Chubb fays himfelf, P. 317. Motive is neceffary 
to the Exertion of the adive Faculty. To excite, is pofitively 
to do fomething ; and certainly that which does fomtthing, is 
the Caufe of the Thing done by it. To create, is to caufe to 
be created ; to make, is to caufe to be made ; to kill, is to 
caufe to be killed ; to quicken, is to caufe to be quickened ; 
and to excite, is to caufe to be excited. To excite, is to be a 
Caufe, in the moft proper Senfe, not meerly a negative 
Occafion, but a Ground of Exiftence by pofitive Influence. 
The Notion of exciting, is exerting Influence to caufe the 
Effe6t to arife or corne forth into Exifl:ence. 

2. Mr. Chubb himfelf, P. 317, fpeaks of Motives as the 
Ground and Reafon of Adion BY INFLUENCE, and BY 
PREVAILING INFLUENCE. Now, what can be meant 
by a Caufe, but fomething that is the Ground and Reafon of 
a Thing by it's Influence, an Influence that is prevalent and 
.fo efFedual ? 

3. This Author not only fpeaks of Motives as the Ground 
and Reafon of A6tion, by prevailing Influence ; but exprefly 
oUhQir Influence as prevailing FOR THE PRODUCTION 
of an A6tion, in the fame P. 317 : which makes the Incon- 
fiflency fliill more palpable and notorious. The Produ^iow 
of an Eifect is certainly the Caufmg of an EfFedf ; and pro- 
du^ive Influence is cnufal Influence, if any Thing is ; And 
that which has this Influence prevalently, fo as thereby to 
become the Ground of another Thing, is a Caufe of that 
Thing, if there be any fuch Thing as a Caufe. This In- 
fluence, Mr, Chubb fays, Motives have to produce an Action ; 
and yet he fays, 'tis abfurd i.nd a Contradidion, to fay they 
are Caufes. 

4. In the fame Page, He once and again fpeaks of Mo- 
tives as difpofmg the Agent to Adtion, by their 'influence. His 


,jSed.X. Scheme of Liberty^ he. 97 

Words are thefe : " As Motive, which takes Place in ther 
*' Underftandmg, and is the Produ6l of IntelHgence, is 
« NECESSARY to Adion, that is, to the EXERTION of 
*« the adive Faculty, becaufe that Faculty would not be ex- 
<« erted without Ibme PREVIOUS REASON to DISPOSE 
*' the Mind to A6tion ; fo from hence it plainly appears, 
*' that when a Man is faid to be difpojed to one A6lion ra- 
<' ther than another, this properly fignifies the PREVAIL- 
« ING INFLUENCE that one Motive has upon a Man 
« FOR THE PRODUCTION of an Aaion, or for the 
*' being at Reft, before all other Motives, for the Prodw^ion 
** of the contrary. For as Motive is the Ground and Rea- 
*« fon of any Adion, fo the Motive that prevails, DISPOSES 
*' the Agent to the Performance of that Adion." 

Now, if Motives difpofe the Mind to Adion, then they 
caufe the Mind to be ctfpofed ; and to caufe the Mind to be 
difpofed, is to caufe it to be willing ; and to caufe it to be 
willing, is to caufe it to will ; and that is the fame Thing 
as to be the Caufe of an A61 of the Will. And yet this 
fame Mr. Chubb holds it to be abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be 
a Caufe of the Ad of the Will. 

And if we compare thefe Things together, we have here 
again a whole Heap of Inconfiftences. Motives are the previous 
Ground and Rcafon of the A(5ts of the Will ; yea, the necejfary 
Ground & Reafon of their Exertion, tvithout which they zuiil 'not 
be exerted, and cannot in the Nature of Things take Place ; and 
they do excite thefe A6ts of the Will, and do this by a pre^ 
vailing Influence ; yea, an Influence which prevails for the Pro-' 
duSiion of the A5t of the Will, and for the difpoftng of the Mind 
to it : And yet 'tis abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be a Caufe of an 
A6t of the Will, or that a Principle of Will is moved or 
caufed to be exerted by it, or that it has any Caufality in the Pro- 
du£tion of it, or any Caufality to be the Caufe of the Exertion of 
the Will 

A due Confideration of thefe Things which Mr. Chubb has 
advanced, the ftrange Inconfiftences which the Notion of Li- 
berty confifting in the Will's Power of Self-determination 
void of all Ncceffity, united with that Dictate of common 
Senfe, that there can be no Volition without a Motive, drove 
him into,may be fufficient to convince us,that it is utterly im- 
poffible ever to make that Notion of Liberty confiftent with 
the Influence of Motives in Volition. And as it is iU a man- 

N t^-^T 

98 GOD certamly foreknows Part II • 

ner felf-evldent, that there can be no A6t of Will, Choice 
or Preference of the Mind, without fome Motive or Induce- 
ment, fomething in the Mind's View, which it aims at, 
feeks, inclines to, and goes after ; fo 'tis moll manifeft, 
there is no fuch Liberty in the Univerfe as Arrninlatis inlift 
on ; nor any fuch Thing poliibie, or conceivable. 

Section XL 

77je Evidence of GOD' s certain Foreknow- 
ledge of the Volitions of moral Agents. 

THAT the A(5ls of the Wills of moral Agents are not 
contingent Events, in that Senfe, as to be without all 
Necellity, appears by God's certain Foreknowledge of 
fuch Events. 

In handhng this Argument,! would in the/?;/? Place prove, 
that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the voluntary A(5ts 
of moral Agents ; and fecondly^ Ihew the Confequence, or 
how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral A- 
gents are not contingent, fo as to be without NecelTity of 
Connedtion and Confequence. 

First, I am to prove, that God has an abfolute and cer* 
tain Foreknowledge of the free Acftions of moral Agents. 

One would think, it fhould be wholly needlefs to enter on 
fuch anArgument with any that profefs themfelves Chriilians : 
But fo it is ; God's certain Foreknowledge of the free A6ts 
of moral Agents, is denied by fome that pretend to believe 
the Scriptures to be the Word of God ; and efpecially of 
late. I therefore Ihall confider the Evidence of fuch a Pre- 
fcience in the moit High, as fully as the defigned Limits of 
this EiTay will admit of ; [fuppo mg my felf herein to have 
lo do with fuch as own the Truta of the Bible. 

Arg. I. Myfi'/? Argument fliall be taken from God's 
Prediclicn of fuch Events Here I would in the firft Place 
iay down thefe tv/o Things as Axioms. 

(I.) If 


Se5:.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 99 

(i.) If God don't foreknow. He can't foretell fuch Events ; 
that is, He can't peremptorily and certainly foretell thtm. 
If God has no more than an uncertain Guefs concernixng 
Events of this Kind, then He can declare no more than an 
uncertain Guefs. Politively to foretell, is to profefs to fore- 
know, or to declare pofitive Foreknowlege. 

(2.) If God don't certainly foreknow the future Volitions 
of moral Agents, then neither can He certainly foreknow 
thofe Events which are confequent and dependent on thefe 
Volitions. The Exiiience of the one depending on the 
Exii^ence of the other, the Knowledge of tlie Exiilence of 
the one depends on the Knowledge of the Exigence of the 
other i and the one can't be more certain than the other. 

Therefore, how many, how great, and how extenfive fo- 
cver the Confcquences of the Volitions of moral Agents 
may be ; tho' they Ihould extend to an Alterat'on of the State 
of Things through the Univerfe, and ih.cJ.d be continued 
in a Series of fucceffive Events to all Eternity, and fliould 
in the Progrefs of Things branch forth into an infinite Num- 
ber of Series, each of tnem going on in an endlefs Line or 
Chain of Events ; God muft be as ignorant of all thefe Con- 
fcquences, as He is of the Volition w^hence they firft take 
their Rife : All thefe Events, and the whole State of Things 
depending on them, how important, extenfive and vaft fo-^ 
ever, mult be hid from him. 

Thefe Pofitions being fuch as I fuppofe none will deny, I 
now proceed to obfer\^e the following Things. 

I. Men's moral Condu6l and Qualities, their Vertues 
■ and Vices, their Wickednefs and good Pra6tice, Things re- 
wardable and punifhable, have often been foretold by God. — 
Pharaoh's moral Conduct, in refufing to obr.y G: ci s Com- 
mand, in letting his People go, was foretold. God fays to 
Mofesy Exod. iii. 19. / am fur e^ that the King ^ Egypt zvill not 
let you go. Here God profelTes not only to guefs at, but to 
know Pharaoh's future Difobedience. In Chap. vii. 4. God 
fays, But Pharaoh JJjall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay 
mine Hand upon Egypt, &c. And Chap. ix. 30. Mofcs fays to 
Pharaoh, As for thee^ and thy Servant Sy I KNOW that ye zviil 
not fear the Lord. See alfo Chap. xi. 9. — The moral Con- 
duct of Joftahy by Name, in his zealoufly exerting himfelf iri 
Oppofition to Idolatr)', in particular Awts oi his, was ffiretold 

N 2 above 

I CO GOD certainly foreknows Part II. 


above three Hundred Years before he was born, and the 

Prophecy feal'd by a Miracle, and renewed and confirm- ■\ 

ed by the Words of a fecond Prophet, as what furely would i 

not fail, I K^ngs xiii. i,— -6, 32. This Prophecy was alfo 1 

in EfFe6t a Predidion of the moral Condud of the People, 1 

in upholding their Schifmatical and Idolatrous Worfhip 'till i 

that Time, and the Idolatry of thofe Priefts of the high ! 

Places, which it is foretold Jofiah fhould offer upon that ti 

Altar oi Bethel.— Micaiah foretold the foclifh and fmful Con- J 

<lu6f of Jhab^ in refufing to hearken to the Word of the & 

Lord by him, and chufing rather to hearken to the falfe % 

Prophets, in going to Raymth-Gilwd to his Ruin, i Kings xxi. }! 

20,-— 22.— The moral Condud of Hazael was foretold, in i 

that Cruelty he (hculd be guilty of ; on which Hazael fays, ^ | 
IP^hat., is thy Servant a Dog^ that he fnould do this Thing! The*} 

Prophet fpeaks of the Event as what he knew, and not what t 

he conjeclured. 2 Kings viii. 12. I know the Evil thou wilt do \ 

f4nto the Children of Ifrael : Thou wilt dafo their Children^ and rip \ 

tip their Women with Child. The moral Condud of Cyrus is ! 

foretold, long before he had a Being, in his Mercy to God's « 

People, and Regard to the tiue God, in turning the Capti- - 

vity of the Jews^ and promoting the building of the Tem- \ 

pie. Ifai. xJiv.28. ^ Ixv. 13. Compare 2 C/?r^«. xxxvi. 22,23. * 

and Ezrai. i,--^.. — _ How many Inftances of the moral \ 

Condu6l of the Kings of the Norths' South., particular Inftances ' i 

oi the Wicked Behaviour of the Kings of Syria and Egypt., are \ 

foretold in the xith Chap, o^ Daniel ? Their Corruption, ii 

Violence, Robbery, Treachery, and Lies. And particularly, , 

how much is foretold of the horrid Wickednefs of Antiochusy , 

jEpiphajies., called there a vile Perjhi^ inftead of Epiphanes, or ' 

Illuftrious. In that Chapter, and alfo in Chap. viii. ver.9,— » ^ 

14,23, to the End, are foretold his Flattery, Deceit and Lies, j 

his having his Heart fet to do Mifchief., and fet againjl the holp ' 

Covenant^ his dejiroying and treading lender Foot the holy People , , 

\n a marvellous Manner, his having Indignation again)} the holy i 

Covenant^ fetting his Heart agalnft it, and confpiring againji ity \ 

his polluting the San£fuary of Strength., treading it under Footy \ 

taking away the daily Sacrifice., and placing the Abomination that \ 

maketh deflate ; his great Pride, magnifying Jmnfelf againji Gody \ 

and uttering marvellous Blafphemies againji Him., 'till God in j 

Indignation jhould dejiroy hi?nl Withal the moral Condu6l of 'j 

the Jews., on Occai'ion of his Perfecution, is predided. 'Tis i 

foretold, that he fmdd corrupt many by Flatteries., Chap. xi. j 

t2,— 34. But that others fhould behave with a glorious i 

/Ojiftancy and Fortitude, in Oppofitlon to him, ver. 32^,^ ; 


Sed.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents, i o i 

And that fome good Men (hould fall, and repent, ver. 35. 
Chriil foretold Peter's Sin, in denying his Lord, with it's Cir- 
cumftances, in a peremptory Manner. And fo, that great 
Sin of Judas^ in betraying his Mafter, and it's dreadful and 
eternal Puniihment in Hell, was foretold in the like pofitive 
Manner. Matth. xxvi. 21, — 25. and parallel Places in the 
other Evangelifts. 

. 2. Many Events have been foretold by God, which were 
confequent and dependent on the moral Conduct of parti- 
cular Perfons, and were accomplifhed, either by their ver- 
tuous or viciousAdions.— Thusjthe Children of Ifrael's going 
down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham^ 
Gen. XV. which v>^as brought about by the WickedneCs of 
Jofeph's Brethren in felling him, and the Wickednefs of Jo- 
Jeph's Miflrefs, and his own fignal Vertue in reiifting her 
Temptation. The Accomplifhment of the Thing preiigur'd 
in Jofeph\ Dream, depended on the fame moral Condu6t^ 

fothmris Parable and Prophecy, y/^^^^i ix. €5, 20. was 

accompiifhed by the wicked Condud of Ahimekch^ and the 
Men of Sheche7n. The Prophecies againft the Houfe of El'iy 

1 Sam. Chap. ii. & iii. were accompiifhed by the Wickednefs 
of Doeg the Edomite^ in accufmg the Priefts ; and the great 
Impiety, and extreme Cruelty of Saul in deftroying the 
Priefts atA^^!^. i Sa?n.xKU.- — Natha7i''s Prophecy 2ig2im{i David, 

2 Sam. xii. 11,12. was fulhl'd by the horrible Wickednefs of 
Jbfalom^ in rebelling againft his P'ather, feeking his Life, 
and lying with his Concubines in the Sight of the Sun. , The 
Prophecy againft iS.?/^;7z^«, i Kings xi. 11,— 13. was fulfil'd 
by JerQboa7ns Rebellion and Ufurpation, which are fpoken 
of as his Wickednefs, 2 C/;r(?w.xiii.5,6. compare ver.18. The 
Prophecy againft Jeroboam's Family, i Kings xiv. was fulfil'd 

' by the Confpiracy, Treafon, and cruel Murders of Baajha,, 
2 Kings XV. 27, &c. The Predications of the Prophet Jehu 
againft the Houfe of Baa/ha^ i Kings xvi. at the Beginning, 
were fulfil'd by the Treafon and Parricide of Zimri^ i Kings 
xvi. 9, 13, 20. 

3. How often has God foretold the future moral Condudl 
of Nations and Peoples, of Numbers, Bodies, and Suc- 
ceffions of Men ; with God's judicial Proceedings, and 
many other Events confequent and dependent on their 
Vertues and Vices ; which could not be foreknown, if 
the Volitions of Men, wherein they a6ted as moral Jgefits^ 
had not been forefeen I The future Cruelty of the Egyptians 



102 GOD certainly foreknows Part II. 

in opprefTing Ifrael^ and God's judging and punching them 
for it, was foretold long before it came to pafs. Gen, xv. 
13, 14. The Continuance of the Iniquity of the Amorites^ 
and the Increafe of it until it Jhould be fully and they ripe, 
for Deftrudion, was foretold above four Hundred Years be^ 
fore-hand, Gen. xv. 16. J^, vii. 6, 7. The Prophecies of 
the Deftru(5lion of Jerufalem^ and the Land of Judah^ were 
abfolute ; 2 Kingi xx. 17,-19. Chap, xxii. 15, to the End. 
It was foretold in Hezekiah's Time, and was abundantly in- 
fifted on in the Book of the Prophet Ifaiah^ who wTote No- 
thing after Hezekiah's Days. It was foretold in Jofiah' sTimCy 
in the Beginnir^ of a great Reformation, 2 Kings xxii. And 
it is manifeft by innumerable Things in the Predidions of 
the Prophets, relating to this Event, it's Time, it's Cir- 
cumftances, it's Continuance and End ; the Rtturn from 
the Captivity, the Reftoration of the Temple, City & Land, 
and many Circumftances, and Confequences of That ; I fay, 
thefe fliew plainly, that the Prophecies of this great Event 
were abfolute. And yet this Event was connected with, and 
dependent on two Things in Men's moral Conduct : firft, the 
injurious Rapine and Violence of the King of Babylon and 
his People, as the efficient Caufe ; which God often fpe^ks 
of as what he highly refented, and would feverely punifli ; 
and 2dly, The final Obftinacy of the Jews, That great E- 
vent is often fpoken of as fufpended on this. Jer. iv. i.& v. i, 
vii. I5— 7. xi. I,— 6. xvii. 24, to the End. xxv. 1,-7, 
xxvi. I,— 8. 13. & xxxviii. 17,18. Therefore this Deftruc- 
tion and Captivity could not be foreknown, unlefs fuch a 
moral Conduct of the Chaldeans and Jews had been fore- 
known. And then it was foretold, that the People Jhould be 
finally ohflinate^ to the Deftruction and utter Defolation of 

the City and Land. Ifai^ vi. 9, 11. Jer, i, 18, 19. vii. 27, 

— 29. Ezek. in, 7. & xxiv. 13, 14. 

The final Obftinacy of thofe Jews who were left in the 
Land of Ifrael^ and who afterwards went down into Egypt^^ in 
their Idolatry and Rejection of the true God, was foretold by 
God, and the Prediaion confirmed with an Oath. Jer, xliv. 
26,27. And God tells the People, Ifai, xlviii.3.4, — 8. that he 
had predided thofe Things which Ihould be confequent on 
their Treachery and Obftinacy, becaufe he knew they would 
be obftinate ; and that he had declared thefe Things before- 
hand, for their Convi^^ion of his being the only trueGod, Gft. 


Sed*XI. the Volitions 6f moral Agents, ic^ 

The Deftru6lion of Babylon^ with many of the Circumftan* 
ces of it, was fore-told, as the Judgment of God for the ex- 
ceeding Pride and Haughtinefs of the Heads of that Monar- 
chy, Nebuchadnezzar, and his Succeflbrs, and their wickedly 
dellroying other Nations, and particularly for their exalting 
themfelves againft the true God and his People, before any 
of thefe Monarchs had a Being ; Ifai. Chap, xiii, xiv, xlvii : 
Compare Habbak. ii. 5, to the End, and Jer. Chap, I. and ii. 
That Babylon's Deftrudion was to be a Reco?npencey according to 
the Works of their own Hands, appears by "Jer, xxv. 14.-— The 
Immorality which the People of Babylon, and particularly her 
Princes and great Men, were guilty of, that very Night that 
the City was deftroyed, their Revelling and Drunkennefs at 
Beljhaz-zar's Idolatrous Feaft, was foretold, Jer, Ii. 39, 57. 

The Return of the Jews from tlie Babyhnijh Captivity is 
often very particularly foretold, with many Circumftances, 
and the Promifes of it are very peremptory ; Jer, xxxi. 35, 
— 40. and xxxii. 6, — 15, 41,-44. and xxxiii. 24,-26. 
And the very Time of their Return was prefixed ; Jer, xxv. 
II, 12. andxxix. 10,11. 2 Lhron. xxxvi. 21. Ezek. iv. 6. and 
Dan, ix. 2. And yet the Prophecies reprefent their Return 
as confequent on their Repentance. And their Repentance it 
felf is very exprefly and particularly foretold, Jer. xxix. 12, 
13,14. xxxi.8,9,18,— 31. xxxiii. 8. 1.4,5. ^2;^>^.vi.8,9,io.vii. 
16. xiv. 22, 23. and xx. 43, 44. 

It was foretold under the old Teftament, that the Meffiah 
(hould fufFer greatly through the Malice and Cruelty of Men j 
as is largely and fully fet forth, Pfal. xxii. applied to Chrift 
in the New Teftament, Matt, xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34. 
Joh. xix. 24. Heb. ii. iiz. And likewife in Pfal. Ixix. which, 

I it is alfo evident by the New Teftament, is fpoken of Chrift ; 
John XV. 25. vii. 5, &c. and li. 17. Rofn. xv. 3. Matt, xxvii. 

i 34, 48. Mark XV. 23. John xix. 29. The fame Thing is alfo 
foretold, Ifai. liii. & 1. 6. & Mic. v. i. This Cruelty of 
Men was their Sin, and what they a6ted as moral Agents. It 
was foretold, that there ftiould be an Union of Heathen and 
Jezvijh Rulers againft Chrift, Pfal. ii. i, 2. compar'd with 
J^s iv. 25, 28. It was foretold, that the Jews ftiould ge- 

;Snerally rejed and defpife the Mefliah, Ifai. xlix. 5, 6, 7. and 

• Jiii. 1—3. Pfalm, xxii. 6, 7. and Ixix. 4, 8, 19, 20. And it. 
■was foretold, that the Body of that Nation ftiould be reje<5led 
in the Mefliah's Days, from .being God's People, for their 
Obftinacy in Sin ; Ifai, xlix. 4 — 7. and viii. 14, I5> i6. com- 


I ©4 GOD certainly iorthiiow^ PartIL J 

pared with Rom.x.ig. and//^/.lxv. at the beginning, compared {) 

with Rom. x. 20, 21. . I: was foretold, that Chrift fhould be j' 

rejedted by the chief Priefts and Rubers among thtjeivs, Pfalm \ 
cxviii. 22. compared with Matth. xxi. 42. Atls iv. 11. i Fet» 

ii. 4, 7. ,! 

Chrift himfelf foretold his being delivered into the Hands ' ia{ 

of the Elders, chief Priefts and Scribes, and his being cruel- j 

J) treated by them, and condemned to Death ; and that he d 

by them fhould be delivered to the Gentiles \ and that He fhould jj) 

be Wi7fi<?^, and fcourged^ 2Lnd crucified^ [Matt.xvi, 21. & xx. ♦: 

17,—- 19. Luke IX. 22. John viii. 28.) and that the Peo- | 

pie fliould be concerned in and contenting to his DeathjfLw^^ ^ 

XX. 13,-18.) efpecially the Inhabitants of yerujalcm \ Luke | 

xiii. 33,- —35. He foretold, that the Difciples fhould ail be i 

offended becaufe of Knn that Nigiit that he was betrayed, \ 

and fhould forfake Him ; Matt. xxvi. 31. John xvi. 32. % 

He foretold that He fhould be rejeded of that Genera- I 

tion, even the Body of the People, and that they fhould | 

continue obilinate,to their Ruin j Matt. xii. 45. xxi. 33,— 42. . 

and xxii. i, 7. Luke xiii. 16, 21,24. ^'^^^^ 25. xix. 14, 27, 

41, — 44. XX. 13,- — 18. and xxih, 345—39- 

As it was foretold in both old Teflament and new, that 
the Jews fliould rejed: the MefFiah, fo it was foretold that the 
Gentiles fliould receive Him, and fo be admitted to the 

Privileges of God's People j in Places too many to be now \ 

particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Tefta- % 

ment,that the Jews fhould envy the Gentiles on thisAccount; | 

Deut. xxxii. 21. compared with Rom. x. 19. Chrifl Himfelf r 

often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true , 

Religion, and become his Followers and People ; Matth.mii, i,; 

10,11,12. x;d. 41,— 43. and xxii, 8,-— 10. Lukex\Yi.i%. xiv, |" 

16,-24. and XX. i5. John x. 16. He alfo foretold the Jewi \ 

Envy of the Gentiles on this Occafion j Matt. xx. 12, — 16. | 

Luke XV. 26,to the End. He foretold, that they fhould conti- '1 

nue in this Oppofition and Envy, and fnouid manifeft it in 1 

cruel Perfecutions of his Followers, to their utter De- I 

flrudion ; Mctt. xxi. 33,-42. xxii. 6. and xxiii. 34, 39. \ 

Luke xi. 49, --5 1. The Jews Obftinacy is alio foretold, A^s % 

xxii. 18. Chnfl often toretold the great Perfecutions his I 

Followers fhould meet with, both from Jews and Gentiles ; * 

Matt. X. 165—18,21, 22, 34,-36. and xxiv. 9. Mark xiii. 9. ^ 

Luke X. 3. xii. II, 49)— 53. and xxi. 12,16,17. John xv. 18,. I 

—21. and xvi. 1,-4. 20,-22,33. ^^ foretold the Mar- I 

tyrdoi» h 

Seft.XI. the Volitims of moral Agents. 105 

tyrdom of particular Perfons ; Matt. xx. 23. Job. xiii. 36^ 
and xxi. 18, 19,22. He foretold the great Succefs of the 
Gofpel in the City of Samaria^ as near approaching j which 
afterwards was fulfilled by the Preaching of Philips Toh. iv, 
35,-38. He foretold the Rifing of many Deceivers, after 
his Departure, Alatt. xxiv. 4, 5, 11. and the Apoftacy of 
many of his profefs'd Followers j Matth. xxiv* 10,— -i 2, 

The Perfecutions, which the Apoftle Paul was to meet with 
in the World, were foretold ; ASis ix.i6.— -xx-23. ^ xxi. 11. 
I'he Apoftle fays to the Chriftian Ephefians, ASis xx. 29,30. / 
know^ that after my Departure Jhall grievous TVolves enter in anwng 
you^ 7iot [paring the Flock : Alfo of your own f elves Jhall Men artfe^ 
fpeaking perverfe Things^ to draw away Dtfciples after them^ 
The Apoftle fays, He knew this ; but he did not know it, if 
God did not know the future Actions of moral Agents. 

4. Unlefs God foreknows the future A<5ls of moral Agents^ 
all the Prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great 
Antichrijlian Apoftacy ; the Rife, Reign, wicked Qualities 
and Deeds of the Man of Sin, and his Inftruments and Ad- 
herents ; the Extent and long Continuance of his Domi- 
nion, his Influence on the Minds of Princes and others, 
to corrupt them, and draw them away to Idolatry, and other 
foul Vices ; his great and cruel Perfecutions ; the Behaviour 
of th& Saints under thefe great Temptations, &c. &c. I fay, 
unlefs the Volitions of moral Agents are forefeen, all thefe 
Prophecies are uttered without knowing the Things foretold, 

. The Predi6tions relating to this great Apoftacy are all of a 
moral Nature, relating to Men's Vertues and Vices,and their 
Exercifes, Fruits and Confequences, and Events dependino* 
on them ; and are very particular ; and moft of them often 
repeated, with many precife CharaaeriftickSjDefcriptionSjand 
Limitations of Qualities, Condu6i:,. Influence, EfFeds, Ex- 
tent, Duration, Periods, Circumftances, final Iflue, &c. 
which it would be very long to mention particularly. And 
to fuppofe, all thefe are predided by God without any cer- 
tain Know^ledge of the future moral Behaviour of free Ar- 
gents, would be to the utmoft: Degree abfurd, 

5. Unlefs God foreknows the future A<5ls of Men's Wills, 
and their Behaviour as moral Agents, all thofe great Things 
which are foretold in both Old Teftament and New con- 
•erning the Eredion, Eftabliftiment, and univerfal Extent 

O •f 

io5 GOD certainly foreknows Part II, f 

of the Kingdom of the Msjfiah^ ■ were predicted and pro- | 
mifed while God was in Ignorance whether any of thefe 
7^hings would come to pafs or no, and did but guefs at 
them. For that Kingdom is not of this World, it don't 
confill in Things external, but is within Men, and confifts ■ 
in the Dominion of Vertue in their Hearts, in Righteouf- 
nefs, and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Gholl ; and in thefe 
Things made manifeft in Pra6lice, to the Praife and Glory 
of God. The MefTiah came to jave Men from their Sim^ and 
deliver them from their fpiritual Ene7mes ; that they ?mght 
ferve Hi?n in Righteoufnefs and HoUnefs before Him : He gave 
Himfelf for us, that he might redeem us from a/hlniqtiity, and pu- 
rify unto Hunfelf a peculiar People^ zealous of good Works. And 
therefore his Succefs confifts in gaining Men's Hearts to 
Vertue, in their being made God's willing People in the Day 
of his Power. His Conqueft of his Enemies confifts in his 
vi6lory over Men's Corruptions and Vices. And fuch 
Succefs, fuch Victory, and fuch a Reign and Dominion is 
often exprefty foretold : That his Kingdom foall fill the 
Earth ; that all People, Nations and Languages 'fl)ould ferve and 
obey Him ; and fo, that all Nations Jlwuld go up to the Momi- , 
iain of the Houfe of the Lord, that He might teach them his - ■^ 
JVays, and that they ?mght walk in his Paths : And that all Men '^ 
fhould he drawn to Chri/i, and the Earth be full of the Know- \ 
ledge of the Lord (by which, in the St)de of Scripture, is ^ 
iTieant true Vertue and Religion) as the JVaters cover the Seas ; ; 
that God's Law Jhoidd be put into Men^s inward Parts, and ivrit- ij 
ten in their Hearts \ and that God's People Jhould be all Righ^ , \., 
teoiis, &c. &c. 'i 

A very great Part of the Prophecies of the Old Tefta- ■[ 

ment is taken up in fuch Predictions as thefe. And here 5 

I would obleiTe, that the Prophecies of the univerfal Preva- ..^ 
lence of the Kingdom of the Meftiah, and true Religion of 't^ 
Jefus Chrift, are delivered in the moft peremptory Mann'er, ' ^ 
and confirmed by the Oath of God. Ifai. xlv. 22,to theEnd, ^1 
Look to me, and he ye faved, all the Ends of the Earth j for 1 am ' m 
God, and there is none elfe. 1 have SWORN by my Self, the ^ 
JVord is gone out of 7ny Mouth in Righteoufnefs, and fljall not re- ^ 
turn, that unto Me every Knee Jhall bow ; and every Tongue Jhatl ^ 
fwear, SURELY, Jhall one fay, in the Lord have I Righte- ^ ♦] 
oufmfs and Strength :- even to Him fljall Men come &c. But here ): 
this peremptory Declaration, and great Oath of the moft ^ 
High, are delivered with fuch mighty Solemnity, to Things y 
which God did not know, if He did not certainly forefee the J 
Volitions of moral Agents, ^'1 


' Sed.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 107 

And all the Prediaions of Chrift and his Apoftles, to the 
like Purpofe, muft be without Knowledge : As thofe of our 
Saviour comparing the Kingdom of God to a Grain of 
Muftard-Seed, growing exceeding great, from a fmali Begin- 
ning ; and to Leaven, hid in three Meafures of Meal, 'till 
the whole was ieaven'd, &c.— And the Prophecies in the E- 
piftles concerning the Reftoration of the Nation of the Jev^s 
to the true Church of God, and the bringing in the Fulnefs 
of the Gentiles ; and the Prophecies in all the Revelation con- 
cerning the glorious Change in the moral State of the World 
of Mankind, attending the Dedru^tion of Antichrift, the 
Kingdoms of the World becoming the Kingdoms of our Lord and 
of his Chrijl ; and it's being granted to the Cimrch to be arrayed 
in that fine Linncn, white and clean ^ which is the Righteoufnejs of 
Saints J Sec. 

CoroL I. Hence that great Promife and Oath of God to 
Abraha??u Ifaac and Jacobs io much celebrated in Scripture, 

. both in the Old Teftament andNev/, namely, TJmt in their 
Seed all the Nations a7id Families of the Earth fooidd be blcffed^ 
mull be made on Uncertainties, if God don't certainly fore- 
know the Vohtions of moral Agents. For the Fulfilment 
of this Promife cpnfiils in that Succefs of Chrift in theWork 
of Redemption, and that Setting up of his fpiritual Kingdom 
over the Nations of the World, which has been fpoken of. 
Men are blejfedin Chriji no otherwife than as they are bro't 

^to acknowledge Flim, trull in Him, love and ferve Him, 
as is reprefented and predi^led in Pfal. Ixxii. ii. All Kings 

'Jhallfall down bfore Him ; all Nations pall ferve Him. With 
ver. 17. Men fnall be bleffed in Him \ all Nations foail call him 
BleJJed. This 0?X\\ to J^^coh znd Jbraham \s fulhiled in fub- 
duing Men's Iniquities ; as is implied in that of the Pro- 
phet Aiicah, Chap. vii. 19,20. 

CoroL 2. Hence alfo it appears, That fird: Gofpel-Pro'^^/if^ 
that ever was made to Mankind, that great Predic5tion of 
the Salvation of the Meffiah, and his Vii5lory over Sat(7ti^ 
made to our firft Parents, Gen. iii. 15. if there be no certain 
Prefcience of the Volitions of m.oral Agents, mull have no 
better Foundation than Conjecture. For ChriiVs Viclory 
over Satan confifts in Men's being faved from Sin, and in 
the Vidory of Vertue and Kolincrs, over that Vice and 
Wickednefs, which Satan by his Temptation I'as Intioduced, 
and wherein his Kino;dom confiits. 

02 6: If 

ic8 GOD certainly foreknows Part II* 

6. If it be fo, that God has not a Prefcience of the future 
A^^ions of moral Agents, it will follow, that the Prophecies 
of Scripture in general .are without Fore-knowledge. For 
Scripture-Prophecies, almoft all of them, if not univerfally 
without any Exception, are either Predictions of the Adings 
and Behaviours of moral Agents, or of Events depending 
on them, or fome Way comiecfted with them ; judicial Dif- 
penfations. Judgments on Men for their Wickednefs, or Re- 
wards of Vertue and Righteoufnefs, remarkable Manifefta- 
tions of Favour to the Righteous, or Manifeftations of fo- 
vereign Mercy to Sinners, forgiving their Iniquities, and 
magnifying the Riches of divine Grace ; or Difpenfations of 
Providence, in fome Refpe6t or other, relating to the Condu6t 
of the Subjetfts of God's moral Government, wifely adapt- 
ed thereto ; either providing for what fhould be in a future 
State of Things, through the Volitions and voluntary Acti- 
ons of moral Agents, or confequent upon them, and regu- 
lated and ordered according to them. So that all Events 
that are foretold, are either moral Events, or other Events 
which are conuedled with, and accommodated to moral 
JE vents r 

That the Predi(5tions of Scripture in general muft be with-r 
out Knowledge, if God don't forefee the Volitions of Men, 
will further appear, if it be confidered, that almoft ail E- 
vents belonging to the future State of the World of Man- 
kind, the Changes and Revolutions which come to pafs iij^ 
Empires, Kingdoms, and Nations, and all Societies, depend 
innumerable Ways on the A6ts of Men's Wills ; yea, on an 
innumerable Multitude of Millions of Millions of Volitions 
of Mankind, Such is the State and Courfe of Things in 
the World of Mankind, that one fmgle Event, which ap- 
pears in it felf exceeding inconfiderabie, may in the Pro- 
grefs and Series of Things, occafion a SuccelTion of the 
greateft and moft important and extenfive Events ; caufing 
the State of Mankind to be vaftly different from what it 
would otherwife have been, for all fucceeding Generations. 

For Inftance, the coming into Exiftence of thofe particu- 
lar Men, who have been the great Conquerors of the World, 
"which under God have had the main Hand in all the con- 
fequent State pf the World, in all after-Ages ; fuch as 
Nebuchadnezzar^ Cyrus ^ Alexander ^ Pompey, Julius Cefar^ &c. 
undoubtedly depended on many Millions of Acts of the 
Will, which followed, and were occafion'd one by ano- 
ther, ■ 

'Se<9:. XL the Volitions of moral Agents. 109 

ther, in their Parents. And perhaps moft of thefe Volitions 
depended on Milhons of Volitions of Hundreds and Thou- 
fands of others, their Contemporaries of the fame Genera- 
tion j and moft of thefe on Millions of Millions of Voliti- 
ons of others in preceedmg Generations.—- As we go back, 
ftill the Number of Volitions, which were fome Way the 
Occafion of the Event, multiply as the Branches of a River, 
'till they come at laft, as it were, to an infinite Number. 
This Will not feem ftrange, to any one who well confiders the 
Matter ; if we recollect what Philoibphers tell us of the in- 
numerable Multitudes of thofe Things which are as it were 
the Principia^ or Stamina VHee^ concerned in Generation ; 
the Animakula in Semine majculo^ and the Ova in the Womb 
of the Female ; the Impregnation, or animating of one of 
thefe in Diftindion from all the reft, muft depend on Things 
infinitely minute, relating to the Time and Circumftances of 
the Adf of the Parents, the State of their Bodies, i^c, 
which muft depend on innumerable foregoing Circum- 
fiances and Occurrences ; which muft depend, infi- 
nite Ways, on foregoing A6ls of their Wills ; which are 
occafioned by innumerable Things that happen in the 
Courfe of their Lives, in which their own, and their Neigh- 
bour's Behaviour, muft have a Hand, an infinite Number 
of Ways. And as the Volitions of others muft be fo many 
Ways concerned in the Conception and Birth of fuch Men ; 
fo, no lefs, in their Prefervation, and Circumftances of Life, 
their particular Determinations and A6tions, on which the 
great Revolutions they were the Occafions of, depended. As 
for Inftance, When the Confpirators in Ferfia^ againft 
the Aiagi^ were confulting about a Succeflion to the Empire, 
it came into the Mind of one of them, to propofe, that he 
whofe Horfe neighed firft, when they came together the 
next Morning, fhould be King. Now fuch a Thing's com- 
ing into his Mind, might depend on innumerable Incidents, 
wherein the Volitions of Mankind had been concerned. 
But in Confequence of this Accident, Darius^ the Son of 
Hifafpes^ was King. And if this had not been, probably 
his Succeflbr would not have been the fame, and all the 
Circumftances of the Ferfian Empire might have been far 
otherwife. And then perhaps Alexander might never have 
conquered that Empire. And then probably the Circum- 
ftances of the World in all fucceeding Ages, might have 
been vaftly otherwife. I might further inftance in many 
•ther Occurrences j fuch as thofe on which depended Alex- 



1 1 o GOD certainly foreknows Part 11. 

€mder\ Prefervatlon, in the many critical Jundlures of his 
Life, wherein a fmall Trifle would have turned the Scale 
againft him -, and the Prefervation and Succefs of the Ro^ 

man People, in the Infancy of their Kingdom and Common- { 

Wealth,and afterwards ; which all the fucceeding Changes ia iJ 

their State, and the mighty Revolutions that afterwards' ] 

came to pafs in the habitable World, depended upon. But \ 

thefe Hints may be fufficient for every difcerning confide- \ 

rate Perfon, to convince him, that the whole State of the | 

World of Mankind, in all Ages, and the very Being of every J 

Perfon who has ever lived in it, in every Age, fmce the "\ 

Times of the ancient Prophets, has depended on more i 

Volitions, or Ads of the Wills of Men, than there are \ 

Sands on the Sea-flioar. I 

And therefore, unlefs God does mofl: exactly and perfedl- \ 
ly forefee the future Acts of Men's Wills, all the Pre-,. 1 
didions which he ever uttered concerning David^ Hezekiahy ^ 

^ojiah^ Nehuchadnezxary Cyrus ^ Alexander ; concerning' the four \ 
lonarchies, and the Revolutions in them ; and concerning ij 
all the Wars, Commotions, Vidories, Profperities and Cala- 
mities, of any of the Kingdoms, Nations, or Communities 
of the World, have all been without Knowledge. 

So that, according to this Notion of God's not forefeeing 
the Volitions and free Ac5lions of Men, God could forefee 
Nothing pertaining to the State of the World of Mankind \\ 
in future Ages ; not fo much as the Being of one Perfon | 
that fhould live in it ; and could foreknow no Events, but I 
only fuch as He would bring to pafs Himfelf by the extra- t 
ordinary Interpofition of his immediate Power ; or Things, i^ 
which fhould come to pafs in the natural material World, J 
by the Laws of Motion, and Courfe of Nature, wherein i)| 
that is independent on the A6lions or Works of Mankind : :| 
That is, as he might, like a very able Mathematician and 1^ 
Aftronomer, with great Exadnefs calculate the Revolutions 1( 
of the heavenly Bodies, and the greater Wheels of the | 
Machine of the external Creation. i; 

And if we clofely confider the Matter, there will appear- : if 
Reafon to convince us, that he could not with any abfo- q 
lute Certainty forefee even thefe. As to the FirJ}^ namely I 
Things done by the immediate and extraordinary Interpo- | 
fition of God's Power, thefe can't be forefeen, unlefs it can 1 
be forefeen when there fhall be Qccafion for fuch extraordi- ^ 


Sed.XI. the Voltttons of moral Agents, in 

nary Interpofition. And that can't be forefeen, unlefs 
the State of the moral World can be forefeen. For 
whenever God thus interpofes, it is with Regard to the State 
of the moral World,requiring fuch Divine Interpofition. Thus 
God could not certainly fore fee the univerfal Deluge, the 
Calling of Abraham^ the Deftru^lion of ^odom and Gomorrah^ 
the Plagues on Egypt^ and IfraeH Redemption out of it, the 
expelling the feve^n Nations of Canaan^ and the bringing 
Ifracl into that Land ; for thefe all are reprefented as con- 
ne6led with Things belonging to the State of the moral 
World. Nor can God foreknow the moft proper and con- 
venient Time of the Day of Judgment, and general Con- 
flagration \ for that chiefly depends on the Courfe & State 
of Things in the moral World. 

Nor, Secondly^ can w^e on this Suppofition reafonably think, 
that God can certainly forefee v/hat Things fliall come to 
pafs, in the Courfe of Things, in the natural and material 
World, even thofe which in an ordinary State of Things 
might be calculated by a good Aftronomer. For the moral 
World is the End of the natural World ; and the Courfe 
of Things in the former, is undoubtedly fubordinate to God's 
Defigns with Refped to the latter. Therefore he has ktn 
Caufe,from Regard to the State of Things in the moral World, 
extraordinarily to interpofe, to interrupt and lay an Arrell: on 
the Courfe of Things in the natural World ; and even in 
the greaterWheelsof it's Motion ; even fo as to flop the Sun in 
it's Courfe. And unlefs he can forefee the Volitions of Men, 
and fo know fomething of the future State of the moral 
World, He can't know but that he may ftill have as great 
Occafion to interpofe in this Manner, as ever He had : nor 
can He forefee how, or when, He fliall have Occafion 
\ thus to interpofe. 

Corol. I . It appears from the Things w^hich have been ob- 
Iferved, that unlefs God forefees the Volitions of moral A- 

gents, that cannot be true which is obferved by the Apoftle 
\ja7nes^ Act. xv. 1 8. Known unto God are all his frorks from the 

Beginning of the World. 

Corol. 2. It appears from what has been obferved,that unlefs 
jGod foreknows theVolitions of moral Agents, all the Prophe- 
cies of Scripture have no better Foundation than meer Con- 
jecture ; and That., in moft Inftahces, a Conje6lure which 
muft have the utmoft Uncertainty j depending on an innu- 

112 GOD certainly foreknows Part II. | 

merable, and as it were infinite. Multitude of Volitions, j 

which are all, even to God,uncertain Events : However,thefe ' 

Prophecies are delivered as abfolute Predidtions, and very ; 

many of them in the moft pofitive Manner, with Affeverati- i 

®ns J and fome of them with the molt folemn Oaths. \ 

CoroL 3. It alfo follows from what has been obferved, ^ ,■ 
that if this Notion of God's Ignorance of future Volitions I 
be true, in vain did Chrift fay (after uttering many great I 
and important Predidions, concerning God's moral King- j 
dom,and Things depending on Men's moral Adions) Matth, | 
xxiv. 35. Heaven and Earth Jhall pafs aivay j but my JVords Jhdl - J 
v.ot pafs away, i 

CoroL 4. From the fame Notion of God's Ignorance, it j 
would foiloWjthat in vain has God himfelf often ipoken of the 
Predictions of his Word, as Evidences of his Foreknowlege ; 
and fo as Evidences of that which is his Prerogative as GOD, 
and his peculiar Glory, greatly diftinguifhing Him from all 
other Beings ; as in Ifai, xli. 22—26. xliii. 9,10. xliv. 8. 
xlv. 21. xlvi. 10. & xlviii. 14. 

Argum. II. If God don't foreknow the Volitions of mo-;| 

ral Agents, then he did not foreknow the Fall of Man, nor 
of Angels, and fo could not foreknow the great Things 
which are mifequent on thefe Events ; fuch as his fending; 
his Son into the World to die for Sinners, and all Things 
pertaining to the great Work of . Redemption 3 all the 
Things which were done for four Thoufand Years before 
Chrift came, to prepare the Way for it ; and the Incarnation, 
Life, Death, Refurre6lion and Afcenfion of Chrift 5 and the 
fetting Him at the Head of the Univerfe, as King of Hea- 
ven and Earth, Angels and Men ; and the fetting up his < 
Church and Kingdom in this World, and appointing Him ;; 
the Judge of the World ; and all that Satan fliould do in 
the World in Oppofition to the Kingdom of Chrift : And 
the great Tranfadioas of the Day of Judgment, that Men 
and Devils fliall be the Subje6ls of, and Angels concerned 
in J they are all what God was ignorant of before the Fall., 
And if fo, the following Scriptures, and others like them, 
muft be without any Meaning, or contrary to Truth. Eph. 
i. 4. Jc cor ding as he hath chofen us in Him before the Foundation of 
the World, i Pet. i. 20. IVho verily was fore-ordained before the 
Foundation of the World. 2 Tim. i. g. Wloo hath faved us^ and 
called us with an holy CaUin'g , not according fQ our Works ^ hut 


Seft. XI . the ToUtions of moral Agents. 113 

\accordmg to his own Purpofe^ and Grace^ which was given us in 
Chrijl Jefus before theWorld began. So, Eph. iii. 1 1 . (fpeaking of 
the Wildom of God in the Work of Redemption) according 
to the eternal Furpofe zvhich he purpofed in Ch7iji Jefus. Tit. 1.2. 
In hope of eternal Life^ which Gody that ■ cannot lie, pro?mfed before 
the World began. Rom. viii. 29. IVhom he did foreknozv^them he 

' alfo did ptedcjVinate.^ &c. i Pet. i. 1, EleSly acco?'ding to the Fore- 
knowledge of God the Father. 

If God did not foreknow the Fall of Man, nor the Re- 
demption by Jefus Chrift, nor the Volitions of Man fmcc 
I the Fall ; then He did not foreknow the Saints in any Senfe ; 
•\ neither as particular Perfons, nor as Societies or Nations ; 
i either by Election, or meer Forefight of their Vertue or good 
I Works ; or any Forefight of any Thing about them relating 
; to their Salvation ; or any Benefit they have by Chrift, or 
] any Manner of Concern of their's with a Redeemer. 

V Arg. III. On the Suppofition of God's Ignorance of the 
-future Volitions of free Agents, it will follow, that God 
tnuft in many Cafes truly repent what He has done, fo as 
properly to wifti He had done otherwife : by Reafon that 
the Event of Things, in thofe Affairs which are moft impor- 
tant, vi%. the Affairs of his moral Kingdom, being uncer- 
tain and contingent, often happens quite otherwife than he 
was aware beforehand. And there would be Reafon to un- 
derftand That, in the moft literal Senfe, in Gen. vi. 6. It 
repented the Lord^ihat he had made Man on the Earth^and it grieved 
%im at his Heart. And that, i Sam. xv. ir. contrary to 
that. Numb, xxiii. 19. God is not the Son of Man, that he ^ 
-flmuld repent. And, I Sam. xv. 15, 29. Alfo the Sti'ength of 
Ifrael will not lie, nor repent : for he is not a Man that he Jhould 
repent. Yea, from this Notion it would follow, that God 
is liable to repent and be grieved at his Heart, in "a literal 
Senfe, continually ; and is always expofed to an infinite 
Number of real Difappointments, in his governing the 
World ; and to manifold, conftant, great Perplexity and 
Vexation : But this is not very coniiftent with his Title of 
Gcd over all, bleffed for evermore ; \vhich reprefents Him as 
poffelTed of perfe6l, conftant and uninterrupted Tranquillity 
-and Felicity, as God over the Univerfe, and in his Manage- 
•ment of the Affairs of the World, as fupreme and univer- 
Xal Ruler. See Rom. i. 25. ix. 5. 2 Cor^ xi, 31. i Ti?}i.\'\. 15. 

P Arg* 

,j 14 GOD certainly foreknows Part IL 

Arc. IV. It will alfo follow from this Notion, that as 
God is liable to be continually repenting what He has done ; 
fo He muft be expofed to be conftantly changing his Mind and 
lntcntions,as to his future Condudt ; altering his Meafures,re- 
iinquiihing his old Defigns, and forming new Schemes & Pro- 
jedions. For his Purpofes, even as to the main Parts of his 
Scheme, namely, fuch as belong to the State of his moral 
Kingdom, muft be always liable to be broken, thro' want 
of Forefight ; and He muft be continually putting his Syftem 
to rights, as it gets out of Order, through the Contin- 
gence of the Adions of moral Agents : He muft be a Being, 
who, inftead of being abfolutely immutable, muft necefTa- 
rily be the Subjed of infinitely the moft numerous Ads of 
Repentance, and Changes of Intention, of any Being what- 
foever ; for this plain Reafon, that his vaftly extenfive 
Charge comprehends an infinitely greater Number of thofe 
Things which are to Him contingent and uncertain. In 
fuch a Situation, He muft have little elfe to do, but to mend 
broken Links as well as he can, and be re6tifying his dif-^ 
jointed Frame and difordered Movements, in the beft^ Man- 
ner the Cafe will aUow. The fupream Lord of all Things 
muft needs be under great and miferable Difadvantages, in 
governing the World which He has made, and has the Care 
of, through his being utterly unable to find out Things 
of chief Importance, which hereafter ftiall befal his Syftem ; 
which if He did but know. He might make fegfonable Pro- 
vifion for. In many Cafes, there may be very great Neceflity 
that He ftiouid make Provifion, in the Manner of his order- 
ing and difpofing Things, for fome great Events which 
are to happen, of vaft and extenfive Influence, and endlefs 
Confequence to the Univerfe ; which He may fe.e after- 
wards, when it is too late, and may wifti in vain that He 
had known beforehand, that He might have ordered his 
Affairs accordingly. And it is in the Power of Man, on 
thefe Principles, by his Devices,. Purpofes and Adions, 
thus to difappoint God, break his Meafures, make Him con- 
tinually to change his Mind, fubjedt Him to Vexation, and 
bring Him into Confufion. 

But how do thefe Things confift with Reafon, or with the 
Word of God ? Which reprefents, that all God's JVorkSy 
all that He has ever to do, the whole Scheme and Series 
of his Operations, are from the Beginn'mg perfectly in hiS 
View ; and declares, that whatever Devices and Defigns are 
, in the Hearts of Men^ the Counfel cf the Lord is that which 
/hail Jlandy and the Thouo^hts of hii Heart to ail Generations, 


Sedt.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 115 

Prov. xix, 21. Pfal. xxxiii. lO, ll. And that which the Lord 
of Ho/is hath purpofed^ none J})all difannul^ Ifai. xiv. 27. And 
that he cannot be fruftrated in one Defign or Thought^ Job xlii.2. 
And that what God doth^ it Jhall he forever^ that Nothing can be put 
to it, or taken fro?n it, Eccl. iii. 14. The Stabihty and Per- 
petuity of God's Counfels are expreily fpoken of as con- 
nected with the Foreknowledge of God, Lai. xlvi. 10. De- 
claring the End from the Beginning, and from ancient Ti'mes the 
Things that are not yet done 3 faying. My Counfel flmll ftand^ 
and I will do all my Pleafure. — And how are thefe Things 
confluent with what the Scripture fays of God's Immu- 
tabjhty, which reprefents Him as without Variahlencfs, or 
(hadow of Turning', and fpeaks of Him moil particularly as 
unchangeable with Regard to his Purpoles. Mai. iii. 6. lam 
the Lord ; / change not ; therefore ye Sons of Jacob are not 
confumed. Exod. iii. 14. / AM THAT I AM, Job xxiii. 
13, 14. He is in one Mind \ and who can turn Him ? And what 
his Soul defireth, even that he doth : fir he performeth the Thing 
that is appointed for me. 

Arc. V. If this Notion of God's Ignorance of tJie future 
Volitions of moral Agents be thoroughly confidered in it's 
Confequences, it will appear to follow from it, that God^after 
he had made the World, was liable to be wholly frujirated 
^^/V £«^ in the Creation of it ; and fo has been in like 
Manner liable to be fruftrated of his End in all the great 
Works He hath wrought. 'Tis manifeft, the moral World 
is the End of the natural : The reft of the Creation is 
but an Houfe which God hath built, with Furniture, for mo- 
ral Agents : And the good or bad State of the moral World 
depends on the Improvement they make of their natural 
• Agency, and fo depends on their Volitions. And there- 
fore, if thefe can't be forefeen by God, becaufe they 
^re contingent, and fubjedt to no Kind of NecelTity, then 
the A.ffairs'of the moral World are liable to go wrong, to any 
aflignable Degree ; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on 
this Scheme, it may v/ell be fuppofed to be literally faid, 
when Mankind, by the Abufe of their moral Agency, 
became very corrupt before the Flood, that the Lord repented 
that he had made Man on the Earth, and it grieved Hi?n 
at his Heart ; fo, when He made the , Univerie, He 
rdid not know but that he might be fo difappointed in it, 
that it might grieve Him at his Heart that he had made it. 
It a<5tually proved, that all Mankind became fmful, and a 
very great Part of the Angels apoftatifed ; And liow could 

P 2 Goi 

Ii6 C^r/^/;^ Foreknowledge Part 11. i 

God know before-hand, that all of them would not ? And , 
how could God know but that all Mankind, notwith- 
Aanding Means ufed to reclaim them, being ftill left to the 
Freedom of their own Will, would continue in their Apofta- 
cy, and grow worfe and worfe, as they of the Old World 
before the Flood did ? 

According to the Scheme I am endeavouring to confute, 
neither the Fall of Men nor Angels, could be forefeen, and 
God mufl be greatly difappointed in thefe Events ; and fo 
the grand Scheme and Contrivance for our Redemption, 
and deftroyjng the Works of the Devil, by the Mefliah, and 
all the great Things God has done in the Profecution of 
thefe Defigns, muft be only the Fruits of his own Difap- 
pointment, Snd Contrivances of his to mend and patch up, 
as well as he could, his Syftem, which originally was all 
very good, and perfedlly beautiful ; but was mar'd, broken^ 
and confounded by the free Will of Angels and Men. 
And ftill he muft be liable to be totally difappointed 
^ fecond Time : He could not know, that He Ihould 
have his defired Succefs, in the Incarnation, Life, 
Death, Refurredion and Exaltation of his only begot- 
ten Son, and other great Works accomplifhed to reftore the 
St-ate of Things : He could not know after all, whether 
there would adually be any tolerable Meafure of Reftora- 
tion ; for this depended on the free Will of Man. There 
has been a general great Apoftacy of almoft all the Chriftian 
World, to that which was worfe than Heathenifm ; which 
continued for many Ages. And how could God, without 
forefeeing Men's Volitions, know whether ever Chriftendom 
would return from this Apoftacy ? And which way could He 
tell before-hand how foon it would begin ? TheApoftle fays, 
jt began to work in his Time ; and how could it be known 
how far it would proceed in that Age ? Yea, how could 
it be known that the Gofpel, whigh was not effedual for 
the Reformation of the Jews^ would ever be eftedlual for 
the turning of the Heathen Nations from their Heathen 
Apoilacy, which they had been confirmed in for fo many Ages? 

'Tis reprefcnted often in Scripture, that God who made 
the World for* Himfelf, and created it for his Pleafure, 
would infallibly obtain his End in the Creation, and in all 
his Works \ that as all Things, are of Him, io they would 
all be to Him ; and that in the final IfTue of Things, it 
would appear that He is thefrjfy and tk hfi. Rev. xxi. 6, 


Se£t. XII. infers fome Neceffity • 117 

And he faid unta me^ It is done. I am Alpha and Omega ^ theBeginning 
and the End^ the firjl and the lafi. But thefe Things are not 
confiftent with God's being fo liable to be disappointed in 
all his Works, nor indeed with his failing of his End in 
any Thing that He has undertaken, or done. 

Section XII. 

GO Us certain Foreknowledge of the future 
Volitions of moral Agent s^ inconfijlent 
withfuch a Contingence ofthofe Volitions^ 
as is without all Neceffity. 

HAVING proved, that GOD has a certain and in- 
fallible Prefcience of the Ads of the Will of moral 
Agents, I come now, in the : Second Place, to" (heW 
the Confequence , to fhew how it follows from hence, that 
thefe Events are necejfary^ with a NecefTity of Connedtign 
or Confequence. 

The chief Armlnian Divines, fo far as I have had Oppor- 
tunity to obferve, deny this Confequence ; and affirm, that 
if fuch Foreknowledge be allowed, 'tis no Evidence of any 
Neceffity of the Event foreknown. Now I defire, that this 
Matter may be particularly and thoroughly enquired into. 
I cannot but think, that on particular and full Conlideration, 
it may be perfecStly determined, whether it be indeed fo, 
or not. 

* In order to a proper Confideration of this Mattfer, I 
would obferve the following Things. 

I. 'Tis very evident, with regard to a Thing whofe Ex- 
"iftence is infallibly and indiffolubly conneded with fome- 
thing which already hath, or has had Exiftence, The Ex- 
iftence of that Thing is necefTary. Here may be noted, 

^ I. I 

li8 €Vr/^/>2 Foreknowledge PartIL I 

1. I obferved before, in explaining the Nature of Neceflity, ^ 
that in Things which are paft, their paft Exiftence is now \ 
necelTary : having already made fure. of Exiftence, 'tis too \ 
late for any PolTibility of Alteration in that Refpedl : 'Tis ; 
now impomble, that it Ihould be otherwife than true, that i 
that Thing has exifted. ,: 

2. If there be any fuch Thing as a divine Foreknowledge ; 
of the Volitions of free Agents, that Foreknowledge, by the 
Suppofition, is a Thing which already has, and long ago 
had Exiftence ; and fo, now it's Exiftence is neceffary ; it 

is now utterly impoffible to be otherwife, than that this Fore • 
knowledge fhould be, or ftiould have been. 

3. 'Tis alfo very manifeft, that thofe Things which are 
indiftblubly conne<5led with other Things that are neceftary, 
are Themfelves neceftary. As that Propofition whofe Truth 
is neceftarily connedcd with another Propofition, which is 
neceflarily true, is itfelf neceftarily true. To fay other- 
wife, would be a Contradiction ; it would be in Effe6l to 
fay, that the CoJine(5tion was indiftbluble, and yet was not 
fo, but might be broken. If That, whofe Exiftence is in- 
diflblubly conneded with fomething whofe Exiftence is now 
neceftary, is it felf not neceftar)^, then it may pojjjbly mi exifl, 
notwithftanding that indiftbluble Connexion of it's Exift- 
ence.— Whether the Abfurdity ben't glaring, let the Rea- 
der judge. 

4. 'Tis no lefs evident, that if there be a full, certain 
and infallible Foreknowledge of the future Exiftence of the 
Volitions of moral Agents, then there is a certain infallible 
and indiftbluble Conneaion between thofe Events and that 
Foreknowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceeding Ob- 
fervations, thofe Events are neceftary Events ; being infal- 
libly and indiffolubly conneded with that whofe Exiftence 
already is, and fo is now neceftary, and can't but have been. 

To fay, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible,and yet ■ 
the Connexion of the Event with that Foreknowledge is 
not indiftbluble, but diffoluble and fallible, is very abfurd. 
To affirm it, would be the fame Thing as to affirm, that 
there is no neceftary Conne(5tion between a Propofition's- 
being infallibly known to be true, and it's being true in*- 
deed. So that it is perfedly demonftrable, that if there be 
any infallible Knowledge of future Volitions, the Event is 

mcejlary j 

Sedt.XII. infers /ome Ncccnity. 119 

necejary •/ or, in other Words, that it is impojjthle but the 
Event Ihould come to pafs. For if it ben't impoflible 
but that it may be otherwife, then it is not impoflible but 
that the Propofition which affirms it's future coming to 
pafs, may not now be true. But how abfurd is that, on the 
Suppofition that there is now an intalUble Knowledge ( i. c. 
Knowledge which it is impoflible ihould fail) that it is true. 
There is this Abfurdity in it, that it is not impoflible but 
that there now ihould be no Truth in that Propofition, 
which is now infalUbly known to be true. 

II. That no future Event can be certainly foreknown, 
whofe Exifl:ence is contingent, and without all NeceiTity, 
may be proved thus ; 'Tis impoflible for a Thing to be 
certainly known to any Intellecfl without Evidence. To 
fuppofe otherwife, implies a Contradi6lion : Becaufe for a 
Thing to be certainly known to any Underftanding, is for 
it to be evident to that Underftanding : And for a Thing 
to be evident to any Underftanding, is the fame Thing, as 
for that Underftanding to fee Evidence of it : But no Un- 
derftanding, created or increated, can fee Evidence where 
there is none : For that is the fame Thing,as to fee that to 
be, which is not. And therefore, if there be any Truth 
which is abfolutely without Evidence, that Truth is abfo- 
lutely unknowable, infomuch that it implies a Contradidtion 
to fuppofe that it is known. 

But if there be any future Event, whofe Exiftence is 
contingent, without all Neceflity, the future Exiftence of 
that Event is abfolutely without Evidence, li there be any 
Evidence of it, it muft be one of thefe two Sorts, either 
Self- Evidence^ or Proof ; for there can be no other Sort of 
Evidence but one of thefe two ; an evident Thing muft be 
fither evident r« ;V y^^, or evident in fomething elfe \ that is, 
evident by Connexion with fomething elfe. But a future 
Thing, whofe Exiftence is without all NeceiTity, can have 
neither of thefe Sorts of Evidence. It can't be Self-evident : 
For if it be, it may be now known by what is now to 
be feen in the Thing it felf ; either it's prefent Exiftence, 
or the NeceiTity of it's Nature : But both thefe are con- 
trary to the Suppofition. It is fuppofed, both that the 
Thing has no prefent Exiftence to be feen ; and alfo 
that it is not of fuch a Nature as to be neceiTa- 
rily exiftent for the future : So that it's future Ex- 
iftence is not Self-evident. And fecondly^ neither is there 
V any 

I20 CenaJn Fovdknowhdgt Part IL j 

any Prdof, or Evidetice in any Thing elfe, or Evidence of ! 

Connexion with fomething tMt that is evident \ For this j 

alfo is contrary to the Suppolition. 'Tis fuppofed, that J 

there is now Nothing exiftent, with which the future Ex- | 

iftence of the contingent Event is conne(5ted. For fuch a j 

Connexion defiroys its Contingence^ and fuppofes Neceflity. i 

Thus 'tis dernonftratedjthat there is in the Natvwe of Things | 

abfoltitely n6 Evidence at all of the future Exiftence of ; 

that Event, v>fhich is contingent, without all Neceflity (if | 

any fuch Event there be) neither Self-Evidence nor Proof, j 

And therefore the Thing in Reality is not evident ; and 1 

fo can't be fefcn to be evident^ or, which is the fame \ 
Thing, can't be known. 

Let us confider this in an Example. Suppofe that fivfe 
Thoufand feven Hundred and fixty Years ago, there w^ag j 
Sio other Being but the divine Being ; and then this 3 
World, or fome particular Body or Spirit, all at once S 
flarts out of Nothing into Being, and takes on it felf a \ 
particular Nature and Form ; all in abfolute Conti?igence, \ 
without any Concern of God, or any other Caufe, in the I 
Matter ; without any Manner of Ground or Reafon of | 
it's Exiftence ; or any Dependence upon, or Connection j 
at all with any Thing foregoing i I fay, that if this be ^ 
fuppofed, there was no Evidence of that Event before- x 
hand. There was no Evidence of it to be feen in the fi 
Thing it felf ; for the Thing it felf, as yet, was not. And \ 
there w^as no Evidence of it to be feen in any Thing elfe ; ; 
for Evidence in fomething elfe, is Connexion with fomethingr | 
elfe : But fuch Connexion is contrary to the Suppofition. I 
There was no Evidence before, that this Thing would hap- -i 
pen-, for by the Suppofition, there was no Reafon why zV'i 
fhoidd happen, rather than fomething elfe, or rather than ii 
Nothing. And if fo, then all Things before were exactly .1 
equal, and the 'fame, with Refpe6t to that and other pofli- 'il 
ble Things ; there was no Preponderation, no fuperiour 
Weight or Value 5 and therefore Nothing that could be i 
of any Weight or Value to determine- any Underftanding. | 
The Thing was abfolutely without Evidence, and abfo- 1 
lutely unknowable. An Increafe of Underftanding, or of I 
the Capacity of Difcerning, has no Tendency, and mak6s % 
no Advance, to a difcerning any Signs or Evidences of it, 1 
let it be increafed never fo much ; yea, if it be increafed jI 
infinitely. The Increafe of the Strength of Sight may have i 
a Tendency to enable to difcera the Evidence which is| 


Sed. XIL i7ifers fom^ Neceflity. 121 

far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in Clouds 
and Darknefs ; but it has no Tendency to enable to difcerri 
Evidence where there is none; If the Sight be infinitely 
ftrong, and the Capacity of Difcerning infinitely great, it 
will enable to fee all that there is, and to. fee it perfe(5lly, 
and with Eafe ; yet it has no Tendency at all to enable a 
Being to difcern that Evidence which is not ; But on the 
contrary, it has a Tendency to enable to difcern with great 
Certainty that there is none. 

III. To fuppofe the future Volitions of moral Agents not 
to be necelTary Events ; or, which is the fame Thing, Events 
which it is not impoflible but that they may not com« to 
pafs ; and yet to fuppofe that God certainly foreknows 
them, and .knows all Things ; is to fuppofe God's Know- 
f ledge to be inconfiftent with it felf. For to fay, that God 
certainly, and without all Conjedure, knows that a Thing 
will infallibly be, which at the fame Time he knows to be 
fo contingent^ that it may polTibly not be, is to fuppofe his 
Knowledge inconfiftent with it felf 5 or that one Thing 
that he knows is utterly inconfiftent with another Thing 
that he knows. 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, He now 
knows a Propofition to be of certain infallible Truths 
which he knows to be of contingent uncertain Truth,,, If 
a future Volition is fo without all Neceflity, 'that there is no- 
thing hinders but that it may not be, then the Propofitioni 
which afferts it's future Exiftence, is fo uncertain, that there 
is Nothing hinders but that the Truth of it may entirely 
fail. And if God knows all Things, He knows this Pro- 
pofition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconfiftent 
v/ith his knowing that it is infallibly true 5 and fo incon-* 
fiftent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the 
Thing be indeed contingent, God views it fo, and judges 
it to be contingent, if he views Things as they are. If the 
Event be not neceftary, then it is poffible it may never be : 
And if it be pofllble it may never be, God knows it may 
poifibly never be ; and that is to knov/ that the Propofition 
which affirms it's Exiftence, may poflibly not be true ; and 
that is to know that the Truth of it is uncertain ; which 
furely^ is inconfiftent with his knowing it as a certain 
Truth. If Volitions are in Themfelves contingent Events, 
without all Neceffity, then 'tis no Argument of Perfection 
of Knowledge in any Being to determine peremptoril)r 
that they will be ; but on the contrary, an Argument of 
Jgnorance and Miftake : Becaufe it would argue, that 

Q^ he 

12 2 Foreknowledge infersNeceJftty^zxX, 11, 

he fuppofes that Propofition to be ccT-tain, which in it's 
own Nature, and ail Things conf.dered, is uncertain and 
contingent. To fay in fuch a Cafe, that God may hav« 
Ways of knowing contingent Events which we can't con- 
ceive of, • is ridi;:ulous ; as much fo, as to fay, that God; 
may know Contradictions to be true, for ought we know,, 
or that he may know a Thing to be certain, and at thei 
fame Time know it not to be certain, tho' we can't con- 
ceive how ; becaufe he has Ways of knowing, which we^ 
can't comprehend. 

Coroh I. From what has been obferved it is evident, that 
tlie abfolute Decrees of God are no more inconfiftent with 
human Liberty, on Account of any Neceffity of the Event 
which follows from fuch Decrees, than the abfolute 
Foreknozvledge of God. Becaufe the ConnecSlion between 
the Event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and 
indlflbluble, as between the Event and an abfolute Decree. 
That is, 'tis no more impollible that the Event and Decree 
fhould not agree together, than that the Event and abfolute 
Knowledge fhould difagree. The Conne6lion between thcl 
Event &Foreknowledge is abfolutelyperfe6l,by theSuppofition:] 
becaufe it it is fuppofed, that the Certainty and Infallibility 
of the Knowledge is abfolutely perfed. And it being fo, 
the Certainty can't be increafed ; and therefore the Con- 
ne<5tion between the Knowledge and Thing known, can't be 
mcreafed ; fo that if a Decree be added to the Foreknow- 
ledge, it don't at ail increafe the Connection, or make it 
more infallible and indiffoluble. If it were not fo, the 
Certainty of Knowledge might be increafed by the Ad-' 
dition of a Decree ; which is contrary to the Suppofition, 
v/hich is, that the Knovv^ledge is abfolutely perfed, or per- 
fect to the higheft polTible Degree. 

There is as much of an ImpoflibiHty but that the Things (1 
which are infallibly foreknown, ihould be, or (which is the i 
fame Thin'<) as great a NecelTity of their future Exiftence, .^ 
as if the Event were already written down, and was known,', 
and read by all Mankind, thro' all preceeding Ages, and j 
there were the mod indiffoluble and perfeA Conne<5tion i 
poffible, between the Writing, and the Thing vmtten.i 
In fuch a Cafe, it would be as impoflible the Event ihould i 
fail of Exigence, as if it had exifted already ; and a ;; 
Decree cau't make aa Event furer or more neceffary than ^ 


Seca.XII. as much as a Decree. 123 

And therefore, if there be any fuch Foreknowledge, as 
it has been proved there is, then Neceffity of Conneaion 
land Confequence, is not at all inconfiftent with any Li- 
berty which Man, or any other Creature enjoys. And 
from hence it may be infer'd, that abfolute Decrees of 
God, which don't at all increafe the Neceffity, are not at all 
•inconfiftent with the Liberty which Man enjoys, on any 
Ifuch Account, as that they make the Event decreed neceffary, 
•fand render it utterly impoffible but that it (hould come to 
pafs. Therefore if abfolute Decrees are inconfiftent with 
Man's Liberty as a moral Agent, or his Liberty in a Statas 
of Probation, or any Liberty v.^hatfoever that he enjoys, it 
is not on Account of any Neceffity which abfolute De- 
crees infer. 

Dr. Wh'ithy fuppofes, there is a great Difference between 
God's Foreknowledge, and his Decrees, with Regard to 
Neceffity of future Events. In his Difcourfe on the five 
Points, P. 474, 5ct. He lays, '^ God's Prefcience has no 

'' Influence at all on our Adions. Should God (fays be) 

*' by immediate Revelation, give me the Knowledge of the 
" Event of any Man's State ^or Actions, would my Know- 
" ledge of them have any Infmence upon his Acflifins ? 
*' Surely none at all.- — Our Knowledge doth not affecl 
" the Things w^e know, to make them more certain, or 
" more future, than they would be without it. Now Fore- 
" knowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Know- 
*' ledge has no Influence on Things that are, fo neither has 
*' Foreknowledge on Things that ihall be. And confe- 
*' quently, the Foreknowledge of any Action that would be 
" otherwife free, cannot alter or diminlfti that Freedom. 
*' Whereas God's Decree of Ele6lion is powerful & adive, 
*' and comprehends the Preparation and Exhibition of fuch 

*' Means, as ftiall unfruft.rably produce the End. Hence 

" God's Prefcience renders no Actions neceflary." And to 
this Purpofe, P. 473. he cites Origen^ where he fays, GocVs 
Prefcience is not the Cauje of Thhigs future^ hut their being fu- 
ture is the Caufe of God's Prefcience that they will be : And 
Le B/anCy where he fays. This is the truejf RefoJutiGn of this 
Difficulty y that Prefcience is not the Caufe that Things are future \ 
hut their being future is the Caufe they are forcfeen. In like 
Manner Dr. Clark^ in his Demonftration of the Being and^ 
Attributes of God, P. 95, — 99. And the Author of 
the Freedom of IVilU in God and the Creature^ fpeaking to the 
like Purpofe with Dr. IVhitby^ reprefents Foreknowledge as 

Q 2 having 


124 Foreknowledge infer sNeceJftty Part 11. j 

having no mor^ hifluence on Things known^ to make them mcejjar^^ \ 
than Jfter-Knouikedge^f or to that Purpqfe. . 

To all which I would fay ; That what is faid about 
Knowledge, it's not having Influence on the Thing knowii- 
to make it necefiary, is Nothing to the Purpofe, nor does 
It in the leaft ^fFecfl the foregoing Reafoning. Whether 
^refcience be the Thing that ?nakes the Event neceflary or no, 
It alters not the Cafe. Infallible Foreknowledge may prov^ 
the Neceflity of the Event foreknown, and yet not be the 
Thing which caufes the Neceflity. If the Foreknowledge be 
abfolute, this proves the Event known to be neceflary, or 
proves that 'tis impoffible but that the Event fliould be, 
by fome Means or other, either by a Decree, or fome 
other Way, if there be any other Way : Becaufe, as was faid 
before, 'tis abfurd to fay, that a Proportion is known to 
t)e certainly and infallibly true, which yet may poflibly prove 
not true. 

The whole of thp feqming Force of this Evafion lies in 
this ; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge don't 
caufe an Event to be neceflary, as a Decree does ; therefor^ 
it don\ prove it to be neceflary, as a Decree does. But there 
is n» Force in this arguing : For it is built wholly on this 
Suppofltion, that Nothing can prove^ ox he an Evidence of a 
Thing's being neceflary, but that which has a coufal In- 
fluence to make it fo. But this can never be 'maintained. 
li certain Foreknowledge of the future exifl:ing of an E- 
yent, be not the Thing which firft makes it impoflij^le that 
it fhould fail of Ej^illence ; yet it may, and certainly does 
demonjh-ate^ that it is impoflible it fliould fail of it, how- 
ever ^'that Impollibility comes. If Foreknowledge .be not 
the Caufe, but the Effe6t of this Impofllbility, it may prove 
that there is fuch an Impoflibility, as much as if it were the 
Caufe. It is as fl:rong arguing from the Effec5l to the 
Caufe, as from the Caufe to the Eff'edt. 'Tis enough, that "j 
an Exiftence which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whe- 
ther that I;npoflibility arifes from the Foreknowledge, or is J 
prior to it. 'Tis as evident, as 'tis pofllble any Thing fliould/j 
be, that it is impoffible a Thing which is infallibly:; 
known to be true, fliould prove not to be true ; therefore^ 
there is a Nccejjiiy that it fliould be otherwife ; whether the ,' 
Knowledge be the C^ufe of this Neceflity, or the NeceffityS 
the Caufe of the Knowledge. 

All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or^ 
After-Knowledge, or concomitant Knov/ledge, proves the 


Sed.XII. as much as a Decree. 125 

vThing known now to be necefTary, by fome Means or other ; 
or proves that it is impoffible it fliould now be other- 
wife than true. — I freejy allow, that Foreknowledge don't 
prove a Thing to be necefTary any more than After-Know- 
ledge : But then After-knowledge which is certain & infalli- 
ble, proves that 'tis now become impoffible but that the 
Propofition known (hould be true. Certain After- Knowledge 
proves that it is now, in the Time of the Knowledge, by 
fome Means or other, become im-pofllble but that the Propo- 
fition which predicates paft Exiflence on the Event, fiiould 
be true. And fo does certain Foreknowledge prove, that 
now, in the Time of the Knowledge, it is by fome Means 
or other, become impoffible but that the Propofition which 
predicates future Exiftence on the Event, fhould be true. 
The Neceffity of thie Truth of the Propofitions, confiding 
in the prefent Impoffibility of the Non-exiflence of the Event 
affirmed, in both Cafes, is the immediate Ground of the 
certainty of the Knowledge ; there can be no Certainty of 
Knowledge without it. 

There mufl be a Certainty in Things themfelves, before 
they are certainly known, or (which is the fame Thing j 
known to be certain. For Certainty of Knowledge is no- 
thing elfe but knowing or difcerning the Certainty there is 
in the Things themfelves which are known. Therefore 
there mufl be a Certainty in Things to be a Ground of Cer- 
tainty of Knowledge, and to render Things capable of be- 
ing known to be certain. And this is Nothing but the Ne- 
celfity of the Truth known, or it's being impoffible but that 
it fhould be true ; or, in other Words, the firm and infalli- 
ble Connexion between the Subjed and Predicate of the 
Propofition that contains that Truth. All Certainty of 
Knowledge confifts in the View of the Firmnefs of that 
Connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the fu- 
ture Exiflence of any Event, is his Vfcw of the firm and in- 
difToluble Connection of the Subject and Predicate of the 
iPropofition that afHrn;s it's future Exiflence. The Subject is 

. ^hat poffible Event ; the Predicate is it's future exifling : 
But if future Exiflence be firmly and indifTolubly connected 
with that Event, then the future Exiflence of that Event 

. is necefTary. If God certainly knows the future Exiflence 
of an Event which is wholly contingent, and may poffibiy 
never be, then He fees a firm Connection between a Sub- 
ject and Predicate that are not firmly connected ; which is 

. a Contradiction, 



J 26 FoTcknowhdgcmfersNeceJ^fj, Pai-tll, 

I allow what Dr. Whlthy fays to be true. That meer ^ 

Knowledge don^t affe5i the Thing knowriy to make it more certain i 

mr more future. But yet, I fay, it fuppofes and proves the | 

Thing to be already^ both future, and certain ; i. e. necefla- 1 

rily future. Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes Futurity ; and I 

2 certain Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes certain Futurity, an- j 

tecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other \ 

certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of j 

Knowledge, than a prior Impoflibility but that the Thing j 

Ihould prove true ; or (which is the fame Thing^ the I 

Neceffity of the Event. I 

I would obferve one Thing further concerning this Mat- |J 

ter, and it is this; That if it be as thofe foremention'd | 

Writers fuppofe, that God's Foreknowledge is not the | 

Caufe, but the EfFe6t of the Exiftence of the Event fore- I 

known ; this is fo far from (hewing that this Foreknowledge 'i 

don't infer the Neceffity of the Exiftence of that Event, that .j 

It rather fhews the contrary the more plainly. Becaufe it t 

Ihews the Exiftence of the Event to be fo fettled U firm, that ;': 

it is as if it had already been ; in as much as in Effect it 'i 

adtualiy exifts already ; it's future Exiftence has already *i 

had a<5hial Influence and Efficiency, and has produced an Effect, \ 

viz. Prefcience : The Effedt exifts already ; and as the j^ 

EfFe(5l fuppofes the Caufe, is connc6ted with the ^aufe, and - ! 

depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future E- .( 

vent, which is the Caufe, had exifted already. The Effedt '^ 

is firm as poffible, it having already the Pofteffion of Ex- j 

iftence, and has made fure of it. But the Effed can't be \ 

more firm and ftable than it's Caufe, Ground and Reafon. I 

The Building can't be firmer than the Foundation. r 

To illuftrate this Matter, let us fuppofe the Appearances } 

and Images of Things in a Glafs ; for Inftance, a refledling "\ 

Telefcope to be the* real Effects of heavenly Bodies (at J 

a Diftance, and out of SightJ which they referable : |J 

If it be fo, then, as thefe Images in the Telefcope have A 

had a paft a6tual Exiftence, and it is become utterly \ 

impoffible now that it fhould be otherwife than that ^ 

they have exifted ; fo they being the true Effe<5ls of the 3 

heavenly Bodies they referable, this proves the exifting of ? 

thofe heavenly Bodies to be as real, infallible, firm and I 

neceffary, as the exifting of thefe Eff*e(5ls ; the one being ^ 

connected with, and wholly depending on the other. ' 

Now let us fuppofe future Exiitences fome Way or other >;< 

Scd.XII. as much as a Decree. 127 

to have Influence back, to produce Efre<5ls before-hand, 
and caufe exadl and perfefl Images of themfelves in a Glafs, 
a Thoufand Years before they exift, yea, in all preceed- 
ing. Ages ; But yet that thefe Images are real Effe6ls of 
thefe future Exiftences, perfectly dependent on, and con- 
necSted with their Caufe ; thefe Effects and Images, having 
already had adual Exiftence, rendring that Matter of their 
Exifting perfedly firm and ftable, and utterly impoffiblc 
to be otherwife ; this proves in like Manner as in the 
other Inftance, that the Exiftence of the Things which 
are their Caufes, is alfo equally fure, firm and neceffary ; 
and that it is alike impoffible but that they fhould be, as 
if they had been already, as their Effeds have. And if 
inftead of Images in a Glafs, we fuppofe the antecedent 
EfFedts to be perfedl Ideas of them in the divine Mind, 
which have exifted there from all Eternity, which are as 
properly EfFe6ls, as truly and properly conne<5led with their 
Caufe, the Cafe is not altered. 

Another Thing which has been faid by fome Armlmans^ 
to take ofiT the Force of what is urged from God's Pre- 
fcience, againft the Contingence of the Volitions of moral 
Agents, is to this Purpofe ; " That when we talk .of 
*' Foreknowledge in God, there is no ftri6i: Propriety in 
" our fo Speaking ; and that altho' it be true, that there is 
" in God the moft perfed Knowledge of all Events from 
*' Eternity to Eternity, yet there is no fuch Thing as 
" before and after in God, but He fees all Things by 
" one perfed unchangeable View, without any SuccelTion." 
To this I anfwer, 

1. It has been already fhewn, that all certain Knowledge 
proves the Necefllty of the Truth known ; whether it be 

before^ after^ or at the fame Time, Tho' it be true, that 

there is no Succeffion in God's Knowledge, and the Manner 
of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much 
we know concerning it, that there is no Event, pad, 
prefent, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of ; He 
never is, never was, and never will be without *infallible 
Knowledge of it ; He always fees the Exiftence of it 'to 
be certain and infallible. And as he always kts Things 

ft as they are in Truth ; hence there never is in Reality 
. ; ^) Thing contingent in fuch a Senfe, as that pofTibly it 
may happen never to exift. If, ftridly fpeaking, there is no 
Foreknowledge in God, 'tis becaufe thofe Things which 


128 CVr/^/» Foreknowledge Part II. I 


are future to us, are as prefent to God, as if they already ; 

had Exiftence : and that is as much as to fay, that future j 

Events are always in God's View as evident, clear, fure i 

and neceflary, as if they already were. If there never is 3 

a Time wherein the Exigence of the Event is not prefent I 

with God, then there never is a Time wherein it is not j 

as much impoffible for it to fail of Exiftence, as if it's \ 

Exiftence were prefent, and were already come to pafs. ] 


God's viewing Things fo perfedlly and unchangeably as u 

that there is no Succeflion in his Ideas or Judgment, don't • \ 

hinder but that there is properly now, in the Mind of God, \ 

a certain and perfe<5l Knowledge of the moral Actions of ' 

Men, which to us are an Hundred Years hence : yea the 1 

Obje6lion fuppoles this ; and therefore it certainly don't 1 

hinder but that, by the foregoing Arguments, it is now ; 

impoffible thefe moral A<5lions fliould not come to pafs. \ 

We know, that God knows the future voluntar}' Anions j 
of Men in fuch a Senfe before-hand, as that he is able par- * 
ticularly to declare, and foretell them, and write them,- :; 
or caufe them to be written down in a Book, as He often 1 
has done j and that therefore the neceffary Connedlion | 
which there is between God's Knowledge and the Event*) 
known, does as much prove the Event to be neceffary \ 
before-hand, as if the divine Knowledge were in the fame ^ 
Senfe before the Event, as the Prediction or Writing is. i 
If the Knowledge be infallible, then the Expreffion of it in i 
the written Prediction is infallible 5 that is, there is an i 
infallible Connedion between that written Predidion and i 
the Event. And if fo, then it is impoffible it iliould i 
ever be otherwife, than that that Prediction and the Event i 
IhouW agree : And this is the fame Thing as to fay, ^ 
'tis impoffible but that the Event fhould come to pafs : | 
and this is the fame as to fay, that it's commg to pafs i 

is neceffary. So that it is manifeft, that there being no ' > 

proper Succeffion in God's Mind, makes no Alteration "4 
as to the Neceffit)^ of the Exiftence of the Events which | 
God knows. Yea, < 

2, This is io far from weakening the Proof, which has 
been given of the Impoffibility of the not coming to pafs i 
of future Events known, as that it eftablifties that whereia 'li 
the Strength of the foregoing Arguments confifts, and. « 
fhQVt's the Clearnefs of the Evidence. For, J 

(I.) The I 

Sedl.XII. infers fome NecdTity. 129 

I (ij The very Reafon why God's Knowledge is with- 

i out SuccelTlon, is, becaufe it is ablblutely perfecl, to the 

I higheft pofTible Degree of Clearnefs and Certainty : all 

i Things, whether paft, prefent or to come, being view'd 

I with equal Evidence and Fulnefs ; future Things being 

\ htn with as much Clearnefs, as if they were prefent ; 

the View is always in abfolute Perfedion ; and abfolute 

! conftant Perfedion admits of no Alteration, and fo no 

I SuccefTion ; the adual Exiftence of the Thing known, don't 

at all increafe, or add to the Clearnefs or Certainty of 

lithe Thing known : God calls the Things that are not, as 

tho' they were ; they are all one to Him as if they 

[had already exifled. But herein coniifts the Strength of 

the Demonftration before given, of the ImpoiTibility of the 

I not exifting of thofe Things whofe Exiftence God knows ; 

('That it is as impolTible they fhould fail of Exiftence, as if 

itheyexifted already. This Objedion, inftead of weakening 

jthis Argument, fets it in the cleareft and ftrongeft Light ; 

for it fuppofes it to be fo indeed, that the Exiftence of 

future Events is in God's View fo much as if it already 

had been, that when they come actually to exift, it makes 

not the leaft Alteration or Variation in his View or 

Knowledge of them. 

(2.) The Objedlon is founded on the Immutability oi Go6!^ 
Knowledge : For 'tis the Immutability of Knowledge makes 
his Knowledge to be without SucceiTion. But this moft 
diredly and plainly demonftrates the Thing I infift on, 
^vz.that 'tis utterly impoffible the known Events fhould 
fail of Exiftence. For if that were pollible, then it would 
be poliible for there to be a Change in God's Knowledge 
and View of Things. For If the knov/n Event ftiouid 
fail of Exiftence, and not come into Being, as God expefted, 
then God would fee it, and fo would change his Mind^ 
and fee his former Miftake ; and thus there would be 
Change and SuccefTion in his Knowledge. But as God is 
immutable, and fo it is utterly and infinitely impoffible 
that his View fhould be changed ; fo 'tis, for ,the fame' 
Reafon, juft fo impoffible that the fore-known Event fhould 
not exift : And that is to be impoffible in the higheit 
iDegree : and therefore the contrary is neceflary. Nothing 
[is more impoffible than that the immutable God fhould 
[be changed, by the SuccefTion of Time ; ^who compre- 
Ikends aU Things, from Eternity to Eternityj in one, moft: 

R. perfect 

130 Forcknowlege/jrw^j NeceJJtty. Part II, 

perfed, and unalterable View ; fo that his whole eternal 
Duration is Vitoe interminabilis^ tota^fimul^ & perfe£ia Pojpjfto, . 

On the whole, I need not fear to fa}S that there is no 
Geometrical Theorem or Propolition whatfoever, more capa-. 
ble of ftri(5t Demonftration, than that God's certain Pre- 
fcience of the Volitions of moral Agents is inconfiftent with 
fuch a Contingence of thefe Events, as is without all 
Neceflity ; and fo is inconfiftent with the Arminian Notion 
of Liberty. 

Cord. 2. Hence the Dodrine of the Calvinifis^ concerning 
the abfoliite Decrees of God, does not at all infer any 
more Fatality in Things, than will demonftrably follow froii\ 
the Doclrine of moft Arminian Divines, who acknowledge 
God's Omnifcience, and univerlal Prefcience. Therefore 
all ObjecStions they make againft the Doclrine of the Calvijiijlsy 
as implying Hobbes's Do6lrine of Neceflity, or the Stoicd. 
Dodrine of Fate, lie no more againft the Dodlrine of 
Cahinijis, than their own Do6lrine : And therefore it ^on't 
become thofe Divines, to raife luch an Out-cry againft the 
Cakinijis, on this Account. 

CoroL 3. Hence^ all arguing from Neceflity, againft the 
Do6tnne of the Inability of unregenerate Men to perform 
the Conditions of Salvation, and the Commands of God; 
requiring fpiritual Duties, and againft the Calviniftic Dodrine 
of efficacious Grace ; I fay, all Arguings of Arminiam 
(fuch of 'em as own God's Omnifcience) againft thefe 
Things, on this Ground, that thefe Doarines, tho' they 
don't fuppofe Men to be under any Conftraint orCoadion, 
yet fuppofe 'em under NecefiTity, with Refpeft to their moral 
Aclions,and thofe Things which are required of 'em in Order 
to their Acceptance with God j and their arguing againft 
t^ie Neceflity of Men's Volitions, taken from the Reafo- 
iiablenefs of God's Commands, Promifes, and Threatnings,, 
and the Sincerity of his Counfels and Invitations ; and all 
Objedions againft any Doctrines of the Cahiynjh as being 
inconfiftent with human Liberty, becaufe they infer NecelFity ; 
I fay, all thefe Arguments and Objections muft fall to 
the Ground, and be juftly efteem'd vain and frivolous, 
as coming from them -, being maintain'd in an Inconflftence 
with themfelves, and in like Manner levelled againft their own 
Doahne, as againft the Doctrine of the Qalvmifls, 


Section XIIL 

Whether weftippofe the Folitions of moral 
Agents to be conneEied with any Xhing 
antecede7tty or not ^ yet they mujl be ne- 
ceffary in fuch a Senfe as to overthrow 
Arminian Liberty. 

EVERY Aa of the Will has a Caufe, or it has not. 
If it has a Caufe, then, according to what has 
already been demonftrated, it is not contingent, but 
neceflary \ the EfFe<5t: being neceffarily dependent and con- 
fequent on it's Caufe ; and that, let the Caufe be what 
it will. If the Caufe is the Will itfelf, by antecedv^nt 
A6ts •chufmg and determining ; ftill the determined and 
canfed Ad muft be a neceflary Effea. The Aa that 
is the determined Effea of tl\e foregoing Aa which is it's 
Caufe, can't prevent the Efficiency of it's Caufe ; but mull 
be wholly fubjea to it's Determination and Command, 
as much as the Motions of the Hands and Feet : The 
confequent commanded Aas of the Will are as paflive 
and as neceffary, with Refpea to the .antecedent determining 
Aas, as the Parts of the Body are to the Vohtions 
"Which determine and command them. And therefore, if 
all the free Aas of the Will are thus, if they are all 
-determined Effeas, determined by the Will it felf, that 
is, determined by antecedent Choice, then they are all 
• neceflary ; they are all fubjec^ to, and decifively fixed by 
the foregoing Aa, which is their Caufe : Yea, even the 
determining Aa it felf ; for that muft be determined and 
fixed by another Aa, preceding that, if it be a free and 
voluntary Aa ; and fo muft be neceflary. So that by this 
all the free Ads of the Will are neceflfary, and can't be 
free unlefs they are neceflary : Becaufe they can't be free, 
according to the Arminian Notion of Freedom, unlefs they 
are determined by the Will ; which is to be determined 
by antecedent Choice ; which being their Caufe, proves 
■ 'em nebeflTary, And yet they fay, NeceflTity is utterly incon- 

R 2 iiftent 

132 Both NeceJJlty &^ Conttngence Part II. ] 

fiflent with Liberty. So that, by their Scheme, the A6ls \ 

oi the Will can't be free unlefs they 2X^ neceflary, and ; 
yet cannot be free if they be ^ssm- neceflary ! 


But if the other Part of the Dilemma be taken, and j 

it be affirm'd that the free A6ts of the Will have no 1 

Caufe, and are connected with nothing whatfoever that \ 

go^s before them and determines them, in order to maintain \ ; 

their proper and abfolute Contingence, and this fliould b« I 

allowed to be poffible ; ftill it will not ferve their Turn. I 

For if the VoUtion comes to pafs by perfect Contingence, ] 
and without any Caufe at all, then it is certain, no A(5t 

of the Will, no prior Ad of the Soul was the Caufe, no" I 

Determination or Choice of the Soul, had any Hand in \ 

it. The Will, or the Soul, was indeed the Subject of what \ 

happened to it accidentally, but was not the Caufe. The i 

Will is not active in caufmg or determining, but purely ;■ 

the palTive Subject ^ at leaft according to their Notion of \ 

A6lion and Paflion. In this Cafe, Contingence does as 1 

much prevent the Determination of the Will, as a proper ' 

Caufe ; and as to the Wil], it was neceflary, and could be .| 

po otherwife. For to fuppofe that it could have^ been i 

©therwife, if the Will or Soul had pleafed, is to fuppofe \ 

that the Ad is dependent Qn fome pnor A6t of Choice or \\ 

Pleafure ; contrary to what now is fuppofed : Jt is to fup- 1 

pofe that it might have been otherwife^ if it's Caufe had \ 

made it or ordered it otherwife. Eut this dpn't agree to \ 

it's having no Caufe or Orderer at all. That muft be -' 

neceflary as to the Soul, which is dependent on no free ij 

A6t of the Soul ; But that which is without a Caufe, is de- > 

pendent on no free A6t of the Soul : bccaufe, by the Sup- • 

pofition, it is dependent on Nothing, and is conneded with 1 

Nothing. In fuch a Cafe, the Soul is neceflarily fubjeded" J 

to what Accident: brings to pafs, from Time to Time, as . 

much as the Earth, that is inadive, is neceflarily fub- j 

jected to what falls upon it. But this don't confift with ! 

the Armnicin Notion of Liberty, which is the Will's Power ' 

of determming it fclf in it's own Ads, and being wholly j 

adive in it, without Pafllvenefs, and without being fubjed '\ 

to Neccirity.--— Thus, Contingence belongs to the Armini^n ' 

Notion of Liberty, and yet is inconfiftent with it. \ 

I would here obferve, that the Author of the EJfay on \ 

the Freedc?n of Will^ in God and the Creature^ Page 76, 77. \ 

^iivs as follows;, " The Word Chance always means forrie- j 

' ' '*' thins: ' 

Seft.XIII. inco?tJiJI^ wi^^hxmm. Liberty . 133 

*' thing done without Defign. Chance and Defign ftand 
" in dire6t Oppofition to each other : and Chance can 
*« never be properly applied to the Ads of the ^yiil, 
« which is the Spring of all Defign, and which defigns 
*« to chufe whatfoever it doth chufe, whether there be any 
<*= fuperiour Fitnefs in the Thing which it chufes, or no -, 
** and it defigns to determine it felf to one Thing, where 
. *' two Things perfedlly equal are propofed, meerly becaufe it 
*' will." But herein appears a very great Inadvertence in this 
Author. For if the IVill be the Spring of all Defign^ as he 
fays, then certainly it is not always the EffeSl of Defign -, 
and the A61s of the Will themfelves muft fometimes come 
to pafs when they don't fprmg from Defign \ and confe- 
quently come to pafs by Chance, according to his own 
Definition of Chance. And if the Will defigns to chiije what- 
foever it does chufe y 2.n6. defigns to determine it felf as he fays, 
then it defigns to determine all its Defigns. Which 
carries us back from one Defign to a foregoing Defign 
determining that, and to another determining that ; and 
fo on in infinitum. The very firft Defign muft be the 
J£fFe6l of foregoing Defign, or elfe it muft be by Chance, 
in his Notion of it. 

Here another Alternative may be propofed, relating to 
the Conne(5\ion of the Acts of the Will with fomething 
foregoing that is their Caufe, not much unlike to the other ; 
which is this : Either human Liberty is fuch that it may 
iwell ftand with Volitions being neceffarily connected with 
the Views of the Underftanding, and fo is confiftent with 
Necelfity ; or it is inconfiftent with, and contrary to fuch 
a Connection and Neceflity. The former is diredly fub- 
<verfive of the Arininian Notion of Liberty, confifting in Free- 
dom from all Neceflity. And if the latter be chofen, and it 
be faid, that Liberty is inconfiftent with any fuch neceflary 
Connection 'of Volition with foregoing Views of the Under- 
ftanding, it confifting in Freedom from any fuch NecelTity 
of the Will as that would imply ; then the Liberty of 
the Soul confifts (in Part at leaft) in the Freedom from 
Reftraint, Limitation and Government, in it's a6tings, by the 
Underftanding, and in Liberty and Liabienefs to aCl contrary 
to the Underftanding's Views and Dictates : and confe- 
quently the more the Soul has of this Difengagednefs, in 
it's acting, the more Liberty. Now let it be confidered 
what this brings the noble Principle of human Liberty to, 
particularly when it is poflefiTed and enjoyed in it's Perfection, 

134 P^rmim^iri Liberty inc^^^ Part II. \ 

viz. a full and perfe(5l Freedom and Liablenefs to a6^ t' 
altogether at Random, without the leaft Conne6tion with, t 
Of Reftraint or Government by, any Di6late of Reafon, \ 
or any Thing whatfoever apprehended, confidered or viewed ^ 
by the Underftanding ; as being inconfiftent with the full i! 
and perfect Sovereignty of the Will over it's own Deter- 
minations. The Notion Mankind have conceived of j 

Liberty, is fome Dignity or Privilege, fomething worth j 
claiming. But what Dignity or Privilege is there, in being 
given up to fuch a wild Contingence as this, to be per-» 
fe<5lly and conftantly liable to a6t unintelligently and un- 
reafonably, and as much without the Guidance of Un- 
handing, as if we had none, or were as deftitute of 
Perception as the Smoak that is driven by the Wind ! 

*w* "^o^ **J0/* %o^ *w "^y ^^ %v* %iv* v^ "w* ^4^ ^{v* *vft^ ^c/* w* 'w <^ 


w^^^s^sss^s^ssi^d^^s^^^'s^^^s^^m I 


( '35 ) 


Wherein is enquired^ whether any fuch 
Liberty of Will as Arminians hold^ be 
neceffary to Moral Agency, Vertue 
and Vice, Praise, and Dispraise, ^c. 

S E-C T I o N I. 

god's moral Excellency neceffary^ yet 
vertuous and praife-worthy. 

*• Tf AVING confidered the firji Thing that was propofed 
^ I '■ 1 to be enquired into, relating to that Freedom of Wili 
'*- -■• which Arminians maintain j namely, Whether any 
fuch Thing does, ever did, or ever can exift, or be con- 
ceived of ; I come now to the fecond Thing propofed to be 
the Subjed of Enquiry, 'viz. Whether any fuch Kind of 
Liberty be requifite to moral Agency, Vertue and Vice, Praife 
and Blame, Reward and Puniihment, i^c. 

I fhall begin with fome Confideration of the Vertue and 
Agency of the Supream moral Agent, and Fountain of all 
Agency and Vertue. 

Dr. IVhithy^ in his Difcourfe on the five Points, P. 14. fays, 
*' If all human Actions are neceffary. Virtue and Vice mud 
*^ be empty Names \ wc being capable of Nothing that is 

*^ blame- 

136 God' smor^lExctWency necejfarj^ Pa.IlI 

'' blame-worthy, or deferveth Praife ; For who can blame 
'^ a Perfon for doing only what he could not help, or judge 
*^' that he deferveth Praife only for what he could not avoid ?'* 
To the like Purpofe he fpeaks in Places innumerable ; efpe- 
cially in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the Will ; conftantly 
maintaining, that a Freedcm tiot only from Coa^ion^ but Necejfity^ 
is abfolutely requifite, in order to Adions being either wor- 
thy of Blame, or deferving of Praife. And to this agrees, as 
is well known, the current Dodrine of Arminlan Writers ; 
who in general hold, that there is no Vertue or Vice, Reward 
or Punifhment, nothing to be commended or blamed, with- 
out this Freedom. And yet Dr. //^/^/%, P. 300, allows, that 
God is without this Freedom ; And Arminians^ fo far as I 
have had Opportunity to obferve, generally acknowledge, 
that Gojd is necelTarily holy, and his Will neceflarily deter- ' 
mined to that which is good. 

So that, putting thefe Things together, the infinitely holy 
God, who always ufed to be efteemed by God's People, not 
only vertuous, but a Being in whom is all pofTible Vertue, 
and every Vertue in the moft abfolute Purity and Perfedion, 
and in infinitely greater Brightnefs and Amiablenefs than in 
any Creature ; the moft perfed: Pattern of Vertue, and the I 
Fountain from whom all others Vertue is but as Beams from i 
the Sun ; and who has been fuppofed to be, on the Ac- '}■ 
count of his Vertue and Holinefs, infi.nitely more worthy jj 
to be efteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended, \ 
extoli'd and praifed, than any Creature ; and He who is \ 
thus every where reprefented in Scripture ; I fay, this Being, 
according to this Notion of Dr. IPlokhy^ and other Ar7nhnans^ 
has no Vertue at all j Vertue, when afcribed to Him, is but 
ah empty Name ; and he is deferving of no Commendation or 
Praife ; becaufe he is under Neceflity, He can*t avoid being 
holy and good as he is ; therefore no Thanks to him for it. 
It feems, the Holinefs, Juftice, Faithfulnefs, &c. of the moft 
High, muft not be accounted to be of the Nature of that 
which is vertuous and praife -worthy. They will not deny, 
that thefe Things in God are good ; But then we muft un- 
derftand them, that they are no more veftuous, or of the 
Nature of any Thing commendable, than the Good that is 
in sny other Being that is not a moral Agent ; as the Bright^ 
nefs of the Sun, and the Fertility of the Earth are good, but 
not vertuous, becaufe thefe Properties are neceflary to thel<5 
Bodies, and not the Fruit of Self- determining. PoiYer. 



Seft.I. j'^/ Vertuous &^ Praife-worthy. 137 

There needs no other Confutation of this Notion of God's 
not being vertuoiis or praife -worthy, to Chriftians ac- 
[quainted with the Bible, but only ftating and particularly 
reprefenting of it. To bring Texts of Scripture, wherein 
God is reprefented as in every Refpedt, in the higheft 
Manner vertuous, and fupreamly praife-worthy, would be 
endlefs, and is altogether needlefs to fuch as have beea 
brought up under the Light of the Gofpel. 

. It were to be wifhedj that Dr. IVhitby, and other Divines 
I of the fame Sort, had explain'd themfelves, when they havci 
afferted that That which is neceflary, is not deferuing of 
Praife ; at the fame Time that they have own'd God's Per- 
fedlion to be necefTary, and fo in EiFe6t repi'efented God as 
not deferving Praife* Certainly, if their Words have any 
Meaning at all, by Praife^ they muft mean the Exercife of 
jT^imony of fome Sort of Efteem, Refpe<5t, or honourable 
jRdgard. And will they then fay> that Men are worthy of 
I that Efteem, Refpe6l, and Honour for their Vertue, fmali 
land imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of^ for his 
[infinite Righteoufnefs, Holinefs, and Goodnefs ? If fo, it 
I muft be becaufe of fome Sort of peculiar Excellency in the 
jvi^rtuous Man, which is his Prerogative, wherein he really 
has the Preference ; fome Dignity, that is entirely diftin- 
iguifti'd from any Excellency, Amiablenefs or Honourablenefs 
in God ; not in Imperfe6tion and Dependance, but in 
Pre-eminence ; which therefore he don't receive from God, 
inor is God the Fountain or Pattern of it ; nor can God, in 
that Refpe6t, ftand in Competition with him, as the Obje<£t of 
Honour and Regard ; but Man may claim a peculiar Efteem, 
Commendation and Glory, that God can have no Pretenfion^ 
!to. Yea, God has no Right, by vertue of his necelTary Ho- 
linefs, to intermeddle with that grateful Refpe(5l and Praife, 
idue to the vertuous Man, who chufes Vertue, in the Exercife 
of a Freedom ad utruinque ; any more than a precious Stone, 
which can't avoid being hard and beautiful. 

And if it be fo, let it be explained what that peculiar 
I Refped is, that is due to the vertuous Man^ which differs 
I in Nature and Kind, in fome Way of Pre-eminence, from 
\ all that is due to God. What is the Name or I>efcription 
I of that peculiar Affedlion ? Is it Efteem, Love, Admiration^, 
Honour, Praife, or Gratitude ? The Scripture every where 
: reprefents God as the higheft Objea of all thefe : there we 
j read of the $quI' s imgnfying the Lord^ of hv'wg Hhn mth all the 
i . ■ " S Hearty 

138 Concerning GOXy^ Vertue. Part III. 

Hearty with all the Soul^wlth all theMind^ ^ with all the Strength ; 
admiring him, and his righteous A^s^ or greatly regarding them, 
as marvellous ^ wonderful ; honouring^ glorifying^ exalting^ extolling^ 
blefpng^ thanking^ and praifing Him ; giving unto Him all the Glory 
of the Good which is done or received, rather than unto 
Men ; that no Flejh Jhould glory in his Prefence j but that He 
fl-iould be regarded as the Being to whom all Glory is due. 
What then is that Refpea ? What Pairion,AfFeaion, or Ex- 
ercife is it, that Arminians call Praife^ diverfe from all thefe 
Things, which Men are worthy of for their Vertue, and 
which God is not worthy of, in any Degree ? ';t 

If that Neceflity which attends God's moral Perfedions 
and Actions, be as inconfiftent with a Being worthy of 
Praife, as a Necefllty of CoacStion ; as is plainly implied in 
or inferred from Dr. Ulnthys Difcourfe ; then why fhould. 
we thank God for his Goodnefs, any more than if He were 
forced to be good, or any more than we ftiould thank one 
of our Fellow-Creatures who did us Good, not freely, and 
of good Will, or from any Kindnefs of Heart, but from meer 
Compulfion, or extrinfecal Neceflity ? Arminians fuppofe, 
that God is neceflarily a good and gracious Being : for this 
they make the Ground of fome of their main Arguments 
againft many Dodrines maintain'd by Calvinijls : They fay, 
thefe are certainly falfe, and it is i?npaffible they fhould be true,: 
becaufe they are not confident wqth the Goodnefs of God.l 
This fuppofes, that it is impoffible but that God fhould be 
good : for if it be fpofuble that He fhould be otherwife, 
then that ImpofTibihty of the Truth of thefe Dodrines ceafes, 
according to their own Argument. 


That Vertue in God is not, in the moft ;^roper Senfe^tft 
rewardcible^ is not for Want of Merit in his moral Perfedi- J 
ons and Actions, fufncient to deferve Rewards from hisli 
Creatures ; but becaufe He is infinitely above all Capacity ;)ii 
of receiving any Reward or Benefit from the Creature : HeH 
is already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and we can'tn 
be profitable unto Him. But flill he is worthy of our fupreamj4 
Benevolence for his Vertue ; and would be worthy of ontk 
Beneficence, which is the Fruit and ExprefTion of Benevo-^^ 
lence, if our Goodnefs could extend to Him. If God de- 1| 
fervcs to be thanked and praifed for his Goodnefs, He wouldrt' 
for the fame Reafon, deferve that we fhould alfo requite his|i 
Kindnefs, if that were poffible. TVhat Jhall I render to thtV 
Lord for all his Benefits f is the natural Language of Thank-| 


Seft.II. Chn{\' s Oh^dicncG mcejfarj. 139 

fulnefs : and (o far as in us lies, it is our Duty to recompenfc 
God's Goodnefs, and render again according to Benefits received. 
And that we might have Opportunity for fo natural an Ex- 
preflion of our Gratitude to God, as Beneficence, notwith- 
ftanding his being infinitely above our Reach j He has ap- 
pointed others tobe his Receivers, and to ftand in his Stead, 
as the Objeas of our Beneficence ; fuch are efpecially our 
indigent Brethren. 

Section II. 

Ths AEis of the Will of the human Soul of 
Jesus Christ neceflarily holy,jj^^/ ^r^/^ 
vertuGus^ praife-worthyy rewardable^ 6cc. 

ir Have already confidered how Dr. Whithy infifis upon it, 
I that a Freedom, not only from Coadion, but Necefiity, 
# is requifde to either Vertue or Vice^ Praife or Dijpraife^ Reward 
or Funijlmient. He alfo infifis on the fame Freedom as abfo- 
h^tely requifite to a Perfon's being the Subject of a Lav;^ ot 
Precepts or Prohibitions \ in the Book before mentioned (P. 301, 
!^3i4, 328, 339, 940, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373,410.; And of 
' Pro7ni/es znd Threatnings (P. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 34G, 
363.) And as requifite to a State of Trial, (P. 297, &c.) 

Now therefore, with an Eye to thefe Things, I would en- 
quire into the moral Condud and Pra<5lice of our Lord Jei'us 
Chrift, which he exhibited in his human Nature here, in 
his State of Humiliation, And Firj}^ I would (hew, that his 
■ hoJy Behaviour was necejfary ; or that it was impcfftble it 
! (liculd be otherwife, than that He iliould behave himfelf 
holily, and that he fliould be perfectly holy in each indivi- 
dualAdt of his Life. And Secondly^ t\\2it his holy Behaviour' 
was properly of the Nature of Vertue^ and was zvorthy of 
Praife ; and that He was the Subject of Lawy Pi'ecepis o>- 
Commands^ Projnifes and Rewards \ and that he was in a State 
of Trial 
i- S 2 I. It 

140 TieJS?so/t&eWi[\o(Chna, P.III. J 

I. It was impojftbk^ that the A(5ls of the Will of the human 
Soul of Chrift Ihould, in any Inftance, Degree or Circum- 1 
fiance, be otherwife than holy, and agreable to God's Na- 
ture and Will. The following Things make this evident, 

I. God had promifed fo effedually to preferve and uphold j 
Him by his Spirit, under all his Temptations, that he ihould 1 | 
not fail of reaching the End for which He came into the \ 
World ; —which he would have fail'd of, had he fallen intg A 
Sin. We have fuch a Promife, Ifai. xlii. 1,2,3,4. Behold my ^\ 
Servant^ wham I uphold ; mine EleSi^ in whom my Soul dellghteth ,\ \ 
I have put my Spirit uponHim : He Jhall bring forth Judgment to the 
Gentiles : He Jhall not cry^nor lift up^nor caufe hisVoice to be heard in 

the Street. He Jhall bring forth Judgment unto Truth. He Jhall 

not fail ^ nor be difcouragedy till he have fet Judgment in the Earth ; 
end the Ifles Jhall wait for his Lqiv. This Promife of Chrift's 
having God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and 
lifting up his Voice &c. relates to the Time of ChrilVs Ap- 
pearance on Earth ; as is manifeft from the Nature of the 
Promife, and alfo the Application of it in the New Tefta- 
ment, Matth. 12, 18. And the Words imply a Promife of 
his being fo upheld by God's Spirit, that he (hpuld be pre- 
ferved from Sin ; particularly from Pride and Vain-glory, 
and from being overcome by any of the Temptations he 
ihould be under to affe6t the Glory of this World ; the Pomp ) 
of an earthly Prince, or the Applaufe and Praife of Men : and I 
that he Ihould be fo upheld, that he fhould by no Means 1 
fail of obtaining the End of his coming into the World, of ( 
bringing forth Judgment unto Victory, and eftalplilhing his 
Kingdom of Grace in the Earth.— And in the following 
Verfes, this Promife is conf rmed, with the greateft imagina- 
ble Solemnity. Thus faith the LORD^ HE that created the 
Heavens^ andjlretched them out ; Tie that fpread forth the Earthy 
arid that which ccmeth out of it ; He that giveth Breath unto the ■■. 
People upon it^ and Spirit to them that tualk therein : I the Lord ^ 
have called Thee in Righteoufnefs^ and will hold thine Hand ; and • 
will keep Thee^ and give Thee for a Covenant of the People, for a . 
Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind Eyes, to briyig out the Pri' ■ 
f oners from the Prijon, and thein that Jit in Darknefs out of the } 
'Prijm-Eloufe. 1 am JEHOVAH, that is my Name, kc. 

Very parallel with thefe Promifes is that, Tfai. xlix. 7, 8,9. 
which alio has an apparent Refpect to the Time of Chrift's 
Humiliation on Earth. Thus faith the Lord, the Redeemer of 
liraelj and his hdy Oncy to Him whom Man defpifeth^ to Hirti 

Se<9:.II. neceflarily ^^/^'. X41 

whom the Nation akhorreth^ to a Servant of Riders j Kings fljalt 
fie and arifi^ F rimes alfo jfimll luorjhip ; becaifi of the Lord 'that is 
i faithful, and the holy One of Ifrael, and He jhall choofe Thee. 
! Thus faith the Lord^ In an acceptable Time have I heard Thee ; in 
I a Day of Salvation have I helped Thee ; and I will preferve 
\ Thee, and give thee for a Covenant of the Peopky to ejlablijh 
fhe Earthy &c. 

And in Ifai. I. 5 9. w^ have the Meffiah expre fling 

his Aflurance, that God would help Him, by fo opening 
his Ear, or inclining his Heart to<Tod's Commandments, 
that He (hould not be rebellious, but (hould perfevere^ 
I and not apoftatife, or turn his Back : That through God's 
Help, He ftiouM be immovable, in a Way of Obedience^ 
\inder the great Trials of Reproach and Suffering he (hould 
meet with ; fetting his Face like a Flint : So that He knev/ 
He (hould not be aihamed, or fruilrated in his Defign ; 
and finally (hould be approved and juftiiied, as having done 
his Work faithfully. ' The Lord hath opened mine Ear ; fo that 
J was not rebellious y neither turned away rny Back : I gave my 
Back to the Smiters, and my Cheeks to them that plucked off the 
Hair ; / hid not my Face from Shame and Spitting. For the 
Lord God will help' me ; therefore jhall I not be confounded : there- 
fore have I fet my Face as a Flint, and 1 know that I Jhall 
not be a foamed. He is near that juflifeth me ; who will contend 
with me f Let us fland together. Who is mine Adverfary ? 
Let him come near to me. Behold the Lord God will help me : 
who is He that fcall condemn ?ne ? Lo, they Jhall all wax old 
as a Garment y the Moth Jhall eat them up, 

2. The fame Thing is evident from all the Promifes 

which God made to the Melfiah, of his future Glory, 

Kingdom, and Succefs, in his Office and Charader of a 

j Mediator : which Glory could not have been obtained, if 

his Holinefs had fail'd, and he had been guilty of Sin. 

God's abfolute Promife of any Things makes the Things 

promifed mceffaryy and their failing to take Place abfolutely 

t impojfible : and in like Manner it makes thofe Things ne- 

I cefTary, on which the Thing promifed depends, and without 

which it can't take Effe6l. Therefore it appears, that it 

I was utterly impoilible that Chrill's Holinefs (hould fall, 

i from fuch abfolute Promifes as thofe, Pfal. ex. 4. The Lord 

j hath fworny and will not repent. Thou ar't a Priejl forever, after the 

\ Order of Melchizedek. And from every other Promife in 

I that Pialm, contaiAe^ in each Verfe of it. And Pfal. ii. 6^ 7. 

142 Tl^e ABs oJtheW^ of Chrift, P.III. i 

1 will declare the Decree r The Lord hath faid unto 7ne^ Thou \ 
mi my Son^ this Day have I begotten Thee : JJk of Me, and / ' 
'wUl give Thee the Heathen for thine Inheritance, &c. Pfal. xlv. 
3, 4> &c. Gird thy Sivord on thy Thigh, O mojl Mighty, with thy \ 
Glory and thy Majejly ; and in thy Majejiy ride profperonjly. And 1 
fo every Thing that is faid from thence to the End .of 
the Pfalm. And thofe Promifes, Ifai, lii. 13, 14, 15. & Hii. ! 
10, II, 12. And all thofe Promifes which God makes to the 1 
Mefliah, of Succefs, Dominion and Glory in the Charader of 
Redeemer, in Ifai. Chap. xhx. 

3. It was often promifed to the Church of God of old, . , 
for their Comfort, that God would give them a righteous^ 
finlefs Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5,6. Behold, the Days come, faith the 
Lord, that I tvill raife up unto David a righteous Branch ; and a 
King Jloall reign and profper, andfiall execute ^Judgment and Jujlict 
in tlye Earth, In his Days jliall Judah he faved, aJid Ifraei Jhall 
dwell fafely. And this is the Narne whereby He Jhall be called. The h 
Lord ourRighteoifnefs, So,Jer.xxxiii.— / will c^ufe the Branch of \\ 
Righteoufnefs to grow i^p unto David ; a^id He Jhall execute fudg- y 
ment and Righteoufnejs in the Land. Ifai. ix, 6, 7. For unto us 
a Child is born ; JJpon the Throne of David and of his King- 
dom, to order it, and to eftablijh it with f:! dement andfuJliceT, 
from h^nceforth^ even fcre^ier : The Zeal of the Lord of Ho/Is will 
do this. Chap. xi. at the Beginning. There JJ^all come forth a ^ 
Rod out of the Stem of Jeffe, and a Branch Jhall grow out of his " 
Roots -y and the Spirit of the Lord Jhall reft upon Him,~-T- The 
Spirit of Knowledge, and of the Fear of the Lord : — IVith Righ- 
teoifnej's Jhall He judge the Poor, and reprove with Equity ;-—- 1 
Righteoufnefs pall be the Girdle of his Loins, ajid Faithfuhiefs. 
the Girdle of his Reins. Chap. lii. 13. My Servant Jliall deal 
prudently. Chap. iiii. 9. Becaufe He had done no Fiolcnce, neither h 
was Grille found in his Mouth. If it be impoffible, that thefe li 
Promifes fhould fail, and it be eafier for Heaven and Earth to pi 
pafs aw^ay, than for one Jot or Tittle -of thefe Promifes of |d 
God to pafs away, then it was impoflible that Chrift fhould 
commit any Sin. Chrift himfelf fignified, that it was im- 
poflible but that the Things which were fpoken concerning 

Him fliould be fulfilled. Luk. xxiv. 44. That all Things mufi 

be fulfilled, which were written in the Law of Mofes, and in 
the Prophets, and in the Pjalnis concerning Me. Mat. xxvi. 53, 54. 
Bui how then Jhall the Scripture be fulfJlcd, that thus it muji be ? 
Mark xiv. 49. But the Scriptures muji be fulfilled. And fo the 

Apoftle, ht\. i. 163 17, This Scripture mufi nmls have been 


4- A^i 

Sed.II. neceflai-ily holy. 14.3 

4. All the Promifes which were made to the Church of 
old, of the Meffiah as' a future Saviour, from that made 
to our firft Parents in Paradife, to that which was delivered 
by the Prophet Malachl^ {hew it to be impoffible that Chrift 
fhould not have perfevered in perfecSt Holinefs. The antient 
Predictions given to God's Church, of the Meffiah as a 
Saviour, were of the Nature of Promifes ; as is evident by 
the Predictions themfelves, and the Manner of delivering 
them. But they are exprefly, and very often called Prbmifcs 
in the New-Teftament ; as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Ads 
I xiii. 32, 33. Rom, i. i, 2, 3. & Chap. xv. 8. Heh. vi. i-^^ &c« 
Thefe Promifes were often made with great Solemnity, and 
confirmed with an Oath ; as in Gen. xxii. 16. 17. By my f elf 
have I Jworriy faith the Lord^ that in hleffing^ I will hlefs thee^ and 
in multiplying^ I will multiply thy Seed, ai the Stars of Heaven, mid 
as the Sand which is upon the Sea-Shore :— — And in thy Seed JhaU 
i all the Nations of the Earth be hleffed. Compare Luke i. 72,73, 
land Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16. The Apoftle in Heh. vi. 17, 18. 
fpeaking of this Promife to Abraham, fays^ IVherein God wil- 
! ling more abundantly to foew to the Heirs of Promife the Imniuta-' 
bility of his Couifel, confirmed it by an Oath ; that by tW9 
IMMUTABLE Things, in which it was IMPOSSIBLE fir 
God to lie, he might have Jlrong Conflation, — In which 
Words, the Neceffity of the Accompiilbment, or (which is 
the fame Thing) the Impojfihility of the contrary, is fully de- 
clared. So God confirmed the Promife of the great Salva- 
I tion of the MelTiah, made to David, by an Oath ; Pfal.Ixxxix* 
j 3? 4' I have made a Covenant with my Chofen, I have fwom 
I Unto David my Servant ; Thy Seed will I ejiablijh for ever, a7id 
\ build up thylhrone to all' Generations. There is Nothing that 
is fo abundantly fet forth jin Scripture, as fure and irrefra- 
! gable, as this Promife and Oath to David, See PfaLlxxxix^ 
34> 355 36. 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. Ifai. Iv. 3. ASf, ii. 29, 30, 
J ,and xiii. 34. The Scripture exprefly fpeaks of it as utterly 
1 impojjible th^t this Promife and Oath to David, concerning 
\ the everlafting Dominion of the Meffiah of his Seed, fhould 
I fail. Jer. xxxiii. 15, &c. In thofe Days, and at that Time, I 

f will caufe the Branch of Righteoujhefs to gj'oiu up unto David. 

For thus faith the Lord, David fiall never want a Man to fit 

upon the Throne of the Houfe o/Ifrael. ver. 20, 21. If you 

can break my Covenant of the Day, and my Covenant of the Nighty 
and that thert f/mdd not he Day and Niglt in their Seafon ; then 
may alfo my Covenant be broken with David my Servant, that He 
JJjoul'l not have a Sen to reign upon his Throne, So in ver. 25^ 

26. Thus abundant is the Scripture in reprefenting how 


144- 1ley4£isoftheWi\\o^C\in9iy P.III. 

impojfible it was, that the Promifes made of Old concerning 
the great Salvation and Kingdom of the MefTiah ftiould 
fail : Which implies, that it was impoffible that this Meffiah, 
the fecond Jdam^ the promifed Seed of Ahrahamf and o{ David^ 
ffcould fall from his Integrity, as the firft Jdam did. 

5. All the Promifes that were made to the Church of God 
under the Old Teftament, of the great Enlargement of the 
Church, and Advancement of her Glory, in the Days of 
the Gofpel, after the Coming of the Meffiah ; the Increafe- 
of her Light, Liberty, Holinefs, Joy, Triumph over her 
Enemi2s,c5V. of which fo great a Part of the Old Tefta- 
ment ccnfifts ; which are repeated fo often, are fo varioufly 
exhibited, fo frequently introduced with great Pomp and So- 
lemnity, and are fo abundantly fealed with typical and fym- 
bolical P^eprefcntations j I fay, all thefe Promites imply, 
that the Meffiah (hould perfed the Work of Redemption j 
and this implies, that he fhould perfevere in the Work 
"which the Father had appointed Him, being in all Things 
conformed to his Will. Thefe Promifes were often confirm- 
ed by an Oath. (See Ifat. liv. 9. with the Context; Chap. 
Ixii. 18.) And it is reprefented as utterly impoffible that 
thefe Promifes (hould fail. {Ifai. xlix. 15. with the Con- 
text, Chap. liv. 10. with the Context ; Chap. li. 4, — 8. Chap. 
xl. 8. with the Context.) And therefore it was impojfible, that 
the Meffiah (liould fail, or commit Sin. 

6. It was impGjJlhky that the Meffiah fhould fail of perfe- 
vering in Integrity and Holinefs, as the firft Adam did, 
becaiife this would have been inconfiftent with the Pro- 
mifes which God made to the bleffed Virgin, his Mother, 
and to her Hufband ; implying, that He Jhould Jave his People 
from their Sins^ that God would give Him the Throne of his Fa- 
ther David, that He jhould reign over the Houfe of Jacob for^ 
ever \ and that of Ins Kingdom there fmdd he no End. Thefe 
Promifes were fure, and it was impoff.ble they fliould fail. 
And therefore the Virgin Mary., in trufting fully to them, 
adted reafonably, having an immovable Foundation of her 
Faith ; as Elifaheth obferves, ver. 45. And hlejjed is fhe that 
heiieveth ; for there J]:>all be a Performance of ihofe Things which 
were told her from the Lord. 

7. That it fliould have been poffible that Chrift (hould 
fin, and fo fail in the Work of our Redemption, does not 
confilt with the eternal Piurpofe and Decree of God,' reveal'd 

Sed.II. neceffarily holy. 145 

i in the Scriptures, that He would provide Salvation for fallen 
I Man in and by Jefus Chrift, and that Salvation fhould be 
i offered to Sinners through the Preaching of the Gofpel. 
Such an abfolute Decree as this Armlniam don't deny. 
Thus much at lead fout of all Controverfy) is implied in fuch 
, Scriptures, as i Cor. ii. 7. £/,f. i. 4, 5. and Ch. iii. 9, 10, 11. 
I Fet. i. 19, 20. Such an abfolute Decree as this, Armlniam 
allow to be fignified in thefe Texts. And the Armlnmn 
Ele6tion of Nations and Societies, and general Ele6tion 
of the Chriftian Church, and conditional Ele6tiGn of parti- 
cular Perfons, imply this. God could not decree before the 
Foundation of the World, to fave all that fhould believe 
in, and obey Chrift, unlefs he had abfolutely decreed that 
Salvation fhould be provided, and effedually wrought out 
by Chrift. And fmce (as the Armlniam themfelves ftrenu- 
oufly maintain) a Decree of God infers Necejftty ; hence 
it became necejfary that Chrift ftiould perfevere, and actually 
work out Salvation for us, and that He fhould not fail by 
the Commiffion of Sin. 

■ 8. That it fnould have been pofTible for Chrift's Ho- 
linefs to fail, is not confiftent with what God pro- 
mifed to his Son before all Ages. For, that Salvation 
fhould be offered to Men thro* Chrift, and beftowed on 
all his faithful Followers, is what is at leaft implied in 

1; that certain and infallible Promife fpoken of by the Apoftle, 
Tit. i. 2. In hope of eternal Life ; which God^ that cannot Ile^ 

f promlfed before the TVorld be'ga?i. This don't feem to be con- 

I troveitei by Armlniam. * 

9, That it ftiould be pofTible for Chrift to fail of doing 
his Father's Will, is inconftftent with the Promife made 

t to the Father by the Son, by the Logos that was with the 
Father from the Beginning, before he took the human 
Nature : as may be feen in Pfal. xl. 6,7, 8. (compar'd with 

'the Apoftle's Interpretation, Heb, x. 5,-9. ) Sacrifice and 
Offering thou did ft not defer e : mine Ears hajl thou opened., (or 
tored ;) Burnt-Offering a7id Sln-Offerlng Thou hafe not required., 
Then f aid /, X^, I come : In the Volume of the Book It Is written 
•f me^ I delight to do thy IFill., O my God., and thy Law Is with- 
in my Heart. Where is a manifeft Allufion to the Cove- 
nant which the willing Servant, who ioved his Mafter's Ser- 
vice, made with his Mafter, to be his Servant for ever, on 

T UiQ 

* See Dr. ffhl/hy on the five Points, P. 48, 49, ;c^ 

14-6 TheASisoftheWi\\oiC\in9i, Partlll. 

the Day wherein he had his Ear bored ; which Covenant 
was probably inferted in the publick. Records, called the 

Volume of the Book^ by the Judges, who were called to take -I 

Cognizance of the Tranfadtion i Exod, xxi. If the Logosy \ 

who. was with the Father, before the World, and who made ': 

the World, thus engaged in Covenant to do the Will of the :' 

Father in the human Nature, and the Promife, was as it were 4 
recorded, that it might be made fure, doubtlefs it was im-,^v 

pofftble that it (hould fail j and fo it was impojftble that Chrift ^ 

fhould fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human u 

Nature. ^ 

ro. If it was poflible for Chrift to have failed of doing 
the Will of his Father, and fo to have failed of effedually 
working out Red(?inption for Sinners, then \^\t Salvation of 
all the Saints, who were faved from the Beginning of the 
World, to the Death of Chrift, was not built on a firm 
Foundation. The Mefliah, and the Redemption which He 
was to work out by^ his Obedience unto Death, was the. 
Foundation of the Salvation of all the Pofterity of fallen 
Man, that ever were faved. Therefore, if when the Old- 
Teftament Saints had the Pardon of their Sins, and the Fa- 
vour of God promifed them, and Salvation beftawed upon 
them, ftiil it was poflible that the Mefliah, when he came, 
might commit Sin, then all this was on a Foundation that 
was not firm and ftable, but liable to fail j fomething which 
it was poflible might never be. God did as it Vv'ere truft 
to what his Son had engaged and promifed to do in future . 
Time ; and depended fo much upon it, that He proceeded 
actually to fave Men on the Account of it, as tho' it had been 
already done. But this Truft and Dependance of God, on 
the Suppofltion of Chrift's being liable to fail of doing his 
Will, was leaning on a Staff that was weak, and might- 
pollibly break. The Saints of old trufted on the Promifes" 
of a future Redemption to be wrought out and compieated 
by the Melfiah, and built their Comfort upon it : Abraham 
^aw Chrift's Day and rejoyccd j and he and the other Pa- 
triarchs died in the Faith of the Promife of it. ( Hcb.x\.ii^,) 
But on this Suppofltion, their Faith and their* Comfort, and 
their Salvation, was built on a moveable fallible P'oundation ; 
Chrift was not to them a tried Stone, a fure Foundation ; as. 
in 7/?//. xxviii. i6. Da-vid cniixoXy refted on the Covenant of 
God with him, concerning the future glorious Dominion aiVd 
Salvationof theiVIefflah,of his Seed ; fays, it was all hisSahationy 
and all his D£ fin ; and comfort;; himfclf that this Covenant was 


Seca.II. neceffarily ic?^. 147 

an everlafting Covenant^ ordered in all Things and fure^ 2 Sam. 
xxiii. 5. But if Chrift's Vertue might fail, he was miftaken :. 
his great Comfort was not built fo fure, as he thought it 
was, being founded entirely on the Determinations of the 
Free-Wiil of Chrift's human Soul ; which was fubje6l to no 
NeceiFity, and might be determined either one Way or the 
other. Alfo the Dependance of thofe who looked for Re- 
demption in Jerufalcm^ and waited for the Confolation of 
Ifrael^ [Luh ii. 25. & 38.) and the Confidence of the Difci- 
pies of Jefus, who forfook all and followed Him, that they 
might enjoy the Benefits of his future Kingdom, was built 
on a fandy Foundation. 

.11. The Man Chrift Jefus, before he had finifhed his 
Courfe of Obedience, and while in the midil of Tempta- 
tions and Trials, was abundant in pofitively predicting his 
own future Glory in his Kingdom, and the Enlargement of 
his Church, the Salvation of the Gentiles through Him &c. 
and in Promifes of Bleffings he would beftow on his true 
Difciples in his future Kirip;dom ; on which Promifes he re- 
quired the full Dependence of his Difciples. (Jjh. xiv.). 
But tlie Difciples would have had no Ground for fuch De- 
pendance, if Chrift had been liable to fail in his Work : 
And Chrift Himfelf would have been guilty of Prefumption, 
in fo abounding in peremptory Promifes of great Things, 
which depended on a nieer Contingence ; nji-z. the Determi- 
nations of his free Will, confifting in a Freedom ad iitrnm- 
^ue^ to either Sin or Holinefs,. ftanding in Indifference, and 
incident, in Thoufands of future Inilances, to go either one 
I Way or the other. 

Thus it is evident, that it was impofflble that the Ac5\s cf 
the Will of the human Soul of Chrift Ihould be otherwife 
than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father ; or, u\ 
ibther Words, they were neceflarily fo conformed. 

I have been the longer in the Proof of this Matter, it being 
a Tiling denied by feme of the greateft Arminhuis^ hy EpJfcopius 
in particular ; and becaufe I look upon It as a Point ck-ariyand 
abfolutely determining the Controverfy between Caivi?ii/h and 
Jrjnimans^ concerning the Nccefftty of fuch a Freedom ot 
Will as is infifted on by the latter, in order to moral Agen- 
cy, Vertue, Command or Prohibition, Promife or Thi ear- 
ning, Reward or Punilhment, Praife or Difpraife, Ment or 
Demerit. I now therefore proceed, 

T 2 • ][, To 

148 Christ's Righteoufnefs 

II. To confider whether Christ, in his holy Behaviour 
on Earth, was not thus a moral Agent ^ fubje<St to Commandi^ 
Proynifes^ &c. 

Dr. JVhitby very often fpeaks of what he calls a Freedom 
0d utriimllbet^ without NecefTity, as requifite to Law and Com- 
mands ; and fpeaks of Neceflity as entirely inconfiftent with 
JnjunSfions and Prohibitions, But yet we read of Chrift's being 
the Subjedl of the Commands of his Father, Joh, x, 18, 
and XV. 10. And Chrift tells us, that every Thing that He 
faid^ or did^ was in Compliance with Com?nandments he had re- 
ceived of the Father ; Joh. xii, 49, 50. h xiv. 31. And we I 
often read of Chrift's Obedience to his Father's Commands, 
Rom. V. 19. Fhil ii, 18. Heh. v. 8. 

The foremention'd Writer reprefents Promifes offered as 
Motives to Perfons to do their Duty, or a being moved and in- 
duced by Prc?nifes^ as utterly inconfiftent with a State wherein 
perfons have not a Liberty ad utrumlibet^ but are neceftarily 
determined to one. (See particularly, P. 298. & 31 1.) But 
the Thing which this Writer afferts, is demonftrably falfe, 
if the Chriftian Religion be true. If there be any Truth in 
Chriftianity or the holy Scriptures, the Man Chrift Jefus 
had his Will infallibly, unalterably and unfruftrably deter- 
mined to Good, and that alone ; but yet he had Promifes 
of glorious Rewards made to Him, on Condition of his per- 
fevering in, and perfe(5>ing the Work which God had ap- 
pointed Him ; Ifai, hii. 10, 11, 12. Pfal. ii. & ex. Ifai^ 
xlix. 7, 8, 9.— In Luke xxii. 28, 29. Chrift fays to his Dif- 
ciples, Te are They which have continued with me in my Tempta^ 
tions y and I appoint unto you a Kingdom^ as my Father hath ap-* 
poirited unto ?ne. The Word moft properly fignifies to ap- 
point by Covenant,orPromife. The plainMeaning of Chrift's 
V/ords is this : " As you have partook of my Temptations 
^^ andTrials,and have been ftedfaft, & have overcome ; I pro- 
^' mife to make youPartakers of my Rewardjand to give you a 
"^^ Kingdom ; as the Father has promifed me a Kingdom 
*< for continuing ftedfaft, and overcoming in thofe Trials/* 
And the Words are well explained by thofe in Rev. iii. 21^ 
To hi?n. that overomicth^ will I grant to fit with me in my Throne\ 
^ven as I alfo overcame^ and am jet down with my Father in his 
Throne, And Chrift had not only Promifes of glorious Suc- 
ct:is and Rewards made to his Obedience and Sufferings, 
tut the Scriptures plainly reprefent Fiim as ufing thefe Pro- 
luilcs ioi' Motives and Inducements to obey and fuffer ; and 


Sed.II. Pratfe-worthy^rewardable^t^c. 149 

particularly that Promife of a Kingdom which the Father 
had appointed Him,or fitting with theFather on his Throne ; 
as in Heb. xii. i,2- Let us lay afide every Weighty and the Sin 
which doth eafly befet us^ and let us run with Patience the Race 
that is Jet before uSy looking unto Jefus^ the Author and Finijher 
of our Faith ; who for the Joy that was fet before Him^ endured 
the Crofs^ defpifing the Shame, and is fet down on the right Hand 
1 of the Throne of God. 

And how ftrange would it be to hear any Chriftian aflert, 
that the holy and excellent Temper and Behaviour of Je- 
fus Chrifl, and that Obedience which he performed under 
fuch great Trials, was not vertuous or P7-aife-worthy ; becaufe 
his Will was not free ad utrumque, to either Holinefs or Sin, 
but was unalterably determin'd to one ; that upon this Ac- 
count, there is no Vertue at all, in all Chrift's Humility, 
Meeknefs, Patience, Charity, Forgivenefs of Enemies, Con- 
tempt of the World, Heavenly-mindednefs, Submiffion to 
the Will of God, perfed Obedience to his Commands, 
(tho' He was obedient unto Death, even the Death of the 
Crofs) his great Compaifion to the AfHicSted, his unparai- 
lel'd Love to Mankind, his Faithful nefs to God and Man, 
under fuch great Trials •, his praying for his Enemies, even 
when nailing Him to the Crofs ; That Vertue^ when applied 
to thefe Things, is but an empty Name ; That there was no 
Merit in any of thefe Things ; that is, that Chrift was wor^ 
I thy of Nothing at all on the Account of them, worthy of no 
I Reward, no Praife, no Honour or Refpe6t from God or 
Man ; Becaufe his Will was not indifferent, and free either 
to thefe Things, or the Contrary ; but under fuch a ftrong 
Inclination or Bias to the Things that were excellent, as 
made it impojfihle that he fliould chufe the contrary ; That 
upon this Account (to ufe Dr. Whitby s Language) // would 
he fenfibly umeafonable that the human Nature fhould be re- 
warded for any of thefe Things. 

According to this Doctrine, That Creature who is evi- 
dently fet forth in Scripture as the Firji-born of every Crea^ 
ture, as having iyi all Things the Pre-eminence, and as the high- 
eft of all Creatures in Vertue, Honour, and Worthinefs of 
Efteem, Praife and Glory, on the Account of his Vertue, is 
lefs worthy of Reward or Praife, than the very leaft of Saints ; 
yea, no more worthy than a Clock or meer Machine, that is 
purely palfr/e, and moved by natural Neceflity. 

1 50 Christ's Rightcoufncfs Part III. l! 

If we judge by fcriptural Reprefentatlpns of Things, wc j 
have Reafon to fuppofc, that Chrift took on him our Na- ^ 
ture, and dwelt witji us in this World, in a fuffering t 
State, not only to fatisfy for our Sins ; but that He, being i 
in. our Nature and Circumilances, and under our Trials, ' < 
might be our moft fit and proper Example, Leader and ' u 
Captain, in the Exercife of glorious and vidorious Ver-' p 
tue, and might be a vifible Inftancc of the glorious End ;,c 
and Reward of it -, That we might fee in Him the ui 
Beauty, Amiablenefs, and true Honour and Glory, and |j 
exceeding Benefit of that Virtue, which it is proper for us | 
human Beings to pra6life ; and might thereby learn, and la 
be animated, to feck the like Glory and Honour, and to [i 

obtain the like glorious Reward. See Heb. ii. 9, 14, m 

•with V. 8,9. and xii, i, 2, 5. Joh. xv. 10. 17. j| 
2 Tim, ii. II. 12. I Pet. ii. 19,20. & iv. 13. But if there \l 
was Nothing of any Vertue or Merit, or Worthinefs of any :j 
Reward, Glory, Praife or Commendation at all, in all that !>; 
He did, becaufe it was all necefiary, and He could not ^1 
help it ; then how is here any Thing fo proper to animate i 
and incite us, free Creatures, by patient Continuance in it 
well-doing, to feck for Honour, Glory, and Vertue ? ^ 

God fpcaks of Himfelf as peculiarly well-pleafed with ;i 
the Righteoufnefs of this Servant of his. Ifai. xlii. 21. Thg ■•i 
Lord is well pleafed foj- his Righteoufnefs fake. The Sacrifices of ]\ 
old are fpoken of as a fweet Savour to God, but the Obe- [3 
dience of Chriil: as far more acceptable than they. Pfal. fi 

xl. 6, 7. Sacrifice and Offering Thou iiidjl not defire : Aline |.j 

Ear haji Thou opened [as thy Servant performing willing 
Obedience j] Burnt -Off'ering and Sin-Offering hnji thou not re- 
quired : Then f aid /, Lo^ I co?ne [as a Sei-vant that chearfully 
anfwers the Calls of his Mafter :] I delight to do thy Will,, O 
my God, and thy Law is ivithin mine Heart, Matth. xvii. 5. p 
This is my lelo'ved Son, in whom I am well-pleafed.' And' > 
Chrift tells us exprefly, that the Father loves Him for tl 
that wonderful Inftance of his Obedience, his voluntarily |' 
yielding himfelf to Death, in Compliance with the P'ather's P 
Command. Joh. x. 17, 18. Therefore doth my Father love me^ i 

lecaufe I lay down my Life : No Man taketh it from me ; J 

hut 1 lay it down of my felf This Command7nent received I of 

iny Father, 

And if there was no Merit in Chrift's Obedience unto 
Death, if u was not worthy of Piaife, and of the moft 


Sc(3:.II. Praife-worthy^rewardaMe^^c.^ i 5I' 

glorious Rewards, the heavenly Hods were exceedingly 
miftaken, by the Account that is given of them, in Rev. v. 
%,— 12.— The four Beafls and the four and twenty Elders fell, 
dozun before the Lamb^ . having every one of them Harps^ mid 

golden Fials full of Odours ; Jnd they Jiing a new Song^ fay- 

ing, . Thou art JFORTHT to take the Btok^ and to open the 

Seals thereof ', for Thou waji Jlain^ And I beheld, and 1 

heard ike Voice of many Jngels round about the Throne^ and the ■ 
Beafls^ and the Riders, and the Number of the?n was ten Ihoufand- 
Times ten Thoufand, and Thoufands of Tlmfands, faying with a loud 
Voice, WORTHY is the Lamb that was Jlain, to receive Power^, 
and Riches, and IVifdom, . and Strength, and Honour, and Glory^ 
md Blejfmg, 

, Chrifl fpeaks of the eternal Life which He was to re* 
ceive, as the Reward of his Obedience to the Father's Com-i 
mandments. Joh. xii. 49, 50. / have not fpoken of my f elf ; but 
the Father which fent me. He gave me a Conwiandmcnt what _ / 
foould fay, and what I Jhould fpeak : And I know that his Com- 
manchnent is Life everlafling : IVJ^atfoever I fpeak therefore, even 
as the Father Jaid unto me, fo 1 fpeaL---God promifes to di- 
vide Flim a Portion with the great Sec. for his being his 
righteous Servant, for his glorious Vertue under fuch great 
Trials & Sufferings. Ifai. liii. 11,12.^ He Jhall fee of the Travel 
of his Soul and be fatisfied : By his Knowledge jhall my righteous' 
\ Servant juflify many -, for he Jhall bear their Iniquities, Therefore 
will I divide him a Portion tvith the Great, and he flmll divide the 
Spoil -with the Strong, becaufe He hath poured out his Soul unto 

Death. The Scriptures reprefent God as rewarding Him 

far above all his other Servants. Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9. He took on 
Him the Form of a Servant, and was made in the Likenefs of 
Men : arid being found in Fajhion ai a Man, He humbled himfelf, 
: and became obedient unU^ Death, even the. Death of the Crofs : 
Wherefore GOD alfo hath highly .exalted Him, and given Him a 
Name above every Name.—'jPM. xiv. 7. Thou lovefl Righieoifnejs, 
and hatefl JVickednefs ; Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed Thee 
With the Oil of Gladnefs above thy Fellows, 

There is no Room to pretend, that the glorious Benefits 
beilowed in Confequence of Chrift's Obedience, are not pro- 
perly of the Nature of a Rev/ard. What is a Reward, in 
the moil proper Senfe, but a Benefit bellowed in Confe- 
quence of lomething ^morally exceiient in Quality or Beha- 
^'iour, in Teftimony of weii-pieafednefs in that moral Ex- 
:cjjency> and Rcfpe<5l and Favour on that Account ? If 


152 Christ's Righteoufnefsj^c*. Partlll, 

We confider the Nature of a Reward moft ftn(5lly, and make 
the utmoft of it, and add to the Things contained in this 
Defcription, proper Merit or Worthinefs, and the Beftow- 
ment of the Benefit in Confequence of a Promife ; ftill it 
will be found, there is Nothing belonging to it, but that 
the Scripture is moft exprefs as to it's belonging to the 
Glory beftowed on Chrift, after his Sufferings ; as appears 
from what has been already obferved : There was a glo- 
rious Benefit beflowed in Confequence of fomething mo- 
rally excellent, being called Righteoufnefs and Obedience ; 
There was great Favour, Love and Well-pleafednefs, for 
this Righteoufnefs and Obedience, in the Beftower ; There 
was proper Merit, or Worthinefs of the Benefit, in the O- 
bedience ; It was beftowed in Fulfilment of Promifes,made 
to that Obedience ; and was beftowed therefor, or becaufi 
he had performed that Obedience. 

I may add to all thefe Things, that Jefus Chrifl, 
while here in the Flefh, was manifellly in a State of Trial. 
The laft Adam^ as Chnfl is called, i Cor, xv. 45. Rom.v. 14. 
taking on Hun the human Nature, and fo the Form of 
a Servant, and being under the Law, to fland and a6t for 

us, was put into a State of Trial, as the firit Adam was. 

Dr. Whitby mentions thefe three Things as Evidences of 
Perfons being in a State of Trial (on the live Points, P. 298, 
299.) namely. Their Afflidions being fpoken of as their 
Triafs or Temptations, their being the Subjeds of Promifes, 
and their being expofed to Satan's Temptations. But Chrift 
was apparently the Subjed of each of thefe. Concerning 
Promifes made to Him, I have fpoken already. The 
Difficulties and AffiiBionz He met v^ith in the Courfe of his 
Obedience, are called his Temptations or l^riaU^ Luke xxii. 28. 
Ye are they which have continued with me in my Temptations, or 
Trials. Heb. ii. 18. For in that he Himfelf hath fuffered, being 
tempted [or tried] He is able to fuccour them that are tempted* 
And Chap. iv. 15. We have not an High-Prieji, which cannot bt 
touched with the Feeling of our Infirmities ; but was in all Points 
tempted, like as we are^ yet without Sin. And as to his being 
tempted by Satan, it is what none will difpute. 

S E c T J Oif 

( ^53 ) 

Section III. 
The Cafe offuch as are given up of God to 
Sin, and (t/' fallen Man in general^ proves 
moral Necejfity and Inability to be con-* 
fijient with Blame-worthinefs. 

R. fFhiiby aflerts Freedom, not only from Coac^ion, 
but Neceffity, to be eflential to any Thing deferving 
the Name of Sin, and to an Adion's being cuipa^ 
hie: in thefe Words (Difcourfe on five Points, Edit. 3.P.348.) 
*' If they be thus neceflitated, then neither their Sins of O^ 
*' mifTion or Commiffion could deferve that Name ; it be- 
*' ing efTential to the Nature of Sin, according to St. AufitrC^ 
*' Definition, that it be an Action, a quo liberum efl ahfi'mere^ 
*' Three Things feem plainly neceffary to make an Adion 
•' or Omiffion culpable ; i. That it be in our Power to 
** perform or forbear it : For, as OrigeUy and all the Fa* 
*' thers fay, no Man is blame-worthy for not doing what 
" He could not do." — And clfewhere the Doctor infills, that 
*' when any do Evil of Neceffity, what they do is no Vice^ 
" that they are guilty of no Fault, || are worthy of no 
" Blame, Difpraife, % or Diftionour, \ but are unblamea- 
" ble. * 

If thefe Things are true, in Dr. lVJMy\ Senfe of Neceffity, 
they will prove all fuch to be blamelefs, who are given up of 
God to Sin, in what they commit after they are thus given 
up. That there is fuch a Thing as Men's being judici- 
ally given up to Sin, is certain, if the Scripture rightly in- 
forms us ; fuch a Thing being often there fpoken of : as m 
Pfal. Ixxxi. 12. So I gave them up to their oivn Hearts Lujly 
. and they ivalked in their ownCounfeh. A61. vii. 42. TJyenGod twned^ 
and gave them up ta worjhip toe Hoji of Heaven, Rom. i. 24, 
Wherefore, God alfo gave them up to UncleannefSy through the 
Lu/ls of their own Hearts, to dijhonour their own Bodies between 
Themfelves, Ver. 26. For this Cauje God gave them up to vile Af* 
feSiions. Ver. 28. And even as they did not like to retain God in 
their Knowledge, God gave them over to a reprubati Mind, t9 do 
thofe Things that are not convenient, 

V Tis 

5 Difc. oh £vePoins. P. 347. 360, 361. 377. % 303^ 325. 329. 
and many other Places, f 371. * 304. 361, 

154 Of the Inability-^ Sin offuch PartllL 

'Tis needlefs to iland particularly to inquire, what God's 
giving Men up to their own Heart* s Liifls fignities : . It is fuffi- 
cient to obferve, that hereby is certainly meant God's fo or- 
dering or difpjpfing Things, in fome Refpedt or other, either 
by doing or forbearing to do, as that the Confequence (hould 
be Men's continuing in their Sins. So much as Men >are 
given up to^ fo much is the Confequence of their being 
given up ; whether that be lei5 or more. If God don't 6rder 
Things fo, by Adtion or Permiffion, that Sin will be the 
Confequence, then the Event proves that they are not given 
up to that Confequence. If Good be the Confequence, in- 
Head of Evil, then God's Mercy is to be acknowledged in 
that Good ; which Mercy muft be contrary to God^s 
Judgment in giving up to Evil. If the Event muft prove 
that they are given up to Evil as the Confequence, then the 
Perfons who are the Subjects of this Judgment, muft be the 
Subjeds of fuch an Event, and fo the Event is neceifary. 

If not only CoaS^lon^ but all NeceJJity^ will prove Men 
blamelefs, then Judas was blamelefs, after Chrift had given 
kim ov^er, and had already declared his certain Damnation, 
and that he Ihould verily betray Him. He was guilty of no 
Siu in betraying his Mafter, on this Suppofition ; tho his fo 
doing is fpoicen of by Chrift as the moft aggravated Sin, 
more heinous than the Sin of Filate in crucifying Him. 
And the Jews in Egypt ^ in Jereimah's Time, were guilty of 
no Sin, in their not worfhipping the true God, after God 
had Sworn by his great Name^ that his Name Jl^ould he no more 
named in the Alouth of any Man <?/" Judah, in all the Land of 
Egypt. Jer. xliv. 26. 

Dr. Whithy (Difc. on five Points. P. 302, 303) denies, that 
Men, in this World, are ever fo given up by God to Sin, that 
their Vv^ills fnould be necelTarily determined to Evil ; tho' He 
Gv/ns, tnat hereby it may. become exceeding difficult for Men to 
do Good, having a ftrong Bent, and powerful Inclination to 
what is Evii.— But \i we ftiould allow the Cafe to be juft as 
he reprefcnts, the Judgment of giving up to Sin will no better 
agree with his Notions of that Liberty, which is effential 
to Praife or Blame, than if we fhould fuppofe it to render the 
avoiding of Sin i?npcjjible. For if an ImpoJJibility of avoiding 
Sin wholly excufes a Man 5 then, for the fame Reafon, it's 
being difficult to avoid it excufes Him in Part ; and this 

iu.^ in Proportion to the Degree of DijBiculty. If the 

'. Influence 

Seft. Hi. as are given up to Sin. 155 

j Influence of- W(7r^/Impoffibility or Inability be the fame, tcj 
; fexcufe Perfons in not doing, or not avoiding any Thing, 
, as that oi natural Inabihty, (which is fuppofed) then undoubt- 
I edly, in like Manner, moral Difficulty has the fame Influence 
I to tXQuit W\\h natural Difficulty. But all allow, that natural 
j Impoflibility wholly excufes,; and alfo that natural Difficulty 
j excufes in rart, and makes the A6t,or Omiflion lefs blame- 
able, in Proportion to the Difliculty. AW natui-al Difficult j^^ 
according to the plaineft Didtates of the Light of Nature, 
excufes in fome Degree, fo that the Negle6l is- not fo blame- 
j able, as if there had been no Brfliculty in the Gafe : - and fo 
the greater the Difliculty is, ftill the more excufable, in Pro- 
i f)ortion to the Increafe of the Difficulty. And as naiural Im-. 
polfibility wholly excufes and excludes all Blame,, fo the nearec 
the Difliculty approaches to Impolhbility, ftill 'th'e nearer a 
Perfon is to Blamelefnefs, in Proportion to that •Approach. 
And if the Cafe of moral Impoffibility or Necellity, be jufl: the 
fame with natural Necellity orCo-adtion, as to Influence to' 
excufe a Negitd, then alio, for the fame Reafon, the Cafe of 
natural Difliculty don't difi^er in Iniluence,to excviie a'Negle(5f, 
from moral Difficulty, arifing from a ftrong Bias or Bent to 
I'^vil, fuch as Dr. IFhnly owns in the Cafe of thofe that are 
given up to their own Hearts Lulls. So that the Fault of 
luch Peribns muft be leffen'd^ in Proportion to the Diffi- 
culty, and Approach to Impoflibility. If ten Degrees of 
moral Difficulty make the Adion quite impoffible, and fo 
wiiolly excufe, then if there be nine Degrees of Difficulty, 
the Peribn is in great Part excufed, and is nine Degrees in 
ten, lefs blame-worthy, than if there had been no Difficulty 
at ell ; and he has but one Degree of Blame-worlhinefs. 
The Reafon is plain, on Arminian Principles ; vvz. becaufe as 
Difficulty, by antecedent Bent and Bias on the Will, is in- 
creafed, Liberty of Indiff'erence, and Self-determination in 
theWill, is diminifhed : fo much Hindrance and Impediment 
is there, in the Way of the Will's ading freely, by meer 
Self-determination. And if ten Degrees of fuch Hindrance 
take away all fuch Liberty, then nine Degrees take away 
! nine Parts in ten, and leave but one Degree of Liberty. 
, . And therefore there is but one Degree of Blameablenefs, 
j ceteris paribus^ in the Negle61: \ the Man being no further 
' blameable in what He does, or negle6fs, than he has Liberty 
' in that Aflfair : For Blame or Praife (fay they) arifes wholly 
i from a good Ufe or Abufe of Liberty. 

y 2 From 

IS6 Of the Inability^ Sin Part III. 

From all which it follows, that a ftrong Bent and Bias one 
Way, and Difficulty of going the contrar)^, never caufes a 
Ferfon to be at all more expofed to Sin, or any Thing blame- 
zh\t: Becaufe as the Difficulty is increafed, lb much the lefs 
is required and expedted. Tho' in one Refped, Expofednefs 
to Sin or Fault is increafed, viz. by an Increafe of Expofed- 
nefs to the evij Action or Omiffion ; yet it is dimimfhed in 
another Refpe<5t, to ballance it ; namely, as the Sinfulnefs 
or Blameablenefs of the A6lion or Omillion is diminilhed in 
the fame Proportion. So that, on the whole, the Affair, as 
to Expofednefs to Guilt or Blame, is left jufl as it was. 

To illuftratc this, let us fuppofe a Scale of a Balance to be 
intelligent, and a free Agent, and indued with a ielf-moving 
Power, by Virtue of which it could a6t and produce Efie(5ts 
to a certain Degree ; ex, gr. to move it felf up or down with 
a Force equal to a Weight of ten Pounds ; and that it might 
therefore be required of it, in ordinary Circumftances, to 
move it felf down with that Force ; for which it has Power 
and full Liberty, and therefore would be -blame-worthy \( it 
fail'd of it. But then let us fuppofe a Weight of ten Pounds 
to be put in the oppolite Scale, which in Force entirely cpun* 
ter-balances it's felf-moving Power, and fo renders it impolii^ 
blefor it to move down at all ; and therefore wholly. excufes it^ 
from any fuch Motion. But if we fyppofe there to be only 
pine Pounds in the oppofite Scale, this renders it's MptiOn 
not impoffible, but yet more difficult ; fo that it can now 
only move down with the Force of one Pqund : But how- 
ever, this is all that is required of it vjnder thefe Circum- 
flances ; it is wholly excufed from nine Parts of its Motion : 
And if the Scale, under thefe Circumftances, neglc6ts to 
inove, and remains at Refl, all that it will be blamed for, v.-ili 
be it's Negle6t of that one tenth Part of it's Motion ; which 
it had as much Liberty and Advantage for, as in ufual Cir^* 
cumftances, it has for the greater Motion, which in fuch a 
Cafe would be reqLjired. So th^t this new Difficulty, don't 
^t ^11 increafe its Expofednefs to any Thing blame-worthy. 

And thus the very Suppofition of Difficulty in the ^Way 
of a Man's Duty^ or Proclivity to Sin, thro' a being given 
Vp to Hardnefs of Heart, or indeed by any other Means 
■yvhatfoever, is an Inconfiftence, according to Dr. lVhHhy% 
Notions of Liberty,Vertue and Vice, Blame and Praife. The 
avoiding Sin and Blame, and the doing what is vertuous 
i^nd Jj^'faife-werthy, muft be jdways equally eafy. 


Sc£l.lII. of fallen Man. 157 

Dr. W}nihy\ Notions of Liberty, Obligation, Vertue, Sin, 
&c. lead Him into another great Inconfiftence. He abun- 
dantly infifts, that Neceffity is inconliftent with fne Nature of 
Sin or Fault. He fays in the foremention'd Treatife, P. 14. 
Who can blame a Ferfon for doing what he could not help ? and P. 1 5. 
// being fenftbly unjujl^ to punijh any Man for doing that which it 
was ne^er in his Poiver to avoid. And in P. 341. to confirm 
his Opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, faying, Why doth 
God command^ if Man hath Jiot Free-will and Fower to obey ? And 
again in the fame and the next Page, IVho will not cry out^ 
that it is Folly to command hm^ that hath 7iot Liberty to do what is 
commanded ; and thai it is unjuf to condeinn Him^ that has it not in 
his Fower to do what is required? And in P. 373. He cites 
another faying, A Law is given to Him that can turn to both 
Parts ; i. e. cbfy or tranfgrefs it : Bitt no Law caii he againjl Him. 
\vho is hound by Natuj-^. 

And yet the fame Dr. PFhithy ailcrts, that fallen Man is not 
able to perform perfe6l Obedience. In P. 165. He has thefe 
Words, ^' The Nature of Jdam had Power to continue in- 
.*' nocent, and without Sin ; whereas it is certain, our Nature 
*' never had fo." But if we han't Power to continue innocent 
and without Sin, then Sin is confiftent with Neceffity, and we 
may be fmful in that which we have not Power to avoid ; 
and thofe Things can't be true, which He aflerts elfewhere, 
nan^ly, " That if we be necelTitated, neither Sins of Omiflion 
" nor Commiffion, would deferve that Name. (P. 348.) If 
we have it not in our Power to be innocent, then we have 
it not in our Power to be blamelefs : and if fo, we are un- 
der a Necelhty of being blame-worthy. And how does this 
confift with what he fo often alferts, that Necellity is in-' 
confiftent with Blame or Praife ? If we have it not in our 
Power to perform perfe6t Obedience to ail the Coifimands of 
God, then we are under a NecelTity of breaking fome 
Commands, in fome Degree ; having no Power to perform 
fo much as is commanded. And if fo, why does he cry out 
of the Unreafonablenefs and Folly of commanding beyond 
what Men have Power to do ? 

And Armimans in general are vtry inconfiftent w^ith them- 
ftlves in what they lay of the Inability of fallen Man in this 
Refpedl. They ftrenuoufly maintain, that it would be un- 
juft in God, to require any thing of us beyond our prefent 
*Power and Ability to perform ; and alfo hold, that we are 
now undblc to perform perfect Obedience, and that Chrift 


J 58 Of de Inability (^/^ fallenMan. Part III. 

died to fatisfy for the ImperfeSfions of our Obedience^ and has 
made Way that our impertecSt Obedience might be accept- 
ed inftead of perfect : Wherein they feem infenfibly to run 
themfelves into the groiTeft Inconfiftence. For, (as I have 
obferved elfewherej *' They hold that God in Mercy to 
*' Mankind has aboiiflied that rigorous Conftitution or LaWj 
*' that they were under originally ; and inftead of it, has in- 
*' troduced a more mild Conftitution, and put us under a 
*' new Law, which requires no more than imperfed fmcere 
*' Obedience, in Compliance with our poor inlirm impotent 
*' Circumftances fmce the Fall." 

Now, how can thefe Things be made confiftent ? I would 
sfk what Law thefe Imperfedions of our Obedience are a 
Breach of ? If they are a Breach of no Law that jwe were 
ever under, then they are not Sins. And if they be not 
Sins, what Need of Chrift's dying to fatisfy for them ? But 
if they are Sins, and the Breach of fome Law, what Law is 
it ? They can't be a Breach of their new Law ; for that 
requires no other than imperfe(5t Obedience, or Obedience 
with Imperfedions : And therefore to have Obedience attend- 
ed with Imperfections, is no Breach of it ; for 'tis as much 
as it requires. And they can't be a Breach of their old Law ; 
for that,they fay, is entirely aboliIhed,and we never were under 
it..--- They fay, it would not be juft in God to require 
of us pertecSl Obedience, becaufe it would not be juft to re- 
quire more than we can perform, or to punifh us for failing 
of it. And therefore, by their own Scheme, the Imper- 
feflions of our Obedience don't deferve to be puniftied. 
What need therefore of Chrift's dying, to fatisfy for them ? 
What need of his Sufferings to fatisfy for that which is no 
Fault, and in it's own Nature deferves no fuffering ? "What 
need of Chnft's dying, to purchafe, that our imperfeSl Obedi- 
ence fnould be accepted, when according to their Scheme,^ 
it would be unjuft in it felf, that any other Obedience than 
imperfci^ ihould be required ? What need of Chrift's dying 
to make Way for God's accepting fuch an Obedience, as 
it would be unjuft in Him not to accept ? Is there any 
Need of Chrift's dying, to prevail with God not to do un- 

righteoufly ? If it be faid, that Chrift died to fatisfy 

tliat old Law for us, that io we might not be under it, but that 
there might be Room for our being under a more mild Law ; 
ftiil I would inquire, what Need of Chrift's dying that 
we might not be under a Law, which (by their Principles). 
it would be in it felf unjuft that we ftxouJd be under, whe- 

Se£t. IV. Of Inability^ and OhXig^Xiori. 159 

ther Ghrift had died or no, becaufe in our prefent State we 
are not able to keep it ? 

' So the Jrmimans are inconfiftent with thcmfelves, not 
op]y- in what they fay of the Need of ChrilVs Satisfac- 
tion ;,to attone for thofe ImperfecStions which we cannot 
avoid," but alfo in what they fay of the Grace of God, 
granted to enable Men to perform the fincere Obedience of 
the new Law. " I grant (fays Dr. Stebbing *) indeed, that 
.« by Reafon of original Sin, we are utterly difabled for the 
*' Performance of the Condition, without new Grace from 
' ' God. But I fay then, that He gives fuch Grace to all of 
" us, by which the Performance of the Condition is truly 
*' poffible : And upon this Ground he may, and doth moil 
'" righteoufly require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to fpeak 
properly, by Grace he muft mean, that AlTiftance which is of 
Grace, or of free Favour and Kindnefs. But yet in the fame 
Place he fpeaks of it as very unreafonable^ ^^^j^i/^ and cruel^ for 
God to require that, as the Condition of Pardon, that is be- 
come impolTible by original Sin. If it be fo, what Grace is 
there in giving AiTiftance and Ability to perform the Condi - 
% tion of Pardon ? Or why is that called by the Name of 
\ Grace, that is an abfolute Debt, which God is bound to be- 
ftow, and which it would be unjuft and cruel in Him to 
with-hold, feeing he requires that, as the Condition of PariJt9k^ 
which we cannot perform without it ? 

Section IV. 

Command, and Obligation to Obedience, 

conjiftent with moral Inability to obey. 

IT being fo much infifted on by Arminian Writers, that 
NecelTity is inconfiftent with Law or Command, and 
particularly, that it is abfurd to fuppofe God by his 
Command Ihould requrre that of Men which they are una- 
ble to do ; not allowmg in this Cafe for any Difference that 
there is between natural and moral Inability ; I would there- 
fore now particularly confider this Matter. 


* Treatife of the Operations of the Spirit. 2 Edit. P. 1 1 z, 113. 

1 60 Commands conf^Jlent Part IIL 

And for the greater Clearnefs, I would diftin(5lly lay down 

the following Things. 

I. The Will it itXU and not only thofe A6Vions which arc 
the Effe6^s of the Will^ is the proper Obje6t of Precept of 
Command. That is, fuch or fuch a State or A6ts of Men's 
Wills, is in many Cafes, properly required of them /by 
Command ; and not only thofe Alterations in the State of 
their Bodies or Minds that are the Confequences of Volition» 
This is moil manifeft ; for 'tis the Soul only, that is properly 
and directly the Subjedl of Precepts or Commands j that /. 
only being capable of receiving or perceiving Commands.,' 
The Motions or State of the Body are Matter of Command, 
only as they are fubjecfl to the Soul, and conneded with 
it's A6ts. But now the Soul has no other Faculty whereby 
it can, in the moft dire6t and proper Senfe, confent, yield to^ 
or comply with any Command, but the Faculty of the Will ; 
and 'tis by this Faculty only, that the Soul can diredly dif- 
obey, or refufe Compliance : For the very Notions of 
Confentmgy TieUing^ Accepting^ Complying^ Refuftng^ RejeSimg &c. 
are, according to the Meaning of the Terms, Nothing but 
certain Ads of the Will. Obedience, in the primary Na- 
ture of it, is the fubmitting and yielding of the Will of one 
to the Will of another. Difobedience is the not eonfent- 
i«g, not complying of the Will of the commanded to the 
manifefted Will of the Commander. Other A61s that are 
not the Adfs of the Will, as certain Motions of the Body 
and Alterations in the Soul, are Obedience or Difobedience 
only indiredly, as they are connected with the State or 
Adions of the Will, according to an eftablilhed Law of 
Nature. So that 'tis manifefl, the Will it {t\i may be re- 
quired : And the Being of a good Will is the mort proper, 
diredt and immediate Subjedt of Command j and if this 
can't be prefcribed or required by Command or Precept, no- 
thing can ; For other Things can be required no otherwife 
than as they depehd upon, and are the Fruits of a good Will, 

Corol. I. If there be feveral Ads of the Will, or a Series 
of Ads, one following another, and one the Effed of ano- 
ther, the firfi and dettr?n:mng A^ is properly the Subjed of 
Command, and not only the confequent Ads, which are de* 
pendent upon it. Yea, 'tis this more efpecially which is that 
which Command or Precept has a proper Refped to ; be- 
caufe 'tis this Ad that determines the whole Affair : In this 
Ad rh.cObedience orDifobediencc lies, in a peculiar Manner ; 


i Sed. IV. with moral Inability. 16c 

I the confequent A(5ts being all fubje(5l to it, and governed and 
I determined by it. This determining governing A61 mull be 
i the proper Subjed of Precept, or none. 

Corol, 2. It alfo follows from what has been obferved, 
j That if there be any Sort of Ad, or Exertion of the Soul, 
\ prior to all free Acts oi theWiil or A6ts of Choice in the Cafe, 
direding and determining Vv^hat the A(5ts of the Will (ball be ; 
that A(5l or Exertion of the Soul can't properly be fubject 
to any Command or Precept, in any Refpe6t whatfoever, 
either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such 
Acts can't be fubje6t to Commands diredly^ becaufe they are 
no A(5ts of the Will ; being by the Suppofition prior to all 
A<5ts of the Will, determining and giving Rife to all it's Ads : 
They not being Ads of the Will, there can be in them no 
Confent to, or Compliance with any Command. Neither can 
they be fubjed to Command or Precept tndireSfly or remotely ; 
for they are not fo much as the Ejf&5is or Confequences of the 
Will, being prior to all its Ads. So that if there be any 
Obedience in that original Ad of the Soul, determining all 
Volitions, it is an Ad of Obedience wherein the \V\\\ has no 
Concern at all ; it preceeding evei-y Ad of Will. And there- 
fore, if the Soul either obeys or difobeys in this Ad, it is 
wholly involuntarily ; there is no willing Obedience or Rebel- 
lion, no Compliance or Oppofition of the Will in the Affair : 
and what Sort of Obedience or Rebellion is this ! 

And thus the Armiman Notion of the Freedom of the Will 
confiding m the Soul's determining it's own x\ds of Wlij], 
inftead of being efiential to moral Agency, and to Men's 
being the Subjeds of moral Government, is utterly incon- 
fiftent with it. For- if the Soul determines all it's Ads of 
Will, it is therein fubjed to no Command or moral Govern- 
ment, as has been now obferved ; becaufe it's original deter- 
mining Ad is no Ad of Will or Choice, it being prior,by the 
Suppofition, to every Ad oi Will. And the Soul can't be the 
Subjed of Command in the Ad of the Will it felf, which 
depends on the foregoing determining Ad, and is determined 
by it ; in as much as this is neceiTary, being the necelTary 
Confequence and Effec^: of that prior determining i\d, which 
is not voluntary. Nor can the Man be the Suojed of Com- 
mand or Government in his external Adious ; becaufe thek* 
are all neceffary, being the neceiTary Effeds of the Ads of the 
Will themfelves. So that Mank.ind,according to this Scheme^ 
sre Subjeds of Command or moral Government in noth ng 

X .at 

i52 ■ Commands ^^;^^/^^;^/ PartllL 

at all ; and all their moral Agency is entirely excluded, and 
no Room left for Vertue or Vice in the World. 

So that 'tis the Arminian Scheme, and not the Scheme of 
the Cahinjjis^ that is utterly inctnfiftent with moral Govern- , 
ment, and with all Ufe of Laws, Precepts, Prohibitions, Pro- 
mifes, or Threatnings. Neither is there any Way whatfoever 
to make their Principles confift with thefe Things. For if, 
it be faid, that there is no prior determining Acl of the Soul, 
preceding the A6ls of the Will, but that Volitions are Events 
that come to pafs by pure Accident, without any determining 
Caufe, this is moft palpably inconfiftent with all Ufe of Laws 
and Precepts ; for nothing is more plain than that Laws can 
be of no Ufe to direcTt and regulate perfect Accident ; which 
by the Suppofition of it's being pure Accident, is in no Cafe 
regulated by any Thing preceeding ; but happens this Way 
or that perfe6tly by Chance,v/ithout any Caufe or Rule. The 
perfedl Ufelefnefs of Laws and Precepts alfo follows from the 
Arminian Notion of Indifference, as elTential to that Liberty 
which is requifite to Vertue or Vice. For the End of Laws is 
to hind to one Side ; and the End of Commands is to turn the 
Will one Way : and therefore they are of no Ufe unlefs they 
turn or bias the Will that Way. But if Liberty confifts in 
Indifference, then their biafTmg the Will one Way only, de- . 
llroys Liberty ; as it puts the Will out of 'Equilibrium. So 
that the Will, having a Bias, thro' the Influence of binding 
Law, laid upon it, is not wholly left to it ^qM^ to determine 
it felf which Way it will, Vv'ithout Influence from without. 

II. Having fhewn that the Will it kl^^ efpecially in thofe 
A6fs wlfich are original, leading and determining in any Cafe, ' 
is the proper Subjed of Precept and Command, and not only 
thofe Alterations m the Body, &c. which are the Effeds of the 
Vv'ill J I now proceed in the /^-tw/^/ Place, to obferve that the 
very Oppofition or Defed of the Will it k\t^ In that A(5t 
which is it's original and detennining Aol in th^ Cafe, I fay the 
Will's Oppofition in this Acl to a Thing propofed or com- 
manded, or it's failing of Compliance, implies a moral Inabi- 
lity to that Thing : Or in other Words, whenever a Com- 
mand requires a certain State or A(5t of the Will, and the 
Perfon conuTianded, notwithftanding the Command and the 
Circumilances under which it is exhibited, ftill finds his Will 
oppoute or wanting, in that^ belonging to it's State or Acfts,. 
ichich is original and determining in the Affair^ that Man is morally 
Unable to obey that Coinmand. 


Sc6l. IV. with moral Inability. 163 

This is manifeft from what was-obferved in the fiift Part, 
concerning the Nature of moral Inability, as didinguiOied from 
jwtural : where it was obferved, That a Man may then be faid 
to be morally unable to do a Thing, when He is under the 
Influence or Prevalence of a contrary Inclination, or has a 
Want of Inclination, under fuch Circumftances and Views. 
'Tis alfo evident from what has been before proved, that the 
Will is always, and in every individual A61, necelTarily deter- 
mined by the ftrongeft Motive ; and fo is alvv^ays unable to go 
againft the Motive, which all Things confidpred, has now 
the greateft Strength and to move the Will.--- 
But not further to infift on thefe Things, the Truth of 
the Pofition now laid down, viz. That when the Will is op- 
pofite /(?, or failing of a Compliance with a Thing in it\ 
§riginal determining Inclination or Acl^ it is not able to comply, 
appears by the Conlideration of thefe two Things. 

1. The Will in the Time of that diverfe or oppoilte leading 
A61 or Inclination, and when adually under the Influence of it, 
is not able to exert it felf to the contrary, to make an Alte- 
ration, in order to a Compliance. The Inclination is unable 
to change it felf ; and that for this plain Reafon, that it is 
unable to in.cline to change it felf, Prefent Choice can't at 
preient chufe to be othervv^ife ': for that would be at prejc?it 
to chufe fomething diverfe from v/hat is at prefent cliofen. If 
the Will, all Things now confidered, inclines or chufes to go 
that Way, then it can't chufe, all Things now confidered, to 
go the other Way, and fo can't chufe to be made to go 
the other Way. To fuppofe that the Mind is now fmcerely 
inclined to change it felf to a different Inclination, is to fiip- 
pofe the Mmd is now truly inclined othtrwife than it is now 
inclined. The Will may oj^pofe fome future remote A<5t that 
it is expofed to, but not its own prefent A61. 

2. As it is impoffible that the Will fhould comply with the 
Thing commanded with Refpe6t to it's leading J^, by any Act 
of it's own, in the Time of that diverfe or oppofite leading and 
original ASi^ or after it is a6kially come under the Influence of 
that determining Choice or Inclination ; fo 'tis impolTible it fhould 
be determined to a Compliance by any foregomg k.Si ; for by 
the very Suppofition, there is no foregoing A<5t ; the oppof.te 
or non-complying Aft being that A6t v.'hich is originul and 
determining in the Cafe. Therefore it muft be io^ that if this 
firjd determining ASi be found non-complying, on the Propcfal 
of the Command, the Mind is morally unable to obey. For 
to fuppofe it to be able to obey, is to fuppofe it to be able to 
determine and caufc it's frjl detcrrnining Aif- to be oriiv;ivvi''"e, 

X 2 and 

164 Q>omx^2iVidi% confiflent Part III. 

and that it has Power better to govern and regulate it's jirjl 
governing and regulating Aa^ v/hich is abfurd ; For it is to flip- 
pofe a prior Ad of the Wi]l, determining it's firft determining 
A6t ; that is,an A6t prior to the firft, and leading and govern- ^ 
ing the original and governing K6X of all \ which is a . 
Contradiction. 1 

Here if it fhould be faid, that attho* the Mind has not ; 

any Ability to will contrary to what it does will, in the - 

original and leading A(5l of the Will, becaufe there is fup- « 

pofed to be no prior A61 to determine and order it otherwife, :;j 

and the Will can't immediately change it felf, becaufe it »3 

can't at prefent incline to a Change ; yet the Mind has an li 

Ability for the prefent to forbear to proceed to Adion, and y 

take Time for Deliberation ; which may be an Occafion of h 

the Chanp;e of the Inclination. |' 

I anfwer, (i.) In this Objection that feems to be for- t 
gotten which was obferved before, viz. that the determin- | 
ing to take the Matter into Confideration, is it felf an 
K€t of the Will : And if this be all the Ad wherein 
the Mind exercifes Ability and Freedom, then this, by 
the Suppofition, muft be all that can be commanded or re» 
quired by Precept. And if this Acl be the commanded Ad, 
then all that has been obferved concerning the commanded 
Acft of the Will remains true, that the very Want of it is a 
moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are fpeaking con- 
cerning the firft and leading A6t of the Will in the Cafe, or 
about the Affair ; And if a Determining to deliberate, or on 
the contrary', to proceed immediately without deliberating, 
be the nrft and leading A6t ; or whether it be or no,if there 
be another A6t before it, which determines that ; or what- 
ever be the- original and leading Ad j ftill the foregoing 
Proof ftands good, that the Non-compliance of the leading 
Ad implies moral Inability to comply. 

If it ftiould be objeded, that thefe Things make all moral 
Inability equal, and fuppofe Men morally unable to will | 
otherwife than they aduaily do will, m all Cafes, and equally ' 

fo, in every Inftance. 


In anfvrer to this Objedion, I defire two Things maybe ' 
obrervcd. Firji^ That if by being equally unable, be meant "j 
5ts really un^blt) then fo far as the Inability is meerly mo-;| 
r^ilj 'tis true, th^ Will, in every Inftance, ads by moral Ne- | 

cefTity, i 

Se6l:. IV. "^tth moral Inability i 165 

ceflity, and is morally unable to a6l otherwife, as truly ancjl 
properly in one Cafe as another ; as, I humbly conceive, 
has been perfedly and abundantly demonftrated by what 
has been faid in the preceeding Part of this ElTay. But yet, 
in forne Refpe6l, the Inability may be faid to be greater in 
fome Inftances than others : Tho' the Man may be truly un^ 
able, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet 

'. he may be further from being able to do fome Things than 
others. As it is in Things which Men are naturally unable 
to do. A FV^rfon whofe Strength is no more than fufficient 
to lift the Weight of one Hundred Pounds, is as truly and 
really unable to lift one Hundred and one Pounds, as ten 
Thoufand Pounds ; but yet he is further from being able to 
lift the latter Weight than the former j and fo, according to 
common Ufe of Speech, has a greater Inability for it. So 
it is in moral Inability. A Man is truly morally unable to 
chufe contrary to a prefent Inclination, which in the leaft 

[ Degree prevails ; or contrary to that Motive, which, all 

I Things confidered, has Strength and Advantage now to 
move the Will, in the leaft. Degree, fuperiour to all other 
Motives in View : But yet he is further from Ability to refill 
a very ilrong Habit, and a violent and deeply rooted Incli- 
nation, or a Motive vaftly exceeding all others in Strength. 
And again, the Inability may in fome Refpe6ts be called 
greater, in fome Inilances than others, as it may be more 
general and extenpve to all JMs of that Kind. So Men may be 
faid to be unable in a different Senfe, and to be further from 
moral Ability, who have that moral Inability which is gene- 

I ral and habitual^ than they who have only that Inability which 
is occafional 2n\A particular. \ Thus in Cafes of natural Inability ; 
he that is born blind may be faid to be unable to fee, in a 
difterent Manner, and is in fome Refpe6fs further from being 

I able to fee, than He whofe Sight is hinder'd by a tranfient 

: Cloud or Mift. 

And befides, that which was obferved in the firft Part of 
this Difcourfe concerning the Inability which attends a ftrong 
and fettled Hablt^ fhould be here remember'd ; viz. That fix'd 
Habit is attended v»^ith this peculiar moral Inability, by which 
it is diflinguiihed from occafional Volition^ namely, that En- 
deavours to avoid future Volitions of that Kind, which arc 
agreabie to luch a Habit, much more frequently and com- 
monly prove vain and infufficient. For tho* it is impofTible 


•}• See thisDilliD(5lion of moral Inability explain'd in Part I. Secl,lY> 

1 66 Covcivci^xi6% confijient Part III. ! 


there ihould be any true fincere Defires and Endeavours a- ! 

gainft a prefent Volition or Choice, yet there may be againft ;j 

Vohtions of that Kind, when view'd at a Diftance. A Perfon i 

may defire and ufe Means to prevent future Exercifes of a :J 

certain Inclination ; and in order to it, may wifh the Habit h 

might be removed ; but his Defires and Endeavours may be 'i 

inefFedual. The Man may be faid in fome Senfe to be ■': 

unable ; yea, even as the Word unable is a relative Terniy and j: 

has Relation to ineffectual Endeavours ; yet not with Regard ^ | 
to prefent, but remote Endeavours. 

Secondly^ It muft be borne in Mind, according' to what was, ' 
obferv'd before, that indeed no Inability whatfoever which is 
meerly moral, is properly called by the Name of Inability j 
and that in the ftrkSteft Propriety of Speech, a Man may be" 
faid to have a Thing in his Power,if he has it at his Election ; »; 
and He can't be faid to be unable to do a Thing, when He \ 
can if He now pleafes, or whenever he has a proper, direct, \ 
and immediate Defire for it. As to thofe Defires and Endea- [« 
vours that may be againft the Exercifes of a ftrong Habit, | 
with Regard to which Men may be faid to be unable to j 
avoid thofe Exercifes, they are remote Defires and Endea- ^ 
vours in two Refpe6ls. Firji^ as to Ti?ne \ they are never: fi 
againft prefent Volitions, but only againft Volitions of fuch a \ 
Kind, when view'd at a Diftance. Seeondfyy^s to their Nature ; | 
thefe oppofite Defires are not directly and properly againft the | 
Habit and Inclination itfelf, or the Volitions in which it is J 
exercifed ; for thefe, in themfelves conndered, are agreable ; 
but againft fomething elfe, that attends them, or is their Con- 
fequence ; the Oppofition of the Mind is levelled entirely 
againft this ; the Inclination or Volitions themfelves are not 
at all oppofed dire6lly, and for their own fake ; but only 
indiredly, and remotely on the Account of fomething aliene 
and foreign. 

III. Tho' the Oppofition of the Will it kl^^ or the very 
want of Will to a Thing commanded, implies a moral Ina- 
bility to that Thing ; yet, if it be as has been already fhewn, 
that the Being of a good State or Ad of Will, is a Thing 
moft properly required by Command ; then, in fome Cafes 
fuch a State or Ad of Will may properly be required, which 
*t prefent is not, and which may alfo be wanting after it is 
commanded. And therefore thofe Things may properly be 
commanded, which Men have a moral Iiiability for. 


Sed. I V. with tioral Inability. 167 

Such a State or A(fl of the Wil], may be required by Com- 
mand, as does not already exifc. For if that Volition only 
may be commanded to be which already is, there could be 
no ufe of Precept ; Commands in all Cafes would be per- 
fedly vain and impertinent. And not only may fuch a Will 
be required as is wanting before the Command is given, but 
alfo fuch as may poflibly l3e wanting afterwards ; fuch as the 
Exhibition of the Command may not be effe<5hial to produce 
or excite. Otherwife, no fuch Thing as Difobedience to a 
proper and rightful Command is poffible in. any Cafe ; and 
there is no Cafe fuppofable or polTible, wherein there can 
be an inexcufable or faulty Difobedience. Which Armimam 
cannot affirm, confiftcntly with their Principles : for this makes 
Obedience to jull and proper Commands always neceffary^ and 
Difobedience impoffible. And fo the Arminian would over- 
throw Himfelf, yielding the very Point we are upon, which 
He fo fti'enuoufly denies, vi%. that Law and Command are 
I confident with Neceffity. 

If meerly that Inability will excufe Difobedience, which is 
implied in the Oppofition or Defe(5t of Inclination, remaining 
after the Command is exhibited, then Wickednefs always 
carries that in it which excufes it. 'Tis evermore fo, that by 
ihow much the more Wickednefs there is in a Man*s Heart, 
I by fo much is his Inclination to Evil the Wronger, and by fo 
much the more therefore has he of moral Inability to the 
iGood required. His moral Inability, confifting in the 
IjStrength of his evil Inclination, is the very Thing wherein 
jhis Wickednefs conlifts ; and yet according to Annmian Prin- 
ciples, it muft be a Thing inconfiflent with Wickednefs ; and 
(by how much the more he has of it, by fb much is he the 
[further from Wickednefs. 

I Therefore, on the whole,it is manifeft, that moral Inability 
jalone (which confifts in Difmclination) never renders any 
Thing improperly the fubje6t-matter of Precept or Command, 
land never can excufe any Perfon in Difobedience, or Want 
fjof Conformity to a- Command. 

\\ Natural Inability, arifing trom the Want of natural Capa-^ 

Icity, or external Hindrance (which alone is properly called 

Inability) without doubt wholly excufes, or makes a Thing 

improperly the Matter of Command. If Men are excufed 

I trom doing or adting any good Thing, fuppofed to be com- 

I Imanded, it mull be through fome Defed or OblUcle that is 

y not 

1 68 Commands and Invitations Part III. \ 

not In the Will itfelf, but extrinfic to it ; either in the Capa- '] 
city of Underilanding, or Body, or outward Circumftances. | 

Here two or three Things may be obferved, y 

1. As to fpiritual Duties or Ad^s, or any good Thing in the \ 
State or immanent A6ts of the Will it felf, or of the Affections i 
(which are only certain Modes of the Exercife of the Will ) | 
if Perfons are juifly excufed, it muft be thro' want of Capacity j 
in the natural Faculty of Underftanding. Thus the fame fpi- \\ 
ritual Duties, or holy Affedions and Exercifes of Heart, can't \ 
be required of Men, as may be of Angels ; the Capacity of Un- j 
derftanding being fo much inferiour. So Men can't be Id 
required to love thofe amiable Perfons w^hom they have '? 
had no Opportunity to fee, or hear of, or come to the Know- \\ 
ledge of, in any Way agreable to the natural State and Capacity 'J 
of the human Underftandmg. But the Infufficiency of Mo- j 
lives wiii not excufe ; uniefs their being infufficient arifes not -v 
from the moral State of the Will or Inclination it feif, but j- 
from the State of the natural Underftanding. The great ^, 
Kindnefs andGenerofity of another may be a Motive infuf^- 1 
cient to excite Gratitude in the Perfon that receives the J 
Kindnefs, thro' his vile and ungrateful Temper : In this Cafe, I 
the Infufficiency of the Motive arifes from the State of the 'y 
Will or Inclination of Heart, and don't at all excufe. But if '.; 
this Generofity is not fufficient to excite Gratitude, being un- -A 
known, there being no Means of Information adequate to the '..\\ 
State and Meafure of the Perfon's Faculties, this Infufriciency '{^^ 
is attended with a natucal Inability, which entirely excufes. !• 

2. As to fuch Motions of Body, orExerciles and Alterations ' 1 
of Mind, which don't confift in the immanent Acts or State ;• i 
of the Vv^iil it felf, but are fuppofed to be required as Effe6ts 'i^ 
of the W'ill^ I fay, in fuch fuppofed EffecSts of the VyfiW^ in |t 
Cafes wherein there is no Want of a Capacity of Underftand- % 
ing ; that Inability, and that only excules, which confifts in \ 
V/ant of Connexion between them and theWill. If the Will %, 
fullv complies, and the propofed Effect don't prove, according \ 
to the Laws of Nature, to be cr>ane6fed with his Volition, ^ 
the Man is perfectly excufed ; he has a natural Inability to the \ 
Thing required. 'For the Will Itfelf, as has been obferved, is i 
all that can be direcSily and immediately required byCommand; \ 
and other Tilings only indirectiy, as connected with the Will. i» 
If therefore there be a full Compliance of Will, the Perfon \ 

haf ;i 

Sec^^.lV. conjijient with morallnability. 169 

has done his Duty ; and if other Things don*t prove to be 
connected with his VoUtion,; that is not owing to him. 

3. Both thefe Kinds of natural Inability that have been 
mentioned, and fo all Inability that excufes, may be refolved. 
into one Thing ; namely. Want of natural Capacity or 
Strength ; either Capacity of Underflanding, or external 
Strength. For when there are external Defeats and Obftacles, 
they would be no Obftaeles, were it not for the Imperfedtion 
and Limitations of Underftanding and Strength. 

Carol. If Things for which Men have a moral Inability, 
may properly be the Matter of Precept or Command, then 
they may alio of Invitation and Couniel. Commands, and 
Invitations come very much to the fame Thing ; the Differ- . 
ence is only circumftantial : Commands are as much a Mani- 
feilation of the Will of him that Ipeaks, as Invitations, and as . 
much Tedimonies of ExpeClation of Compliance. The Dif- 
ference between them Hes in nothing that touches the Affair 
in Hand. The main Difference betv/een Command and 
Invitation confiiis in the Enforcement of the Will of Him 
who commands or invites. In the latter it is his Klndncfs^ the 
Goodnefs which his Will arifes from t in the former it is 
iiis Authority. But whatever be the Ground of the Will of 
him that fpeaks, or the Enforcement of what he fays, yet 
feeing neither his Will nor Expedation is any more teltifkd 
in the one Cafe than the other ; therefore a Perfon's being 
known to be morally unable to do the Thing to which he is ■ 
directed hy Invitation^ is no more an Evidence of InfmcerJty in. 
him that directs, in manifeliing either a Will, or Expc6tation: 
which he has not, than his bemg known to be morally unable 

to do what he is diredted to hy Cotmnand, So that all this 

grand Objection of Arniiniam againil the Inability oi fallen 
Men to exert Faith in Chrift, or to perform other fpiritual- 
Gofpel-Duties, from the Sincerity of God's Counfels and In^ 
vitations, muft he without Force. #' 

i>i ■* 


1 70 What Willingnefs and Part IIL 

Section V. 

H^at Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours, 
ivhich is Juppofed to tXQ\x{Q, in the Non- 
performance of Things in themf elves goody 
particularly conjidered. 

^ *^--|-'^IS what is much Infifted on by many, that fome Men, 
I thp' they are not able to perform fpiritual Duties, 
iuch as Repentance of Sin, Love to God, a cordiaj 
/Acceptance of Chrift as exhibited and offer'd in the Gofpe!,&c. 
yet they may fmcerely defire and endeavour thefe Things ; 
and therefore muft be excufed ; it being unreafonable to 
blame 'em for the Omiflion of thofe Things which they fm- 
cerely deiire and endeavour to do, but can't do. 

Concerning this Matter, the following Things may be 

I. What is here fuppofed, is a great Miftake, and grofs 
Abfurdity ; even that Men may iincerely chufe and deftre 
thofe fpiritual Duties of Love, Acceptance, Choice, Rejec^lion 
&c. confifting in the Exercife of the Will it felf, or in the Dif- 
pofition and Inclination of the Heart ; and yet not be able to 
perform or exert them. This is abfurd, becaufe 'tis abfurd tq 
fuppofe that a Man fhould directly, properly aod fmcerely in- 
cline to have an Inclination, which at the fame Time is con- 
trary to his Inclination : for that is to fuppofe him not to be 
inclined to that which he is inclined to. If a Man, in the 
State and Ads of his Will and Inclination, does properly and 
dire6ily fall in with thofe Duties, he therein performs 'em : 
For the Duties themfeives conlift in that very Thing ; they 
coniift in the State and hdis of the Will being fo formed and 
directed. If the Soul properly and fmcerely falls* in with a 
certain propofed A61 of Will or Choice, the Soul therein 
makes that Choice it's own. Even as when a moving Body 
falls in with a propofcd Direction of its MotioHj that is the 
fame Thing as to move in that Direflion« 

2. That 

SeA.V. Sincerity is no Excufe. 17 1 

2* That which is called a Deftre and IVUlingnefs for thofe 
inward Duties, in fuch as don't perform them, has refpe6t to 
thefe Duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly 
reprefented as a Willingnefs for them -, not only becaufe (as 
was obferved before) it refpeds thole good Volitions only in a 
diftant View, and with refped to future Time ; but alfo be- 
caufe evermore, not thefe Things themfelves, but fomething 
t\k^ that is aliene and foreign, is the Objed that terminates 
thefe Volitions and Defires, 

A Drunkard, who continues in his Druhkeiinefs, being un- 
der the Power of a Love, and violent Appetite to ftrong Drink, 
and without any Love to Vertue ; but bemg alfo extreamly 
•covetous and clofe, and very much exercifed and grieved at 
the Diminution of his Eftate, and Profpe6t of Poverty, may ia 
a Sort defij-e the Vertue of Temperance : and tho' his prefent 
Will is to gratify his extravagant Appetite, yet he may wifh 
he had a Heart to forbear future Ads of Intemperance, and 
forfake his Exceffes, thro' an Unwillingnefs to part with his 
Money : But ftill he goes on with his Drunkennefs ; his 
V/ifhes and Endeavours are infufficient and ineffectual : Such 
a Man has no proper, direct, lincere Willingnefs to forfake 
this Vice, and the vicious Deeds which belong to it : for He 
.adls voluntarily in continuing to drink to excefs : His Defire 
is very improperly called a Willingnefs to be temperate ; it is 
no true Defire of that Vertue ; for it is not that Vertue that 
terminates his Wiihes ; nor have they any dire(5t Refpedt at 
all to it. 'Tis only the faving his Adoney^ and avoiding Poverty, 
that terminates, and exhaufts the whole Strength of his Defire, 
The Vertue of Temperance is regarded only very indire6lly 
and improperly, even as a neceffary Means of gratifying th<s 
Vice of Covetoufnefs. 

So, a Man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked Heart, 
who has no Love to God and Jefus Chrift, but on the con- 
trary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the 
greateft Diftafte of the Things of Religion,and Enmity againft 
'em ; yet being of a Family, that from one Generation to 
another, have moil: of 'em died IrtYouth of an hereditaryCon- 
fumption j*'& fo having littleHope of livmg long ; and having 
been inftru6ted in the Necelllty of a fupreara Love to Chrifr, 
and Gratitude for his Death and Sufferings, in Order to his 
Salvation from eternal Mifery j if under thefe Circumftances 
he fliould^tbro' Fear of eternal Toiments, wiOi he had fuch a 
- Difpoiltioa : But his profane and carnal Heart remaining, He 

Y a Gontiuuss^ 

I7« What W-^xi^^^ and PartllL 

continues ftill in his habitual diftafte of, and Enmity to God 
and Religion, and wholly without any Exercife of that Love 
and Gratitude, (as doubtlefs the very Devils themfelves, not- 
withftanding all the Devilifhnefs of their Temper, would wifh 
for a holy Heart, if by that Means they could get out of Hell :) 
In this Cafe, there is no lincere Wiliingnefs to love Chrift 
and chufe him as his chief Good : Thefe holy Difpofitions 
and Exercifes are not at all the dlred Object of the Will : 
they truly (hare no Part of the Inclination or Defire of the 
Soul ; but all is terminated on Deliverance from Torment : 
and thefe Graces and pious Volitions, notvvithtianding this 
forced Confent, are looked upon undefirable ; as when a 

fick Man defires aDofe he greatly abhors, to fave his Life. 

From th^fe Things it appears. 

3. That this indire(5l Wiliingnefs which has been fpoken 
of, is not that Exercife of the Will which the Command 
requires ; but is entirely a different one ; being a Volition of 
a di^^erent Nature, and terminated altogether on different 
Objtds ; wholly falling fliort of that Vertue of Will, which 
the Command has refpedl to. 

. 4. This other Volition, which has only fome indirecStCon- 
cern with the Duty required, can't excufe for the Want of 
that good Will it {t\^^ which is commanded ; being not the 
Thing which anfwers and fulfils the Command, and being 
wholly deftitute of the Vertue which the Command feeks. , 

Further to illuftrate this Matter. If a Child has a moft 

excellent Father, that has ever treated him with fatherly 
Kindnefs and Tendernefs, and has eveiy Way in the higheft 
Degree merited his Love and dutiful Regard, being withal 
very wealthy ; but the Son is of fo vile a Difpofition, that He 
jnveterately hates his Father ; and yet, apprehending that his 
Hatred of Him is like to prove his Ruin, by bringing Him 
iinally to Poverty and abjedt Circumfiances, thro' his Father's 
difinheriting Him, or otherwife ; which is exceeding crofs \o 
his Avarice and Ambition ; He therefore wifhes it were other- 
wife : but yet remaining u^^dcr the invincible Power of his vile 
and malignant Di{j>olition, He continues ftill in his fettled 
Hatred of his Father. Now if fuch a Son's indirect Wiliing- 
nefs to have Love and Honour towards his Father, at all ac- 
quits or excufes before God, for his failing of a6luaily exer- 
citing thefe Difpofitions tov»'ards Him which God requires, 
it muft be ou one of thcf<i two Accounts, (i.) Either that 


Se<St.V. Sincerity h no Excufe. 173 


I it anfwers and fulfils the Command. But this it does not, by 
the Suppofition ; becaufe the Thing commanded is Love and 

, Honour to his worthy Parent. If the Command be |)roper 
and juft, as is fuppofed, then it obliges to the Thing com- 
manded ; and fo nothing elfe but that can anfwer the Ob- 
ligation. Or, (2.) It mufl: be at leaft ^becaufe there is that 

; yertue or Goodnefs in his indirecft Willingnefs,that is cquiva- 

1 lent to the Vertue required ; and fo balances or coun- 
tervail^ it, and makes up for the Want of it. But that 
alfo is contrary to the Suppofition. The Willingnefs the Son 

j has merely from a Regard to Money and Honour, has no 
<^oodnefs in it, to countervail the Want of the pious filial 
•^efpe(5i: required. 

Sincerity and Reality, in that indire(^ W^illingnefs which 
has been fpoken of, don't make it the better. That which 
is real and hearty is often called fmcere ; whether it be in 
Vertue or Vice. Some Perfons are fmcerely /'^^ ; others are 
fincerely good ; and others may be fincere and hearty in 
Things which are in their ownNaturefW/^7T«f ; asaMan may 
-be fincerely defirous of eating when he is hungry. But a 
being fincere, hearty and in good Earnefl:, is no Vertue, un- 
lefs it be in a Thing that is vertuous. A Man may be fin- 
cere and hearty in joining a Crew of Pirates, or a Gang of 
Robbers. When the Devils cried out, and befought Chrift 
•not to torment them, it was no mere Pretence ; they were 
very hearty in their Defires not to be tormented : but this 
did not make their Will or Defires vertuous. And if Men 
,have fincere Defires, which are in their Kind and Nature no 
better, it can be no Excufe for the want of any required 
■ Vertue. 

And as a Man's being fincere in fuch an indiredt Defire or 
Willingnefs to do his Duty, as has been mention'd, can't ex- 
cufe for the w^ant of Performance ; fo it \% y^\\\\ Eyideavours 
arifing from fuch a Willingnefs. The Endeavours can have 
no more Goodnefs in 'em, than the Will which they are the 
Effe6l and Exprefiion of. And therefore, however fincere and 
^ real, and however great a Perfon's Endeavours are ; yea, tho' 
they fhould be to \\\t utmoft of his Ability j unlefs the Will 
which they proceed from be truly good and vertuous, they 
•can be of no Avail, Influence or Weight to any Purpofe what- 
r/oever, in a moral Senfe or Refpedl. That which is not truly 
. vertuous in God's Sight, is looked upon by Him as good for 
; J^othing : and fo can be of no Value, Weight or Influence 


174- T^hat Sincerity of Endeavours, PartllL 

in his Account, to recommend, Tatisfy, excufe or make up for 

any moral Defe6t. For nothing can counter-balance Evil, but 
Good. If Evil be in one Scale^ and we put a great deal into 
^\-i^ other, iincere and earneil: Defires, and many and great 
Endeavours ; yet if there be no real Goodnefs in all, there ig 
no Weight in it ; and fo it does nothing towards balancing 
the real Weight which is in the oppofite Scale. Tis only lilcft 
the fubftradVing a Thoufand Noughts from before a real Num- 
ber, v/hich leaves the Sum julf as it was. 

Indeed fuch Endeavours may have a negatively good Influ- 
ence, "rhoie Things which have no pofitive Vertue, have no 
pofitive mo:al Influence ; yet they may be an Occafion of 
Pcrfons avoiding fome pofitive Evils. As if a Man were in 
the Water with a Neighbour that he had ill-will to, wha 
could not fwim, holding him by his Hand ; which Neigh- 
bour was much in Debt to Him ; and (hould be tempted to let 
him fmk and drown ; but Ihould rei'ufe to comply with the 
Temptation ; not from Love to his Neighbour, but from the 
Love of Money, and becaufe by his drowning He fliould lofe 
his Debt ; that which he does in preferving his Neighbour 
fi-om drowning, is nothing good in the Sight of God : Yet 
hereby he avoids the greater Guilt that would have bfeent 
contracted, if he had defignedly let his Neighbour fink ^d 
periih. But when Armhnans in their Difpiites with CahiA/is 
infill: (6 much on Hncere Defires and Endeavours, as wiat 
mull: excufe Men, muft be accepted of God he. 'tis manlSneft 
they have Refped to fome pofitive moral Weight or Influence 
cf thofe Defires and Endeavours. Accepting, juftifying, or 
excufing on the Account of iincere honeft Endeavours (as 
they are called) and Men's doing what they can, &c. has Re- 
lation to fome moral Value, iomething that is accepted as 
Good, and as fuch, countervailing fome Defedl. 

But there is a great and unknown Deceit, arifing from tlie 
Ambiguity of the Phrafe, y/Wr^ Endeavours. Indeed there is a 
vaft Ind!uin(5tnefs & Unhxednefs in moft,or at leaft very many 
of the Terms ufed to exprefs Things pertaining to nwral and 
fpiritual Matters. Whence arife innumerable Miifakes, ftrong 
Prejudices, inextricable Confulion, and endiefs Controverfy. 

The Word finccre is mofi: commonly ufed to fignify fome- 
thing that is good : Men are habituated to underlfand by it 
the fame as honejl and vpight \ which Terms excite an Idea 
of fomething good iu the flri^^eft aiid highell: Senie i good in 


I Sect. V. is no Excufe. 175 


j the Sight of Him who fees not only the outward Appearance, 

I but th"e Heart. And therefore Men think that if a Perfon be 

; fuuere^ he will certainly be accepted. If it be faid that any 

\ one is fincere in his Endeavours, this fuggeih to Men's Minds 

as much, as that his Heart and Will is good, that there is no 

Defed of Duty, as to vertuous Inclination ; he honeflly and 

uprightly defires and endeavours to do as he is required ; and 

this leads 'em to fuppofe that it would be very hard and un- 

reafonable to punifh him, only becaufe he is unfuccefstul in 

\i\s Endeavours, the Thing endeavoured being beyond his 

Power. Whereas it ought to be obferved, that the Word 

[ ftncere has thefe different Significations. 

1. Sincerity^ as the Word is fometimes ufed, fignifies no 
I more then Reality of IP' ill and Endeavour^ with refpect to any 

Thing that is profelled or pretended ; without any Confidera- 
tion of the Nature of the Principle or Aim, whence this real 
I Will and tme Endeavour arifes. If a Man has fome real 
Defire to obtain a Thing,either diredl or indired,or does really 
endeavour after a Thing,he is laid iincer:ly to deiire or endea- 
vour It j without anyConfideration of the Goodnefs or V'ertu- 
oufnefs of thePrincipie he acts rrom,or anyExcellency orWor- 
thinefs of the End he.acSls for. Thus a Man that is kind 
to his Neighbour's Wife, who is f)ck and languifhing, and 
very helpful in her Cafe, makes a Shew of defiring and en- 
I deavouring her Reftoration to Health and Vigour ; and not 
i only makes fuch a Shew, but there is a Reality in his Pretence, 
! he does heartily and earneftly defire to have her Health re- 
j ftored, and ufes his true and utmoft Endeavours for it 5 He 
} is faid fmcerely to deiire and endeavour it, becaufe he does 
1 ki truly or really ; tho' perhaps the Principle he ads from, 
i$ no other than a vile and fcandalous PalTion ; having lived 
in Adultery with her, he earneftly defires to have her Health 
and Vigour reftored, that he may return to his criminal Plea- 
fures With her. Or, 

2. By Sincerity is meant, not meerly a Reality of Will and 
'Endeavour of fome Sort or other, and from fome Coniidera- 
tion or other, but a vertuous, Sincerity. That is, that in the 
Performance of thofe particular Ads that are the Matter of 
Vertue or Duty, there be not only the Matter, but the Form 

J and EiTence of Vertue, confifting in the Axim that governs the 
I Ad, and the Principle exercifed in it. There is not only the 
1 Reality of the A.d, that is as it were the Body of the Duty ; 
i but ahb the Soul^ v;hich fhould properly belong; to fuch a 
1 ^ Body. 

17^ 0/ Promises Part IIL 


Body. In this Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, when he 
2(5ts with a pure Intention ; not from finifter Viev/s, or bye- 
Ends : He not only in Reality defires and feeks the Thing to 
be done, or Qualitication to be obtained, for fome End or 
other ; But he wills the Thing direaiy and properly, as nei-. :§i 
ther forced nor bribed ; the Vertue of the Thing is properly, ffj 
the Objea of the Will. ^ it 

Jn the former Senfe^a Man is faid to be fmcere,in Oppofiti-,; i| 
on to a mecr Pretence, and Shezv of the particular Thing to he done \% 
or exhibited, without any real Deiire or Endeavour at" all. la- 
the latter Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, in Oppofition to/ 
that Shezu of Vertue there is in meerly doing the Matter of Duty, 
without the Reality of the Vertue it felf in the Soul, and the 
EiTence of it, which there is a Shew of. A Man may be fin- 
cere in the former Senfe, and yet in the latter be in the Sight 
of God, who fearches the Heart, a vile Hypocrite. 

In the latter Kind of Sincerity, only, is there any Thin^ 
truly valuable or acceptable in the Sight of God. And this is- 
the Thing which in Scripture is called Sincerity, Uprightnefsj 
Integrity, Truth in the inward Parts, and a being of a perfe^ Heart, 
And if there be fuch a Sincerity, and fuch a Degree of it as 
there ought to be, and there be any Thing further that the 
Man is not able to perform, or which don't prove to be con^ 
neded with his fincere Defires and Endeavours, the Man is. 
wholly excufed and acquitted in the Sight of God ; His Will 
jfhall furely be accepted for his Deed : And fuch a fincere. 
Will and Endeavour is all that in Stri6tnefs is required of him, 
by any Command of God. But as to the other Kind of 
Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours, it having no Vertue in 
it, (as was obferved before) can be of no Avail before Goc' 
in any Cafe, to recommend, fatisfy, or excufe, and has no pofi 
tive moral Weisht or Influence whatfoever. 


Cord' I. Hence it may be infer'd, that Nothing in the Rea-' 
fon and Nature of Things appears, from the Confideration of 
any moral Weight of that former Kind of Sincerity, whicK 
has been fpoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or leading" 
us to fuppofe, that God has made any pofitive Promifes of 
Salvation, or Grace, or any faving Afilftance, or any fpiritual 
Benefit whatfoever, to any Defires, Prayers, Endeavours, 
Striving, or Obedience of thofe, who hitherto have no true 
%'ertue or Holinefs in their Hearts ; tho' we fiiculd fuppofe 


Sed.V. to gracelefs Endeavours. 177 

all the Sincerity, and the utmoft Degree of Endeavour, that is 
polFible to be in a Perlon without Holinefs* 

Some objefl againft God's requiring, as the Condition of 

ii Salvation, thole holy Exercifes, which are the Refult of a fu- 

pernatural Renovation ; fuch as a fupream Refped to Chrifl, 

Love to God, loving Holinels for it's own fake, ^c. that thefe 

inward Difpofitions and Exercifes are above Men's Power, as 

they are by Nature ; and therefore that we may conclude, that 

i when Men are brought to be fmcere in their Endeavours, and 

[do as well as they can, they are accepted ; and that this muft 

,1 be ail that God requires in order to Men's being received as 

'the Objects of his Favour, and muft be what God has ap- 

' pointed as the Condition of Salvation. Concerning v/hich I 

vsould obferve, that in fuch a Manner of Speaking of Men's 

being accepted^ becavfe they are fincere^ and do as well as they can<^ 

there is evidently a Siippofition of fome V^ertue, fome Degree 

of that wdiich is truly Good ; tho' it don't go fo far as were 

tobewifh'd. For if Men do what ihey can^ unlefs their fo 

doing be from fome good Principle, Difpofition, or Exercife of 

Herrt, fome vertuous Inclination or A61 of the Will ; their 

fo doing Vv^hat they can, is in fome Refpeds not a Whit better 

than if they did Nothing at all. In fuch a Cafe, there is no 

more pcfitive m.orai Goodnefs in a Man's doing what he can, 

than in a Vv'ind-MiU's doing what it can ; becaufe the A6iioa 

does no more proceed from Vertue ; and there is Nothing in 

iuch Sincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that Ihould 

render it any mere a proper or fit Recommendation to pofitivc 

Favour and Acceptance, or the Condition of any Reward or 

ad-uai Benefit, than doing Nothing -, for both the one and the- 

other are alike Nothing, as to any true moral Weight or 


Coroh 2. Hence alfo it follov>'s, there is Nothing that appears 
in theRealbn and Nature of Things,which can juftly lead us to 
determine, that God will certainly give the neceffary Means of 
Salvation, or fome Way or other beftow true Holinefs and 
tternal Life on thofe Heathen^ who are fincere (in the Senfc 
above explained) in their Endeavours to find out the Will of 
the Deity, and to pleafc Him, according to their Light, that 
they may efcape his future Difpleafure and Wrath, and obtain 
Happinefs in their future State, through his Favour, 

Z Section 

178 IndifFerence inconftjlent Part III. 
Section VI. 

Liberty of IndifFerence, not only not ne-: 
cejfary to Vertue, but utterly mconj7jie?pt{\\ 
with it ; And ally either vertuous or vi-r 
cious Habits or Inclinations, inconjifient 
with Arminian Notions of Liberty an 
moral Agency. 

lO fuppofc fuch a Freedom of Will, as Armin'ians talk of, \ 
to be requilite to Vertue and Vice, is many Ways con- I 
trary to common Senfe. J 

If Indifference belongs to Liberty of Will, as Arminlam fup- |i 
pofe, and it be effential to a vertuous A6lion that it be perfor- m 
med in a State of Liberty, as they alfo fuppofe ; it will follow, fl 
that it is ellential to a veituous A6lion that it be performed in | 
a State of Indifference : And if it be performed in a State of \ 
Indifference, then doubtlefs it muft be performed in the 77W ,1 
of Indifference. And fo it will follow, that in order to th^ % 
Vertuoufnefs of &n A61, the Heart mull be indifferent in the j 
Time of the Performance of that Adi, and the more indiffer- \ 
cnt and cold the Heart is with Relation to the A(5t which is f 
p-crformed, fo much the better ; becaufe the A(5l is performecj -i 
with fo much the greater Liberty. But is this agreable to the \ 
Light of Nature ? Is it agreable to the Notions which Man- i 
kind, in all Ages, have of Vertue, that it lies in that which \ 
is contrary to Indifference, even in the Tendency and Inclination i 
of theHeart to vertuous Action ; and that the ftronger the In- I 
clmation, and fo the further from Indifference, the more ver- ' 
tucus the Heart, and fo much the more praife-worthy the J^ ] 
which proceeds from it r \ 

If we (hould fuppofe (contrary to what has been before de— j 
monftrated) that there may be an A61 of V/iIl in a State of j 
indifference ; for Inflance, this A6t, vi-z. The Will's deter-' | 
mining to put it felf out of a State of Indifference, and give it 1 
iclf a Preponderatiou one Vv^ay, then it would follow, on Jrm^ 


Sed:. VL wii^/j Ycrtwc. 179 

man Principles, that this A61 or Determination of the Will is 
that alone wherein Vertue confifts, becaufe this only is per- 
formed while the Mind remains in a State of Indifference, and 
fo in a State of Liberty : For when once the Mind is put out 
of it's Equilibrium, it is no longer in fuch a State ; and there- 
fore all the A(5ts which follow afterwards, proceeding from 
Bias, can have the Nature neither of Vertue nor Vice. Or if 
the Thing which the Will can do, while yet in a State of 
Indifference, and fo of Liberty, be only to fufpend ailing, and 
determine to take the Matter into Confideration, then this 
Determination is that alone wherein Vertue confifts, and not 
proceeding to Action after the Scale is turned by Confideration, 
So that it will follow from thefe Principles, all that is done 
after the Mind, by any Means, is once out of it's Equilibrium 
and already pollelfed by an Inclination, and ariling from that 
Inclination, has nothing of the Nature of Vertue or Vice, and 
is worthy of neither Blame nor Praife. But how plainly con- 
trary is tills to the univerfal Senfe of Mankind, and to the No.- 
tion they have of fmcerely vertuous A6lions ? Which is, that 
they are Actions which proceed from a Heart well difpofed and 
ind'med ; and Xh^Jironger^ and the vaox^t fix'd and determined xht 
good Difpofition of the Heart, the greater the Sincerity of 
Vertue, and fo the more of the Truth and Reality of it. But 
if there be any Ads which are done in a State of Equihbrium, 
or fpring immediately from perfe61: Indifference and Coldnefs 
; of Heart, they cannot .arife from any good Principle or Djf- 
J3ofition in theHesrt ; and confequentlyj according to common 
Senfe, have no nncere Goodnefs in 'em, having no Vertue of 
Heart in 'em. To have a vertuous Heart, is to have a Heart 
that favours Vertue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfcd\- 
1 ly cold and indifferent about it. 

And befides the Anions that are done in a State of Indiffer- 
ence, or that arife immediately out of fuch a State, can't be 
vertuous, becaufe, by the Suppofition, they are not determined 
by any preceeding Choice. For if there be preceedingChoice, 
then Choice intervenes between the A61 and the State of In- 
difference ; which is contrary to the Suppofition of the Ad's 
" arifing immediately out of Indifference. But thofe Ads which 
are not determined by preceeding Choice, can't be vertuous or 
vicious hy Arminian Principles, becaufe they are not determined 
^by theWill. So that neither oneWay, nor the other, can any 
Adions be vertuous or vicious according toy/rwrn/^wPrinciples. 
If theAdion be determined by a preceedingAd oif Choice it can't 
be vertuous ; becaufe the Adion is not done in a State of In- 
i Z 2 d-ifFerence,^ 

i8o \nd\Stv. inconft/i^ withV^vtuQ. Part III, 

difference, nor does immediately arife from, fuch a State ; and, 

fo is not done in a State of Liberty. If the A6tion be not d^-. . \ 

Urmined by a preceeding Act of Choice, then it can't be ver-^ ^ 

tuous J becaufe then the Will is not Self-determin'd in it, \ 

So that 'tis made certain, that neither Vertue nor Vice caa '\ 

ever find any Place in the Univerfe. ; \ 

Moreover, that it is neceffary to a vertuous A^ion that \% i 

be performed in a State of Indifference, under a Notion of \ 

that's being a State of Liberty, is contrary to common Senfe ; a 

as 'tis a Di6tate of common Senfe, that Indifference it felf, in - 

Tnany Cafes, is vicious, and fo to a high Degree. As if when % 

I fee my Neighbour or near Friend, and one who has in \ 

the higheft Degree merited of me, in extreme Diflrefs, and \ 

ready to penlh, I find an Indifference in my Heart with Re-» l^ 

fpc6t to any Thing propofed to be done, which I can eafily do, f 

for his Relief. S^ if it Ihpuld be propofed to me, to blafpheme ^ 

God, or kill my Father, or to do numberlefs other Things j 

"which might be mentioned ; the being indifferent, for a Mo- i 

nient, would be highly vicious and vile. j 

And it may be further obferved, that to fuppofe this Liberty \ 

of Indifference is effential to Vertue and Vice, deilroys the .1 

great Difference of Degrees of the Guilt of different Crimes, k 

and takes away the Heinoufnefs of the moft fiagitious horrid ' 

Iniquities ; fuch as Adultery Beftiality, Murder, Perjur)', Blaf- \ 

phe'Tiy, &c. For according to thefe Principles, there is no 1 

Harm at all in having the Mind in a State of perfect Indiffer- i 

ence withRefpe<fl to thefeCrimes ; nay, 'tis abfolutely neceffary j 
in order to aiiy Vertue in avoiding them, or Vice in doing 

them. But for the Mind to be in a State of Indifference j 

%vith Refpedt to 'em, is to be next Door to doing them : It is i 
then inlinitely near to chuling, and fo committing the Fad : 

For Equilibrium is the next Step to a Degree of Prepondera^ J 

tion ; and one, even the leaft Degree of Preponderation (all 'i 

Things confidered) is Choice. And not only fo, but for the \ 

Will tQ be in a State of perfed Equilibrium with Refped to \ 

fuch Crimes, 'is for the Mind to be in fuch a State, as to he Jj 

full as likely to chufe 'em as to refufe 'em, to do 'em as to ! 

prnit 'em. And if our Minds muft be in fuch a State \ 

vvherein it is as neSr to chufmg as refufing, and wherein it \ 

^nud of Neceffity, according to the Nature of Things, be ^ |; 

likely to commit 'em, as to refrain from 'em \ where is the^ \ 

^xceedin^ Heinoufnefs of chuf^ng and committing them .'' If l| 

thefe be no Harm ia often being ia fuch a State, wherein the |j 

Probability \ 

Sed.VI. Ofvertuous &* vicious Habits. i8i 

Probability of doing and forbearing are exaflly equal, there 
being an Equilibrium, and no more Tendency to one than thq 
other ; then according to the Nature and Laws of fuch a Con- 
tingence, it may be expeded, as an inevitable Confequence of 
fjjch a Difpofition of Things, that we {hould chufe 'em as 
often as reject 'em : That it fhould generally fo fall out is ne- 
cefTary, as Equality in the EfFed is the natural Confequence 
of the equal Tendency of the Caufe, or of the antecedent 
State of Things from which the Effed arifes r Why then 
Ihould we be fo exceedingly to blame, if it does fo fall out \ 

'Tis many Ways apparent, that the Jrminian Scheme of Li- 
berty is utterly inconiiitent with the being of any fuch Thin2;s 
as either vertuous or vicious Habits orDifpoiitions. If Liberty 
of Indiffere-nce be efTential to moral Agency, then there can be 
no Vertue in any habitual Inclinations of the Heart ; which 
are contrary to Indifference, and imply in their Nature the 
very Dertrudion and Exclulion of it. They fuppoie nothing 
can be vertuous, in which no Liberty is exerciied ; ' but hov/ 
abiurd is it to talk of exerciling Indiiference under Bias and 
Prcponderation ! 

And if felf- determining Power in the Will be necelTarv to 
moral Agency, Praife, Blame, &c. then nothing done by^ the 
Will can be any further Praife or Bhme-vvorthy,than fo far a$ 
the Will is moved, fwayed and determined by it {e\i^ and the 
Scales turned by the fovereign Pov/er the Will has over it {e\x» 
And therefore the Will muft not be put outof it'sBaiance already, 
thePreponderation muft not be determined and effected before- 
hand ; and fo the felf-determining A61: anticipated. Thus it 
appears another Way, that habitual Bias is inconfiftent with 
that Liberty which Annlnlans fuppofe to be necelTary to Vertue 
or Vice ; and fo it follows, that habitual Bias it felf cannot be 
either vertuous or vicious. 

The fame Thing follows from their Dodrine concerning 
the Inconfiftence of Necejfity with Liberty, Praife, Difpraife,&e. 
None will deny,thatBias and Inclination may be fo ftrong as to 
be invincible, and leave no Poilibility of the Will's deterinin- 
Jng contrary to it ; and fo be attended with Neceifity. This 
^Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Vv'ili of God, Angels and 
glorified Saints, with Refped to Good ; and the V/ill of 
Devils with Refped to Evil. Therefore if NeceiTity be incon- 
Hftent with Liberty ; then when iix'd Inclination is to fuch a 
;Pegree of Strength, it utterly exgiudes aii Vertue, Vice^ Praife 


1 82 Of vertuous^ PartllL 

or Blame. And if fo, then the i\earer Habits ^'are to thisj^ 

iitrength, the .more do they impede Libetty, and Po diminifti' j 
Praife and Blame. If very ftrong Habits deilroy Liberty, the j 
leiler Ones proportionably hinder it, a.ccording to their Degree' i 
of Strength. And therefore it wilt follow, that then is the ;j 
A<51 moft vertuous or vicious, when perfonned without any ^5 
Inclination or habitual Bias at all j becaufe it is then perform-' -'^ 
ed with moft Liberty. -l 

Every pre-poffeffing fix'd Bias oti the Miijd brings a Degree i 
of moral inability for the contrary ; becaufe fo far as theMind ( 
is biaffed and pre-poiTeffed, fo much Hindrance is there of the ^ 
contrary. And therefore if moral Inability be inconfit^ent with j 
moral Agency, or the Nature of Vertue and Vice, then fo far v^ 
as tiiere is any fuch Thing as evil Diipofition of Heart, or ha- J 
bitual Depravity of Inclination ; whether Covetoufnefs, Pride, '^ 
Malice, Cruelty, or whatever elfe ; fo much the more excuf- •' 
able Peribns are j fo much the lefs have their evil Ads of this j 
Kind, the Nature of Vice. And on the contrary, v^rhatever "{ 
excellent Difpolitions and Inclinations they have, fo much are ' 
they the ieis vertuous. ] 

'Tis evident, that no habitual Difpofition of Heart, whether \ 

it be to a greater or lefler Degree, can be in any Decree ver- 
tuous or vicious i or the Avftions which proceed from them | 
at all Praife or Blame-worthy. Becaufe, tho' we faould fup- '\ 
pofe the Habit not to be of fuch Strength as wholly to take \ 
av/ay all moral Ability and felf-determining Power i or hin- '\ 
der but that, altho' the Acft be partly from Bias, yet it may ^| 
be in Part from Self-determination ; yet in this Cafe, all that \ 
is from antecedent Bias muft be fet afide, as of no Confidera- | 
tion 5 and in eftimating the Degree of Vertue or Vice, no >' 
more muft be confidered than what arifes from felf-determin- 
ing Pov^/er, without any Influence of that Bias, becaufe Liberty i 
is exercifed in no more : So that all that is the Exercife of | 
habitual Inclination, is thrown away, a^ not belonging to thcj '■ 
Morality of the Adlion. By which it appears, that no Exer- j 
cife of t'hefe Habits, let 'em be ftronger or weaker, can ever i'l 
have any Thing of the Nature of either Vertue or Vice. I 

Here if any one ffeould fay, that notwithftanding all thefd ' 
Things, there may be the Nature of Vertue and Vice in Habits \ 
of the Mind j becaufe thefe Habits may be the .Effe6ls of | 
thofe h&.i, wherein the Mind exercifed Liberty ; that how- ;| 
ever t^ie foremention'd Reafons will prove that no Habits '{ 


Sed. VI. and ^/r/^^j\Habits, ,, ^ 183 

which are natural^ or that any are born or created with us, can 
be either vertuous or vicious ; yet they will not prove this of 
Habits, which have been acquired ' and eftablifh'd by repeated 
free Ads. 

To fuch an Objector I would fay, that this Evifion will not 
at all help the Matter. For if Freedom of Will be eflential to 
the very Nature of Vertue and Vice, then there is no Vertiie 
or Vice but only in that very Thing, wherein this Liberty is 
exerclfed. If a Man in one or more Thing that he does, ex- 
ercifes Liberty, and then by thofe A6ts is brought into fuch' 
Circumftances, that his Liberty ceafes, and there follows a 
■.long Series of A6ls or Events that come to pafs neceflarily ; 
thofe confequent Ads are not vertuous or vicious, rewardable 
or punhhable ; but only the free Adts that eftablifli'd this Ne- 
cedlty J for in them alone v^as the Man free. The following 
Effects that are neceffary, have no more of the Nature of Ver- 
tue or Vice, than Health or Sicknefs of Body have properly 
the Nature of Vertue or Vice, being the EfFe61:s of a Courfe of 
free Acts of Temperance or Intemperance ; or than the good 
Qiialities of a Clock are of theNature of Vertue,which are the 
Eifiects of free A6ls of theArtificer ; or theGoodnefs and Sweet- 
nefs of the Fruits of a Garden are moral Vertues, being the 
Efre6ls of the free and faithful Adts of the Gardener. If Li- 
berty be abfolutely requifite to the Morality of Actions, and 
Neceflity wholly inconfiftent with it, as Annmians greatly infift ; 
then no necejfary EffeSls whatfoever, let the Caufe be never fo 
good or bad, can be vertuous or vicious ; but the Vertue or 
Vice muft be only in \Sx^ free Caufe. Agreably to this, Dr. 
Whtihy fuppofes, the Neceffity that attends the good anti 
evil Habits of the Saints in Heaven, and Damned in Hell, 
which are the Confequence of their free Acts in tlieir State of 
Probation, are not rewardable or puniQiable. 

On the whole,- it appears, that if the Notions o^ Ar?n'm}nns 
concerning Liberty and moral Agency be true, itjv/ill fol]ov»r 
that there is no Vertue in any fuch Habits or Qualities as 
Humility, Meeknefs, Patience, Mercy, Gratitude, Generofity, 
Heavenly-mindednefs ; Nothing at ail Praife -worthy in loving 
Chrid: above Father and Mother, Wife and Children, or our 
own Lives ; or in Delight in Holinefs, hungring and thirfting 
after Rightebufnefs, Love to Enemies, univerfal Benevolence 
to Mankind : And on the other Hand, there is nothing at all 
vicious, or worthy of Difpraife, in the moft fordid, beaflly, 
Rlgljg^cant, dcviiiinDifpofition^ ;. in being ungrateful, profane, 


184 Armimamfm intonfiftent Partlll. 

habitually hating God, and Thihgs facred and holy ; or in 
being mofi: treacherous^ ehvibUs and cruel toVvards Men. For 
all thefe Things are Difpojitions i.'ix^ Inclmations of the Heart. 
And in fliort, there is no iuch Thing as any vertuous or vici- 
ous ^ality of Mind ; no Iuch Thing as inherent Vertue and 
Holinels, or Vice and Sin : And the ftronger thofe Habits or 
Difpofitions are, which ufed to be called vertuous and vicious, 
the further they are from being fo indeed ; the more violent 
Men's Lufls are, the more tix'd their Pride, Envy, Ingratitude 
and Malicioufnefs, ftill the further are they from being blame- 
worthy. If there be a Man that by his own repeated Acts, 
or by any other Means, is come to be of the moft hellifh 
Diipofition, defperately inclined to treat his Neighbours with 
Injurioufnefs, Contempt and Malignity ; the further they 
fliould be from any Diipofition to be angry with Him, or in 
the leafi to blame Him. So on the other Hand, if there be a 
Perfon, who is of a moft excellent Spirit, ftrongly inclining 
him to the moft amiable Actions, admirably meek, benevolent 
&:c. fo much is he further from anyThing rewardable or com- 
mendable. On which Principles, the Man Jefus Chrift was 
very far from being Praife-worthy for thofe Acts of Holinefs 
and Kindnefs which He performed, thefe Propenfities being fo 
ftrong in his Heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and 
gracious God, is infinitely remote from any Thing commen- 
dable, his good Inclinations being infinitely ftrong, and He 
therefore at the utmoft poflible Diftance from being at Liberty. 
And in all Cafes, the ftronger the Inclinations of any are to 
Vertue, and the more they love it, the lefs vertuous they 
are ; and the more they love Wickednefs, the lefs vicious.— ^ 
Whether' thefe Things are agreable to Scripture, let every 
Chriftian, and every Man who has read theBible, judge : and 
whether they are agreable to common Senfe, let every one 
judge, that have human Underftanding in Exercife. 

And if we purfue thefe Principles, we (hall find that Ver- 
tue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the World -, and that 
there never was, nor ever c^an be any fuch Thing as one or 
the other ; either in God, Angels or Men. No Propenfity, 
Difpofition or Habit can be vertuous or vicious, as has been 
(liewn i becaufe they, ki far as they take Place, deftroy the 
Freedom of the Will, the Foundation of all moral Agency, 

and exclude all Capacity of either Vertue or Vice. 

And if Habits and Difpofitions themfelves be not vertuous 
nor vicious, neither can the Exercife of thefe Difpofitions be 
ig ; For the Exercife of Bias is not the Exercife of free fTf- 


Seel. VII. with moral Habits ^Motives. 185 

determining TVtll^ and fo there is no Exercife of Liberty in it. 

Confequently noMan is vertuous or vicious, either in being well 

or ill difpofed, nor in acting from a good or bid Difpolition. 

And whether this Bias or Difpofition be habitual or not, if it 

exifts but a Moment before the Act of Will, which is the 

Effect of it, it alters not the Cafe, as to the Neceflity of .the 

Effect. Or if there be no previous Difpofition at all, either 

habitual or occafional, that determines the Act^ then it is not 

Choice that determines it : it is therefore a Contingence, that 

happens to the Man, arifing from Nothing in him ; and is 

neeeffary, as to any Inclination or Choice of his ; and there- 

I fore can't make Him either the better or worfe, any more than 

a Tree is better than other Trees, becaufe it oftener happens 

to be lit upon by a Swan or Nightingal ; or a Rock more 

vicious than other Rocks, becaufe Rattle-Snakes have happen'd 

I oftner to crawl over it. So that there is no Vertue nor Vice 

I in good or bad Difpofitions, either fix'd or tranfient ; nor any 

! Vertue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous In- 

i clination ; nor yet any Vertue or Vice in acting wholly with- 

j out any previous Inclination. Where then fhali we find 

1 Room for Vertue or Vice ? 

Section VII. 

Arminlan Notions of moral Agency incojt- 
Jiftent with all Influence of Motive and 
Inducement, in either vertuous or vicious 

As Armtnian Notions of that Liberty, which is efTentlal 
to Vertue or Vice, are inconfiftent with common Senfe^ 
in their being inconfiftent with all vertuous or vicious 
Habits and Difpofitions ; fo they are no lefs fo in their Incon- 
^{lency with all Influence of Motives in moral Actions. 

A a 'Ti3 

1 86 Motive &^ Inducem^ incoiifif^ Y'^xX III. 

'Tis equally againft thofe Notions of Liberty of Will, whe- 
ther there be, previous to the Act of Choice, a Preponde- 
rancy of the Inchnation, or a Preponderancy of thofe Circum- 
ftances, which have a Tendency to move the Inchnation. 
And indeed it comes to juft the fameThing : To fay, the Cir- 
cumftances of the Mind are fuch as tend to fway and turn it*s 
Incliaation one Way, is th^ faine Thing as to fay, the IntU- 
nation of the Mind, as under fuch Circumftances, tends th^t 

Or if any think it moft proper to fay, that Motives do alter 
the Inclination, and give a new Bias to the Mind ; it will not 
alter the Cafe, as to the prefent Argument. For if Motives 
operate by giving the Mind an Inclination, the^ they operate 
by deftroying the Mind's Indifference, and laying it under a 
Bias. But to do this, is to deftroy the Anninian Freedom : B: 
is not to leave the Will to it's own Self-determination, but to 
bring it into Subjection to the Power of fomething extrinficfc, 
which operates upon it, fways and det-ermines it, previous to 
it's own Determination. So that what is done from Motive, 

can't be either vertuous or vicious. And befides, if the Acts 

of the Will are excited by Motives, thofe Motives are the 
Caufes of thofe Acts of the Will : which makes the Acts of 
the Will neceffary ; as Effects neceffarily follow the. Efficieticy 
of the Caufe. And if the Influence and Power of the Mo- 
tive caufes the Volition, then the Influence of the Motive 
determines Volition, and Volition don't determine it felf ; 
and fo is not free, in the Senfe of Arviinimis (as has been 
largely (liewn already) and confequently can be neither ver- 
tuous nor vicious. 

The Suppofition, v/hich has already been taken Notice of 
as an infufficient Evafion in other Cafes, would be in like 
Manner impertinently alledged in this Cafe ; namely, the* 
huppofition that Liberty coniifl:s in a Power of fuipending 
Adlion for the prefent, in order to Deliberation. If it (hould 
be faid, Tho' it be true, that the V/Ul is under a Neceffity of 
finally following the firongeft Motive, yet it may for the pre- 
fent forbear to ad upon the Motive prefented, till there has- 
been Opportunity thoroughly to confider it, and compare it's 
real Weight with the Merit of other Motives. I anfwef, 
as follow^. 

Here ?gain it mufl: be remember'd, that if determining thust 
to fufpeud and confider,be that A61 of the Will wherein alone 
Liberty is exercifed„ then in this all Vertue and Vice muft 

conflU i 

Sedl.Vll. mthXtmim^nFertue^Fict. 1S7 

confift 5 and the A<5ls that follow this Confidcration, and are 
#ie Effe6ts of it, being neceflary, are no more vertuous or 
vicious than fome good or bad Events which happen when 
they are fail alleep, and are the Confequences of what 
they did when they were awake. Therefore I would here 
obierve two Things. 

I. To fuppofe that all Vertue andVice, in every Cafe, con- 
fifts in determining whether to take Time for Confideration, 
or not, is not agreable to common Senfe. For according to 
fuch a Suppofition, the moft horrid Crimes, Adultery, Murder, 
Buggery, Blafphemy, &c. do not at all confift in the horrid 
Nature of the Things themfelves, but only in the Negle6t of 
thorough Confideration before they were perpetrated : which 
brings their Vicioufnefs to a fmall Matter, and makes all 
Grimes equal. If it be faid, that Negled of Confideration, 
when fuch heinous Evils are propofed to Choice, is worfe than 
in other Cafes : I anfwer, this is inconfiftent, as it fuppofes 
the very Thing to be, which at the fame Time is fuppofed 
ftot to be ; it fuppofes all moral Evil, all Vicioufnefs and Hei- 
noufnefs, dees not confift meerly in the want of Confideration, 
It fuppofes fome Crimes in themfelves^ in their oivn Nature, to be 
inore heinous than others, antecedent to Confideration or In- 
confideration, which lays the Perlbn under a previous Obliga- 
tion to coafider in fome Cafes more than others. 

2. If it were fo, that all Vertue and Vice,' in every Cafe, 
confifted only in the Ael of the Will, whereby it determines 
'ii^hether to coniider or no, it would not alter the Cafe in the 
leaft, as to the prefent Argument. For ftill in this A6t of the 
Will on this Determination, it is induced by fome Motive, and 
neceffarily follows the ftrongeft Motive ; and fo is necelTary, 
vcven in that Ad wherein alone it is either vertuous or vicious. 

Gne Thing more I would obfefve, concerning the In con - 
fiftence of Jrmiman Notions of moral Agency with the Influ- 
ence of Motives. I fuppofe none will deny,that 'tis pof^ibie 

for Motives to be fet before theMind fo powerful, and exhibit- 
<rd in fo ftrong aLight,and under fo advantageousCircumliances, 
as to be invmcible ; and fuch as the Mind cannot but yield 
to. In this Cafe, ^rwm/^;zi will doubtlefs fay. Liberty is de- 
ftroyed. And if fo, then if Motives are ejvhibited with half 
fo much Power, they hinder Liberty in Proportion to their 
Strength, and go half-way towards deftroying it. If a 
Thoufand Degrees of Motive abolith all Liberty, then five 

A a 2 Hundrect 

1 88 hxmvci. Arg^ from />6^ Sincerity Partlll. 

Hundred take it half away. If one Degree of the Influence^ 
of Motive don't at all infringe or diminifn Liberty, then no 
more do two Degrees \ for Nothing doubled, is ftill Nothing. 
And if two D'Cgrees don't diminifli the Will's Liberty, no 
more do four, eight, fixteen, or fix Thoufand. For Nothing 
multiplied never fo much, comes to butNothing. If there be 
iicthing in the Nature of Motive or moral Suafion, that is at 
all oppolite to Liberty, then the greateft Degree of it can't 
hurt Liberty. But if there be any Thing in the Nature of 
the Thing, that is againft Liberty, then the leaft Degree of it 
hurts it in fome Degree ; and confequently hurts and dimi- 
nifhes Vertue. If invincible Motives to that A6tion which is 
good, take av/ay all the Freedom of the Ad, and fo all the 
v''ertue of it ; then the more forceable the Motives are, fo 
much the worfe, fo much the lefs Vertue i and the weaker 
the Motives are, the better for the Caufe of Vertue j and 
none is befl of all. 

Now let it be confidered,v^hether thefe Things are agreable 
to common Senfe. If it Ihould be allowed, that there are 
fome Infcances wherein the Soul chufes without any Motive, 
what Vertue can there be in fach a Choice ? I am fure, there 
is no Prudence or Wifdom in it, Such a Choice is made for 
no good End ; for it is for no End at all. If it were for any 
End, the View of the End would be the Motive exciting to 
the Acft ; and if the A61 be for no good End, and fo from no 
good Aim, then there is no good Intention in it ; And there- 
fore, according to all our natural Notions of Vertue, no more 
Vertue in it than in the Motion of the Smoke,which is driven 
to arid fro by the V/ind, without any Aim or End in the 
Thing moved, and which knows not whither, i)or why and 
wherefore, it is moved. 

Corol. I. By thefe Things it appears, that the Argument 
againft the Cahinijls^ taken from the Ufe of Counfels, Exhor- 
tations, Invitations, Expoftulations, &c. fo much infifted on 
by Armhnans^ is truly again [t themfeives. For thefe Things 
can operate no other Way to any good EfFed, than as in 
them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite 
p.nd determine the Acls of the V/ill. But it follows on their 
Principles, that the A6ts of Will excited by fuch Caufes, can't 
t-e vertuous j becaufe fo far as they are from thefe, they 
3re not from the Will's felf-determining Power. Hence it 
ivill follovv/, th:it it :s not worth the while to offer any Argu- 
iy\mp to peruvade I'ltxx to any vertuous Volition or voluntary 
'' '" '•■'•••■• Aetion 5 

Se.VII. of Invit2LWc. again/! thcmklvcs. 189 

I A<5tion ; 'tis in vain to fet before them the Wifdom and 
Amiablenefs of Ways of Vertue, or the Odioufnefs and 
Folly of Ways of Vice. This Notion of Liberty and moral 
Agency fruftrates all Endeavours to draw Men to Yertuc 
by Inftrudion, or Perfwafion, Precept, or Example : For tho* 

I thefe Things may induce Men to what is materially vertuous, 
yet at the fame Time they take away the Form of Vertue, 

; becaufe they deftroy Liberty ; as they, by their own Power, 
put the Will out of it's Equilibrium, determine and turn the 
Scale, and take the Work of felf-dctermining Power out of 

\ it's Hands. And the clearer the Inftru(5lions are that are given, 

, the more powerful the Arguments that are ufed, and the more 
moving the Perfwafions or Examples, the more likely they are 
to fruftrate their own Defign ; Becaufe they have fo much the 

i greater Tendency to put the Will out of it's Balance, to hinder 
it's Freedom of felf-determination •, and fo to exclude the 
very Form of Vertue, and the EiTence of whatfoever is Praife- 

So it clearly follows from thefe Principles, that God has no 
Hand in any Man's Vertue, nor does at all promote it, either 
by a phyfical or moral Influence ; that none of the moral 
Methods He ufes with Men to promote Vertue in the World, 
have Tendency to the Attainment of that End ; that all the 
Inilrudlions which He has given to Men, from the Beginning 
of the World to this Day, by Prophets, or Apoftles, or by his 
Son Jefus Chrift ; that all his Counfels, Invitations, Promifes, 
Threatnings, Warnings and Expoftulations ; that all Means 
He has ufed with Men, in Ordinances, or Providences ; yea, 
all Influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have 
had no Tendency at all to excite any one vertuous Adl of the 
Mind, or to promote any Thing morally good and commen- 
dable, in any Refpe6t. For there is no Way that thefe or 

any other Means can promote Vertue, but one of thefe three. 
Either ( I.) By a phyfical Operation on the Heart. But all 
Effe6ls that are wrought in Men in this Way, have no Vertue 
in them, by the concurring Voice of all Jr?mmans. Or (2.) 
Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the Underftanding,to excite 
good Acls in the Will. But it has been demonftrated, that 
Volitions which are excited by Motives, are neceflary, and not 
excited by a felf-moving Power ; and therefore, by their Prin- 
ciples, there is no Vertue in them. Or (3.) By meerly giving 
the Will an Opportunity to determine it felf concerning 
the Objects propofed, either to chufe or reject, by it's own 
Jjncaufed, unmoved, uninfluenced felf-determinatiou. And if 


igo Arminianifhl excludes ^// Vertuey P.llL 

this be all, then all thofe Means do ho more to promote Ver-^ 
ttic, than Vice: For they do Nothing but give the Will 
Opportunity to determine it felf either Way\ either to Good 
or Bad, without laying it under any Bias to either : And fo 
thtrc is really as much of an Opportunity given to determine 
in Favour of Evil, as of Gefod. 

Thus that horrid blafphemous Confequence will certainly- 
follow from the Armiman Dodrine, which .they charge on 
Others \ namely, that God a6ls an inconfiftent Part in ufing 
fo many Counfels, Warnings, Invitations, Intreaties, &c. with 
Sinners, to induce 'em to forfake Sin, and turn to the Ways of 
Vertue ; and that all are infincere and fallacious. It will fol- 
\m^ from their Dodrine, that God does thefe Things whert 
He knows at the fame Time, that they have no Manner of 
Tendency to promote the Effedt He feems to aim at ; yea^ 
knows that if they have any Influence, this very Influence 
will be inconfiftent with fuch an Eifecl:, and will prevent it. 
But what an Imputation of Infincerity would this tix on Him 
who is infinitely holy and true !~So that their's is theDo6lrJn5 
which if purfued in it's Confequences, does horribly reflect on 
the moft High, and fix on Him theCharge of Hypocrify ; arid 
not the Dodlrine of the Cahhiijl ; according to their frequentj 
and vehement Exclamations and Invedives. 

Corol. 2. From what has been obferved in this S€<51:ion, ft- 
again appears, that Armhuayi Principles and Notions, when 
fairly examined, and purfued in their demonftrable Confe- 
quences, do evidently Ihut all Vertue out of the World, and 
make it impoflible that there fhould ever be any fuch Thing, 
in any Cafe \ or that any fuch Thing fhould ever be conceiv'd 
of. For by thefe Principles, the very Notion of Vertue oi^ 
Vice implies Abfurdity and Contradidion. For it is abfurd irt 
it felf, and contrary to common Senfe, to fuppofe a vertuous 
A<51 of Mind without any good Intention or Aim ; and by 
their Prin^eiples, it is abfurd to fuppofe a vertuous A(5l with a 
good Intention or Aim \ for to att for an End, is to a6t froih- 
a Motive. So that if we rely on thefe Principles, there cart 
be no vertuous A61 with a good Defign and End ; and 'tiS 
felf-evident, there can be none without : confequently there 
can be no vertuous A61 at all. 

Corol, 3. Tis manifeft, that Armmian Notions of moral 
Agency, and the Being of a Faculty of V/ill, cannot confift to- 
gether i and that if there be apy fuch Thixig as, either a ver- 


Sea.VIL and Victy out of the World. 191 

tuous, or vicious A<5t, it can't be an A(5l of Will ; no Will can 
bye at all concerned in it. For that A6t which is performed 
without Inclination, without Motive, without End, muft be 
performed without any Concern of the Will. To fuppofe an 
A51 of the Will without thefe, implies a Contradiction. If 
the Soul in it's Act ha? no Motive or End ; then in that Ad 
(as was obferv^d before) it feeks Nothing, goes after Nothing, 
exerts no Inclination'to any Thing ; and this implies, that in 
that A61 it defires Nothing, and chufesNothing ; fo that there 
is noA<5t of Choice in theCafe : And that is as much as to fay, 
there: is no Adt of Will in the^ Cafe. Which very effedtualiy 
fhuts out all vicious and vertuous A6ts put of the Univerfe ; 
in as much as, according to this, there can be no vicious or 
vertvious A(5t wherein the Will is concerned ; arid according 
\.o the plaineft Didates of Reafon, and the Li^ht of Nature, 
and alfo the Principles of Armin'mm themfelyes, there can be 
no vertuous or vicipus K6k wherein the Will is not concerned. 
And therefore there is no Room for any vertuous or vicious 
A«ts at all. 

Corok 4. If none of the moral A(ftions of intelligent Beings^ 
are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, ano- 
ther ftrange Thing will follow ; and this is, that God not 
only can't foreknow any of the fijiture moral Acftions of his 
Creatures, but He can make no Conjedure, can give no pro- 
bable Guefs concerning them. For, all Conjedure in Things 
of this Nature, muft depend on fome Difcerning or Apprcr. 
li^nfion of thefe two Things, previous Difpcfition^ and Motive ; 
which, as has been obferved, Arminian Notions pf moral 
' Agency, in their real Confequ.ence, altogether exclude. 


{ 192 ) 


Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafon- 
ings o{ Arminians^m Support andDefence 
of the foremention'd Notions o{ Liberty^ I 
moral Ageitcy^^c. and againft the oppo- I 
file Doctrine, are confidered. ■% 

Section I. 

!r>5^ Eflence of the Vertue and Vice of Dif \ 

pofttions of the Hearty a?td A8is of the \ 

JVilly lies not in their Caufe, hut their \ 

Nature. \ 

NE main Foundation of the Reafons, which are 
brought to eftablifh the foremention'd Notions of 
Liberty, Vertue, Vice, &c. is a Suppofition, that the 
Vertuoufnefs of the -Difpofitions or A^s of the Will 
confifts not in the Nature of thefe Difpofitions or 
A6ls, but wholly in the Origin or Caufe of them : fo that if 
the Difpofition of the Mind or hdi of the Will be never io 
£Ood, yet if the Caufe of the Difpofition or Adt be not our 
Vertue, there is nothing vertuous or praife-worthy in it ; and 
•a the contraiy, if the Will in it's Inclination or Ads bene- 


Sea.I. OftkeMcnctofFertue &> Fice,i^^ 

I vcr fo bad, yet unlefs it arifes from fomething that is our 
Vice or Fault, there is Nothing vicious or bIame-^\^orthy in 

I it. Hence their grand Objedlion and pretended Demonftra- 
tion, or Self-Evidence, againft any Vertue and Cofrtmenda- 
bJenefs, or Vice and Blame-worthinefs, of thofe Habits or 
A(5ls of the Will 3 which are not from fome vertuous or Vici* 

I; ous Determination of the Will it felf. 
Now, if this Matter be well confidered, it will appear to 
be altogether a Miftake, yea, a grofs Abfurdity ; and that it is 
r moft certain, that if there be any fuch Things, as a vertuous, 
or vicious Difpofition-, or Volition of Mind, the Vertu5ufnefs 
or Vicioufnefs of them confifts not in the Origin or Caufe of 
thefe Things, but in the Nature of them. 

If the EiTence of Vertuoufnefs or Commendablenefs, and 
of Vicioufnefs or Fault, don't lie in the Nature of the Difpo- 
fitions Or A6ls of Mind, which are faid to be our Vertue or 
our Fault, but in their Caufe, then it is certain it lies no 
where at all. Thus^ for Inflance, if the Vice of a vicioi^s 
Aa of Will, lies not in the Nature of the Aa, but the 
Caufe ; fo that it's being of a bad Nature will not 
make it at all our Fault, unlefs it afifes from fome faulty 
Determination of our's as it*s Caufe, or fomething in us that 
is our Fault; then for the fame Reafon, neither can the 
Vicioufnefs of that Caufe lie in the Nature of the Things it 
felf, but in it^s Caufe : that evil Determination of our's is not 
our Fault, meerly becaufe it is of a bad Nature, unlefs it 
arifes from fome Caufe in us that is our Fault; And when 
v/e are come to this higher Caufe, fl:ill the Reafon of the 
Thing holds good ; tho* this Caufe be of a bad Nature, ye^L 
V, e are not at all to blame on that Account, unlefs it arifes 
from fomething faulty in us. Nor yet can Blame-worthinefs 
lie in the Nature of ibis Canje^ but in the Caufe of that. And 
thus we muft drive Faultinefs back from Step to Step, from 
a lower Caufe to a higher, in infinitum : and that is thoroughly 
to banilh it from the World, and to allow it no polfibility of 
Exigence any where in the Univerfality of Things. On thefe 
Principles, Vice or moral Evil can't confift in any Thing 
I that is an EffeSf ; becaufe Fault don't confift in the Nature 
; of Things, but in their Caufe ; as well as becaufe Effefls 
: are neceiuiry, being unavoidably conne(5led with their Caufe : 
' \ therefore the Caufe only is to blame. And fo it follows, that 
Faultinefs can lie only in that Caufi^ which is a Caufe only^ zn6. 
no Effecft of any Thing. Nor yet can it lie in this ; for then 
it muft lie in the Mature of the Thinir it felf ; cct in it's be- 
k B b ^ ia^ 

K^^T^e Effcnct of Fertue & J^ke^ Part IV* 

ing from any Determination of o]jr*s, nor any Thing faulty 
m us which is the Caufe, nor indeed from any Caufe at all, 
for by the iiuppofition, it is no EfFed, and hai no Caufe. 
And thus, He that will maintahi, it is n'ot the Nature of 
Habits or Ads of Will that makes them vertuous or faulty, 
but the Caufe, muft immediately run Hnnfelf out of his 
ovm AfTertion ; and in maintaining it, will infenfibly con- 
tradid and deny it. 

This is certain, tha.t if EfFe6ls are vicious and faulty, not 
from their Nature, or from any Thing inherent in them, 
but bccaufe they are from a bad Caufe, it muft be on Ac- 
count of the Badnefs of the Caufe ; and fo on Account 
of the Nature of the Caufe : A bad EfFea in the Will muf^ 
be bad, becaufe the Caufe is bad^ or of an evil Nature^ 
or has Badnefs as a Quality inherent in it : and tl good Eflfed 
in the Will muft be good^ by Reafon of the Goodnefs of the 
Caufe, or it's being of a geod Kind and Nature, And if this 
be what is meant, the very Suppofition of Fault and Praife 
iving not in the«» Nature of the Thing, but the Caufe, con- 
tradicts it {€ii^ and does at leaft refolve the Eftence of Vertue 
and Vice into theNature of Things, and fuppofes it originally 

to confift in that. And if a Caviller has a Mind to run 

from the Abfurdity, by faying, '' No, the Fault of the 
«"^ Thing which is the Caufe, lies not in this, that the Caufe, 
>' it {^ii is of an evil Nature^ but that the Caufe is evil in 
*^' that Senfe, that it is from another bad Caufe". Still the 
Abfurdity will follow him ; for if fo, then the Caufe before, 
ch"arged is at once acquitted, and all the Blame muft be laid, 
to the higher Caufe, and muft confift in that's being Evil^ or 
of an evil Nature. So now we are come again to lay theBlamC' 
of the Thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the Thing, and 
not to the Caufe. And if any is fo foolifti as to go higher 
ftill, and afcend from Step to Step, till he is come to that 
which is the lirftCaufe concerned in the whole Affair, and will 
fay, all the Blame lies in that ; then at laft he muft be forced 
to ov/n, that the Faultinefs of the Thing which he fuppofes 
alone blame-worthy, lies wholly m the Nature of the Thing, 
and not in the Original or Caufe of it ; for the Suppofition 
is, that it has no Original, it is determined by noAct of our's, 
is caufcd by nothing faulty in us, being abfolutely w///>tf«f 
ans; Qaufl. And fo the Race is at an End, but the Evader is 
taken In his Flight. 

'Tis agreable to x\\'^ natural Notions of Mankind, that 
moral Evil, v.'ith it's Defert of Diilike and Abhorrence, and 
ali it's other Jll-defcrvings, confifts in a certain DAtw/Zv in 

. the 

Se.I. in the^^t^ of Volition ^not in theC^LVik. 1 9 5 

the Nature of certain Difpofitions of the Heart, and A€is of 
the Will ; and not in the Deformity of fcrmihing elfe^ diverfe. 
from the very Thing it felf, which deferves Abhorrence, 
fuppofed to be the Catife of it. Which would be abfurd, 
becaufe that would be to fuppofe, a Thing that is in- 
nocent and not Evil, is truly evil and faulty, becaufe another 
Thing is Evil. It implies a Contradidion ; for it would be 
to fuppofe, the very Thing which is morally evil and blame- 
worthy, is innocent and not blame-worthy j but that fomething 
elfe, which is it's Cauie, is pnly to blame. To fay, that Vice 
don't confift in the Thing which is vicious, but in it's Caufe, 
is the fame as to fay, that Vice don't confiil: in Vice, but in 
that which, produces it. 

'Tis true, a Caufe may be to blame, for being the Caufe 
of Vice : It may be Wicicednefs in the Caufe, that it pro- 
duces Wickednefs. But it would imply a Contradidion, to 
fuppofe that thefe two are the fame individual Wickednefs. 
The wicked A61 of the Caufe in producing Wickednefs, is 
one Wickednefs ; and the Vf ickednefs produced, if there be 
any produced, is another. And therefore the Wickednefs of 
the latter don't lie in the, but is diftind from it ; and 
the Wickednefs of both lies in the evil Nature of the Things 
which are wicked. 

The Thing' which makes Sin hateful, is that by which it 
deferves P'uniSiment ; which is but the Expreffion of Hatred. 
And that which renders Vertue lovely, is the fame with that, 
on the Account of which, it is fit to receive Praife and Re- 
ward ; which are but the Expreflions of Efteem and Love. 
But that which makesVice hateful, is it's hateful Nature ; and 
that which rendersVertue lovely, is it's amiable Nature. 'Tis 
a certain Beauty or Deformity that are inherent in that good 
'or evil Will, whieh is the Soul of Vertue and Vice (and not 
in the Occafion of it) which is their Worthinefs of Eileem or 
Difefteem, Praife or Difpraife, according to the common Senfe 
of Mankind. If the Caufe or Occaficn of the Rife of an 
hateful Difpofition or Ad of Will, be alfo hateful ; ^ fuppofe 
another antecedent evil Will 5 that is entirely an^ig. Sin, 
and defer\^es Punidiment by it felf, under a diilincrv^onf de- 
ration. There is Worthinefs of Difpraife in the Nature of an 
evil Volition, and not wholly in fome foregoing A<5t which 
is it's Caufe ; otherwife the evil Volition wl»ich is the Eifeit* 
is no moral Evil, any more than Sicknefs, or fome other na- 
tural Calamity, which arifes from a Caufe moraUy evil. 

B b 2 Thus 


«96 The Effence ofFerm ^Vice, PartlV. 

Thi;s for Inftance, Ingratitude is hateful and worthy of 
Difpraife,ajccording to common Senfe ; not becaufe fomethjng 
as bad, or worfe than Ingratitude, was the Caufe that produced 
^t ; but becaufe it is hateful in it i€ii^ by it's own inherent 
Deformity. So the Love of Vertue is amiable, and worthy of 
Praife, not meerly becaufe fomething elfe went before thi^ 
Love of Vertue in our Minds, which caufed it to take Place 
there ; forlnflance our own Choice ; we chofe to love Vertue, 
and by fome Method or other wrought our felves into th$ 
Love of it ; but becaufe of the Amiablenefs and Condecei\cy 
of fuch a Difpofition and Inclination of Heart. If that was 
the Cafe, that we did chufe to love Vertue, and {o produced 
that Love in our \thts^ this Choice it felf could be no other-! 
wife amiable or praife- worthy, than as Love to Vertue, or 
fom,e other amiable Inclination, was exercifed and impjied in 
it. If that Choice was amiable at all, it muft be fo on Act 
count of fome amiable Qiiality in the Nature of the Choice, 
If we chofe to love Vertue, not in Love to Vertue, or any 
Thing that was good, and exercifed no fort of good Difpofi* 
tion in the Choice, the Choice it felf was not vertuous, no!" 
worthy of any Praife, according to commpn Senfe, becaufe^ 
the Choice vvas not of a good Nature. 

^ It may not be improper here to take Notice of fomething 
faid by anAuthor, that has lately made a mighty Noife in Ame- 
rica, <« A neceffary Holinefs (fays He *) is no Holinefs.- — 
" Adam could not be originally created in Righteoufnefs and 
*' true Holinefs, becaufe He muft chufe to be righteous, before 
*^ He could be righteous, And therefore He muft exift. He 
'* muft be created, yea He muft exercife Thought and Re^^ 
" fledtion, before he v<ras righteous." There is much more 
to the fame Effed: in that Place, and alfo in P. 437, 438, 439, 
440. If thefe Things are fo, it will certainly follow, that the 
^rft chufmg to be righteous i? no righteous Choice ; there 
is no Righteoufnefs or Holinefs in it ; becaufe no chufing to 
be righteous goes before it. For He plainly fpeaks of chufmg 
to be righteous y as what muji go before Righteoufnefs : And that 
which follows the Choice, being the EfFe^ of the Choice, 
can't be Righteoufnefs cr Holinefs : For an Eife<5l is a Thing 
neceifary, and can't prevent the Influence or Efficacy of it's 
Caufe J and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the 
Caufe : And He fays, A neceffaryHolinefs is no Holinefs, So that 
neither can a Chpice of Righteoufpefs be Righteoufnefs oc 


♦^ ?cnp. Pqc, of Qri^iaal Sin.y, f, 180. 3d ^dit* 

ScJ.m theNat^ ofVoUtton^notin /^^Caufe. 197 

Holincfs, nor can anyThing that is confequent on that Choice, 
and the EfFedl of it, be Righteoufnefs or Holinefs ; nor can 
any Thing that is without Choice, be Righteouinefs or Holi- 
nefs. So that by his Scheme, all Righteoufnefs and Holinefs 
is at once fhut out of the World, and no Door left open, by 
which it can ever poflibly enter into the World. 

I fuppofe, the Way that Men came to entertain this abfurd 
inconfirtent Notion, with Refpe6l to internal Inclinations and 
Volitions themfelves, (or Notions that imply it,) vi%. that the 
ElTence of their moral Good or Evil lies not in their Nature, 
but their Caufe ; was, that it is indeed a very plain Didate 
of common Senfe, that it is fo with Refpe(5t to all outward 
J^fio-fis, and fenfible Motions of the Body ; that the moral 
Good or Evil of 'em don't lie at all in the Motions them- 
felves ; which taken by themfelves, are nothing of a moral 
Nature ; and the EfTence of all the moral Good or Evil that 
concerns them, lies in thofe internal Difpofitions and Volitions 
which. are the Caufe of them. Now being always ufed to de- 
termine this, without Hedtation or Difpute, concerning external 
Atliom \ which are the Things that in the ccmmiOn Ufe of 
Language are fignified by fuch Phrafes, as Men's Actions^ or 
their Doings ; Hence v^hen they came to fpeak of Volitions, 
and internal Exercifes of their Inclinations, under the fame De- 
nomination of their Jdlisns, or what they do, they unwarily de- 
termined the Cafe muil alfo be the fame with thefe, as with 
txterjzal Actions ; not confidering the vaft Difference in th« 
Nature of the Cgfe. 

If any (hall ftill objed and fay. Why is it not neceffary 
tfiat the Caufe ihould be confidered, in order to determine 
whether anyThing be worthy of Blame orPraife ? Is if agreable 
to Reafon and common Senle, that a Man is to be praifed or 
blamed for that which he is not the Caufe or Author of, and 
has no Hand in ? 

I anfwer, fuch Phrafes as being the Caufe, being the Author, 
paving a Hand^ and the like are ambiguous. They are moft 
vulgarly underftood for being the defigning voluntary Caufe, 
or Caufe by antecedent Choice : And it is moft certain that 
Men are not in this Senfe the Caufes or Authors of the firfl 
A<5t of their Wills, in any Cafe ; as certain as any Thing is, 
or ever can be ; for nothing can be more certain, than that a 
Thing is not before it is, nor a Thing of the fame Kind be- 
fcre the firft Thing of that Kind -, and To no Choice before 


rgS The Arminian JVo/ion of A&ion, P.IVr 

Ac firft Choice.-— As ihtPhrvik, heing the Juthofy may be un- 
derftood, not of being the Producer by an antecedent Ad: of' 
Will ; but as a Perfon may be faid to be the Author of the 
A<5t of Will it felf, by his being the immediate Agent, 
^ the Being that is a^'mg^ or in Exercife in that A&. ; If the' 
Phrafe of heitig the Author^ is ufed to iignify this, then donbt-\ 
lefs cwnmon Senfe requires Men's being the Authors of their 
own A(5ts of Will, in order to their being efteemed worthy of 
Praife or Difpraife on Account of them. And common Senfe' * 
teaches, that tHey muft be the Authors of external ASiions^ \vi 
the former Senfe, namely, their being the Caiifes of 'em by an" 
A6t of Will or Choice, in order to their being juftly blamed 
or praifed : But it teaches no ftich I'hing with Refpe6t to the 
Ads of the Will thennfelves.— But this may appear more ma- 
nifeft by the Things whrch will be obferved in the following 

Section II. 

lT)e Falfenefs and Incon/tjience of that meta- 
phyfcal Notion of Adion, ^W Agency, 
which feems to be generally entertained by 
the Defenders of the Arminian Do&riner 
concerning Liberty ^ moral Agency y &c. 

ONE Thing that is made very much a Ground of Argu- 
ment and fuppofed Demonftration by Arminians^ in 
Defence of the fore-mentioned Principles, concerning 
moral Agency, Vertue, Vice 5cc. is their metaphyseal Notion 
of Agency and A^ion. They fay, unlefs the Soul has a Self- 
determining Power, it has no Power of A5iion ; If it's Vo- 
litions be not caufed by it felf, but are excited and determined 
by fome ex»rinfic Caufe, they can't be the Soul's own ASls j 
and that the Soul can't be a^'ive^. but muft be wholly pajjlvey in 
thofe EfFeds which it is the Subject of necefTarily-, and ;iQt 
from it's own free Determination, 


Se£l:. II. falfe and inconjijlent. igg 

Mr. Chuhh lays the Foundation of his Scheme of Liberhr, 
and of his Arguments to fupport it, very much in this Pofiti- 
on. That Man is an Agent^ ancl capable of A6lion. Which 
doubtlefs is true : But Bdf- determination belongs to his Notion 
pf A6fion^ and is the very Eflence of it. Whence he infers 
that it is impoffible for a Man to a6l and be ac^led upon, in 
the fame Thing, at the fame Time ; and that nothing that is 
an Adion, can be the Effedl of the Adion of another : and he 
infifts, that a necejjary Agent ^ or an Agent that is neceffarily 
determined to ad:, is a plain Cofitracii^ion, 

But thofe are a precariousSort of Demonftrations,whichMen 
build on the Meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a Word ; 
efpeciaily when that Meaning is abftrufe, inconfiftent, and 
entirely diverfe from the original Senfe of the Word in com^ 
mon Speech. 

That the Meaning of the Word Adlion^ as Mr. Chubb apd 

many others ufe it, is utterly unintelligible and inconfifl:ent,^is 

manifell:, becaule it belongs to their Notion of an Adion, that 

'tis fomething wherein is no Pafllon or PalTivcnefs ; that is 

(according to their Senfe of Paffivenefs) it is under the 

Power, hiiluence or Adion of no Caufe. And this implies, 

that A(5tion has no Caufe, and is no Effed : for to be an 

Effe6t implies Pajftvenefs^ or the being fubjed to the Power and 

! Adion of it's Caufe. And yet they hold, that the Mind's 

A^ion is the Effedl of it's own Determination, yea, the Mind's 

free and voluntary Determination ; which is the fame with 

i free Choice. So that Adion is the EfFed of fomething pre- 

ceeding, even a preceeding Ad of Choice : And confequently, 

i in this Effed the Mind is paffive, fubjed to the Power and 

I Adion of the preceeding Caufe, which is the foregoing Choice, 

[and therefore can't be adive. So that here we have this Con- 

tradidion, that Adion is always the Effed of foregoingChoice ; 

; and therefore can't be Adion ; becaufe it is pajftve to the 

I Power of that preceeding caufal Choice ; and the Mind can't 

I be adive and paffive in the fame Thing, at the fame Time. 

I Again, they fay, Neceffity is utterly inconfiftent with Adion, 

iand a neceflary Adion is a Contradidion ; and fo their Notion 

of Adion implies Contingence, and excludes all NecefTity. 

And therefore their Notion of Adion implies, that it has no 

neceflary Dependence or Connedion with any Thing forego- 

{ing ; for fuch a Dependence or Connedion excludes Contin- 

|gence, and implies Neceflity. And yet their Notion of Adion 

^implies NecefTity, and fuppofes that it is neceffary, and can't be 


200 T^^Arminian Notion of AGtion^ Parti V. \ 

tontingent. For they fuppofe,that whatever is properly called i 

A(5tion, muft be determined by the Will and free Choice ; ] 

and this is as much as to fay, that it muft be neceffary, being j 

dependent upon, and determined by fomething foregoing ; j 

namely, a foregoing A(5t of Choice. Again, it belongs to their 1 

Notion of Adtion, of that which is a proper and meer A<51^ f 

that it is the Beginning of Motion, or of Exertion o( Power ; ^ 

but yet it is implied in their Notion of A6lion, that it is not i 

the Beginning of Motion or Exertion of Power, but is confe- i 

quent and dependent on a preceeding Exertion of Power, viz» i 

the Power of Will and Choice : for they fay there is no pro- . i 
per Adion but what is freely chofen ; or, which is the fame 

Thing, determined by a foregoing A6i of free Choice. But i 

if any of them (hall fee Caufe to deny this, and fay they hold \ 
flo filchThing as that every A6tion is chofen. or determined by 

a foregoing Choice ; but that the very firft Exertion of Will j 

tonly, undetermined by any preceeding A61:, is properly called \ 

Adion ; then I fay, fuch a Man's Notion of A6tion implies i 

NecelTity ; for what the Mind is the Subjedt of without the 'J 

Determination of it's own previous Choice, it is the Subjed of" I 

necefiarily, as to any Hand that free Choice has in the Affair ; ' 

and without any Ability the Mind has to prevent it, by any * 

Will or Eledlion of it's own : becaufe by the Suppofition it 1 
precludes all previous Ads of the Will or Choice in the Cafe, 

which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this 'other i 

Way, implied in their Notion of Ad, that it is both neceffary '} 

and not necefiary. Again,it belongs to their Notion of an Ji^, i^ 

that it is no Effed of a pre-determining Bias or Preponderation, 'J 

but fprings immediately out of Indifference ; and this implies % 

that it can't be from foregoing Choice, which is foregoing Pre- 'j 

ponderation : if it be not habitual, but occafional, yet if it 'f 

caufes the Ad, it is truly previous, efficacious and determining. ' ; 

And yet, at the fame Time, 'tis eifential to their Notion of an ' j;1 

Ad, that it is what the Agent is the Author of freely and vo- 'i* 

luntarily, and that is, by previous Choice and Defign. •] 

So that according to their Notion of an Ad, confidered witb^ i1 

Reeard to it's Coniequences, thefe following Things are all ! 

cffential to it j viz. That it fhould be neceffary, and not ne- \ < 

cefTary ; that it fhould be from a Caufe, and no Caufe' ; that it. 3 

(hould be the Fruit of Choice and Defign, and not the Fruit of '\ 

Choice and Defign ; that it fhould be the Beginning of Motioi* i 

or Exertion, and yet confequent on previous Exertion ; that :« 

it fhould be before it is ; that it fliould fpring immediately '^- 

out oi Indifference and Eq^iiibrium, aftd yet be the EfFed oP i 

PiCeponderation.^ ^ 

Sed:. II. falfe and inconfifient. 20 1 

Preponderation ; that it lliould be felf-orlginated, and alfo 
have it's Original from fomething elfe ; that it is what the 
Mind caufes it felf, of it's own Will, and can produce or pre- 
vent, according to it's Choice or Pleafure, and yet what the 
Mind has no Power to prevent, it precluding all previous 
Choice in the Affair. 

So that an A(5l, according to their metaphyfical Notion of 

it, is fomething of which there is no Idea ; 'tis nothing but 

a Confufion of the Mind, excited by Words without anv 

difi:in6l Meaning, and is an abfolute Non-entity ; and that in 

two Refpeds ; (i.) There is nothing in the World that ever 

was, is, or can be, to anfwer the Things which mufl belong to 

it's Defcription, according to what they fuppofe to be eflential 

jto it. And (2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, 

any Notion or Idea to anfwer the Word, as they \ife and ex- 

i plain it. For if we (hould fuppofe any fuch Notion, it would 

many Ways deftroy it felf. But 'tis impolTible, any Idea of 

i Notion (liould fubfift in the Mind, v/hofe very Nature and 

lEfTence, which conftitutes it, deilroys it.™ If fome learned 

i Philofopher, who had been abroad, in giving an Account of 

[the curious Obfervations he had made in his Travels, fhould- 

|fay, " He had been in Terra del Fuego^ and there had feen an 

I " Animal, which he calls by a certain Name, that begat and 

I «« brought forth it felf, and yet had a Sire and a Dam di{lin<5l 

i " from it felf ; that it had an Appetite, and was hungry before 

r' it had a Being ; that his Mafier, v/ho led him, and govern- 

*' ed him at his Pleafure, was always governed by him, and 

I •* driven by him where he pleafed ; that when he moved, hs 

\ ** always" took a Step before the firit Step ; that he went with 

i " hisHead firft,and yet always wentTail foremoft ; and this,tho' 

J!" he had neitherHead norTail:" It would be no Impudence at 

; all, to tell fuch a Traveller, tho' a learned Man, that Ke him- 

felf had no Notion or Idea of fuch an Animal as he gave an 

i Account of, and never had, nor ever would have. 

■ As the fcremention'd Notion of Acftion is very inconfiflent, 
fo it is wholly diverfe from the original Meaning of the Word, 
The more ufual Signification of it in vulgar Speech, f^ems to 
be fome Moticn or Exertion of Power ^ that is voluntary, or that 
\% the Effe6l cf the IVill ; and is ufed in the fame Senle as doing : 
And moil commonly 'tis ufed to fignify cutzuard Afuom. So 
Tinr.kirg is often diftinguilh'd from Atnng ; and Defirhig and 
TVilUng^ from Doing. 

C c Befide* 

4 " 

202 7^^ArininIaniV<9//^;^ of Ailion, Part IV. 

Befides this more ufual and proper Signification of the Word 
A^ion^ there are other Ways in which the Word is ufed that 
are lefs proper, which yet have Place in common Speech. 
Oftentimes 'tis ufed to fignify fome Motion or Alteration in 
inanim.ate Things, with Relation to fome Obje6l and Effect. 
So the Spring of a Watch is faid to aot upon the Chain and 
Wheels ; the Sun-beams, to a6l upon Plants and Trees ; 
and theFire, to ad upon Wood. Sometimes the Word is ufed 
to fignify Motions, Alterations, and Exertions of Power, which 
are feen in corporeal Things, cor.fidered ahfolutely ; efpecially 
when thefe Motions feem to arife from fome internal Caufe 
■which is hidden j fo that they have a greater Refemblance of 
thofe Motions of our Bodies, which are the Effe6fs of internal 
Volition, or invifible Exertions of Will. So the Fermentation 
of Liquor, the Operations of the Loadfi:one, and of eledlrical 
Bodies, are called the Adiion of thefe Things. And fometimes 
the Word Aciion is ufed to fignify the Exercife of Thought, 
or of Will and Inclination : fo meditating, loving, hating, in- 
clining, difinclining, chufing and refufing, may be fometimes 
called acting ; tho' more rarely (unlefs it be by Philofophers 
and Metaphyficians) than in any of the other Senfes. 

But the Word is never ufed in vulgar Speech in that Senfe 
which Anninian Divines ufe it in, namely, for the felf-deter- 
minate Exercife of the Will, or an Exertion of the Soul that 
arifes without any necefiTary Connexion v^rith any Thing fore- 
going. Jf a Man does fomething voluntarily, or as the EfFed 
of his Choice, then in the moft proper Senfe, and as the Word 
is moil originally and commoaly ufed, he is faid to a^ : But 
whether that Choice or Volition be feif-determined, or no, 
whether it be conne(5led with foregoing habitual Bias, whether 
it be the certain Effed of the ftrongefi; Motive, or fome extrin- 
iick Caufe, never comes into Confideration in the Meaning of 
the Word. 

And if the Word ASfion is arbitrarily ufed by fome Men 
othervv'ife, to fuit fome Scheme of Metaphyficks or Morality, 
no Argument can reafonably be founded on fuch a Ufe of this 
Term, to prove any Thing but their own Pleafure. For Di- 
vines and Philofophers ftrenuoufly to urge fuch Arguments, as 
tiio' they were fufficient to fupport and demonftrate a whole 
Scheme of moral Philofcphy and Divinity, is certainly to eredt" 
a mighty Edifice on the Sand, or rather on a Shadow. And 
tho' it mav now perhaps, thro' Cufiom, have become natural 
for 'em tg ufe the \Vord in this Senfe (if that may be called a 


Seel, II. falfe and inconjijlent. 203 

Senfe or Meaning, which is fo in confident with it felf ) yet 
this don't prove that it is agreable to the natural Notions Men 
have of Things, or that there can be anyThing in the Creation 
that fhould anfwer fuch a Meaning. And tho' thej^ appeal to 
Experience, yet the Truth is, that Men are fo far from expe- 
riencing any fuch Thing, that it is impolTible for 'em to have 
any Conception of it. 

If it fhould be objecfled, that Atihii. and Faffion are doubtlefs 
Words of a contrary Signification ; but to fuppofe that the 
Agent, in it's Action, Is under the Power and Influence of 
fomething extrinlick, is to confound Adion and PafTion, and 
make 'em the fame Thing. 

I anfwer. That Acflion and Faffion are doubtlefs, as they are 
fometimes ufed, Words of oppofite Signification ; but not as 
fignifying oppofite Exijiences^ but only oppofite Relations. The 
Words Caufe and Ef}£i are Terms of oppofite Signification ; 
but neverthelefsjif I afieit that the fameThing may at the fame 
Time, in different Refpecls and Relations, be both Caiife and 
Effe^^ thi^ will not prove that I confound the Terms. The 
Soul may be both aSiive and paffive in the fame Thing „in dif- 
ferent Refpeds, aSiive with Relation to one Thing, and pajjlvg 
with Relation to another. The Word PaJJion when fet in Op- 
pofition to A^mt or rather ASiivenefs^ is meerly a relative Term : 
it fignifies noEfled or Caufe, nor any proper Exiftence ; but is 
the fame ^'xKwPaJfivencfi.^ or a being paflive,or a being a6led up- 
on by fomething. Which is a meerRelatlon ofaThing to fome 
Power or Force exerted by fome Caufe, producing fome Effe6t 
in it, or upon it. And ASi'ion^ when fct properly m Oppofition 
to Pajfion^ or Pajfivenefs., is no real Exifience ; it is not the fam.c 
with AN AtYion^ but is a meer Relation : 'Tis the ABvvcnefi of 
fomething on another Thing, being the oppofite Relation to 
the other, Wz. a Relation of Power, or Force exerted by fome 
Caufe, towards another Thing, which is the Subjcn^l of the 
Effe6l of that Power. Indeed the Word Att'ion is frequently 
ufed to fignify fomething not meerly relative^ but more ahfoluie^ 
and a real Exifience ; as when we fay An Acfion ; when the 
Word is not uled tranfitively, but abfoiutely, for fome Motion 
or Exercife of Body or Mind, without any Relation to any 
Object or Eff&6t : And as ufed thus, it is not properly. the op- 
'Ippfite of Pajfton \ v^hich ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute, 
but meerly the Relation of being aiied upon. And therefore if 
the Word '/JStion be ufed in the like relative Seiife, then Action 
and PalTion are only two contrary Relations. And 'tis no Ab- 

Q Q 2, furdity 

:204 How _ this Arminian Notion Part IV. ] 

furdlty to fuppofe, that contrary Relations may belong to the i 

fame Thing, at the fame Time, with refpedt to difFerentThings. \ 

So to fuppofe, that ther^ are Ads of the Soul by which a Man \ 

voluntarily moves, and ac^s upon ObjecSts, and producesEfFe6ls> , 

which yet themfelves are Effe6ls of fomething elfe, and wherein \ 

the Soul it felf is the Object of fomething adting upon, and i 

influencing that, don't at all confound Adion and PafTion. i 

The Words may neverthelefs be properly of oppoiite Signiti- • 

cation : there niay be as true and real a Difference between I 

adling and being caufed to a6l^ tho' we fliould fuppofe the Soul "i 

to be both in the fame Volition, as there is between livings and \ 

heing qtiukerid^ or made to live. 'Tis no more a Contradiction, to 'i 

luppofe that Adion may be the Effe6t gf fome other Caufe, ,^ 

hefides the Agent, or Being that aifts, than to fuppofe that Life \ 

may be the EfFed of fome other Caufe, befides the Liver, or 1 

the Being that lives, in whom Life is caufed to be. ■ 

The Thing v/hich has led Men into this inconfiftent No- j 
tion of Action, v/hen applied to Volition, as tho* it were \ 
eiTential to this internal A6lion, that the Agent (hould be felf- I 
determined in it, and that the Will fliould be the Caufe of it, ^ 
was probably this ; that according to the Senfe of Mankind, \ 
and the common Ufe of Language it is fo, with refpedl to ; 
Men's external Adions ; which are what originally, and ac- 
cording to the vulgar Ufe and mofl: proper Senfe of the Word, A 
are called A^iions. Men in thefe are felf-dire(5ted, felf-deter- i 
mined, and their Wills are the Caufe of the Motions of thei? ij 
Bodies, and the external Things that are done ; fo that unlefg ij 
Men do 'em voluntarily, and of Choice, and the A6tion be de- ij 
termined by their antecedent Volition, it is no A61ion or Doing || 
of theirs. Hence fomeMetaphyficians have been led unwarily, \\ 
but exceeding abfurdly, to fuppofe the fame concerningVolitioi) | ■ 
it felf, that That alfo mufl: be determined by the Will ; which % 
is to be determin'd by antecedent Volition, as the Motion of 1 
the Body is 5 not confidering the Contradiction it implies. 


But 'tis very evldent,that in the metaphyfical Diftind^ion bev 

tween A6lion and PaiT|on, (tho' long fince become common j 

and the general Vogue) due Care has not been taken to con- -■ 

form Language to the Nature of Things, or to any diftind j 

clear Ideas. As it is in innumerable other Philofophical, Me* 1 
t:aph3^f]cal Terms, ufed in thefe Difputes ; which has occafion'<|[^!.;| 
;r,e::fQrcirible Difficiilty, Contention, Errour and Confufion. 


Se(^. II. probably arofe. 205 

And thus probably it came to be thought,that NecefTity was 
inconfifleiit with Adion, as thefe Terms are applied to Vo- 
lition. Firft, thefeTerms A^'ion and Necejftty afe changed from 
dieir original Meaning, as fignifying external voluntary A6tion, 
and Conftraint, (in which Meaning they are evidently incon- 
fiftent) to fignify quite other Thinigs, viz. Volition it felf, and 
Certainty of Exiftence. And when the Change of Signification 
is made, Care is riot taken to make proper Allowances and 
Abatements for the Difference of Senfe ; but ftill the fame 
Things are unwarily attributed to J^ion and Necejftty^ in the 
new Meaning of the Words, which plainly belonged to 'em in 
their firft Senfe ; and on this Ground, Maxims are eftablifned 
without any real Foundation, as tho' they were the moft cer- 
tain Truths, and the moft evident Didates of Reafon. 

But however ftrenuoufly it is maintain'd, that what is necef- 
fary can't be properly called Adion, and that a necefTary 
Adion is a Contradicftion, yet 'tis probable there are few Armt^ 
man Divines, who if thoroughly tried, would ftand to thefe 
Principles. They will alIow,that God is in the higheft Senfe 
an a6tive Being, and the higheft Fountain of Life and A(5tion ; 
and they would not probably deny, that thofe that are called 
God'^s X<5ts of Righteoufnefs, Holinefs and Faithfulnefs, are 
truly and properly God's A6ls^ and God is really a holy Agent 
in them : and yet I truft, they will not deny, that God necef- 
farily adts juftly and faithfully, and that it is impoflibk for 
Him to ad unrighteoufly aad unholily. 


2o6 JVhy C^\m\(vn. is fuppofed Part IV. 

Section III. 

The Reafons why fome think it contrary to 
common Scnfe, to fuppofe thofe things 
which are neceffary, to be worthy of either 
Praife or Blame. 

^^~W^<IS abundantly affirmed and urged by Armm'ian Writers, 
I that it is contrar}^ to common Senfe^ and the natural No- 
tions and Apprehenfions of Mankind, to fuppofe o- 
therwife than that Neceffity ('making no Diftindlion between 
natural and moral Necefnty) is inconfiftent with Vertue and 
Vice, Praife and Blame, Revv^ard and Punilhment. And their 
Arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in ; 
and have been not a little perplexing to many who have been 
friendly to the Truth, as clearly revealed in the holy 
Scriptures .* It has fcem'd to them indeed difficult, to recon- 
cile Calvinijlk Do6lrines with the Notions Men commonly 
hav^e of Juftice and Equity. And the true Reafons of it 
feem to be thefe that follow. 

L 'Tis Indeed a very plain Dictate of common Senfe, that 
natural Neceffity is wholly inconfiftent with juft Praife or 
Blame. If Men do Things which in themfelves are very 
good, fit to be brought to pafs, and very happy Effeds, pro- 
perly againft their Wills, and can't help it ; or do them from 
a Neceffity that is without their Wills, or with which 
their Wills have no Concern or Connexion ; then 'tis 
a plain Didate of common Senfe, that it's none of their 
Vertue, nor any moral Good in them ; and that they are 
not worthy to be rewarded or praifed ; or at all efteemed, 
honoured or loved on that Account. And on the other 
Ha^d, that if from like Neceffity they do thofe Things which 
in Themfelves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them 
becaufe they can't help it ; the Neceffity is fuch, that it is 
all one whether they will them, or no j and the Reafon why 
they are done, is from Neceffity only, and not from their 
Wills ; 'Tis a very plain Dicflate of common Senfe that they 
are not at all to blame ; there is no Vice, Fault, or moral 
Evil at ail in the E£fe6l ilQii^ j *noi; are they who arc thus 


Se6l.III. contrary to common Senfe, 207 

necelTitated, in any wife worthy to be puniihed, hated, or 
in the leall difrefpeded, on that Account. 

In like Manner, if Things in themfelves good and defira^ 
ble are abfolutely impofhbie, with a natural Impoffibility, 
the univerfal Reafon of Mankind teaches, that this wholly a)id 
perfcSlly excufes Perfons in their not doing them. 

And 'tis alfo a plain Didate of common Senfe, that if the 
doing Things in themfelves Good, or avoiding Things io 
themfelves Evil, is not abfolutely impojfihle^ with fuch a natural 
Impoffibility, but very difficulty with a natural Difficulty ; that 
is, a Difficulty prior to^ and not at all confifling in Will and 
Inclination it felf, and which would remain the fame, let the 
Inclination be what it will ; then a Perfon's Negle6t or O- 
miffion is excufed in fojne Meafure^ tho' not wholly ; his Sin is 
lefs aggravated,than if theThing to be done were eafy. And if 
inftead of Difficulty and Hindrance, there be a contrary natural 
Propenfity in the State of Things, to the Thing to be done, or 
£fte6i: to be brought to pafs, abftra6ted from any Confidera- 
tion of the Inclination of the Heart ; tho' the Propenfity be 
not fo great as to amount to a natural Neceffity ; yet being 
fome Approach to it, fo that the doing the good Thing be 
very much from this natural Tendency in the State of Things, 
and but little from a good Inclination ; then it is a Dictate 
of common Senfe, that there is fo much the lefs Vertue in 
what is done ; and fo it is lefs Praife-worthy and rewarda- 
ble. TheReafon is eafy, viz, becaufe fuch a natural Propenfity 
or Tendency is an Approach to natural Neceffity ; and th® 
greater the Propenfity, ftill fo m^uch the nearer is the 
Approach to Neceffity. And therefore as natural Neceffity 
takes away or fhuts out all Vertue, fo this Propenfity ap- 
proaches to an Abolition of Vertue ; that is, it diininijhes it. 
And on the other Hand, natural Difficulty in the State "of 
Things is an Approach to natural Impoffibility. And as the 
latter, when it is compleat and abfolute, whclly takes away 
Blame ; fo fuch Difficulty takes away fome Blame, or dimi- 
niflies Blame ; and makes the Thing done to be lefs worthy 
of Punifhment. 

II. Men in their firft Ufe of fuch Phrafes as thefe, Mnjf^ 

. mritn^ cant help it, can't avoid it^ necejjary^ unable^ impojJible.y uH" 

trvoidable^ Irreftflible he. ufe them to fignify a Neceffity of Con- 

ftraint or Rertraint, a natural Neceffity or Impoflibility ; or 

-fome Neceffity that the Will has nothing to do in- ; which 


2 o8 tFhy Galvinlfm is fuppofed Part IV. 

may be, whether Men will or no ; and which may be fup- 
pofed to be juft the fame, let Men's Inclinations and DefireJ 
be what they will. Such Kind of Terms in their original 
\Jky I fuppofe among all Nations, are relative ; carrying in 
their Signification (as was before obferved) a Reference or Re-' 
fpe6l to fome contrary Will, Defire or Endeavour, which, it is^ 
fuppofed, is, or may be in the Cafe. All Men find, and be- 
gin to find in early Childhood, that there are innumerable 
Things that can't be dene, which they defire to do ; and in- 
numerable Things which they are averfe to, that mull be, 
they can't avoid them, they will be, whether they chufe them 
or no. 'Tis to exprefs this Neceflity, which Men fo foon 
and fo often find, and which fo greatly and fo early afFe6ls 
them in innumerable Cafes, that fuch Terms and Phrafes 
are firft formed ; and 'tis to fignify fuch a Neceffity, that 
they are firft ufed, and that they are moft conftantly ufed, in 
the common Affairs of Life ; and not to fignify any fuch me- 
taphyfical, fpeculative and abftradt Notion, as that Connexion 
m the Nature or Courfe of Things, which is between the 
Subje6t and Predicate of a Propofition, and which is the Foun- 
dation of the certain Truth of that Propofition ; to fignify 
which, they who employ themfelves in Philofophical Inqui- 
ries into the firft Origin and Metaphyfical Relations and 
Dependences of Things, have borrowed thefe Terms, for 
want of others. But we grow up from our Cradles in a Ufa^ 
of fuch Terms and Phrafes, entirely diff*erent from this, and 
carrying a Senfe exceeding diverfe from that in which they are 
commonly ufed in the Controverfy between Jr?nmia?is anM 
Calvinifts. And it being, as was faid before, a Di6late of , 
the univerfal Senfe of Mankind, evident to us as foon as we 
begin to think, that the Neceflity fignified by thefe Terms, in 
the Senfe in which we firft learn them, does excufe Perfons, 
and free them from all Fault or Blame ; Hence our Idea's of 
Excufablenefs or Faultlefnefs is tied to thefe Terms and 
Phrafes by a ftrong Habit, which is begun in Childhood as 
foon as we begin to fpeak, and grows up with us, and is 
ftrengthned by conftant Ufe and Cuftom, the Connedioft 
growing ftronger and ftronger. 

The habitual Conneaion which is in Men's Minds be- 
tween Blamelefnefs and thofe foremention'd Terms, Muji^ 
cannot^ unable^ mcejfary, impcjfible^ unavoidable &:c. becomes very 
ftrong j becaufe as foon as ever Men begin to ufe Reafori 
and Speech, they have Occafion to excufe themfelves, from 
the nataral Neceflity fignified by thefe Terms*, in numerous i, 

Inftancesv | 

Sed. III. contrary to common Senfe. 209 

Inftances I can't do It— 1 could not help it. And all Man- 
kind have conftant and daily Occafion to ufe fuch Phrafes 
in this Senfe, to excufe themfelves and others in almoft all 
the Concerns of Life, with Refped to Difappointments, and 
Things that happen which concern and afFe(5t us and others, 
that are hurtful, or difagreable to us or them, or Things de» 
firable that we or others fail of. 

That a being accuftomed to an Union of different Ideas, 
hfem early Childhood, makes the habitual Connexion ex- 
ceeding ftrbng, as tho' fuch Connection were owing \.q Nature^ 
is manifeil in innumerable* Inftances. It is altogether by 
fuch an habitual Connexion of Ideas, that Men judge of the 
Bignefs or Diftance of the Objects of Sight from their Ap- 
pearance. Thus 'tis owing to fuch a Connection early ellab- 
i liflied, and growing up with a Perfon, that he judges a Moun- 
i tain, which he fees at ten Miles diftance, to be bigger than 
I his Nofe, or further off than the End of it. ■ Having been 
s uled fo long to join a confiderable Diftance and Magnitude 
[with fuch an Appearance, Men imagine it is by a Dictate of 
natural Senfe : Whereas it v^rould be quite otherwife with 
one that had his Eyes newly ofxened, who had been born blind : 
He would have the fame vifible Appearance, but natural 
Senfe would dictate no fuch Thing concerning the Magnitude 
.or Diftance of what appeared. 

III. When Men,after they had been fo habituated to conne(S 
Ideas of Innocency or Blamelefnefs with fuch Terms, that the 
Union feems to be the Effe6t of meer Nature, come to hear the 
fameTerms ufed, & learn to ufe them themfelves in the foremen- 

\ tion'd new & metaphyiical Senfe, to fignify quite anotherSort of 
Necefllty,which has no fuchKind of Relation to a contrary fup- 
pofable Will and Endeavour ; the Notion of plain and mani- 
feft Blamelefnefs, by this Means, is by a ftrong Prejudice, in- 

ienfibly and unwarily transfer'd to a Cafe to which it by no 
Means belongs : The Change of the Ufe of the Terms, to 
a Signification which is very diverfe, not being taken Notice 

L of, or adverted to. And there are feveral Reafons why it 

fis not. 

I. The Terms,as ufed by Philofophers, are not very diftlnd 
kind clear in their Meaning : few ufe them in a fix'd deter- 
mined Senfe. On the contrary, their Meaning is very vagus 
;uid confufed. Which is what coininonly happens Xo "the 

D d Words 

2 lo TVhy Calvinifm isfuppvfed Part IV. i 

Words ufed to fignify Things intelle6tual and moral, and to 
exprefs what Mr. Locke calls mixt Modes. If Men had a clear J 
and diftindl underftanding of what is intended by thefe meta- s| 
phyfical Terms, they would be able more eafily to compare i 
them with their original and common Senfe ; and fo would i 
not be fo eafily cheated by them. The Minds of Men are i 
fo eafily led into Delufion by no Sort of Terms in the World, 'i 
as by Words of this Sort. j 

2. The Change of the Signification of the Terms is the .1 
more infenfible, becaufe the Things fignified, tho' indeed very : 
different, yet do in fome generals agree. In Necefftty^ that I 
which is vulgarly fo called, there is a ftrong Connection be- ' \ 
tween the Thing faid to be neceflary, and fomething antece- i 
dent to it, in the Order of Nature ; {o there is alfo m philo- \ 
fophical Necejfity, And tho' in both Kinds of Neceflity, the;; 
Connexion can't be called by that Name, with Relation to'j 
an oppofite Will or Endeavour, to which it \% fuper'iour \-[ 
which is the Cafe in vulgar Neceflity \ yet in both, the Con- i 
ne^ion is prior to Will and Endeavour, and fo in fome Re-,! 
fpe(5t fuperiour. In both Kinds of Neceffity there is a Foun-j 
dation for fome Certainty of the Propofition that affirms the ; 

Event. The Terms ufed being the fame, and the Things 1 

lignified agreeing in thefe and fome other general Circumftan- ■' 
ces, and the Exprefllons as ufed by Philofophers being not il 
well defined, and fo of obfcnre and loofe Signification i hence j 
Perfons are not aware ©f the great Difference ; and the No- ^j 
tions of Innocence or Faultlefnefs, which were fo ftrongly [j 
^bciated with them, and were ftricSlly united in their Mind^, 
ever fince they can remember, remain united with them ftill, 
as if the Union were altogether natural and neceffary ; and 
they that go about to make a Separation, feem to them to do \ 
great Violence even to Nature it ML \ 

■ \ 
IV. Another Reafbn why it appears difficult to reconcile it | 
with Reafon, that Men mould be blamed for that which U \ 
neceffary with a moral Neceffity (which as was obferved before^ | 
is a Species of Philofophical Neceffity) is, that for want of I 
due Confideration, Men inwardly entertain that Apprehenfion> 
that this Neceffity may be agair\il Men's Wills andfincere En- 
deavours. They go away with thatNotion,thatMen may truly 
will and wilb and firivc that it may be otherwife ; but that 
invjncible Neceflity iiands in the Way. And many think, thus 
concerning themfelves : fome that are wicked Men think tliey. 
AViih that they were jood, that tliey loved God and Holinefs jj 


Seil.III. contrary to common Senfev 211 

but yet don't find that their Wifhes produce the EfFe<5V. 

The Reafons why Men think thus, are as follows, (i.) They 
ifind what may be called an indire£i Willingnefs to have a better 
^Will, in the Manner before obferved. For it is impoflible, 
J and a Contradiction to fuppofe the Will to be diredly and 
• properly againft it felf. And they don't confider, that this in- 
direct Willingnefs is entirely a different Thing from properly 
willing the Thing that is the Duty and Vertue required ; and 
that there is no Vertue in that fort of Willingnefs whicbthey 
have. They don't con{ider,that the Volitions which a wicked 
M^n may have that he loved God, are no Ads of the Will 
at all againft the moral Evil of not loving God ; but only 
feme difagreable Confequences. But the making the requifite 
Diflindion requires more Care of Reflection and Thought 
than moft Men are ufed to. And Men thro' a Prejudice in 
their own Favour, are difpofed to think well of their own 
Defires and Difpoiitions, and to account 'em good and ver- 
tuous, tho' their Rel"pe6l to Vertue be only ipAire£i and remote^ 
and 'tis noticing at all that is vertuous that truly excites or ter- 
minates their Inclinations. (2.) Another Thing that infenfibly 
leads and beguiles Men into a Suppofition that this moral 
NecelTity or ImpolTibility is, or may be againft Men's Wills, 
and true Endeavours, is the Derivation and Formation of the 
Terms themfelves, that are often ufed to exprefs it, which 
is fuch as feems direClly to point to, and hold this forth. Such 
, Words, for Inftance, as unable^ unavoidable^ impojjible^ Irreftjiihle ; 
v/hich carry a plain Reference to a fiippofable Power exerted. 
Endeavours ufed, Refiftance made, in Oppofition to the Ne- 
celfity : And the Perfons that hear them, not confidering nor 
fufpeding but that they are ufed in their proper Senfe : That 
Senfe being therefore underftood, there does naturally, and as 
it were neceffarily arife in their Minds a Suppofition that it 
may be fo indeed, that true Defires and Endeavours may take 
Place, but that invincible Neceffity ftan4s in the Way, and 
renders '.em vain and to no Effed:. 

V. Another Thing which makes Perfons more ready to 
fuppofe it to be contrary to Reafon, that Men fliould be ex- 
pofed to the Punifhments threaten'd to Sin, for doing thofc 
Things which are morally neceflary, or not doing thole 
Things morally impoffible, is,that Imagination ftrengLhens the 
Argument, and adds greatly to the Power and Influence of 
the feeming Reafons againft it, from the Greatnefs of that 
Puniftiment. To allow that they may be juftly expofed to a 
u fmall Puniftiment, would not be fo difficult. Whereas,- if there 
I D d 2 • were 

212 Neceffary Vertue^ &c. Part IV^ « 

were any good Reafon in the Cafe, if it were truly a Didate of 
Reafon that fuch Neceffity was inconfiftent with Faultineis, or 
jufl Punifhment, the Demonftration would be equally certain 
with refpecfl to a fmall Punifhment, or any Punifliment at all, 
as a very great one : But it is not equally eafy to the Imagi- ; 
nation. They that argue againft the Juftice of daimiing Men ' 
for thofe Things that are thus neceflary, feem to make their 
Argument the llronger, by fetting forth the Greatnefs of the 
Punifliment in flrong ExprefTions -.—-'That a Man jhould he cafi 
into eternal Burnings,, that he Jhould he rnade to fry in Hell to all 
Eternity ,, for thofe Things which He had no Power to avoids and was 
under afatal^ unfruftrahle^ invincible Necejfity of doing. ^ 

Section IV, 

// is agreahle to common Senfe, and the na- 
tural Notions of Mankind, to fuppofe 
moral NeceJJlty to be conjifient with Praife 
and Blame ^ Reward and Punijhment. 

WHETHER the Reafons that have been given, why it 
appears difficult to fome Perfons to reconcile with 
common Senfe the praifing or blaming, rewarding gr 
piinifhing thofe Things which are morally neceffary, are 
thought fatisfadory, or not ; yet it mofl evidently appears by 
the following Things, that if this Matter be rightly under- 
ilood, fetting afide all Deiufion arifmg from the Impropriety 
and Ambiguity of Terms, this is not at all inconfiftent with 
the nature Apprehenfions of Mankind, and that Senfe of 
Things which is found every where in the common People, 
who are furtheft from having their Thoughts perverted from 
their natural Channel, by metaphyseal and philofophical Sub- 
tilties ; but on the contrary, altogether agreable to^ and the 
yery Voi<;:e and DitiUte of this natqral and vulgar Senfe. 

L This vnW appear if we confid^r what the vuIgarNotion of % 
BJr.tnf-'Worthinefs is. The Idea which the common People i 
■ ^ - through i 

Sed. IV. agreable to common Senfe. 213 

through all Ages and Nations have of Faultinefs, I fuppofe to 
be plainly this ; A Perfon's being or doing wrongs with his own 
Will and Pleafure ; containing thefe two Things ; i. His doing 
ijurong^ when he does as he pleafes, 2. His Pleafure*s being wrong. 
Or in other Words, perhaps more intelligibly exprefTing their 
' Notion ; A Per/on s having hisHeart wrongs and doing wrong from 
his Heart, And this is the Sum total of the Matter. 

The common People don't afcend up in their Refledtions and 
Abftra6tions, to the metaphyfical Sources, Relations and De* 
pendences of Things, in order to form their Notion of Faul- 
tinefs or Blame-worthinefs. They don't wait till they have 
decided by their Refinings, what firft determines the Will ; 
whether it be determined by fomething extrinfiQ, or intrinfic ; 
whether Volition deterniines Volition, or whether the Under- 
ftanding determines the W~ill ; whether there be any fuch 
Thing as Metaphyficians mean by Contingence (if they have 
any Meaning;) whether there be a Sort of a ftrange unac- 
countable Sovereignty in the Will, ir) the Exercife of which, 
by it's own fovereign A6ls, it brings to pafs all it's own fove- 
reign Ads. They don't take any Part of their Notion of 
Fault or Blame from the Refolution of any fuch Queftions. If 
this were the Cafe, there are Multitudes, yea the far greater 
Part of Mankind, nine Hundred and ninety-nine out of a 
. Thoufand would live and die without having any fucH 
Notion as that of Fault ever entring into their Heads, or with- 
out fo much as once having any Conception that any Body- 
was to be either blamed or commended for any Thing. To 
be fure^^it would be a long Time before Men came to have 
fuchNotions. Whereas 'tis manifeft,they are fome of the firft 
Notions that appear in Children ; who difcover as foon as 
they can think, or fpeak, or a(5l at all as rational Creatures, 
a Senfe of Defert. And certainly, in forming their Notion of 
it, they make no ufe of Metaphyficks. All the Ground they 
go upon conlifts in thefe two Things ; Experience^ and 2. natu^ 
ral Senfation of a certain Fitnefs or Agreablenefs which there is 
in uniting fuch moral Evil as is above defcribed, vi%. a being 
or doing wrong with the Will^ and Refentment in others, and 
Pain inflided on the Perfon in whom this moral Evil is. 
Which natural Senfe is what we call by the Name of Confcience, 

'Tis true,the common People and Children, in their Notion 

of a faulty A 61 or Deed of any Perfon, do fuppofe that it is 

' the Perfon's own ASf and Deed. But this is all that belongs to 

what they underiland by aThing's being a Perfon's own Deed 9r 

A^ion i 

214 Necejfary Fertue^ &c. Part IV. 

j£fion I even that it is fomething done by him of Choice. 
That fome Exercife or Motion fliould begin of it felf, don't 
belong to their Notion of an A6lion^ or Doing. If fo, it would 
belong to their Notion of it, that it is fomething which is the 
Caufe of it*s own Beginning : And that is as much as to fay, 
that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of dm 
ASiion fome Motion or Exercife that begins accidentally, with- 
out any Caufe or Reafon ; for that is contrary to one- of the 
prime Dictates of common Senfe, namely, that every Thing 
that begins to be, has fome Caufe or Reafon why it is. 

The common People, in their Notion of a faulty or 
praife-worthy Deed or Work done by any one, dp fup- 
pofe that the Man does it in the Exercife of Liberty. But 
then their Notion of Liberty is only a Perfon's having Oppor^ 
tunity of doing as he pleafes. They have no Notion of Liber- 
ty confiding in the Will's firft ading, and fo caufmg it's own 
A<5ls ; and determining, and fo caufing it's own Determinati- 
ons ; or chufing, and fo caufing it's own Choice. Such a 
Notion of Liberty is what none have, but thofe that have 
darken'd their own Minds with confufed metaphyfical Specu- 
lation, and abftrufe and ambiguous Terms. If a Man is not 
reftrain'd from ading as his Will determines, or conftrain'd to 
Z.&. otherwife ; then he has Liberty, according to common No- 
tions of Liberty, without taking into the Idea that grand Con- 
tradi6tion of all the Determinations of a Man's free Will being 

the EfFecfts of the Determinations of his free Will. Nor 

have Men commonly any Nol^ion of Freedom confiding in In- 
difference. For if fo, then it would be agreable to their No- 
tion, that the greater Indifference Pvlen a6t with, tlie more 
Freedom they a6t with ; whereas theReverfe is true. He that 
in acfling, proceeds with the fulleft Inclination, does what He 
does with the greateft Freedom, according to common Senfe. 
And fo far is it from being agreable to common Senfe, that 
fuch Liberty as confifts in Indifference is requifite to Praife ox 
Blame, that on the contrary, the Didate of every Man's natu- '\ 
ral Senfe thro' the World is, that the further he is from being 
indifferent in his ading Good or Evil, and the more he does 
either with full and ftrong Inclination, the more is he efteemed 
or abhorred, commended or condemned. 

II. If It were inconfiftent with the common Senfe of Man- 
kind, that Men (hould be either to be blamed or commend- 
ed in any Volitions they have or fail of, in Cafe of moral 
Neceffity or Impoffibihty ; then it would furely alfo be agrea- 
feie to the fame Senfe and Reafon of Mankjind, that the near- 

Se£t. IV. agr cable to common Senfc. 215 

er the Cafe approaches to fuch a moral Neceffity or Iinpoffi- 
bility, either through a flrong antecedent morai Propenfity 
on the one Hand, * or a great antecedent Oppofition and 
Difficulty on the other, the nearer docs it approach to a being 
neither blameable nor commendable ; fo that A<5Vs exerted 
with fuch preceeding Propenfity would be worthy of propor- 
tionably lefs Praife ; and v/hen omitted, the A61 being attend- 
ed with fuch Difficulty, the Omiffion would be worthy of the 
lefs Blame. It is fo, as was obferved before, with natural 
Neceffity and Impoffibility, Propenfity and Difficulty : As 'tis 
a plain Didate of the Senfe of all Mankind, that natural Ne- 
ceffity and Impoffibility takes away all Blame and Praife j and 
therefore, that the nearer the Approach is to thefe through 
previous Propenfity or Difficulty, fo Praife and Blame are 
proportionably diniinijhed. And if it were as much a Dictate 
of common Senfe, that moral Neceffity of doing, or Impoffi- 
bility of avoiding, takes away all Praife and Blame, as that 
natural Neceffity or Impoffibility does this ; then, by a psrfe<5l 
Parity of Reafon, it would be as much the Dictate of common 
Senfe, that an Approach to moral Neceffity of doing, or Im- 
poffibility of avoiding, diminijhes Praife and Blame, as that 
an Approach to natural Neceffity and Impoffibility does fo. 
'Tis equally the Voice of common Senfe, that Perfons are 
excufahle in Part^ in negleding Things difficult againft their 
Wills, as that they are excufahle wholly in negledling Things 
impoffible againft their Wills. And if it made no Difference, 
whether the Impoffibility were natural and againft the Will, 
or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to Excufablenefs > 
fo neither would it make any Difference, whether the Diffi- 
culty, or Approach to Neceffity be natural againft theWiH, 
or moral, lying in the Propenfity of the Will. 

But 'tis apparent, that the Reverfe of thefe Things is true. 
\ If there be an Approach to a moral Neceffity in a Man's Ex- 
ertion of good A6ls of Will, they being the Exercife of a 
Lftrong Propenfity to Good, and a very powerful Love to Ver- 
I tue 3 'tis fo far from being the Di<5tate of common Senfe, that 
I He is lefs vertuous, and the lefs to be efteem'd, loved and 
praifed ; that 'tis agreable to the natural Notions of all Man- 
' kind that he is fo much the better Man, worthy of greater 
Refped, and higher Commendation. And the ftronger the 
Inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to Neceffity in that 

Refpect ; 

, * 'Tis here argued, on Suppofition that not all Propenfity implies 
moral Necefiiiy, but only fom« very high Degrees ; which rione 
will deny. 

2i6 Neceffary Vertue^ &c. Part IV. 

Refpe6t, or to Impoflibility of neglecting the vertuous A(5t,or of 
doing a vicious one ; ftiJl the more vertuous, and worthy of 
higher Commendation. And on the other Hand, if a Man 
exerts evil A6ts of Mind ; as for Inftance, A(5ls of Pride or 
Mahce, from a rooted and ftrong Habit orPrinciple of Haugh- 
tinefs and Mahcioufnefs, and a violent Propenfity of Heart to 
fuch Ads J according to the natural Senfe of all Men, he is 
fo far from being the lefs. hateful and blameable on that Ac- 
count, that he is fo much the more worthy to be detefted and 
condemned by all that obferve Him, 

Moreover, 'tis manifeft that it is no Part of the Notion 
which Mankind commonly have of a blameable or praife- 
lyorthy A6t of the Will, that it is an Adl which is not deter- 
mined by an antecedent Bias or Motive, but by the fovereign 
Power of the Will it felf j becaufe if fo, the greater Hand 
fuchCaufes have in determining any Ads of the Will, fo much 
the lefs vertuous or vicious would they be accounted j and 
the lefs Hand, the more vertuous or vicious. Whereas the 
Keverfe is true : Men don't think a good A<5t to be the lefs 
praife-worthy, for the Agent's being much determined in it by 
a good Inclination or a good Motive ; but the more. And if 
good Inclination or Motive has but little Influence in deter- 
mining the Agent, they don't think his A61 fo much the more 
vertuous, but the lefs. And fo concerning evil Ads, which 
are determined by evil Motives or Inclinations. 

Yea, if it be fuppofed that good or evil Difpofitlons are xm- 
planted in the Hearts of Men by Nature it felf (which, it \% 
certain, is vulgarly fuppofed in irmumerable Cafes) yet it is 
not commonly" fuppofed that Men are worthy of no Praife or 
Difpraife for fuch Difpofitions ; altho* what is natural is un- 
doubtedly neceffary, Nature being prior to all Ads of the Will 
whatfoever. Thus for Inftance, if a Man appears to be of a 
very haughty or malicious Difpofition, and is fuppofed to be 
fo by his natural Temper, 'tis no vulgar Notion, no Didae of 
the common Senfe and Apprehenfion of Men, that fuch Dif- 
pofitions are no Vices or moral Evils, or that fuch Perfons arc 
not worthy of Difefteem, Odium and Difhonour ; or that the 
proud or malicious Ads which flow from fuch natural Difpo- 
fitions, are worthy of . no Refentment. Yea, fuch vile na- 
tural Difpofitions, and the Strength of 'em, will commonly be 
mention'd rather as an Aggravation of the wicked Ads that 
come from fuch a Fountain, than an Extenuation of 'em. 
Jt's being natural for Men to ad thus, i$ gften obferved by 
. Mea 

Seel. IV. agr cable to common Senfe. 217 

Men in theHeight of their Indignation : They will fay, " 'Tis 
;" his very Nature : He is of a vile natural Temper -, 'tis as 
i 4*<, natural to Him to adt fo, as it is to breathe ; He can't help 
I " ferving the Devil, &c." But it is not thus with Regard t(> 
hurtful mifchievous Things that any are the Subjecfis or Ccca- 
iions of by natural Nectijjity^ zg^iin^ their Inclinations. In fuch 
a Cafe, the NecelTity, by the common Voice of Mankind, will 

be fpoken of as a full Excufe. Thus 'tis very plain, that 

common Senfe makes a vaft Difference between thefe two 
Kinds of Neceffity, as to the Judgment it makes of their In- 
fluence on the moral Quality and Defert of Men's A<5lions» 

AndthefeDi6latesof Men'sMinds are fo natural and neceffar}'', 
iihat it may be very much doubted whether the Arminlam 
themfelves have ever got rid of 'em ; yea,their greatefbDodors, 
t^^at have gone furtheft in Defence or their metaphyseal No- 
tions of Liberty, and have brought their Arguments to their 
greateu Strength, and as they fuppofe to a Demonftration, 
againu theConfiftence of Vertue and Vice with any Neceffity : 
'"ris to be queflion'd, whether there is fo much as one of them, 
but that if He fuffered very much from the injurious AcSIs of a 
Man under the Pov>rerof an invincible Haughtinefs and Malig- 
nancy of Temper, would not, from the foremention'd natural 
I Senfe of Mind, refent it far otherwife,than if as great Sufferings 
came upon Him from the Wind that blows, and Fire that 
burns by natural Neceffity ; and otherwife than he would, if 
! he fuffered as much from the Condu6l of a Man perfecflly de- 
; hrious ; yea, tho' he hrft brought his Diftraction upon Him 
t feme Way by his own Fault. 

Some feem to difdain the Diflindlon that we make between 
i natural and moral Neceffity^ as tho' it were altogether impertinent 
in this Controverfy : " That which is neceffary (fay they) is 
*' neceffary ; it is that which muft be, and can't be prevented. 
" And that which is impoffible,isimpoffible, and can't be done : 
*' and therefore none can be to blame for not doing it." And 
fuch Comparifons are made ufe of, as the commanding of a 
Man to walk who has loft his Legs, and condemning and pu- 
nilhing Him for not obeying ; Inviting and calling upon a 
Alan,, who is ffiut up in a ftrong Prifon, to come forth, &:c. 
But in thefc Things Armmians arc very unreafonable. Let 
common Senfe determine whether there be hot a great Differ- 
ence between thofe two Cafes ; the one, that of a Man who 
has offended his Prince, and is caft into Prifon ; and after he 
has lain there a while^ the King ccnies to him, calls him to 
... E « corns 

2i8 Calyinifm conjijlent Part IV.' 

come forth toHim ; and tells him that if he will do fo,and will 
fall down before Him, and humbly beg his Pardon, he (hall 
be forgiven, and fet at Liberty, and alfo be greatly enrich'd,and 
advanced to Honour : The Prifoner heartily repents of the 
Folly and Wickednefs of his Offence againft his Prince, is 
thoroughly difpofed to abafe Himfelf, and accept of the King's 
Offer ; but is confined by flrong Walls, with Gates of Brafs;, ^ 
and Barrs of Iron. The other Cafe is, that of a Man who 4 
is of a very unreafonable Spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, |j 
wilful Difpofition ; and moreover, has been brought up in | 
traiterious Principles ; and has his Heart poUeffed with an ii^ 
extream and inveterate Enmity to his lawful Sovereign ; and ij 
for his Rebellion is caft into Prifon, and lies long there, loaden |ij 
with heavy Chains, and in miferable Circumflances. At length jtj 
the compaflionate Prince comes to the Prifon, orders his ps 
Chains to be knocked off, and his Prifon-Doors to be fet widp ;| 
open ; calls to him, and tells Him, if He will come forth to ,'5 
him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has i 
treated him unworthily, and afk his Forgivenefs ; He Ihall h&i 
forgiven, fet at Liberty, and fet in a Place of great Dignity and p 
Profit in his Court. But He is fo flout and flomachful, and ,il 
full of haughty'Malignity,that He can't be willing to accept the 1 
Offer : his rooted flrong Pride and Malice have perfe61: Power ]»; 
over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his Heart : ) 
The Oppofition of his Heart has the Maflery over Him, hav- i 
ing an Influence on his Mind far fuperiour to the King's Grace ] 
andCondefcenfion,and to all his kindOffers & Promifes. Now, } 
is it agreable to common Senfe, to affert and fland to it, that a 
there is no Difference between thefe two Cafes, as to any \ 
Worthinefs of Blame in thePrifoners ; becaufe, forfooth, there ( 
is a Neceffrty in both, and the required A(5t in each Cafe is j 
iijipoffible ? 'Tis true, a Man's evil Difpofitions may be as, j 
llrong and immovable as the Bars of a Caflle. But who 
can't fee, that when a Man, in the latter Cafe, is faid to be 
unable to obey the Command, the Expreffion is ufed improper- 
ly, and not in the Senfe it has originally and in common ;| 
Speech ? And that it may properly be faid to be in theRebersfl 
Power to come out of Prifon, feeing he can eafily do it if he ; 
pleafes ; tho* by Reafon of his vile Temper of Heart which i%;| 
hx'd and rooted, 'tis impoffible that it fhould pleafe Him ? J 

Upon the whole, I prefume there is no Perfon of good Un- | 
derftanding, who impartially confiders the Things which have "^ 
been obferved, but will allow that 'tis not evident from the '^ 
Didta^es of the common Senfe, or natural Notions of Man- .; 

kind, I 


'Sed^ VI. with common Senfe. 219 

kind, that 'moral Neceffity is inconfiftent with Praife and Blame. 
And therefore, if the Arminians would prove any fuch Incon^ 
ififtency, it muft be by fome philofophical and metaphyfical 
Arguments, and not common Senfe. 

There is a grand Illufion in the pretended Demonftration 
of Armimans from common Senfe. The main Strength of all 
ithefeDemonftrations, lies in that Prejudice that arifes thro' the 
infenfible Change of the Ufe and Meaning of fuch Terms as 
Liberty^ able ^uneble^ necejjary^ impojfible^ unavoidable^ invincible, j£fiony 
&c. from their original and vulgarSenfe, to a metaphyfxaiSenfe 
entirely diverfe ; and the ftrong Connection of the Ideas of 
Blamelefnefs &c. with fome of thefe Terms, by an Habit 
contraded and eftablifh'd, while thefe Terms were ufed in 
their firft Meaning. This Prejudice and Delufion is the Fouii- 
dation of all thofe Portions they lay down as Maxims, by 
which moft of the Scriptures, which they alledge in this Con- 
troverfy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous De- 
monftrations from Scripture and Reafon depend. From this 
fecret Delufion and Prejudice they have almofl all their Ad- 
vantages : 'Tis the Strength of their Bulwarks, and the Edge 
of their Weapons. And this is the main Ground of all the 
Right they have to treat their Neighbours in fo affuming a 
Manner, and to infult others, perhaps as wife and good as 
themfelves, as weak Bigots^ Men thai dwell in the dark Caves of 
Superjlition^ perverjly fet^ objfinately /hutting their Eyes againjl the 
Noon-day Lights Enemies to common Senfe^ maintaining the firjl -born 
of Abfurdities^ &c. hc. But perhaps an impartial Confideration 
of the Things which have been obferved in the preceeding 
Parts of this Enquiry, may enable the Lovers of Truth better 
to judge, whofe Do6lrine is indeed abfurd, abjhufe^ felf-contra- 
diotory^ and inconfiftent with common Senfe, and many Ways 
repugnant to the univcrfal Dictates of the Reafon of Mankind. 

Corol. From Things which have been obferved, it will fol- 
low, that it is agreable to common Senfe to fuppofe, that the 
glorified Saints have not their Freedom at all diminifti'd, in 
any Refpect ; and that God Himfelf has the higheft pofTible 
Freedom, according to the true and proper Meaning of the 
Term ; and that He is in the higheft poflible refpect an Agent, 
and active in the Exercife of his infinite Holinefs ; tho' He 
acts therein in the higheft Degree necefiarily : and his Actions 
of this Kind are. in the higheft, moft abfolutely perfect Man- 
ner vertuous and praife-worthy ; and are fo, for that very 
Reafon, becaufe they are moft perfectly necefiary. 

E e 2 Section 

2 20 Endeavours not rendered vain, Part I V. ' 
Section V. 

Concerning thofe ObjeftionSj that this Scheme \ 
of Necejftty renders all Means and En- | 
deavoursy^r the avoiding of Siny or the i 
obtaining Vertue and Holinefs ^ vain, and i 
to no Purpofe ; and that it snakes Men \ 
no more than meer M.?ich\nt^ in Affairs i 

of Morality and Religion. | 


yfRm'inians fay, if it be fo, that Sin and Vertue come to ! 
„^:^^ pafs by a Neceffity conliiling in a fure Conne6tion of ■ 
Caufes and Effects, Antecedents and Confequents, it \ 
can never be . worth the while to ufe any Means or Endea- '\ 
vours to obtain the one, and avoid the other ; feeing no En- '■. 
deavours can alter the Futurity of the Event, which is become j 
neceffary by a Connexion already eftabliftied. j^ 

But I defire, that this Matter may be fully confidered ; and \\ 
that it may be examined with a thorough Stridtnefs, whether ij 
it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or ;> 
obtain any future Thing, muft be more in vain, on the Sup- li 
pofition of fuch a Connedtion of Antecedents and Confequents^ \\ 
than if the contrary be fuppofed, |i 

For Endeavours to be In vain, is for 'em not to be fuccefsfui^ fi 
that is to fay, for 'em not eventually to be the Means of the p 
Thing aimed at, which can't be, but in one of thefe two l| 
Ways ; either, Firfi^ That altho' the Means are ufcd, yet the |^ 
•Event aimed at don't follow : Or, Secondly^ If the Event does i^ 
follow, it is not becaufe of the Means, or from any Connexion j; 
or Dependence of the Event on the Means, the Event would il 
have come to pafs, as well without the Means, as with them, i} 
If either of thefe two Things are the'Cafe, then the Means jj 
are not properly fuccefsful, and are truly in vain. The Sue- |] 
cefsfulnefs or Unfuccefsfuinefs of Means, in order to an s 
Effe6t, or their being in vain or not in vain, confilfs in thofe \ 
Means being connected, or not counec^led, with the EfFe<^, in j 

iuch \ 

Sect. V. hy Calviniftic Principles. 22 1 

fuch a Manner as this, vi%. That the Ef?e6t is with thcMeans, 
,and not without them ; or, that the Being of the EfFe6t is, ori 
the one Hand, conne6ted with the Means, and the Want of 
the Effe(5t, on the other Hand, is conne6ted with the Want o# 
the Means. If there be fuch a Connexion as this between 
Means and End, the Means are not in vain : The more there 
is of fuch a Connedion, the further they are from being in 
vain ; and the lefs of fuch a Connedion, the more are they 
in vain. 

Now therefore the Qiieftion to be anfwered, (in order to 
determine, whether it follows from this Dodnne of the ne- 
cefiary Connedion between foregomg Things and confequent 
ones, that Means ufed in order to any EffciSt^ are more in 
vain than they would be otherwife) is. Whether it follows 
from it, that there is lefs of the forementioned Connedion 
between Means and EfFed ; that is. Whether on the Suppoli- 
tion of there being a real and true Connedion between 
antecedent Things and confequent ones, there mufi: be lefs of 
a Connedion between Means and EfFed, than on the Suppo- 
fition of there being no fix'd Connedion between antecedent 
Things and confequent ones : And the very ftating of this 
Quefi:ion is fufficient to anfwer it. It muil: appear to every 
one that w^ill open his Eyes, that this Queftion can't be 
affirmed, without the grofseft Abfurdity and Inconfiftence. 
Means are foregoing Things, and Effeds are following 
Things : And if there were no Connedion between foregoing 
Things, and following ones, there could be no Conne6lion 
between Means and End 5 and fo all Means would be wholly 
vain and fruitlefs. For 'tis by Vertue of fome Connedion 
only, that they become fu(±efsful : 'Tis fome Connedion 
obferved, or revealed, or otherwife known, between ante- 
icedent Things and following on^s, that is what direds in the 
Choice of Means. And if there were no fuch Thing as an 
eftablifh'd Connedion, there could be no Choice,as to Means ; 
one Thing would have no more Tendency to an Effed, than 
another ; there would be no fuch Thing as Tendency in the 
Cafe. All thofe Things which are fuccefsful Means of other 
Things, do therein prove conneded Antecedents of the m : 
And therefore to aflert, that a fix'd Connedion between Ai ite- 
cedents and Confequents makes Means vain and ufelefs, or 
(lands in the Way to hinder the Connedion between Me'ans 
and End, is juft fo ridiculous, as to fay, that a Conned :ion 
between Antecedents and Confequents ftands in the Wa}/ to 
hinder a Connedion between Antecedents and Confequentsj;. 


222 Means&^ Endeavours made rain, P.IV. 

Nor can any fuppofed Connexion of the Succeffion orTrain 
©f Antecedents and Confequents, from the very Beginning of 
all Things, the Connexion being made already fure and 
neceffary, either by efl:abli(h'd Laws of Nature, or by 
thefe together with a Decree of fovereign immediate Inter- 
pofitions of divine Power, on fuch and fuch Occafions, or any 
other Way (if any other there bej) I fay, no fuch neceffary 
Connexion of a Series of Antecedents and Confequents can 
in the leaft tend to hinder, but that the Means we ufe may 
belong to the Series ; and fo may be fome of thofe Antecedents 
which are eonneded with the Confequents we aim at, in the 
eftablifh'd Courfe of Things. Endeavours which w^e ufe, are 
Things that exift ; and therefore they belong to tl;ie general 
Chain of Events ; all the Parts of which Chain are fuppofed 
to be conne6ted : And fo Endeavours are fuppofed to be con- 
nected with fomeEffe6ls, or fome confequent Things, or other. 
And certainly this don't hinder but that the Events they are 
connected with, may be thofe which we aim at, and which 
we chufe, becaufe we judge 'em moft likely to have a Con- 
nection with thofe Events, from the eftablifh'd Order and 
Courfe of Things which we obferve, or from fomething in 
divine Revelation. 

Let us fuppofe a real and fure Connexion between a Man's 
having his Eyes open in the clear Day-light, with goodOrgans 
of Sight, and Seeing ; fo that Seeing is connected with his 
opening his Eyes, and not feeing with his not opening his 
Eyes 5 and alfo the like Connection between fuch a Man's 
attempting to open his Eyes, and his adtually doing it : The 
fuppofed eftablifhed Connection between thefe Antecedents and 
Confequents, let theConnedion -be never fo fure and neceffary, 
certainly don't prove that it is in vain, for a Man in fuch Cir- 
cumftances to attempt to open his Eyes, in order to feeing : 
His aiming at that Event, and the tJfe of the Means, being 
the Effect of his Will, don't break the Conne(5tion, or hinder 
the Succefs. 

So that the Objecftion we are upon, don't lie againft the 
Doctrine of the Neceffity of Events by a Certainty of Connec- 
tion and Confequence : On the contrary, it is truly forcible 
againft the Armiman DoCtrine of Contingence and Self-deter- 
mination ; which is inconfiftent with fuch a Connexion. If 
there be no Connection between thofe Events wherein Vertue 
and Vice confift, and any Thing antecedent j then there is no 
Connection between thefe Evens and any Means orEndeavours 


Sed. V. by the Arminian Scheme. 223 

ufed in order to them : And if fo, then thofe Means mud be 
in vain. The lefs there is of Conne6lion between foregoing 
Things.and following ones, fo much the lefs there is between 
Means and End, Endeavours and Succefs ; and in the fame 
Proportion are Means and Endeavours inefFedlual and in vain. 

It will follow from Arminian Principles, that there is no 
Degree of Connection between Vertue or Vice, and any 
foregoing Event or Thing : Or in other Words, That the 
Determination of the Exiftence of Vertue or Vice don't in the 
leaft depend on the Influence of any Thing that comes to 
pafs antecedently, from which the Determination of its Ex- 
iftence is, as its Caufe, Means, or Ground ; becaufc, fo far as 
it is fo, it is not from Self-determination : And therefore,fo far 
there is nothing of the Nature of Vertue or Vice. And fo 
it follows, that Vertue and Vice are not at all, in any Degree, 
dependent upon, or conneded with any foregoing Event or 
Exiftence, as its Caufe, Ground, or Means. And if fo, then 
all foregoing Means muft be totally in vain. 

Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any Confiftence with 
the Arminian Scheme, be any recifonable Ground of fo much 
as a Conje6lure concerning the Confequence of any Means 
and Endeavours, in order to efcaping Vice or obtainingVertue, 
or any Choice or Preference of Means, as having a greater 
Probability of Succefs by fome than others ; either from any 
natural Connexion or Dependence of the End on the Means, 
or through any divine Conftitution, or revealed Way of God's 
beftowing or bringing to pafs thefe Things, in Confequence of 
any Means, Endeavours, Prayers or Deeds. Conjedure in 
this latter Cafe depends on a Suppolition that God himfelf is 
the Giver, or determining Caufe of the Events fought : But 
if they depend on Self-determination, then God is not the 
determining or difpofing Author of them : And if thefe 
Things are not of his Difpofal, then no Conje(5ture can be 
made from any Revelation he has given concerning any Way 
or Method of his Difpofal of them. 

Yea, on thefe Principles, it will not only follow that Men; 
can't have any reafonable Ground of Judgment or Conje^hire, 
that their Means and Endeavours to obtain Vertue or avoid 
Vice, will be fuccefsful," but they may be fure ,they will not ; 
they may be certain, that they will be in vain j and that if 
ever the Thing which they feek comes to pafs, it will not be 
at ail owing to the Means they ufe. For Means and En- 

2 24 Calvinifm dm t encoiirage Sloth. P. IV; 

deavours can have no EfFe6t at all, in Order to obtain the 
End, but in one of thefe two Ways j either (i.) Through fi 
natural Tendency and Influence, to prepare and difpofe the 
Mind more to vertuous Adts, either by cauflng the Difpofition 
of the Heart to be more in Favour o^ fuch A6ls, or by 
bringing the Mind more into the View of powerful Motives 
and Inducements : Or, (2.) By putting Perfons more in the 
Way of God's Be''owmept.; of the pjenelit. But neither o£ 
thefe can be the Cafe. Nbt the, latter ; fof. as has been juft 
now obferved, it don't confift with the j^rmiman l^ot'.on of 
Self-determination, which they fupppie effential to Vertue, 
that God fhould be the Bel'tpwer, or (which is the fame 
Thing) the determining, ^ifpoimg Author of Vertue. NoJ: 
^he former ; for natural Influence and Tendency fuppofes 
Caufality and Connexion > and that fuppoies Necefiity of 
Event, which is inconfiftent with Ar?mnian Liberty. A Ten- 
dency of Means, by biafling the Heart in Favour of Vertue, or 
by bringing the Will under ; the Influence and Power of 
motives in its Determinations, are both inconfiftent with 
Armin'ian Liberty of Will, confifting in Indifference, and 
fovereign Seif-determination, as has been largely demonftrated. 

But for the more full Rernoval of this Prejudice againft that 
Do61:rine of N^icemty which has been maintain'd, as though it 
tended to encourage a total Negledt of all Endeavours as vain j j 
ihe following Things may be conlidered. 

The Queftion is not. Whether Men may not thus improve 
this Do6\rine : We know that many true and wholefome 
Do6trines are abufed : But, V/hether the Doctrine gives any 
juft Occaiion for fuch an Improvement ; or whether, on. the. 
Suppofition of tlie Truth of the Do61rine, fuch a Ufe of it 
would not be unreafonable ? If any fliall aflirm, that it would 
not, but that the very Nature of the Do6lrine is fuch a*' 
gives juft Occafion for it, it muft be on this Suppofition ; 
iiamely. That fuch an invariableNeceflity of all Things already 
fettled, muft render the Interpofition of all Means, Endear 
vours, Conclufions or A6lions of ours, in order to the obtaining 
any "future End whatfoever, perfectly infignificant ; becaufe 
they can't in the leaft alter or vary the Courfe and Series of 
Thmgs, in any Event or Circumftance ; all being already fixed 
unalterabiy by Neceffity : And that therefore 'tis Folly, for 
Men to ufe any Means y^^r cn.'^ End \ but their Wifdom,to fave 
themfelves the Trouble of Endeavours, and take their Eafe. 
No Perfon can dravf fuch an Inference from this Dodrine, 


6^(3:. V. Calvlhifm dont encourageSloth, 225 

and come to fuch a Conclulion, without contradic^ing^himfclf, 
and going counter to the very Principles he pretends to a6l 
upon : For he comes to a Conclufion, and takes a Gourfe, hi 
order to an &nd, even his Eafe^ or the faving himfelf from 
Trouble ; he feeks fomething future, and ufes Means inOrder 
to a future Thing, even in his drawing up that Conclufion, 
that he will feek nothing, and ufe no Means in order to any 
Thing future ; he feeks his future Eafe, and the Benefit and 
"Comfort of Indolence. If prior Neceffity that determines ail 
'Things, makes vain all A6tions or Conclufions of ours, in 
order to any Thing future ; then it makes vain all Conclufions 
and Condu6l of ours, in order to our future Eafe. The Mea- 
fure of our Eafe, with the Time, Manner and every Circum- 
fiance of it, is already fix'd, by all-determining Neceffity, as 
much as any Thing elfe. If he fays within himfclf, " What 
♦' future Happinefs'or Mifery I (hall have, is already in Efied: 
*' determined by the neceiTary Courfe and Connedtion of 
"*' Things ; therefore I will lave myfelf the Trouble of Labour 
*'« and Diligence, which can't add to my determined Degree 
*' of Happinefs, or diminilh my Mifery i but will take my 
*' Eafe, and will enjoy the Comfort of Sloth and Neghgence." 
Such a Man contradicts himfelf : He fays, the Meafure of his 
future Happinefs and Mifery is already tix'd, and he won't 
try to diminilh the one, nor add to the other : But yet in his 
very Conclufion, he contradi6ts this ; for he takes up this 
Conclufion, to add to his future Happinefs^ by the Eafe and 
Comfort of his Negligence ; and to diminidi his future Trou- 
ble and Mifery, by faving himfeif the Trouble of ufing Means 
and taking Pains. 

Therefore Perfons can't reafonably make this Improvement 
of the Dodrine of Neceffity, that they will go into a v6iuntary 
Kegligence of Means for their own Happinefs. For the 
Principles they mufi: go upon, in order to this, are inconfiftent 
with their making any Improvement at ail of the Dodrine : 
For to make fome Improvement of it, is to be influenced by 
it, to come to fome voluntary Conclufion, in Regard to 
their own Condu6t, with fome View or Aim : But this, as 
has been (hown, is inconfiftent with the Principles they pretend 
to a6t upon. In (hort, the Principles are fuch as cannot be 
acted upon at all, or in any Refpect, confiftently. And there- 
fore in every Pretence of acting upon them, or making ur.y 
Improvement at all of them, there is a Seif-con^adicticn. 

F f -• A^ 

2 2 6C^\vim{mdo/2'itmakeMenMachincs.'PAV' 

As to that Objection againft the Doctrine which I have 
endeavoured to prove, that it makes Men no more than 
meer Machines ; I would fay, that notwithftanding this Doc- 
trine, Man is entirely, perfedly and unfpeakabiy tlifferent from 
a meer Machine, m that he has Reafon and Underftanding^ 
and has a Faculty ot' Will, and fo is capable of Volition and 'i 
Choice ; and in that, his Will is guided by the Di6tates or 
Views of his Underftanding ; and in that his external Adions 
and Behaviour, and in many Refpe6l alfo his Thoughts, and 'j 
the Exercifes of his Mind, are fubje6l to his V^ill ; fo that i 
he has Liberty to acft according to his Choice, and do what he (^ 
pleafes j and by Means of thefe Things, is capable of moral i 
Habits and moral A6ls, fuch Inclinations and Actions a^ i;( 
according to the common Senfe of Mankind, are worthy of !.| 
Praife, Efteem, Love and Reward ; or on the contrary, of 
Difefteem, Deteftgtion, Indignation and Punifhment. 

In thefe Things is all the Difference from meer Machines, ii 

as to Liberty and Agency, that would be any Perfection, Dig- | 

nity or Privilege, in any Refpect : Ail the Difference that can a 

be defired, and all that can be conceived of j and indeed all j 

that the Preteniions of the Jr?nmians themfelves come to, as j 

they are forced often to explain themfelves. (Tho' their Expli- I 

cations overthrow and abolifh the Things afferted, and pre- '\ 

tended to be explained) For they are forced to explain a felf- \\ 

determining Power of Will, by a Power in the Soul, to deter- ii 
mine- as it chufes or wills ; v*hich comes to no more than';! 

this, that a Man has a Power of chufmg, and in many \\ 
Inilances,can do as he chufes. Vv'hich is quite a differentThing 
fr-om that Contradiction, his having Power of chufmg hi5 
flrft Act of Choice in the Cafe. 

Or if their Scheme makes any other Difference than this^ 
between Men and Machines, it is for the worle : It is fo far 
from fuppoUng Men to have a Dignity and Privilege above 
Machines, that it makes the Manner of their being determined 
(lijl more unhappv. Whereas Machines are guided by an un- 
derflanding Caule', by the flcihul Hand of the Workman or 
Owner ; the V/ill of Man is left to the Guidance of nothing, 
but abibiute blind Contingence. 

S E c T I on 

Sea. VI. Of the Stoical Fate. 227 

Section VL 

Concerning that Objeflion agai7ijl the Doc- 
trine which has been maintain d^ that it 
agrees with the Stoical DoEirine of 'Fate, 
and the Opinions of Mr, Hobi3es. 

WHEN Calv'inij^s oppcfe the Armmlan Notion of the Free- 
dom of Will, and Contingence of Volition, and infift 
I V that there are no A6ts of the Will, nor any other 

Invents whatfoever, but what are attended with fome Kind of 
Neceffity ; their Oppofers cry out of thenr, as agreeing with 
the antient Stoicks in their Doctrine of Fut^y and with Mr. 
Hobbes in his Opmion of Necejftty. 

It would not be worth while, to take Notice of fo imperti- 
nent an Objection, had it not been i#ged by fome of the chief 

'Jrminian Writers. There were many important Truths 

\ maintain'd by the antient Greek 2in^ Roman Philofophers, and 
I cfpecially the Stoicks^ that are never ther worfe for being held by 
[them. The S/^/V Philofophers, by the general Agreement of 
\ Chriflian Divines, and even Arminian Divines, were the 
\ greateit, wifeft and molt vertuous of all the Heathen Philofo- 
\ phers ; and in their Dodrine and PracStice came the neareft 
" to Chriftianity of any of their Seels. Flow frequently are the 
I Sayings of thefe Philofophers, in many of the Writings and 
Sermons, even of Arminian Divines, produced, not as Argu- 
ments of the P'alfenefs of the Dodrines which they delivered, 
but as a Confirmation of fome of the greateft Truths of the 
Chriftian Religion, relating to the Unity and Perfedions of the 
Godhead, a future State, the Duty and Happinefs of Maiikind, 
h<z. as obferving how the Light of Nature and Realbn in the 
wifeft and beft of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms 
the Gofpel of Jefus Chrift. a 

And it is very remarkable concerning Dr. W¥itb)\ that altho' 
He alledges the Agreement of the Stoicks with us, wherein He 
fuppofes they maintain'd the like Dodrine with us, as an Ar^ 
gument againft the Truth of our Doctrine \ yet this very Dr. 
Whitby alledges the Agreement of the Stoich with the Jrminians^ 

F f 2 ' wherein 

2 28 Of the Stoical Fate. Part IV. ' 

"vvherein he fuppofes they taught the fame Do6lrine with them, 
as an Argument tor the Truth of their Doctrine. * So that 
v/hen the ^toicks agree >vith t^em.^ this (it feems) is a Confirma- 
tion of their Dodrine, and a Confutation of ours, as fhewing 
that our Opinions are contrary to the .natural Senfe h common 
Reafoh of Mankind : Neverthelefs, when the Stoicks agree with 
7is^ it argues no fuch Thing in our Favour ; but on the con- 
trary, is a great Argument agairjft us, and ihews our Doctrine 
to be Heathenifh. . «.' :' 

It is obfe)*ved by fome Cahinifilc Writers, that the Jrmintam \\\ 
fymbohze with the Stokksy in fome of thofe Dodrines wherein 4' 
they are oppofed by the Cahinijls \ particularly in their denying ' : 
an original, innate, total Corruption and Depravity of Heart'; \\ 
and in what they held- of Man's Ability to make Himfelf i 
truly vertuou5 and conformed to God ;— - and in fome other jj 
Doctrines. ' | 

It may be further obfervcd, 'tis certainly no better Objection j 

againft our Doctrine, that it agrees in fome Refpects with the I 

Doctrine of the antient Sttoic Philofophers, than it is againft \ 

theirs, wherein they diffe?^from us, that it agrees in fome Re- i 

fpects with the Opinion of the very word of the Heathen Phi- \ 
lofophers, the Followers of Epicurus^ that Father of Atheifm 
and Licentioufnefs, and with the Dodrine of the Sadducees and 

jefuits, ;;^ 

I am not much concerned to know precifely what the antient;. 
Stoic Philofophers held concerning Fate^ in order to determine 
what is Truth ; as tho' it were a fure Way to be in the right, 
to take good Heed to differ from them. It feems that they 
differed among themfelves ; and probably the Do61rineofiv7^^, .) 
yis maintain'd by moft of 'em, was in fome Refpe6ts erroneous, ^j 
But whatever their Dodrine was, if any of 'em held fuch \ ■ 
Fate, as is repugnant to any Liberty conlifting in our doing ')\ 
as we pleafe, I utterly deny fuch a Fate. If they held any. v 
fuch Fate, as is not confident with the common and univerfal j 
Notions thatMankmd have of Liberty, A61:ivity, moral Agency, | 
Vertue and Vice ; I difclaim any fuch Thing, and think I j 
have demonftrated that the Scheme I maintain is no fuch <] 
Scheme. If the Stoicks by Fate meant any Thing of fu^h a^.;' 
Nature, as can be fuppofed to ftand in the Way of the Advan-*?| 
tage and Benefit of the Ufe of Means and Endeavours, or-j^ 


f l-rhithy on the five Points, Edit. 3. P. 325, 326, 327. ' | 

f'Sc(a.VI. 0/ Hohhidical JVeceJ^fj. 229 

makes it lefs worth the while for Men to defire, and feek after 
any Thing wherein their Vertue and Happinefs confifts ; 1 
hold no Do6lrin€ that is clog'd with any- fuch Inconvenience, 
any more than any other Scheme whatfoever ; and by no 
Means fo much as the Jrm'inian Scheme of Contingence ; as 
has been Ihewn. If they held any fuch. Dodrine of univerfal 
Fatality, as is inconfiftent with^ny Kind of Liberty, that is 
or can be any Perfection, Dignity, Privilege or Benefit, or 
any Thing defirable, in any Refpect, for any intelligent Crea- 
ture, or indeed with any Liberty that is poiflible or conceivable ; 
lembrace no fuch Doctrine; If they held any fuch Doctrine 
of Fate as is inconfiftent with the World's being in all Things 
fubject to the Difpofal of an intelligent wife Agent, that pre- 
lides, not as the Soul of the World, but as the fovereign Lord 
of, the Univerfe, governing all Things by proper Will, Choice 
.and Defign, in the Exercife of the moft perfect Liberty con- 
ceivable, without Subjection to any Conftraint, or being pro- 
perly under the Power or Influence of any Thing befote, above 
or without himfelf ; I wholly renounce any fuch Doctrine. 

' As to Mr. Hobbes's maintaining the fame Doctrine concern- 
ing NeceiTity ;— I confefs, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes, 
Let his Opinion be what it will, we need not reject all 
Truth which is demonftrated by clear Evidence, meerly be- 
caufe it was once held by fome bad Man.- This great Truth, 
that Jefus is thj Son of God, was not fpoil'd becaufe it was* 
once and again proclaimed with a loud Voice by the Devil. 
If Truth is fo defiled becaufe it is fpoken by the Mouth, or 
written by the Pen of fome ill-minded mifchievous Man, that 
it muft never be received, we fhall never know when we hold 
any of the moft precious and evident Truths by a lure 
Tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad Ufe of this 
Truth, that is to be lamented : bat the Truth is not to be 
tho't worthy of Reje6lion on that Account. 'Tis common for 
the Corruptions of the Hearts of evil Men, to abufe the beft 
Things to vile Purpofes. 

I might alfo take Notice of it's having been obferved, that 
the ArminidJis agree with Mr. Hobbes f in many more Things 
than the Cahinijh. As, in what he is faid to hold concerning 
Original Sin, in denying the Neceffity of fupernatural Illumi- 
nation, in denying infufed Grace, in denying the Dodrine of 
Juftification by Faith alone , and other Things. 

t Dr. Gill, in his Anfwcr to Dr. IVhithy. Vol. 3. P. 1 83, &c. 


230 Concerning the Neceffity Part IV. 

Section VIL 
Concerning the NecefTity of the Divine Will. , 

^OME may pofTibly obje6l againft what has be^n fuppofed 
^S of the Abfurdity and Inconfiftence ,of a feif-determining 
Power in the Will, and the^ ImpolfibilJty of it's being 
otherwife, than that the Will fhould be determined in every^ 
Cafe by fome Motive, and by a Motive which (as it (lands 
in the Viev/ of the UnderRanding) is of fuperiour Strength to 
any appearing on the other Side ; That if thefe Thmgs are 
true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created A4inds, 
but the Will of GqcI Hhnfelf is necefiaryin all it's Determina- 
tions. Concerning which fays the Authpr of the EJfay. on the 
Freedj?n of IVill hi God and m the Creature' {V^g^ 85, 86.) 
What llrange Doctrine is . this,., contrary to ail our Ideas oi 
the Dominion of God ? Does it not deftroy the Glory of 
his Liberty of Choice, and take away from the Creator and 
Governour and Benefactor of the. World, that moft free and 
fovereign Agent, all the Glory of this. Sort of Freedom ? 
Does it not feem to make Him a Kind of mechanical Me- 
dium of Fate, and introduce Mr. Hohbcs's Dodrine of Fata.- 
li'ty and NecelTity, into all Things that God hath to do 
with ? Does it riot feem to reprefent the blelTed Go^, as a 
Being of vaft Underftanding, as well as Power and Effi- 
ciency, but flill to leave Him without a Will to chufe among 
all the Objects within his View^ ? In fliort, it feems to make 
the blefTed God a Sort of almighty Minifter of Fate, under 
it's univerfal and fupream Influence ; as it was the profefs'd 
Sentiment of fome of the Antknts, that Fate was above the 

This is declaiming, rather than arguing 5 and an Applica- 
tion to Men's Imaginations and Prejudices, rather than to meer 

Reafon. But 1 would calmly endeavour to confider whether 

there be any Reafon in this frightful Reprefentation. But 

before I enter upon a particular Confideration of the Matter, I 
would obferve this : That 'tis reafonable to fuppofe, it ftiould 
be much more difficult to exprefs or conceive Things accord- 
ing to exa<5t metaphyfical Truth, relating to the Nature and 
Manner of the Exigence of Things in the divine Underftand- 
ing and Will, and the Operaticn of thefe Faculties (if I may 


Seel. VII. of the Divine Volume. 231 

To call them) of the divine Mind, than in the human Mind ; 
which is infinitely more within our View, and nearer to a 
Propottion to the Meafure of our Comprehenfion, and more 
commenfurate to the Ufe and Import of human Speech. 
Language is indeed very deficient, in Regard of Terms to 
exprefs precife Truth concerning our own Minds, and their 
Faculties and Operations. Words Vv^ere iirft formed to exprefs 

-external Things ; and thofe that are applied to exprefs Things 
internal and fpiritual, are almoft all borrowed,and ufed in a Sort 
ef figurative Senfe. Whence they are mofl of 'em attended with 
a great Deal of Ambiguity and Unfixednefs in their Signitica^ 

-tion, occafioning innumerable Doubts, Difficulties and Confu- 
fions in Enquiries and Controverfies about Things of this Na- 
ture. But Language is much lefs adapted to exprefs Things 
in the Mind of the incomprehenfible Deity,precifely as they are. 

We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exadly of 
the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithftanding all the 
Progrefs which has been made in pad and prefent Ages, in 
this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaphyficks, as it 
relates to thefe ' Things, is brought to greater Perfe6tion than 
once it Was ; yet here is flill Work enough left for future En- 
quiries and Refearches, and Room for Progrefs flill to be made. 
Tor many Ages and Generations. But we had need to b^ in- 
finitely able Metaphyiicians, to conceive withClearnefs, accord- 
ing to ftricl, proper and perfed Truth, concerning the Nature 
of the divine EfTence, and the Modes of the Adion and Ope- 
ration of the Powers of the divine Mind. 

And it may be noted particularly, that tho' we are obliged 
^to conceive of fome Things in God as confequent and depen- 
dent on others, and of fome Things pertaining to the divine 
Nature and Will as the Foundation of others, and fo before 
others in the Order of Nature : As, we muft conceive of the 
Knowledge and Holinefs of God as prior in the Order of Na- 
ture to his Happinefs ; the Perfedion of his Underftanding, as 
the Foundation of his wife Purpofes and Decrees ; the Ploli- 
nefs of his Nature, as the Caufe and Reafon of his holy De- 
I terminations. And yet v/hen v/e fpeak of Caufe and Effedf , 
Antecedent and Confequent, fundamental and dependent, de- 
termining and determined, in the firfc Being, who is felf- 
cxifient, independent, of perfe^ft and abfolute Simplicity and 
Imm.utability, and the firft Caufe of all Things ; doubtlefs 
there mull: be lefs Propriety in fuchPvepref&utations, than when 


232 Necefftty of aSiing mojl wifely. Part IV. 

we fpeak of derived dependent Beings, who are compounded, 
and liable to perpetual Mutation and Succeflion. 


Having premifed this, I proceed to obferve concerning the i 

foremention'd Author's Exclamation, •showX.i^ix^ necejjary Deter- .J 

mination of God's IVill^ in all Things, by v^at He fees to be \ 

fitteji and beji. ' \ 

That all the feeming Force of fuch Obje6lions and Excla- 
mations muft arife from an Imagination, that there is fomc i 1 
Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without fuch a moral ; 
Neceffity, as will make it impoliible to do any other, than ;^ 
always chufe what is wifeft and beft ; as tho' there were fome ^c 
Difadvantage, Meannefs and Subje6tion, in fuch a NecelTity ; "j 
a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and \i 
held in Servitude by fomething,-which, as it were, maintained >\ 
a ftrong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds \\ 
that held him fail:, and that he could by no Means deliver { 
himfeif from. Whereas, this muft be all meer Imagination i 
and Delufion. 'Tis no Difadvantage or Dilhonour to a Being, \ 
neceiTariJy to a(5t in the moft excellent and happy Manner, ' 
from the necelTary Perfedlion of his own Nature. This argues i 
no Imperfe6tion, Inferiority or Dependance, nor any Want of \ 
Dignity, Privilege or Afcendancy. f 'Tis not inconfiflent with j 

the \ 

•)- *' It might have been objefted with much more Plaufiblenefs, that j 

" the fupreme Caufe cannot be free, becaufe he mutt needs do | 

" always what is beft in the Whole. But this would not at all i^ 

*' ferve Spinoza s Purpofe : For this is a Necefhty, not of Nature pj 

*• and Fate, but of Fitnefs and Wifdom ; a Neceffity confiftent ji 

•« with the greateft Freedom, and moft perfeft Choice. For the lii 

" only Foundation of this Neceffity is fuch an unalterable Refti- |^ 

*' tude of Will, and Perfeflion of Wifdom, as makes it impoffible I' 

*' for a wife Being to ad foolifhiy." C/arF& Dem. of the Being J 

" and Attrib. of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. ^ 

" Tho' God is a moft perfeftly free Agent, yet he cannot but do. 5 

*' always what is beft and wifeft in the Whole. The Reafon i^ ^ !^ 

" evident ; becaufe perfeft Wifdom and Goodnefs are as fteady*' j.- 

" and certain Principles of Adion, as Neceffity itfejf ; and an' fi 

** infinitely wife and good Being, indued with the moft perfect ? 

*' Liberty, can no more chufe to aft in Contradiftion to Wifdom' f] 

•* and Goodnefs, than a neceffary Agent can aft contrary to the ^ 

*' Neceffity by which it is afted ; it being as great an Abfurdity and > 

«* impoffibility in Choice, for infinite Wifdom to chufe to aft un- \\ 

*' wifely, or infinite Goodnefs to chufe what is not good, asit would i 

•• be 

; Se.VII. agreahle to mojl perfeBUhzYty. 233 

il the abfolute, and moft perfe6l Sovereignty of God. The 
I Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do what- 
' ever pleafes Him ; v^^hereby He doth accord'mg to his TVill in the 
. Armies of Heaven^ and amon^ the Inhabitants of the Earthy and 

none canjiay his Hand^ or fay unto hirfi^ What dofi thou ? The 

I following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God ; vi-z, 
\ (i.) Supreme, univerfal, and infinite Ptjwn*; whereby he is 
able to do what he pleafes, without Controul, without any 
■ (Confinement of that Power, without any Subje(5\ion in the leaft 
Meafure to any other Power ; and fo without any Hindrance 
or Refiraint, that it fhould be either impolTible, or at all 
difficult, for him to accomplifli his Will 3 and without any 

G g Dependance 

" be in Nature, for abfolute Neceffity to fail of producing its ne- 
*' ceffary EfFeft. There was indeed no Neceffity in Nature, thac 
*' (jod Ihould at firll create fuch Beings as he has created, or in- 
*' deed any Being at all ; becaufe he is in himftilf infinitely happy 
" and Allfaflicient. There was alfo no Neceffity in Nature, that 
•' he fhould preferve and continue Things in Being, after they were 
*' created; becaufe he would be felffufiicient without their Conti- 
" nuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was fit and wife 
-<• and good, that infinite Wifdora fhould manifeft, and infinite Good- 
*' nefs communicate itfelf ; and therefore it was neceilary, in the 
" Senfe of Neceffity I am now fpeaking of, that Things ihould be 
^ •' made at fuch a l'i?ne^ and cor^tinued fo long^ and indeed with. 
** various Perfedlions in fuch Degrees, as infinite VVifdom and 
" Goodnefs faw it wifeft and bell that they fhould." Ibid, P. 1 1 2,1 1 3. 
*' 'Tis not a Fault, but a Perfedion of our Nature, to defirc, will and 

** adl, according to the laft Rcfult of a fair Examination. This 

** is fo far from being a Reftraint or Diminution of Freedom, that 
*' it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it : 'Tis not an Abridg- 
" ment, 'ds the End and Ufe of our Liberty ; and the further we 
" are removed from fuch a Determination, the nearer we are ta, 
*' Mifery and Slavery. A perfed: JndifTerence in the Mind, noc 
*' determinable by its lafl Judgment of the Good or Evil that is 
*' thought to attend its Choice, would be fo far from being an Ad- 
*' vantage and Excellency of any inteJiedlual Nature, that it would 
•* be as great an Imperfedion,as the Want of IndifFerency to a£l, or 
** not to ad, till determined by the Will, would be an Imperfedtion 

** on the other Side." Tis as much a Perfedion, that Defire 

** or the Power of preferring fhould be determined by Good, as that 

** the Power of ading fliould be determined by the Will : And the 

** certainer fuch Determination is, the greater the Perfedion, Nay, 

" were we determined by any Thing but the lall Refult of our owa 

^** Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Adion, we were 

? " not U^Q, The very End of our Freedom being, t!:at we might 

M. »» attam 

2 3 4 Necejftty of aEiing moji wifely, Part IV. 

Dependance of his Power on any other Power, from whence 
it fliould be derived, or which it (hould ftand in any Need of: 
So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, \ 
and is abfolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has fu- \ 
preme Authority ; abfolute and moft perfect Right to do what j 
He wills, without Subjedion to any fuperiour Authority, or • 
any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by ; 
any diftind independent Authority, either fuperiour, equal, or , 
inferiour 5 he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain ; 
of all. Authority ; and alfo without Reftraint by any Obliga- \ 
tion, implying either Subje6tion, Derivation, br Dependance, ; 
or proper Limitation. (3.) That his /F/7/ is fupreme, unde- i 
rived, and independent on any Thing without Himfelf ; being j 

in \ '[ 
*' attain theGood we chufe ; and therefore every Man is bro't under i 
** a NeceiTity by his Conftitution, as an intelligent Being, to be " 
" determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what i 
*' is beft for him to do ; elfe he would be under the Determination j 
" of fome other than himfelf, which is Want of Liberty. And to 
** deny that a Man's Will, in every Determination, follows hisov^n 
** Judgment, is to fay, that a Man wills and afts for an End that ; 
** he would not have, at the fame Time that he wills and afts for it, ' 
<' For if he prefers it in his prefcnt Thoughts, before any other, 
" 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any \ 
*' other ; unlefs he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, 1 
<* at the fame Tiroe ; a Contradidtion too manifeft to be admitted.-- i 
" If we look upon thofe fuperior Beings above us, who enjoy per- \ 
«* fe6l Happinefs, we /hall have Reafon to judge/that they are more V 
*' Readily determined in their Choice of Good than we j and yet f] 
" we have no Reafon to think they are lefs happy, or lefs free, than f^ 
** we are. And if it were fit for fuch poor finite Creatures as we ;^ 
'■ are, to pronounce what infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs could do, ij 
** I think we might fay, that God himfelf cannot chufe what is not itj 
" Good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being deter minei "^ 

♦* by ivhat is beji. But to give a right View of this miftaken % 

*' Part of Liberty, let me a/k, Would any one be a Changeling, | 
** becaufe he is lefs determined by v/ife Determinations, than a wife' | 
" Man ? Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be atLiberty to play ii, 
** the Fool, and draw Shame and Mifery upon a Man's felf ? If to > 
•* break loofe from the Condudl of Reafon, and to want that fi 
*' Reftraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us from \\ 
*' doing or chufing the worfe, be Liberty, true Liberty, Mad -men ;j 
*' and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think no Body would | 
*' chufe to be mad, for the fake of fuch Liberty, but he that is ' 
*♦ mad already. Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216. j 
** This Being having all Things always necelTarily in View, mull al^ j 

•• ways,. I 

Sed-VII. ;7(? Meannefs (?r Difadvantage* 235 

in every Thing det'ermin'd by his own Counfel, having no 
other Rule but his own Wifdom ; his Will not being fubjedl 
to, or reftrain'd by the Will of any other, and others Wills 
being perfectly fubje6t to his. (4.) That his Wifdom^ which 
determines his Will, is fupreme, perfe6t, tinderived, felf- 
fufficient, and independent ; io that it may be faid as in Ifai. 
■xl. 14. With whom took He Counfel ? And who wjiru5ted Him and 
taught Him in the Path of Judgment^ and taught Him Knowlege^ and 

\Jhewed Him the Way of Vndcrjianding f There is no other 

(divine Sovereignty but this : and this is properly ahfolute Sove- 
reignty : No other is defirable ; nor would any other be ho- 
liourable, or happy : and indeed there is no other conceivable 
or poffible. 'Tis the Glory and Greatnefs of the divine 
Sovereignty, that God's Will is determin'd by his own infinite 
all-fufficient Wifdom in every Thing ; and in nothing at all 
is either direded by any infenour Wifdom, or by no Wifdom ; 
whereby it would become fenfelefs Ai-bitrarmels, determining 
and adlmg without Reafon, Defign or End. 

' G g 2 If 

ways, and eternally will, according to his 'infinite Comprehenfion 
of Things; thac is, mull will all Things that arewifeil and bell to 
be done. There is no getting free of this Confequence. If it 
can will at all, it mufl will this Way . To be capable of know- 
ing, and not capable of u'il'ing, is not to be underftood. And 
to be capable of willing otherwife than what is wifeft and beft, 
contradids that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge 
mufl diredl the Will without Error Here then is ths Origin of 

moral NeceJJity ; and that is really^ of Freedom. ■ Perhaps it 

may be faid, when the divine Will is determined, from the Con- 
fideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as necelTarily 
determined, as if it were phyfically impel'd, if that were poiTible. 
But it is Unfkilfulnefs, to fuppofe this an Objection. The great 
Principle is once eftablifhed, <viz. That, the divine Will is deter- 
mined by the eternal Reafon and Aptitudes of Things, inllead of 
being phyfically impelled; and after that, the more (Ircng and 
neceflary this Determination is, the more pcrfeft the Deity muil 
be allowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and 
adorable Being, whofe Will and Power are condantly, immutably 
determined, by the Confideration of what is wifeft and beft ; in- 
ftead of a furd Being, with Power, bnt without Difcerning and 
Reafon. // is the Beauiy of this Necefity, thnt it is fro?2g as Fate 
itfelf nvith all the Ad'vantnge of Ren fan and Goodnefs. It is 

■ ftrange, to fee Men contend, that the Deity is notFree, becaufe he 

■ is neceflarily rational, immutably good and wife ; when a Man 
is allowed ftiil the perfecler Being, the more fixedly and conllantly 
his Will is de ermined by Reafon and Truth." Enquiry into the 
Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II. P. 403, 404. 


236 Necejfity of aEiing mo ft wifely, Parti V. \ 

If God's Will is fteadily and furely determined in every J 
Thing by/z//'r^?//^Wifdora, then it is in every Thing neceiTarily :i 
determined to that which is moji wife. And certainly it would „f 
be a Djfadvantage and Indignity, to be othervv^ife. P or if the J 
divine Will was not necefiarily determined to that which in ' ( 
every Cafe is wifeft and beft, it muft be fubjec5t to fome Degree ( 
of undefigning Contingence ; and fo in the fame Degree i 
liable to Evil. To fuppofe the divine Will liable to be carried j 
hither and thither at Random, by the uncertain Wind of blind I 
Contingence, which is guided by no Wifdom, no Motive, no :; 
intelligent Didate whatfoever, (if any fuchThing were pbfTible) i 
would certainly argue a great Degree of Imperfection and \ 

Meannefs, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a Dif- J 

advantage, for the divine Will to be attended v/ith this moral (j 
NecefTity, then the more free from it, and the more left at j 
Random, the greater Dignity and Advantage. And confe- \ 
quently to be perfectly free from the Direction of Underftand- \ 
ing, and univerfally and entirely left to fenfelefs unmeaning! 
Contingence, to act abfolutely at Random, would be the \ 
fupreme Glory. "^ ,, 

It no more argues any Dependence of God's Will, that his \ 
fupremely wife Volition is ncceffary, than it argues a Depcn- -J 
dence of his Being, that his Exiftence is necellary. If it be i 
fomething too low, for the fupreme Being to have his Will de- i^ 
termined by moral Ne^ceffity, fo as neceiTarily, in every Caf^ 1! 
to will in the higheil: Degree holily and happily ; then why 
is it not alfo fom.ething/too low, for him to have hisExiftence, 
and the infinite Perf^edion of his Nature, and his infinite 
Happinefs determined by NecefTity ? It is no more to God's 
Diilionour, to be necefTarily wife, than to be necefTarily holy.> 
And if neither of them be to his Dilhonour, then it i^ 
not to his Difhonour necefTarily to ad holily and wifely. An<t 
if it be not diihonourable, to be necefTarily holy and wife, iii 
the highefi pofTible Degree, no more is it mean or diflionour- , 
able, necefTarily to act holily and wifely in the higheil pofTible 
Degree ; or (vv'hich is the fame Thing) to do that, in every 
Cafe, which above all other Things is wifefl andbefl. • 

The R.eafon why it is not difhonourable, to be necefTarily 
7n'iji holy, is, becaufe Holinefs in itfelf is an excellent and 
honourable Thing. Eor the fame Reafon, it is no Difhonour 
to be necefTarily rr.cj} wife, and in every Cafe to a(5t moft wifely, 
or do the Thing which is the wifefl of all ; for Wifdom is 
alfo i» it felf excellent and honourable. 


Sed.VII. /^^ Meannefs (^r Difad vantage. 237 

The forementioned Author of the EJpiy on the Freedom of IVtll 
Sec. as has been obferved, reprefents that Do6lrine of the 
divine Will's being in every Thing neceflarily determined by 
fuperior Fitnefs, as making the blefled God a Kind of al- 
mighty Minifter and mechanical Medium of Fate : And he 
infifts, P. 93, 94. that this moral NeceiTity and ImpolTibility is 
in Effea the fame Thing with phyfical and natural NecelTity 
and Impoffibility : And in P. 54, 55. he fays, " The Scheme 
" which determines the Will always and certainly by the 
" Underflanding, and the Underftanding by the Appearance 
" of Things, feems to take away the true Nature of Vice 
" and Vert^ue. For the fublimefi: of Vertues, and the vileil 
" of Vices, feem rather to be Matters of Fate and Neceffity, 
" flowing naturally and neceflarily from the Exiftence, the 
" Circumliances, and prefent Situation of Perfons andThings : 
" For this Exiilence and Situation neceflTarily makes fuch an 
" Appearance to the Mind ; from this Appearance flows a 
" neceflary Perception and Judgment, concerning thefeThings; 
" this Judgment neceflTarily determines the Will : And thus 
" by this Chain of necefl'ary Caufes, Vertue and Vice would 
" iofe their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and neceflary 
" Things, infl:ead of moral and free Adions." 

And yet this fame Author allows, P. 30, 31. That a per- 
fe6i:ly wife Being will confl;antly and certainly chufe VN^hat is 
?nofl: fit ; and fays, P. 102, 103. " I grant, and ahvays have 
" granted, that wherefoever there is fuch an antecedent fupe- 
" nor Fitnefs of Things, God acts according to it, fo as never 
" to contradi<St it ; and particularly, in all his judicial Pro- 
" ceedings, as a Governor, and Diftributer of Rewards and 
" Puniflimcnts." Yea, he fays exprefly, P. 42. " That it is 
*'_ not poflible for God to act otherwife, than according to 
" this Fitnefs and Goodnefs in Things." 

So that according to this Author,putting thefe feveralPafiages 
of his EflPay together, there is fio Vertue^ nor any Thing of a moral 
Nature, in the moft fublime and glorious A6ts and Exercifes of 
God's Holinefs, Juftice, and Faithfulnefs ; and He never does 
any Thing which is in it felf fupreamly worthy, and above dl 
other Things fit and excellent, but only as a Kind of mecha- 
nical Medium of Fate ; and in iJuhat he does as the Judge^ and 
moral Governor of the IVorld, He exercifes no moral Excellency ; 
exercifing no Freedom in thefe Things, becaufe He a6ts by 
moral Neccflity, \Yhich is in Effect the fame with phyfical or 


2Z^]Veceffity of Govs a^ wifely,^c. P.IV. 

natural Neceffity ; and therefore he only a6ts by an Hohhiftical 
Fatality \ as a Being indeed ofvaji Vnderjianding>, as ivcll as Poiuer 
and Efficiency (as He iaid before) but wiihout a Will to chufe^ being 
a Kind cf almighty Adinifier of Fate^ acting under ifsfupreafu In- 
fiuenee. For He allows, that in all thefe Things God's Will 
is determined conftantly and certainly by a fuperiour Fitnefs, 
and that it is not poffible for Him to acft otherwife. And if 
thefe Things are fo, what Glory or Praife belongs to God 
for doing holily and judly, or taking the moft fit, holy, wife 
and excellent Courfe, in any one Inftance ? Whereas, accord- 
ing to the Scriptures, and alio the common Senfe of Mankind, 
it don't in the leaft derogate from the Honour of any Being, 
that through the moral Perfedlion of his Nature, he necelTarily 
sets with fupream Wifdom and Holinefs : But on the con- 
trary, his Praife is the greater : Herein confifts the Height of 
his Glory. 

The fame Author, P. 56. fuppofes, that herein appears the 

excellent Character of a zvife and good lidan^ that tho' he can chuje 
contrary to the Fitnefs of Things^ yet he does not ; hut fuff'ers himfef 
U be dire^ed by Fitnefs ; and that in this Condu<^ He imitates 
the bleffed God. And yet He fuppofes 'tis contrariwife with the 
blefled God ; not that he fufrers Himfelf to be direded by 
Fitnefs, when He can clmfe contrary totheFitnefs of Things^ but that 
he cannot chufe contrary to the Fitnefs of Things -, as he fays, P. 42. 
— Tl:at it is not poffible for God to a^ otherwife^ than^ accorditig to 
this Fitnefs^ where there is any Fitnefs or Goodn^s in Things : Ye a, he 
fuppofes, P. 31. That if a Man were fetfe^ily wife and good^ he 
could not do otherwife than be conflantly and certainly determined by the 
Fitnefs of Things. 

One Thing more I would obferve, before I conclude this 
Section ; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the 
Glory of God, to be necelTarily determined by fuperior Fitnefs 
in fome Things, then neither does it to be thus determined in 
all Things ; from any Thing in the Nature of fuch Neceffity, 
as at all detrading from God's Freedom, Independence, abfo- 
lute Supremacy, or any Dignity or Glory of his Nature, State, 
or Manner of ading ; or as implying any Infirmity, Reftraint, 
or Subjection. And if the Thing be fuch as well confifts with 
God's Glory, and hasnothing tending at all to detracSl from 
it ; then we need not be afraid of afcribing it to God in too 
many Things, left thereby we fhould detra6t from God's 
Glory too much. 


( 239 ) 
Section VIII. 

Some further ObjeEiions againji the moral 
Neceffity of God's Volitions conjidered. 

THE Author laft cited, as has been obferved, owns that 
God, being perfedly wife, will conftantly and certainly 
chufe what appears moft fit, where there is a fuperior 
Fitnefs and Goodnefs in Things j and that it is not pomble 
for him to do otherwife. So that it is in Effed confefs'd, that 
in thole Things where there is any real Preferablenefs, 
'tis no Diflionour, nothing in any Refpec^ unworthy of God, 
for him to a6l from Neceffity ; notwithftanding all that can 
be obje6tcd from the Agreement of fuch a Neceflity, . with the 
Fate oit\\Q-Stoicks^ and the Neceflity maintain'd hylAx. Hobbes, 
From which it will follow, that if it were fo, that in all the 
different Things, among which God chufes, there were ever- 
more a fuperior Fitnefs or Preferablencfs on one Side, then it 
would be no Dilhonour, or any Thing, in any Refpe6f, un- 
worthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be neceffarily 
determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a 
giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unfuitablenefs of 
fuch a Neceifity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and 
Glory of the divine Being ; and a refting the wholeWeight of 
-the Affair on the Decifion of anotherPoint wholly diverfe ; viz. 
Whether it be fo indeed^ that in all the various poifibie Things 
which are in God's View, and may be confidered as capable 
ObjecSls of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferabienefs 
in one Thing above another. This is denied by thisAuthor ; 
w{io fuppofes, that in many Inftances, between two or more 
poiTible Things, which come v/ithin the View of the divine 
Mind, there is a perfe6t Indifference and Equality as to Fitnefs, 
or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in 
View, or to anfwer any of his Deiigns. Now therefore I 
would coniider whether this be evident. 

r The Arguments brought to prove this, are of two Kinds, 
(i.) It is urged, that in many Inllances w^e mufl fuppofe 

.there is abfolutely no Difference between various poffible Ob- 
jeds of Choice, which God has in View : And (2,). that the 

•^ . Difference 

240 0/* God's creating the World^ Part IV. 

Difference between many Things is fo inconfiderable, or of 
fuch a Nature, that it would be unreafonable to fuppofe it to 
be of any Confequence ; or to fuppofe that any of God's wife 
Defigns would not be anfwered in oneWay as well as the other. 

Therefore, ,) 

I. The firft Thing to be confidered is, "Whether there are \ 

any Inftances wherein there is a perfe(5l Likenefs, and ab- - 

folutely no Difference,between different Objeds of Choice, that i: 

are propofed to the divine Underffanding ? ' ^ 

And here in the firjl Place, it may be worthy to be confi- " 

dered, whether the Contradiction there is in the Ti?r;?2^ of the 1 

Queftidn propofed, don't give Reafon to fufpedl that tliere is 'i 

an Inconfirtence in the Thhig fuppofed. 'Tis inquired, whe- ;j 

ther different Objects of Choice mayn't be ab folutely withcut \ 

Difference P If they .are abfolutely zvithout Difference^ then how i 

are they different Objeds of Choice ? If there be abfolutely no j 

Difference in any Refpe6t, then there is no Variety or DiJiinSiion : ' 

For DiftinCtion is only by fome Difference. And if there be ] 

no Variety among propofed OhjeSfs of Choice^ then there is no j 

Opportunity for Variety of Choice^ orDifference of Determination. 1 

For that Determination of a Thing w^hich is not different in j 

any Refpedt, is not a different Determination, . but the fame. \ 

That this is no Quibble, inay appear more fully anon. I 


The Arguments, to prove that the moft High, in fome In- ' 

ftances, chufes to do one Thing rather than another, where | 

the Things themfelves are perfe6tly without Difference, are 1 

two. - j 

I. That the various Parts of infinite Time and Space, ab- | 

folutely confidered, are perfedtly alike, and don't differ at all | 

one from another : And that therefore, when God determined | 

to create the World in fuch a Part of infinite Duration and ! 

Space, rather than others, he determin'd and prefer'd among '. 
various Objects, between which there w^as no Preferablenefs, , 
and abfolutely no Difference. 

Jnfiv. This Objection fuppofes an infinite Length of Time 
before theVv^orld was created, diftinguifhed by fucceffive Parts, 
properly and truly fo ; or a Succeffion of limited and unmea- 
furable Periods of Time, following one another, in an infi- 
nitely long Series : which muff needs be a groundlefs Imagi- 
nation. The eternal Duration which was before the Worlds 
Veing only the I'2ternity of God's Exiflence ; which is nothing 


Sed.VlIL atfuch a Time ^W Place. 1\X 

clfe but his immediate, perfetfl and invariable Poffeffion of the 
whole of his unlimited Life, together and at once 5 Vita inter- 
fninabtlis^' tota^ ftmtil ^ perfeSfa Pojfeffio. Which is fo generally 
allowed, that I need not ftand to demonftrate it* * 

So this Obje6lion fuppofes an Extent of Space beyond the 
Limits of the Creation, of an infinite* Length, Breadth and 
Depth, truly and properly diftinguilhed inta different meafur- 
able Parts, limited at certain Stages, one beyond another, in 
an infinite Series. Which Notion of abfolute and infinite Space 
is doubtlefs as unreafonable, as that now mention'd, of abfo- 

H h lute 

* " if all created Beings were taken away, all t^oflibility of any Mu- 
" tation or Succeffion of one Thing to another would appear to 
*' be alfo removed. Abftraft Succeffion in Eternity is fcarce to be 
** underftood. What is it that fiicceeds ? One Minute to another 
*' perhaps, ^velut unda Jupewenit undam. But when we -imagine 
** this, we fancy that the Minutes are Things feparately exifting. 
•* This is the common Notion ; and yet it is a manifeft Prejudice. 
*• Time is nothing but the Exiftence of created fucceffive Beings, 
*' and Eternity the necelTary Exiftence of the Deity. Therefore^i^ 
'* this necefTary Being hath no Change or Succeffion in his Nature, 
«* his Exiftence muft of Courfe be unfucceffive. We feem to com- 
•♦ mit a double Overfight in this Cafe ; firji, we find Succeffion in 
«* the neceftary Nature and Exiftence of the Deity himfelf : V7hich 
« is wrong, if the Reafoning above be conclufive. And then 
«* we afcribe this Succeffion to Eternity, coniidered abftraftedl/ 
" from the eternal Being j and fuppofe it, one knows not what, a 
•* Thing fubfifting by it {t\iy and flowing, one Minute after another, 
" This is the Work of pure Imagination, and contrary to the 
«* Reality of Things, Hence the common metaphoricalExpreffions ; 
•* ^ime runs a-pace» let us lay hold on the frefent Minute, and the like. 
« The Philofophers themfelves mifiead us by their Jlluftrations : 
" They compare Eternity to the Motion of a Point running on 
« forever, and making a tracelefs infinite Line. Here the Point u 
** fuppofed a Thing adually fubfifting, reprefenting the prefent Mi- 
** nute ; and then they afcribe Modon or Succeffion to it ; that is, 
" they afcribe Motion to a meer Non-entity, Co illuftrate to us a 

" fucceffive Eternity made up of finite fucceffive Parts. li once 

** we allow an all-perfe6lMind, which hath an eternal,immutable and 
" infiniteComprehenfion of allThings, always (and allow it we muft) 
«* the Diftindlion of paft and future vaniflies with Refpedl to fuch a 

** Mind. In a Word, if we proceed Step by Step, as above, 

" the Eternity or Exiftence of the Deity will appear to be Vit^ 
•* interminahilisy tot a, fimul tf perfe^a PoJfeJJjo ; how much fosver 
" this may have been a Paradox hitherto." Enquiry ivVo the Nature 
tf thi Human Soul, Vol. t, P. 409, 410, 411. Edit. 3, 

242 Of Go^'s placing 6\SQVtvi\\y Part IV. | 

lute and infinite Duration. 'Tis as improper, to imagine that . 
the Immenfity and Omniprefence of God is diftinguilhed by a 
Series of Miles and Leagues, one beyond another ; as that I 
the infinite Duration of God is diftinguilhed by Months andij 
Years, one after another. A Diverfity and Order of diftind t 
Parts, Hmited by certain Periods, is as conceivable, and does iJ| 
as naturally obtrude itfelf on our Imagination, in one Cafe as |:; 
the other ; and there is equal Reafon in each Cafe, to fuppofe < 
that our Imagination deceives us. 'Tis equally improper, to k 
talk of Months and Years of the divine Exiftence, and Mile- \ 
fquares cf Deity : And we equally deceive our felves, when ) 
we talk of the World's being differently fix'd with Refpec5t to ^i 
either of thefe Sorts of Meafures. I' think, we know not what \ 
we mean, if we fay, the World might have been differently J 
placed from what it is, in the broad Expanfe.of Infinity ; or, ?Jt 
that it might have been differently fix'd in the long Line of I 
Eternity : And all Arguments and Objections which are i 
built on the Imaginations we are apt to have of infinite Exten- 1 
fion or Duration, are Buildings founded on Shadows, or J 
Caftles in the Air. 

2. The fecond Argument, to prove that the moft High wills 1 
one Thing rather than another, without any fuperior Fitnefs or ;1i 
Preferablenefs in the Thing prefer'd, is God's adually placing ,1 
in different Parts of the World, Particles or Atoms of Matter \ 
that are perfe6tly equal and alike. The forementioned Author ii 
jfays, P. 78, b'V. " If one would defcend to the minute fpecific j 
" Particles, of which different Bodices are compofed, we fhould j 
*' fee abundant Reafon to believe that there are Thoufands of \\ 
" fuch little Particles or Atoms of Matter, which are perfectly 1 
" equal and alike, and could give no diftind Determination to il 
*' the Will of God, where to place them." He there inftances )i 
in Particles of Water, of which there are fuch immenfe Num- l 
bers, which compofe the Rivers and Oceans of this World j ;j 
and the infinite Myriads of the luminous and fiery Particles, | 
which compofe the Body of the Sun ; fo many,that it would be ''S 
>ery unreafonable to fuppofe no two of'them fhould be exadly j 
equal and alike. | 

Jnfw, (i.) To this I anfwer : That as we mufl fuppofe 'i 
Matter infinitely divifible, 'tis very unlikely that any two \ 
of all thefe Particles are exadtly equal and alike ; fo unlikely, | 
that it is a Thoufand to one, yea, an infinite Number to one, i 
but it is lotkerwife : And that altho' we fhould allow a great I 

Similarity 1 

Se6l. Vlli, fimilar Particles. 243 

Similarity between the different Particles of Water and Fire, 
as to their general Kature and Figure ; and however fmall we 
fuppofe thofeParticles to be, 'tis infinitely unlikely, that any two 
of them (hould be exa6lly equal in Dimenlions and Quantity 

of Matter. If we (liould fuppofe a great many Globes of 

the fame Nature with the Glpbe of the Earth, it would be very 
ftrange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the 
fame Number of Particles of Dull and Water in them. But 
infinitely lefs ftrange, than that tvvo Particles of Light fhould 
have juft the fame Quantity of Matter. For a Partici" of 
Light (according to the Dodrine of the infinite Diviiibuity of 
Matter) is compofed of infinitely more affignable Parts, than 
there are Particles of Duft and Water in UiQ Globe of the 
Earth. And as it is infinitely urJ;kely, that any two of thefe 
Particles (hould be equal ; fo it is, that they (hiouid be alike m 
other Refpe6ls : To inriance ia the Configuration of their 
Surfaces. If there were very many Globes, of the Nature of 
the Earth, it would be very unlikely that any two Ihould have 
exactly the fame Number of Particles of Dafi, Water andStone, 
in their Surfaces, and all pofited exacStly alike, one with Ref- 
pe6l to another, without any Difference, in any Part difcernable 
either by the naked Eye or Microfcope ; but infinitely lefs 
ftrange, than that two Particles of Light ftiouid be periediy 
of the fame Figure. For there are infinitely more alfignable 
real Parts on the Surface of a Particle of Light, than there are 
Particles of Duft, Water and Stone, on the Surface of the 
terreftrial Globe. 

Anf, (2.) But then, fuppofmg that there are two Particles 
fer Atoms of Matter perfe6tly equal and alike, which God has 
placed in different Parts of the Creation ; as I will not deny it 
to be poffible for God to make two Bodies perfedly alike, aad 
put them in different Places ; yet it will not follow, that two 
different or diltind A6ls or Eft"e6ls of the divine Power have 
^ exadly the fame Fitnefs for the fame Ends. For thefe two 
different Bodies are not different or diftmd, in any other 
Refpeds than thofe wherein they differ r They are two in no 
other Refpe<5ls than thofe wherein there is a Difference. If 
they are perfectly equal and alike in thernfehes^ then they csnbe 
diftinguifhed, or be diftind, only in thofe Things "Which are 
called Circumjiances j as. Place, Time, Reft, Motion, or fome 
other prefent or paft Circumftar^ces or Relations. For 'tis 
Difference only, that conftitutes Diftindion. If God makes 
two Bodies ifi tJ3£mfelv€S everyWay equal and alike, and agreeing 

H h 2 perfeaiy 

244 0/* God's /'/<?a«^ differently Part 

IV. 1i 

perfedly in all other Circumftances and Relations, but only i| 
their Place ; then in this only is there any Diftin6lion or Du- 
plicity. The Figure is the fame, the Meafure is the fame, 
the Solidity and Refiftance are the fame, and every Thing the , 
fame, but only the Place. Therefore what the Will of God 
determines, is this, namely, that there (hould be the fame \ 
Figure, the fame Extenfion, the fame Refiftance, ^c. in two 
different Places. And for this Determination he has fome 
Reafon. There is forne End, for which fuch a Determination 
and A6t has a peculiar Fitnefs, above all other A(5ls. Here is 
no one Thing determined without an End, and no one Thing 
without a Fitnefs for that End, fuperior to any Thing elfe. If 
it be the Pleafure of God to caufe the fame Refiftance, and the 
fame Figure, to be in two different Places and Situations, we 
can no more juftly argue from it, that here muft be fomq 
Determination or A(5t of God's Will, that is wholly without 
Motive or End, then we can argue that whenever, in any 
Cafe, it is a Man's Will to fpeak the fame Words, or make, 
the fame Sounds at two different Times ; there muft be fome 
Determination or A61 of his Will, without any Motive orEnd, 
The Difference of Place, in the former Cafe, proves ne more 
than the Difference of Time does in the other. If any one 
fhould fay with Regard to the former Cafe, that there muft be 
fomething determined withor.t anEnd ; viz. That of thofetwo 
fimilarBodieSjthis in particular Ihould be made in thisPlace,and 
the other in the other, and fhould enquire why the Creator did 
not make them in a Tranfpofition, when both are alike, and 
each would equally have fuited either Pla^e ? The Enquiry 
fuppofes fomething that is not true j namely, that the two 
Bodies differ and are diftin6t in other Refpedts befides theift 
Place, So that with this DiftincSlion, inherent in them, they 
might in their firft Creation have been tranfpofed, and each 
inight have begun it's Exiftence in the Place of the other. 

Let us for Clearnefs fake fuppofe, that God had at the 
Beginning made two Globes, each of an Inch Diameter, both 
perfe<5|: Spheres, and perfedly folid without Pores, and per- 
'fedlly alike in every Refpe(5t, and placed them near one to 
another, one tow^ards the right Hand, and the other toward* 
the left, without any Difference as to Time, Motion or Reft, 
paft or prefent, or any Circumftance, but only their Place ; 
and the Qijeftion fliould be afk'd. Why God in their Creation 
placed 'em fo ? Why that which is made on the right Hapd, 
was not made on the left, and vice verfa f Let it be well con- 



Sed.VIIL fimilar Particles. 245 

iidered, whether there be any Senfe in fuch a Queftion ; and 
•whether the Enquiry don*t fuppofe fomething falfe and abfurd. 
Let it be confidered, what the Creator muft have done other- 
wife than he did, what different Acl of Will or Power he muft 
have exerted, in order to the Thing propofed. All that could 
have been done, would have been to have made two Spheres, 
perfectly alike, m the fame Places where he has made them, 
without any Difference of the Things made, either in them- 
felvcs, or in any Circumftance ; fo that the whole Effect would 
have been without any Difference, ^nd therefore jufi: the fame* 
By the Suppofition, the two Spheres are different in no other 
Refpe6t but their Place ; and therefore in other Refpeds they 
are the fame. Each has the fame Roundnefs : it is not a 
diflind Rotundity, in any other Refpecft but it's Situation. 
There are alfo the fame Dimenfions, differing in nothing but 
their Place. And fo of their Refiftance, and every Thing elf® 
that belongs to them. 

Here if any chufes to fay, " that there is a Difference in 
another Refped, viz. That they are not NUMERICALLY 
the fame : That it is thus with all the Qualities that belong 
to them : That it is confeffed they are in fome Refpe6ts 
the fame ; that is, they are both exadly alike ; but yet nume^ 
rically they differ. Thus the Roundnefs of one is not the 
fame numerical., individual Roundnefs with that of the other." 
Let this be fuppoied ; then the Queftion about the Determi- 
nation of the divine Will in the Affair, is. Why did God will, 
that this individual Roundnefs fliould be at the right Hand, and 
the other individual Roundnefs at the left ? Why did not he 
make them in a contrary Pofition ? Let any rational Perfoi> 
confider, whether fuchQueftions be notWords without aMean- 
ing ; as much as it" God Ihould fee fit for fome Ends to caufe 
the fame Sounds to be repeated, or made at two different 
TJiries ; the Sounds being perfe6lly the fame in every other 
Jvefpedl, but only one was a Minute after the other ; and it 
fhould be afk'd upon it, why God caufed thefe Sounds, nume- 
rically different, to fucceed one the other in fuch a Manner ? 
why he did not make that individual Sound which was in the 
(irft Minute, to be in the fecond ? and the individual Sound of 
the laft Minute to be in the firft ? Which Enquiries would be 
even ridiculous ; as I think every Perfon muft fee at once, in 
the Cafe propofed of two Sounds, being only the fame repeat- 
ed, abfolutely without any Difference, but that one Circum- 
ftance of Time. If the moft High fees it will anfwer fom^ 


24^6 Of God's chuf among likeZ^/;^^j,P.IV. 

good End, that the fame Sound (hould be made by Lightning 
at two diftincft Times, and therefore wills that it fhould be fo, 
piuft it needs therefore be, that herein there is fome Ad of 
God's Will witho|it anyMotive or End ? God faw fit often, at 
diftin<5l Times, and on different Occafions, to fay the very 
fame Words to Mofes ; namely thofe, / am Jehovah. And 
would it not be unreafonable, to infer as a certainConfequence 
from this, that here muft be fome A61 or Adls of the divine 
Will, in determining and difpofing thefe Words exa6lly alike 
at different Times, wholly without Aim or Inducement ? But 
it would be no more unreafonable than to fay, that there muft 
be an AS. of God's without any Inducement, if he fees it beft, 
and for fome Reafons, determines that there fhall be the fame 
Refiftence, the fame Dimenfions, and the fame Figure, in 
feveral diftindt Places. 

If in the Inftance of the two Spheres, perfe(5lly alike, it be 
fuppofed pofTible that God might have made them in a contrary 
Pofition J that which is made at the rightHand, being made at 
the Left ; then I afk, Whether it is not evidently equally poffi- 
ble, if God had made but one of them, and that in the Place 
of the right-hand Globe, that he might have made that nume- 
rically different from what it is, and numerically different from 
what he did make it ; tho' perfedlly alike, and in the fame 
Place ; and at the fame Time, and in every RefpecSV, in the 
fame Circumftances and Relations ?, Namely, Whether he 
might not have made it numerically the fame with that which 
he has now made at the left Hand ; and fo have left th^at 
which is now created at the right Hand, in a State of Non- 
Exiftence ? And if fo, whether it would not have been poffible 
to have made one in that Place, perfectly like thefe, and yet 
numerically differing from both ? And let it be confidered, 
whether from this Notion of a numerical Difference inBodies, 
perfedly equal and alike, which numerical Difference is fome- 
thing inherent in the Bodies themfelves, and diverfe from the 
Difference of Place or Time, or any Circumftance whatfoever j 
it will not follow, that there is an infinite Number of numeri - 
Gaily different poffible Bodies, perfedlly alike, among which 
God chufes, by a felf-determining Power, when be goes about 
to create Bodies. 

Therefore let us put the Cafe thus : Suppofing that God in 
the Beginning had created but one perfedly folid Sphere, in a 
certain Place 3 and it (hould be ^nquired,Why God created that 


Se.VIII. andThings of XxivbXDifference. 247 

individual Sphere, in that Place, at that Time ? And why he 
did not create another Sphere perfecSVly hke it, but numerically 
different, in the fame Place, at the fame Time ? Or why he 
chofe to bring into Being there, that very Body, rather thaa 
any of the infinite Number of other Bodies, perfe(5i:Iy like it 5 
either of which he could have made there as well, and would 
have anfwered his End as well ? Why he caufed to exift,, at 
that Place and Time, that individual Roundnefs, rather thaa 
any other of the infinite Number of individual Rotundities, juft 
like it ? Why that individual Refifiance, rather than any other 
of the infinite Number of poflible Refiftances juft like it ? And 
it might as reafonably be afked. Why, when God firft caufed 
it toThunder,he caufed that individualSound then to be made, 
and not another juft like it ? Why did he make Choice of this 
very Sound, and reje6l all the infinite Number of other poflible 
Sounds juft like it, but numerically differing from it, and all 
differing one from another ? I think, every Body muft be fen- 
fible of the Abfurdity and Nonfenfe of what is fuppofed in fuch 
Inquiries. And if we calmly attend to the Matter, we (hall be 
convinced, that all fuch Kind of Obje<5lions as I am anfwer- 
ing, are founded on nothing but the Imperfe(5tion of our Man- 
ner of conceiving of Things, and theObfcurenefs of Language, 
and great Want of Clearnefs and Precifion in the Signification 
of Terms. 

If any fhall find Fault with this Reafoning, that it is going 
a great Length into metaphyfical Niceties and Subtilties ; I 
anfwer, The Obje6tion which they are in Reply to, is a me- 
taphyfical Subtilty, and muft be treated according to the Na- 
ture of it. * 

II. Another Thing alledged is. That innumerable Things 
which are determined by the divine Will, and chofen and done 
by God rather than others, differ from thofe that are not 
chofen in fo inconfiderable a Manner, that it would be unrea- 
fonable to fuppofe the Difference to be of any Confequence, 
or that there is any fuperiour Fitnefs or Goodnefs, that God 
can have Refpe<5t to in the Determination. 


* " For Men to have Recourfe to Subtilties, in raifing Difficulties, 
" and then complain, that they fhould be taken off by minutely 
" examining thefe Subtilties, is a ftrange Kind o( Procedure.''' 
Nature 0/ the Hum. Soul, V. 2. P. 331. 

248 0/God's chufi am^ (vnzWMattersV.lV. 

To which I anfwer ; it is impoflible for us to determine 
with any Certainty or Evidence, that becaufe the Difference is 
very fmali, and appears to us of no Confideration, there- 
fore there is abfolutely no fuperiour Goodnefs, and no valuable 
End which can be propofed by the Creator and Governor of 
the World, in ordering fuch a Difference. The foremention'd 
Author mentions many Inftances. One is, there being one 
Atom in the wholeUniverfe more,or lefs. But I think it would 
be unreafonable to fuppofe, that God made one Atom in vain, 
or without any End or Motive. He made not one Atom but 
what was a Work of his almighty Pov/er, as much as the 
whole Globe of the Earth, and requires as much of a conftant 
Exertion of almighty Power to uphold it ; and was made and 
is upheld underftandingly, and on Defign, as much as if no 
<3ther had^-been made but that. And it would be as unreafo- 
nable to fuppofe, that he made it without any Thing really 
aimed at in fo doing, as mucii as to fuppofe that he made the 
Planet Jupiter without Aim or Defign. 

'Tis pofFible, that the moft minute Efre6ts of the Creator's 
Power, the fmaileft affignable Differences between the Things 
which God has made, may be attended, in the whole Series 
of Events, and the whole Compafs and Extent of their Influ- 
ence, with very great and important Confequences. If the 
Laws of Motion & Gravitation, laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton^ 
.hold univerfally, there is not one Atom, nor thjs leaft affignable 
Part of an Atom, but what has Influence, every Moment, 
throughout the whoie material Univerfe, to caufe every Part 
to be'otherwife than it would be,'if it were not for that parti- 
cular corporeal Exiftence. And however the Effed is infenfl- 
ble for the prefent, yet it may m Length of Time become 
great and important. 

To illuflrate this. Let us fuppofe two Bodies moving the 
fame Way, in flrait Lines, perfectly parallel one to another j 
but to be diverted from this Parallel Courfe, and drawn one 
from another, as much as might be by the Attra6tion of an 
Atom, at the Diilance of one of the furtheft of the fix'd Stars 
from the Earth ; thefe Bodies being turned out of the Lines 
of their parallel Motion, will, by Degrees, get further and 
further diflant, one from the other ; and tho' the Diftance may 
be imperceptible for a longTime, yet at Length it may become 
very great. So the Revolution of a Planet round the Sun be- 
i^ttg retarded or accelerated, and the Orbit of it's Revolution 


Se^VIII.Neceflity conftpwi^^ itttGrace. 249 

made greater or lefs, and more or lefs elliptical, and (o it's 
Periodical Time longer or lliorter, no more than may be by 
the Influence of the lead Atom, might in Length of Time per- 
form a whole Revolution fooner or later than otherwife it 
would have done ; which might make a vaft Alteration 
with Regard to Millions of important Events. So the Influence 
of the leaft Particle may, for ought we know, have fuch EfFecSt 
on fomething in the Conftitution of fome human Body, as to 
caufe another Thought to arife in the Mind at a certain Time, 
than otherwife would have been ; which in Length of Time 
(yea, and that not very great) might occafion a vaft Alteration 
thro' the whole World of Mankind. And fo innumera- 
ble other Ways might be mention'd, wherein the leaft afllgn- 
able Alteration may poflibly be attended with great Confc- 

Another Argument^ which the foremention'd Author brings 
sgainft a neceflary Determination of the divine Will by a fupe- 
hour Fitnefs, is, that fuch Do6trine derogates from the Freenefl 
of God's Grace and Goodnefs^ in chufing the Objedls of his 
Favour and Bounty, and from the Obligation upon Men to 
Thankfulnefs for fpecial Benefits. P» 89, ^c* 

In anfwer to this Objedion, I would obfefve, 

1. That it derogates no more from the Goodnefs of God, 
to fuppofe the Exercife of the Benevolence of his Nature to 
be determined by Wifdom, than to fuppofe it determined by 
Chance, and that his Favours ate beftowed altogether at Ran- 
dom, his Will being determin'd by nothing but perfed: Acci- 
dent, without iany End or Defign whatfoever ; which muft be 
the Cafe, as has been demonftrated, if Volition be not deter- 
mined by a prevailing Motive. That which is owing to per- 
it^ Contingence, wherein neither previous Inducement, nor 
antecedent Choice has any Hand, is not owing more to Good- • 
nefs or Benevolence, than that which is owing to the Influence 
of a wife End. 

2. 'Tis acknowleged,that if the Motive that determines the 
Will of God, in the Choice of the Objeds of his Favours, be 
any moral Quality in the Objecfl, recommending that Obje(5t 
to his Benevolence above others, his chufing that Objedt is 
not fo great a Manifeftation of the Freenefs and Sovereignty of 
his Grace, as if it were otherwife. But there is no NecelFity 
of fuppoiing this, in ©rder to our fuppoiing that ha has fome 

I i wii'tj 

2^0 Neceffity confifl^ wi^^ free Cr^c^. Parti V. 

wife End in View, in determining to beftow his Favours on 
one Perfon rather than another. We are to diftinguilh be- 
tween the Merit of the Objcdf of God's Favour^. ox a moral Qua- 
lification of th ObjeSi ?.ttracling that Favour and recommend- 
ing to it, "kn^ xhz nahird Fkntfs of fuch- a Determination of 
the ASi of God's Goodnefs^ to anfwer fome wife Defign of his 

own, fome End in the View of God's Oranifcience. 'Tis 

God's own A61, that is the proper and immediate Objedt of 
his Vohtion. 

3. I fuppofe that none will deny, but that in fome Inftances, 
God a6ts from wife Deiign in determinmg the particular Sub- 
jeds of his Favours : None will fay, I prefume, that when 
God diftinguifhes by his Bounty particular Societies or Perfons, 
He never, in any Inftance, exercifes any Wifdom in fo doing, 
aiming at fome happy Confequence. And if it be not denied 
to be fo in fome Inftances, then I would enquire, whether in 
thefe Inftances God's Goodnefs is lefs manifeiled, than in 
thofe wherem God has no Aim or End at all ? And whether 
the Subjeds have lefs Caufe of Thankfulnefs ? And if fo, who 
Ihall be thankful for the Beftowment of diftinguiihing Mercy, 
with that enhancing Circumftance of the Diftin6Vion's being 
made without an End ? How fhall it be known when God is 
influenced by fome wife Aim, and when not ? It is very mani- 
fefl with Refpe6l to the Apoftle Paul, that God had wife Ends 
in chuiing Him to be aChriftian and an Apoll:le,who had been 
a Perfecutor, &c. The Apoftle himfelf mentions one End. 
I Tifn. i. 15, 16. Chrtft J ejus came into the World to fave Sinners y 
of whom I am chief. Hovjbeit, for this Caufe I obtained Mercy , that 
in ??ie fi'J}^ J^fr^ Chrijl might fhew forth all Long-fuffering^ for a 
Pattern to the?n who Jhoidd hereafter believe on Hi?n 10 Life ever- 
hfAng. But yet theApoftle never look'd on it as a Diminution 
"of the Freedom and Riches of divine Grace in his Election, 

which Ke fo often and fo greatly magnifies. This brings me 
to obferve, 

4. Our fuppcfrng fuch a moral Neceifit)' in the Acfls of God's 
XViil as has been fpoken of, is fo" far from neceflariiy derogat- 
ing from the Riches of God's Grace to fuch as are the chofen 
ObjecSts of his Favour, that in many Inftances, this moral Ne- 
cellity may arife from Goodnefs, and from the great Degree of 
it. God may chufe this Objei5l rather than another, as having 
a fuperiour Fitnefs to anfwer the Ends, Defigns and Inclina- 
tions of his Goodnefs ; being m*ore finful, and fo more mife- 


Secl.VIIL Oi Arminian Fatality. 251 

rable and neceflitous than others ; the Inclinations of infinite 
Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gra- 
cious Defign of God's fending his Son into the World may be 
more abundantly anfwered, in the Exercifes of Mercy towards 
fuch an Object, rather than another. 

One Thing more I would obferve, before I finifli what I 
have to fay on the Head of the Neceflity of the A6ts of God's 
Will ; and that is, that fomething much more like a fervile 
Subjedion of the divineBeing to fatalNeceirity,will follow from 
Arminian Principles, than trom the Doctrines which they cp- 
pofe. . P^or they (at leall moft of them) fuppofe, with Refpedt 
to all Events that happen in the moral World depending on 
the Volitions of moral Agents, which are the moft important 
Events of the Univerfe, to which all others are fubordinate ; 
I fay, they fuppofe witli refpe6t to thefe,that God has a certain 
Foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any Purpofes or De- 
crees of his about them. And if fo, they have a fix'd certain 
Futurity, prior to any Pefigns or Volitions of his, and inde- 
pendent on them, and to which his Volitions muft be fubjed, 
as He would wifely accommodate his Affairs to this fix'd 
Futurity of the State of Things in the moral World. So that 
here, inftead of a moral Necelfity of God's Wil], arifing from 
or confiding in the infinite Perfedtion and Blefiednefs of the 
divine Being, we have a fix'd unalterable State of Things, 
properly difiincf from the perfect Nature of the divine Mind, 
and the State of the divine Will and Defign, and entirely in- 
dependent on thefe Things, and which they have no Hand in, 
becaufe they are prior to them ; and which God's Will is truly 
fubjedl to, being obliged to conform or- accom.modate himfelf 
to it, in all his Purpofes and Decrees, and in every Thing He 
does in his Difpofals and Government of the V/orld ; the 
moral World being the End of the natural ; fo that all is in 
vain, that is not accommiodated to that State of the moral 
World, v/hich confifts in, or depends upon the A6ls and State 
of the Wills of moral Agents, which had a fix'd Futurition 
from Eternity. Such a Subjedion to Necefiity as this, would 
truly argue an Inferiority and Servitude,that would be unworthy 
of the fupreme Being ; and is much more agreable to the No- 
tion which many of the Heathen had of Fate, as above the 
Gods, than that moral Necefiity of Fitnefs and Wifdom which 
has been fpoken of ; and is truly repugnant to the abfolute 
Sovereignty of God, and inconfiftent with the Supremacy of his 
Will ; and really fu"bjeas the Will of the moft High to the Will 
qI his Creatures, and brings him into Dependence upon them. 

I i 2 Section 

252 Of the 0\y^Qdi\QXi about Part IV. i' 

Section IX. 

Concerning that ObjeEiion againft the Doc- ' 
trme which has been maintain d^ that it 
makes Goo the Author of Sin. 


TTTIIS urged by Arminians^ that the Dodrine of theNecelTity 
j[. of Men's Volitions, or their neceffary Connection with 
antecedetit Events and Circumftances, makes the firft 
Caufe, and fupreme Orderer of all Things, the Author of Sin; 
in that he has fo conftituted the State and Coyrfe of Things, 
that finful Volitions become neceflary, in Confequence of his 
pifpofal. Dr. Whitby^ in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the 
Will, * cites one of the Antients,as on his Side,declaring that 
this Opinion of the NecefTity of the Will "abfolves Sinners, as 
^' doing nothing of their own Accord which wasEvil,and would 
** caft all the Blame of all the Wickednefs committed in the 
•' World, upon God, and upon his Providence, if that were 
*' admitted by the Afl'ertors of this Fate ; whether he himfelf 
♦* did neceflitate them to do thefe Things, or ordered Matters 
"*' fo that they fhould be conftrain'd to do them by fome other 
<' Caufe." And the Dodor iays in another Place, % " In the | 
** Nature of the Thing, and in the Opinion of Philofophers, 
*' Caufa deficiens^in rebus necejfarils^ad Caufafii per fe efficient em redu- 
^' cenda eft. In Things neceflary, the deficient Caufe muft be 
*' reduced to the efficient. And in this Cafe the Reafon is 
*' evident ; bfecaufe the not doing what is required, or not 
avoiding vyhat is forbidden, being aDefe6t,muft follow fron^ 
the Pofition of the neceflary Caufe of that Deficiency.'* 

Concerning this, I would obferve the following Things. \ 

I. If there be any Difficulty in this Matter, 'tis nothing pe- \ 

?!uliar to this Scheme ; 'tis no Difficulty or Difadvantage |i 

wherein it is diftinguirtied from the Scheme of Ar?mmans j and \ 

therefore not realbnabiy obje(5led by them. ' \ 

Dr. Whitby fuppofes, that if Sin necefTarily follows from j 

pod's withholdingAffiftance, or if that Affiftance be not given ^ 

which I 

J Pn the five Points. P. 361. % Ihid P. 4S6. \ 

Seft.lX. makingGod the Author^ Sin. 253 

which is abfolutely neceflary to the avoiding of Evil ; then in 
the Nature of the Thing, God mull be as properly the Author 
of that Evil, as if he were the efficient Caufe of it, P^otn 
whence, according to what he himfeif fays of the Devils and 
damned Spirits, God muft be the proper Author of their perfect 
unreftrained Wickednefs : He muft be the efficient Caufe of 
the great Pride of the Devils, and of their perfect Malignity 
againft God, Chrift, his Saints, and all that is Good, and of 
the infatiable Cruelty of their Difpofition. Yox he ailowsjthat 
God has fo forfaken them, and does fo withhold his Affiilance 
from them, that they are incapacitated from doing Good, and 
determined only to Evil, f Our Dodrine, in its Confequence, 
makes God the Author of Men's Sin in this World, no more, 
and in no other Senfe, than his Do6trine, in its Confequence, 
makes God the Author of the hellilli Pride and Malice of the 
Devils. And doubtlefs the latter is as odious an Effe6l as 
the former. 

Again, if it ^\\\ follow at all^ that God is the Author of Sin, 
from «-aat has been fuppofed of a fure and infallibleConneclion 
between Antecedents and Confequents, it Vvill follow hecaufe 
of this^ 1J12., That for God to be the Author, or Orderer of 
thofe Things which he knows before-hand, will infallibly be 
attended with fuch a Confequence, is the fame Thing inEftcct, 
as for him to be the Author of that Confequence. But if this 
be fo, this is a Difficulty which equally attends the Dodrine 
of Ar?mnians themfelves ; at leait, of thofe of them wlio allow 
God's certain Fore-knowledge of all Events. For on the 
Suppofition of fuch a Fore-knowledge, this is the. Cafe with 
Refpedl to every Sin that is committed : God knew, that if he 
ordered and brought to pafs fuch and fuch Events, fuch Sins 
would infallibly follow. As for Inftance, God certainly fore- 
knew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered Thing;s 
fo, that there (hould be fuch a Man born, at fuch a Time, 
and at fuch a Place, and that his Life fhould be preferved,an(l 
that he fhould, in divine Providence, be led into Acquaintance 
withjefus; and that his Heart fhould be fo influenced by 
God's Spirit or Providence, as to be inclined to be a Follov/er 
of Chriil: ; and that he fliould be One of thofe Twelve, .which 
fhould be chofen conftantly to attend him as his Family ; and 
that his Health fhould be preferved fo that he fhould go up to 
Jerufaleniy at the laftPaffover in Chrift's Life ; and it fhould be 
io ordered that Judas Ihould fee Chrift's kind Treatment of 

X Ihid?, 3©2. 305. 

5 54 How GOD is concern d Part IV. 

the Woman which anointed him at Bethany^ and have that 
Reproof from Chrift, which he had at that Time, and fee and 
hear other Things, which excited his Enmity againft his 
Mafter, and other Circwmftances Ihould be ordered, as they 
■were ordered ; it would be what would moil certainly and in- 
fallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would 
■foon after hang himfelf, and die impenitent, and be fent to 
HeiJ, for his horrid Wickednefs. 

Therefore this fuppofed Difficulty ought not to be brought 
3san Objection againft theScheme which has been maintain'd, 
as difagreelng v/ith the Arminian Scheme, feeing 'tis no Diffi- 
culty owing to fuch TiDifagreement ; but aDiffi.culty wherein the 
Armmians ihare with us. That muft be unreafonably made 
an ObjecStion againft our differing from them, which we fhouid 
nQt\efcape or avoid at all by agreeing with them. 

And therefore I would obferve, 
II. 'Fhey who object, that this Doc5trine makes God the 
Author of Sin, ought diftin6tly to explain what they mean by 
that Phrafe, The Author of Sin. I know, the Phrafe, as it is 
commonly ufed, fignihes fomethins; very 111, If by ihe Author 
cf Sin^ be meant the Sinner^ the Agent^ or ASior of Shi, or ihe 
Doer of a wicked Thing ; fo it would be a Reproach and Blaf- 
phemy, to fuppofe God to be the Author of Sin. In this 
Senfe, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin ; rejecting 
fuch an Imputation on the moft High, as what is infinitely to 
be abhor'd ; and deny any fuch Thing to be the Confequence, 
of what I have laid down, fut if by the Author of Sin, is meant 
the Permitter, or not a Hinderer of Sin ; and at the fame 
Time, a Difpofer of the State of Evente, in fuch a Manner, 
for v>/ife, holy and moft excellent Ends and Purpofes, that Sin, 
if it be permitted or not hindered, will moft certainly and in- 
fallibly follow : I fay, if this be all that is meant, by being the 
Author of Sin, I don't deny that God is the Autlior of Sin, 
(tho' I dilhke and reject the Phrafe, as that which by Ufe and 
Cuftom is apt to carry another Senfe) it is no Reproach for the 
moft High to be thus the Author of Sin. This is not to be 
the AtUr of Sin, but on the contrary, of Holwefs. What God 
doth herein, is holy ; and a glorious Exercife of the infinite 
Excellency of his Nature. And I don't deny, that God's being 
thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid down ; 
and I affert, that it equally follows from the Doctrine which is 
maintained bv moft of the Armman Divines. 


Sed:. XL in the Exiftence of Sin. 255 

That it is moft certainly fo, that God is In fuch a Manner 
the Difpofer and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any Credit is to 
be given to the Scripture ; as well as becaufe it is impoffible in 
the Nature of Things to be otherwife. In fuch a Manner God 
ordered the Obftinacy of Pharaoh^ in his refufing to obey God's 
Commands, to let the People go. Exod. iv. 21. 1 will harden 

his Hearty and he Jhall not let the People go. Chap. vii. 2 5. 

Aaron tl^ Brother fiall /peak unto Pharaoh, that he fend the Chil- 
dren cf Ifrael out of his Land. And I will harden Pharaoh'j Hearty 
and midtiply jny Signs and my Wonders in the Land of Egypt. But 
Pharaoh jhall not hearken unto you \ that I may lay mine Hand upon 
Egypt, by great Judgments., kc. Chap. ix. 12. Jnd the Lord 
\ harden d the Heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto the?n^ as 
\ the Lord had fpoken unto Mofes. Chap. x. 1,2. And the Lord 
I faid unto Mofes, Go in ««^(7 Pharaoh ; for I have harden d hisHearU 
\ and the Heart of his Servants^ that I . might Jhew thefe ?ny Signs 
I before Him., and that thou may ft tell it in the Ears of thy Son^ and 
I thy Son's Son^ what Things I have wrought in Egypt, and my Signs 
which I have done anwngfi them., that ye may knoiv that I am the Lord. 
•Chap. xiv. 4. And I will harden Pharaoh's Heart, that he Jhall 
follow after them : and I will be hanoured upon Pharaoh, and upon 
all his Hoji. V. 8. And the Lord hardened the Heart i?/' Pharaoh 
King of Egypt, and he purfued after the Children (j/'IfraeL And it 
is certain that in fuch a Manner, God for wife and good Ends, 
ordered that Event, Jofeph's being fold into Egypt by his Bre- 
thren. Gen. xlv. 5. Now therefore he 7iot grieved., nor angry 
: with your/elves, that ye fold ?ne hither ; for God did fend me before you 
\ to preferve Life. Ver. 7, 8. God did fend me before you to preferve a 
I Pofierity in the Earth., and to fave your Lives by a great Deliverance : 
]^^fo that now it was not you, that fent me hither^ but God. Pfal. evil. 
j 17. He fent a Man before them., even Jofeph, vjho zvas fold for & 
! Servant. 'Tis certain, that thus God ordered the Sin and Folly 
jj of Sihon King of the Amarites., in refufmg to let the People of 
j Ifrael pafs by him peaceably. Deut. ii. 30. But Sihon King of 
Hefhbon would not let us pafs by him ; for theLord thy God harden d 
his Spirit., and made his Heart objlinate., that He might deliver Him 
into thine Hand, 'Tis certain, that God thus ordered the Sin 
and Folly of the Kings of Canaan., that they attempted not to 
make Peace with Ifrael., but with a ftupid Boldnefs and Oblli- 
nacy, fet themfeives violently to oppofe them and their God. 
Jofh. xi. 20. For it was of the Lord., to harden their Hearts ^ that 
'they fljould come againji Ifrael in Battle., that he mght 
dejhoy them utterly^ and that they might have no Favour j but 
that he might deftroy thcm^ as the Lord co?nmanded Mofes^ 'TiS 


256 How GOD is concern d Part IV. 

e^wdent, that thus God ordered the treacherous Rebellion of 
Zedekiah^ againft the King of Babylon. Jer. iii. 3. For thro' the 
Anger of the Lord it came to pafs in Jerufalem, ajid Judah, '//// He 
had caji them out fro?n his Prejhice^ that Zedekiah rebelled againfl 
the Kinz of Babylon. So 2 Kings xxiv. 20. And 'tis exceeding 
manifell, that ^God thus ordered the Rapine and unrighteous 
Ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in fpoiling and ruining the Nations 
round about. Jer. xxv. 9. Behold^ I will fend and take all the 
Fsmil'ies of the Norths faith the Lord, «,W Nebuchadnezzar my Ser- 
^jant>and^will bring them againfl this Land^and againfl all theNations 
round about; and will utterly dejlroy thern^andmake them anAfioiiiJhment^ 
nnd an hiijfmg, a7id perpetual Deflations. Ch. xliii. 10. Ii. I will 
fend and take Nebuchadnezzer the King of Babylon, my Servant ; 
and I ivill ft his Throne upon thefe Stones that I have hid, and he" 
fhall jpread his royal Pavilion over them. And when he cometh, he 
fhall finite the Land of Egypt, and deliver juch as are for Death to 
Death, and fuch as are for Captivity to Captivity, and fiich as are 
for the Sword to the Sword. Thus God reprefents himfelf as 
^ fending for Nebuchadnezzar, and taking of him and his Armies, 
and bringing him agaiiUt the Nations which were to be deftroy- 
ed by him," to that very End, that he might utterly deftroy 
them, and make them defolate ; and as appointing the Work 
that he fhould do, fo particularly, that the very Pcrfons were 
defigned, that he fhould kill with the Sword ; and thofe that 
fliould be kiird wnth Famine and Peftilence, and thofe that 
Ihouid be earned into Captivity ; and that in domg all thefe 
Things, he fnould aa as his Servant : By which, lefs can't be 
intended, than that he Ihould ferve his Purpofes and Defigns. 
And in Jer. xxvii. 4, 5, 6. God declares how he would caufe 
him thus to ferve his Deligns, viz. by bringing this to pafs in 
his fovereign Difpofals, as" the great PofTeflbr and Governor of 
the Univerfe, that difpofes all Things juft as pleafes him. 
Thus faith the Lord of Hojls, the God ^/Ifrael ; / have made the 
Earth, the Man and the Beaft that are upon the Ground, by my greaf/ 
Power, and my fr etched out Arm, and have given it unto whom^ it 
feemed meet unto ?ne : And now I have given all thefe Lands into' 
the Hands ^/Nebuchadnezzar MY SERVANT, 'and the Beafls ' 
cf the Field have I given alfo to ferve him. And Nebuchadnezzar is 
fpoken of as doing thefe Things, by having his Arms firengthned 
by God, and \\^v\u2, God's Sword put into his Hands, for this- 
End. Ezek. xxx. 24,^25, 26. Yea, God fpeaks of his terribly 
ravac;ino; and waftino; the Nations, and cruelly deftroying all 
Sorts, Without Diftiriaion of Sex or Age, as the Weapon in 
God's Hand, and the Inftrument of his Indignation, which 


Sed:. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin. 257 

God makes ufe of to fulfil his ownPurpores,and execute his bwn 
Vengeance. Jer. li. 20, &c. Thou art my Battle- Axe^ and Wea- 
pons of JVar. For with thee will I break in Pieces the Nations^ and 
with thee I will dejlroy Kingdoms^ and with thee I will break in 
Pieces the Horfe and his Rider^ and with thee I tvill break in 
Pieces the Chariot an J his Rider ; with thee alfo tvill I break in 
Pieces Man and Woman ; and tvith thee will I break in Pieces Old 
and Young \ and with thee will I break in Pieces the young Man and 
the Adaid., &c. 'Tis reprefented,that the Defigns ot Nekichadnez- 
i&cr, and thofe that dertroyed Jerufalem, never could have been 
accompliflied, had notGod determined them, as well as they j 
Lam. iii. 37. Who is he that faith ^ and it cometh to pafs^ and ths 
Lord conmiandeth it not P And yet the King of Babylon's thus 
deftroying the Nations, and efpecially the Jews, is fpoken of 
as his great Wickednefs, for which God finally dertroyed him, 
Jfai. xiv. 4, 5, 6, 12. Hab. ii. 5,-12. and Jer. Chap. 1. & h. 
'Tis mofi manifeft, that God, to ferve his own Defigns, provi- 
dentially ordered Shimei's curi\ng David, 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11, 

Trje Lord hath faid unto him-, Curfe David. Let him curfe^ for 

the Lord hath bidden him. 

'Tis certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious 
and glorious Ends, ordered the Fa6l which they committed, 
who were concerned in Chrift's Death ; and that therein they 
did but fulfil God's Defigns. As, I truft, no Chriflian will deny 
it was the Defign of God, that Chrift {hould he crucified^ and 
that for this End, he came into the World, 'Tis very manifeft 
by many Scriptures, that the whole Affair of ChrilVs Cruci- 
fixion, with it's Circumftances, and the Treachery of Judas^ 
that^ made Way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in 
Purfuance of his Purpofe 5 notwithftanding the Violence that 
is ufed with thofe plain Scriptures, to obfcure and pervert the 
Senfe of 'em. A6t. ii. 23. Him being delivered^ by the detcrininatc 
Cownfel and Foreknowledge of Gody f ye have taken., and vjith wicked 
Hands^ have crucified and fiain. Luk. xxii. 21,22. \\ But behold the 
Hand of him that bctrayeth me^ is with me on the Table: And truly 

K k the 

f " Grotiusy as well as 'Beza,oh(erve%, that isroiywi'Tj? mud herefig- 
" nifie Decree ; and Elfner has fhewn that it has that Significa- 
" tion, in approved Gr^^i^ Writers. And it is certain irJor'^ 
*' fjgniiies one given up into the Hands of an Enemy." Doddridge 
in hoc. 

II " As this PaiTage is not liable to the Ambiguities, which Tome 
" have apprehended in ^J?. ii. 23. and iv. 28. (which yet feera 
** on the whole %q be parallel to it, in their moll natural Conflruc- 

*' thn) 

258 How Gob is concerned Part IV. 

the Son of Man goeth, as it tCas determined. A6t. iv. 27, 281 
For of aTruthy agamji thy holy Child Jefus^ whom thou haft anointed^ 
both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles^ and the People | 
^Ifrael, were gathered together ^ for to do whhtfoever thy Hand and (i 
thy Counfel determined before to be done. A<5t. iii. 17, 18. jind now | 
Brethren^ I wot that through Igyiorance ye did it, as did alfo your t 
Rulers : Bat thefe Things ^ which God before had /hewed by the Mouth | 
9f all his Prophets y that Chriji Jhould fuffer^ he hath fo fulfilled. So \ 
that what thefe Murderers of Chrift did, is fpoken of as what 1i 
God brought to pafs or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled | 
his own Word. | 

In Rev. xvii. 17. The agreeing of the Kings of the Earth to give I 
their Kingdom to the Beafl, tho' it was a very wicked Thing in 
them, is fpoken of as a fulfilling God's PFill, and what God 
had put it into their Hearts to do. 'Tis manifeft, that God fome- 
times perinitsSin to be committed.and at the fameTime orders I 
Things fo, that if he permits the Fad, it will come to pafs, I 
becaufe on fome Accounts he fees it needful and of Importance ! 
that it (hould come to pafs. Matt, xviii. 7. It muft needs be^ \ 
that Offences come ; hut Wo to that Man by whom the Offence cometh, \ 
With I Cor. xi. 19. For there rriuji alfo be Hereftes among you^ \ 
that they which are approved^may be made manifefl among you. \ 

Thus it is certain and demonftrable, from the holy Scrip- \ 
tures, as well as the Nature of Things^ and the Principles of | 
ArminianSy that God permits Sin j and at the fame Time, fo ij] 
orders Things, in his Providence, that it certainly and mfalli- ■( 
bly will come to pafs, in Confequcnce of his Permiflion. \ 

I proceed to obferve in the next Place, : 

III. That there is a great Difference between God*s 
being concerned thus, by his Permiffton^ in an Event and Adt, 
•which in the inherent Subject and Agent of it, is Sin, (tho' the 
Event will certainly follow on his PermilTion,) and his being 
concerned in it by />;Wm«^ it and exerting the- Acfl of Sin j 
or between his being the Orderer of it's certain Exiftence, by 
7tot hindering it, under certain Circumftances, and his being the 


*' tion) I look upon it as an evident Proof, that thefe Things are/ 
** in the Language of Scripture,faid to be determined or decreed 
** (or exadly bounded and mark'd out by God, as the Word 
•* Qi^\?^oi moll naturally Signifies) which he fees in Fa6l will hap- 
<* pen, in Confequence of his Volitions, without any necefEtating 
" Agency ; as well as thofe Events^ of which he \& properly 
*• the Author." DQdd. in hoc. 

Seft. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin. 259 

proper j£lor or Author of it, by a pofitive Agency or Efficiency, 
I And this, notwithftanding ^ix'sxDx .Whithy offers about a Saying 
of Philofophers, thatC^/^y^ defic'iens^ in Rebus necejfariis^ ad Caufam 
\perfe efficientem rediicenda eji. As there is a valt Difference be- 
tween the Sun's being the Caufe of the Lightfomenefs and 
Warmth oi the Atmofphere, and Brightnefs of Gold and 
Diamonds, by its Prefence and pofitive Influence ; and its be- 
ing the Occafion of Darknefs and Froft, in the Night, by its 
Motion, whereby it defcends below the Horizon. The Motion 
of the Sun is the Occafion of the latter Kind of Events ; but 
it is not the proper Caufe, Efficient or Producer of them j. tho* 
they are neceffarily confequent on that Motion, under fuch 
Circumftances : No more is any A6tion of the divine Being 
the Caufe of the Evil of Men's Wills. If the Sun were the 
i proper Caufe of Cold and Darknefs, it would be the Fountain 
[of thefe Things, as it is the Fountain of Light and Heat : And 
! then fomething might be argued from the Nature of Cold and 
I Darknefs, to a Likenefs of Nature in the Sun ; and it might 
be juifly infer'd, that the Sun itfelf is dark and cold, and that 
his Beams are black and frofty. But from its being the Caufe 
no otherwife than by its Departure, no fuch Thing can be 
infer'd, but the contrary j it may juftly be argued, that the 
Sun is a bright and hot Body, if Cold and Darknefs are found 
j to be the Confequence of its Withdrawment ; and the more 
conftantly and necefTarily thefe Effeds are connected with, and 
confined to its Abfence, the more fl:rongly does it argue the 
Sun to be the Fountain of Light and Heat. So, inafmuch as 
Sin is not the Fruit of any pofitive Agency or Influence of the 
moft High, but on the contrary, arifes from the withholding of 
IJiis A(5lion and Energy, and under certain Circumftances, ne- 
ceffarily follows on the Want of his Influence; this is no Ar- 
gument that he is finful, or his Operation Evil, or has any 
I Thing of the Nature of Evil ; but on the contra^ry, that He, 
I and his Agency, are altogether good and hjoly, and that he js 
the Fountain of all Holinefs. It would be flraiige arguing in- 
I deed, becaufe Men never commit Sin, but o;iiy when God 
leaves 'em to themfelves^ and necefTarily fin, when he does 
fo, that therefore their Sin is not from thefnfelves^ but fromGod ; 
and fo, thatGod muft be a finful Being : As flrange as it would 
be to argue, becaufe it is always dark when, the Sun is 
gone, and never dark when the Sun is prefent, that therefore 
I all Darknefs is from the Sun, and that his Difk and Beams 
mufl, needs be black, ^ 

K k 2 IV. It 

26o How GOD is concerned Part IV. 

IV. It properly belongs to the fupreme and abfblute Gover^Sll 
nor of the Univerfe, to order all important Events within his 
Dominion, by his Wifdom : But the Events in the moral 
World are of the moft important Kind ; fuch as the moral 
A<5tions of intelligent Creatures, and their Confequences. 

Thefe Events will be ordered by fomething. They will 
either be difpofed by Wifdom, or they wnll be difpol'ed by , 
Chance ; that is, they will be difpofed by blind ?.nd undefign-j , 
ing Caufes, if that were poffible, and could be called a Dilpo^'^i I 
fal. Is it not better, that the Good and Evil which happensfe'^ 
in God's World, (hould be ordered, regulated, bounded and ^ 
determin'd by the good Pleafure of an infinitely Vv^ife Being,| 
who perfe^ly comprehends within his Underftanding and con-j 
ftant View, the Univerfality of Things, in all tlieir Extent an4 1 
Duration, and fees all the Influence of every Event, with ; 
Refpedt to every individual Thing and Circumftance, through-^ ; 
out the grand Syftem, and the whole of the eternal Series of ' 
Confequences ; than to leave thefe Things to fall out by ■ 
Chance, and to be determined by thofe Caufes which have no'j 
Underftanding or Aim ? Doubtlefs, in thefe important Events^ ' 
there is a better and a worfe, as to the Time, Subje6t, Place, 
Manner and Circumftances of their coming to pafs, wnth Re- 
gard to their Influence on the State and Courfe of Things, 
And if there be, 'tis certainly bel^ that they fhould be deter-, 
inine4 to tha^ Time^ Place, 5cc, which is beft. And therefore : 
'tis in its own Nature fit, that Wifdom, and not Chance, fliould 
order thefe Things. So that it belongs to the Being, who is. 
the PofTeflbr of infinite Wifdom, and is the Creator andOwner J 
of the w^hole Syftem of created Exiftences,and has the Care oF * 
all ; I fay, it belongs to him,to take Care of this Matter ; ard ; 
he would iiot do what is proper for him, if he fliould negiecl it. 
And it is fo far from being unholy in him, to undertake this 
Affair, that it would rather have been unholy to negled it ; aj^ 
it would have been a negle61ing what fitly appertains to him y 
pnd fo it would have been a very unfit and unfuitable Negle6^. 

Therefore the Sovereignty of God doubtlefs extends to thisj^^ 
Matter : efpecially confidering, that if it fhould be fuppofed*' 
to be other wife, and God ihould leave Men's Volitions, and * 
'sxW moral Events, to the Determination and Difpofition of j 
blind and unmeaning Caufes, or they fhould be left to happen 
perfectly without a Qaufe ; this would be no more confiflerit 
Wh Li|:)crty, in any Notion of it, and particularly not in the 

Arminlan i 

' i3 

Sed. IX. in //6^ Exiftence of Sin. 261 

Armmtan Notion of it, than if thefe Events were fubje(5l to the 
Difpofal of divine Providence, and the Will of Man were de- 
termined by Circumftances which are ordered and difpofed 
by divine Wifdom ; as appears by what has been already 
oblerved. But 'tis evident, that fuch a providential difpofing 
and determining Men's moral Adions, tho' it infers a moral 
NecelTity of thofe Adions, yet it does not in the leaft infringe 
the real Liberty of Manicind, ; the only Liberty that common 
Senfe teaches to be necefiary to moral Agency, whifh, as has 
been demonftrated, is not inconfiflent whith fuch Neceffity, 

On the whole, it is manifeftjthat God may be, in theManner 
which has been defcribed, the Orderer and Difpoler of that 
Event, which in the inherent Subjed and Agent is moral Evil; 
and yet His fo doing may be no moral Evil. He may will the 
Difpofal of fuch an Event, and it's coming to pafs for good 
Ends, and hisWill not be an immoral or fmful Will, but a per- 
fe6tly holy Will. And he may actually in his Providence fo 
difpofe and permitThings, that the Event may be certainly and 
infallibly, conneded with fuchDifpofal h. Permiffion, and hisA(5l 
therein net be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holyAct. 
Sin may be an evil Thing, and yet that there fnould be fuch a 
Difpofal and Permiffion, as that it (hould come to pafs, may be 
a good Thing. This is no Contradi6tion, or Inconfifterjce. 
Jofeph's Brethren's felling him into Egypt ^ confider it only as it 
was a6ted by them, and with RefpeCt to their Views and Aims 
which were evil, was a very bad Thing ; but it was a good 
Thing, as it was an Event of God's ordering, and confider'd 
with Refped to his Views and Aims which were good. Gen. 
1. 20. Js for yoii^ ye thought Evil againft me \ hut God ?neant it unt§^ 
Good. So the Crucifixion of Chrift, if we coniider only thofe 
Things which belong to the Event as it proceeded from his 
^urde,rers, and are comprehended within the Compafs of the 
Affair confidered as their A61, their Principles, Difpofitions, 
Views and Aims ; fo it was one of the moft heinous Things 
that ever wa:s done ; in many Refpeds the moft horrid of all 
Aels : But confider it, as it was v/ill'd and ordered of God, 
in the Extent of his Defigns and Views, it was the moft ad- 
mirable and glorious of all Events ; and God's willing the 
Event was the moft holy Volition of God, that ever was made 
known to Men ; and (jod's Ad in ordering it, was a divine 
Ad, which above all others, manifefts the moral Excellency 
©f the divine Being. 


262 OfGOUs fecret Part IV. 

TheConfideration of thefeThings may help us to a fufficient 
Anfwer to the Cavils of Arminians concerning what has been 
fuppofed by many Calvinifts^ of a Diftindion between a fecret 
and revealed Will of God, and their Diverfity one from the 
other s fuppofing, that the Calvimfts herein afcribe inconfiftent 
Wills to the mod High : Which is without any Foundation. 
God*s fecret and revealed Will, or in other Words, his difpofing 
and preceptive Will may be diverfe, and exercifed in diffimilar 
A<5ts, theu one in difapproving and oppoling, the other in 
willing and determining, without any Inconfiftence. Becaufe, 
altho* thefe diffimilar Exercifes of the divine Will may in 
fome Refpe6ls relate to the fame Things, yet in Stridnefs they 
have different and contrary Objeds, the one Evil and the 
other Good. Thus for Inftance, the Crucifixion of Chrift 
was a Thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of 
God ; becaufe, as it was viewed and done by his malignant 
Murderers, it was a Thing infinitely contrary to the holy Na- 
ture of God, and fo necefiarily contrary to the holy Inclina- 
tion of his Heart revealed in his Law. Yet this don't at 
all hinder but that the Crucifixion of Chrift, confidered with 
all thofe glorious Confequences, which were within the View 
of the divine Omnifcience, might be indeed, and therefore 
might appear to God to be, a glorious Event ; and confe^ 
quently be agreable to his Will, tho' this Will may be fecret, 
i. e, not revealed in God's Law. And thus confidered, the 
Crucifixion of Chrift was not evil, but good. If the fecret 
Exercifes of God's Will were of a Kind that is diflimilar and 
contrary to his revealed Will, refpecSting the fame, or like 
Obje(fts ; if the Objedts of both were good, or both evil j 
*hen indeed to afcribe contrary Kinds of Volition or Inclina- 
tion to God, refpeding thefe Objeds, would be to afcribe an 
inconfiftent Will to God : but to afcribe to Him different and 
oppofite Exercifes of Heart, refpeding different Obje6ls, and 
Obje(5ls contrary one to another, is fo far from fuppofing God's 
Will to be inconfiftent with it felf, that it can't be fuppofed 
confiftent with it felf any other Way. For any Being to have 
a Will of Choice refpe(5ling Good, and at the fame Time a 
Will of Rejection and Refufal refpeding Evil, is to be very 
confiftent : But the contrary, vi%, to have the fame Will to- 
wards thefe contrary Obje6ts, and to chufe and love both 
Good and Evil at the fame Time, is te be very inconfiftent. 

There is no Inconfiftence in fuppofing, that God may hate 
a Thing as it is in it felf, and confidei-ed fimply as Evil, and 


Sect. IX. and revealed TVilL 263 

yet that it may be his Will it ihould come to pafs, con- 
fidering all Confequences. I believe, there is no Perfon of 
good Underftanding, who will venture to fay, he is certain 
that it is impolTible it fhouid be beft, taking in the whole 
Compafs and Extent of Exiftence, and all Confequences in 
the endlefs Series of Events, that there fhouid be fuch a Thing 
as moral Evil in the World. * And if fo, it will certainly fol- 

* Here are worthy to be obferved feme Paffages of a late noted 
Writer, of our Nation, that no Body who is acquainted with Him 
will fufpedl to be very favourable to Cahinifm. ** Jt is difficult 
" (fays he) to handle the NeceJJjty of E'vH in fuch a Manner, as 
** not to Humble fuch as are not above being alarmed at Propo- 
" fitions which have an uncommon Sound. But if Philofophers 
" will but refleft calmly on the Matter, they will find, that con- 
** fiftently with the unlimited Power of the fupreme Caufe, it 
" may be faid, that in the beft ordered Syftem, En)ils muft have 

** Place." TurnbuiPs Principles of moral Philofophy. Pag. 

327, 328. He is there fpeaking of w^r^/ Evils, as may be feen. 

Again the fame Author, in his fecond Vol. entitled, Chrijiian Philofophy^ 
Pag 35. has thefe Words : ** If the Author and Governor of 
*' all Things be infinitely perfeSi^ then whatever is, is right ; of all 
** poffible Syllems he hath chofen the hejl : and confequently there 

" is no abfolute Enjil in the Univerfe. ~ This being the Cafe, 

" all the feeming Imperfedions or E'vH! in it are fuch only in a 
" partial View i and with Refpefl to the wohok Syftem, they arc 

. " Goods. 
Ibid. Pag. 37. " Whence then comes E'vH, is the Queftion that hath in 

< " all Ages been reckon'd the Gordian Knot in Philofophy. And 
** indeed, if we own the Exiftence of Evil in the World in an 
" abfolute Senfe, we diametrically contradidl what hath been juft 
*' now prov'd of God. For if there be any En;il in the Syftem, 
** that is not good with Refpeft to the ivhole, then is the ivhole not 
" good, but evil : or at beft, very imperfeft : And an Author mufl 
** be as his Workmanfhip is ; as is the EfFedl, fuch is the Caufe. 

' *' Bttt the Solution of this Difficulty is at Hand ; That there is »» 
" E'vH in the Vni'verfe. What ! Are there no Pains, no Imper- 
" feftions ? Is there no Mifery, no Vice in the World ? Or are 
** not thefe £ij//f ? Evils indeed they are ; that is, thofe of one 
*' fort are hurtful, and thofe of the other fort are equally hurtful 
•* and abominable : But they are not evil or mifchievous with Re- 

•^ « fpea to the 'w/?.^^^." 

Ibid. Pag. 42. <* But He is at the fame Time faid to create Evil, 
" Darknefs, Confufion ; and yet to do no Evil, but to be the Au- 
** thor of Good only. He is called the Father of Lights, the Author 
" oi e'very perfcSl and good Gift , ivith fwhom there is no Variahlenefs 
r nor Shadow of Turning, who tempt fth w Man, but gi<veth to all Men 

V iib^rallft 

264 Of GO Us fecret Part IV. 

low, that an infinitely wife Being, who always chufes what is 
beft, muft chufe that there fhouid be fuch a Thing. And if 
fo, then fuch a Choice is not an Evil, but a wife and holy 
Choice. And if fo, then that Providence which is agreable 
to fuch a Choice, is a wife and holy Providence. Men do will 
Sin as Sin, and fo are the Authors and Adors of it : They 
love it as Sin, and for evil Ends and Purpofes. God don't 
v^ill Sin as Sin, or for the fake of any Thing evil ; tho' it be 
bis Pleafure fo to order Things, that He permitting. Sin will 
come to pafs ; for the fake of the great Good that by his 
Difpofar (hall be the Confequence. His willing to order 
Things fo that Evil (hould come to pafs, for the fake of the 
contrary Good, is no Argument that He don't hate Evil,aiJ 
Evil : And if fo, then it is no Reafon why he mayn't reafona- 
bly forbid Evil as Evil, and punifh it as fuch. 

The Armimans themfelves muft be obliged, whether they 
will or no, to allow a Diftin61ion of God's Will, amounting 
to juft the fame Thing that Calvimfis intend by their Diftinc- 
tion of -^ fecret and revealed TVill. They muft allow a Diftindion 
of thofe Things which God thinks beft fhouid be, confidering 
all Circumftances and Confeqiiences, and fo are agreable to 
his difpofing Will, and thofe Things which he loves, and are 
agreable to his Nature, in themfelves confidered^ Who is 
there that v*ill dare to fay, that the hellifti Pride, Malice and 
Cruelty of Devils, are agreable to God, and what He likes 
and approves ? And yet, I truft, there is no Chriftian Divine , 
but what will allow, that 'tis agreable to God's Will fo to 
©rder and difpofe Things concerning them, fo to leave them 
to themfelves, and give them up to their own Wickednefs, 
that this perfect Wickednefs fhouid be a neceflary Confe- 
quence. Befure Dr. Whitby's Words do plainly fuppofe and 
allow it. t 


** liberally^ and uphraideth not. And yet by the Prophet l/aias He; 
** is introduced faying of Himfelf, 1 form Light, and create Dark' 
•* nefs ; / make Peace, and create E'vil : I the Lord do all theft 
*' Things. What is the Meaning, the plain Language of all this,. 
•* but that the Lord delighteth in Goodnefs, and (as the Scripture 
** fpeaks) Evil is his firange H'ork f He intends ^ndpurfues the 
** univerfal Good of his Creadon : and the En;il which happens, 
" is not permitted for it's own fake, or tr^ro' any Pleafure in Evil,, 
•* but becaufe it is requifite to the greater Good purfued^'* 

t Whith^ on the five Points. Edit. ^. P. 300, 305,, 309. 

Sea.IX. and revealed Will 265 % 


Thefe following Things may be laid down as' Majiims of % 

plain Truth, and indifputable Evidence. *!l 

1. That God is a perfeSfly happy Being, in the mofl: abfo- ■■ 
lute and higheil Senfe poffible. i 

2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from J 
every Thing that is contrary to Happinefs ; and fo, that in ftridt ^ 
Propriety of Speech, there is no fuch Thing as any Pain, j; 
Gn(if or Trouble in God. ;f| 

3. When any intelligent Being is really crofs'd and difap- % 
pointed, and Things are contrary to what He truly defires, ^ 
He is the lefs pkafed^ or has lefs Pleafure^ his Pleafure and Happi- ** 
nefs is dimimjhed^ and he fufFers what is difagreable to him, or v.^ 
is the Subje6l of fomething that is of a Nature contrary to J, 
Joy and Happinefs, even Pain and Grief, ** % 

From this lafl: Axiom it follows, that If no Di0:in6lion is | 

to be admitted between God's Hatred of Sin, and his Will • ■ 

with Refpect to the Event and the Exigence of Sin, as the | 

alwife Determiner of all Events, under the View of all Con- J 

fcquences through the whole Compafs and Series of Things ; f 

I fay, then it certainly follows, that the coming to pafs of '% 

every individual Kdi of Sin is truly, all Things confidered, h 

contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crofs'd in it ; \ 

and this in Proportion as He hates it. And as God's Hatred ^^ 

of Sin is infinite, by Reafon of the infinite Contrariety of his j; 
holy Nature to Sin ; fo his Will is infinitely crofs'd, in every 

Act of Sin that happens. Which is as much as to fay. He ' 

ejidures that which is infinitely difagreable to Him, by Means I 

oF every A6t of Sin that He fees committed. And therefore, ') 

as appears by the preceeding Pofitions, He endures truly and [ 

really, infinite Grief or Pain from every Sin. And fo He muft '^ 

be infinitely crofs'd, and fufi:''er infinite Pain, every Day, in n 

Millions of Millions of Infiances : He muft continually be fj 

the Subje6t of an immenfe Number of ;W, and truly infinite- \ 

\\ great CrofTes and Vexations. ' Which would be to make \ 

him infinitely the moll miferable of all Beings. 1 

LI If I 

**Certain]y 'tis not lefs abfuH & unreafonable, to talk of God's Wil! | 

andDefire's being truly and properly crofs'd, withoiit his fufferirg j 

any Uneafinefs, or any Thing grievous, or difagreable, rhan it is -j 

to talk of fomething that may be called a re^uealed Will, whicM \\ 

may in fome Refped be different from a fecret Purpofe ; wl^ \ 

Purpofe may be fulfilled, v/hen the other is oppofed* I 

266 Of GOD's fecret Part IV. 

If any Objedor (hould fay ; All that thefe Things 
s mount to, is, that God may do Evil that Good may come ; which 
is juilly efteem'd immoral and fmful in Men ; and therefore 
may be juftly efteem'd inconfiftent with the moral Perfedions 
of God. I anfwer. That for God to difpofe and permit Evil, 
in the Manner that has been fpoken of, is not to do Evil that 
Good may come ; for it is not to do Evil at all.— In Order 
to a Thing*s being morally Evil^ there muft be one of thefe 
Things belonging to it : Either it mud be a Thing unfjt and 
iinfuitahle in it's own Nature -, or it muft have a had Tendency ; 
or it muft proceed from an evil Difpofttion^ and be done for an 
evil End. But neither of thefe Things can be attributed to 
God's ordering and permitting fuch Events, as the immoral 
Ads of Creatures, for good Ends, (i.) It is not unfit in it's 
own Nature^ thatHe fhould do fo. For it is in it's own Nature 
fit, that infinite IVifidom, and not blind Chance, fhould difpofe 
moral Good and Evil in the World. And 't'lsfit, that the 
Being who has infinite JFifichn, and is the Maker, Owner, and 
fupreme Governor of the World, fhould take Care of that 
Matter. And therefore there is no Unfitnefis, or Unfuitablenefs 
in his doing it. It may be unfit, and fo immoral, for any 
other Beings to go about to order this Affair ; becaufe they 
are not poiTefs'd of a Wifdom, that in any Manner fits them 
for it ; and in other Refpe6ls they are not fit to be trufted 
with this Affair ; nor does it belong to them, they not being 
the Owners and Lords of the Univerfe. 

We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wife and good 
Man knew v,-ith abfolute Certainty, it would be beft, all 
Things confidered, that there fliould be fuch a Thing as moral 
Evil in the World, it would not be contrary to his Wifdom 
ajid Goodncfs, for him to chufe that it fliould be fo. 'Tis no 
evil Defire,to defire Good, and to defire that which, all Things- 
confidered, is beft. And it is no unwife Choice, to cliufe that 
That fnould be, which it is beft fhould be ; and to chufe the 
Exiftence of that Thing concerning which this is known, viz, 
that it is beft it ftiould be, and fo is known in the whole 
to be moft worthy to be chofen. On the contrary, it would 
be a plain Defedt in Wifdom and Goodnefs, for him not to 
chufe it. And the Reafon why he might not order it, if he 
were able,would not be becaufe he might not defire it,but only 
the ordering of that Matter don't belong to him. But it 
*s no Flarm for Him Vvho is by Right, and in the greateft Pro- 
' ^:ty, the fupreme Orderer of all Things, to order every 


Sed.lX. and xtv^AzdiTVilL 267 

Thing in fuch a Mann€r,as It would be a Point of Wifdom in 
Him to chufe that the.y IhoUld bt; ordered. If it would be a 
plainDefe6t of Wifdom and Goodfiefs in a Being, not to chufe ^ 
that That Ihould be, which He certainly knows it would, all . 
Things confidered, be beft fliould be (as^ was but now ob- 
ferved ) then it muft be impoliibie for a Being who has no 
Defe6l of Wifdom and Goodnefs, to do otherwife than chufe 
it fhould be ; and that, for this very Reafon, becaufe He 
is perfectly wife and good. And if it be agreable to perfe61: 
Wifdom and Goodnefs for him to chufe that it fliouid be, 
and the ordermg of all Things fupremely and pcrfedly belongs 
to him, it muft be agreable to infinite Wifdom and Gccdnels, 
to order that it iliould be. If the Choice is good, the order- 
ing and difpofmg Things according to that Choice muft alfo 
be good. It can be no Harm in one to whom it belongs to 
do his Will in the Annus of Heaven^ and amon^d the Inhabitants of 
the Earthy to execute a good Volition. If his Will be good, 
and the Objedl of his Will be, all Things confidered, good 
and beft, then the chufing or willing it is not willing Evil that 
Good may come. And if fo', th-en his ordering according to 
that Will is not doing Evily that' Good may come. 

2. 'Tis not of a bad Tendency, (cr the fupreme Being thus to 
order and that moral Evil to be, which it is beft ftiould 
come to pafs. For that it is of good Tendency, is the very 

Thing fuppofed in the Point now in Queilion. Chrift's 

Crucifixion, tho' a moft horrid Fa6l in them that perpetrated 
it, was of moft glorious Tendency as permitted and ordered 
of God. 

3. Nor is there any Need of fuppofing, it proceeds from any 
'■'tvil Difpofition or Jim : for by the Suppofition, what is aim'd 

at is Go^d, and Good is the adual Iifue, in the final Refult of 

L I 2 Sectioji 

268 Of Sins firft Entrance Part IV. 

Section X. 

Concerning Sin's firft Entrance into the' 

THE Things which have already been offered, may 
ferve to obviate or clear many of theObjedions v^iich 
might be raifed concerning Sm's tirft coming into the 
World ; as tho' it would follow from theDo61rine maintain'd, 
that God muft be the Author of -the firft Sin, thro' his fo dif- 
pofmg Things, that it fhould r.eceiTarily follov/ from his Per- 
mifTion, that the finfui A6t fliould be committed, &c. I need 
not therefore ftand to repeat what has been faid already, about" 
fuch a Neceflity's not proying God to be the Author of Sin, 
in any ill Senfe, or in any fuch Senfe as to infringe any 
Liberty of Man, concerned in his moral Agency, or Capacity 
of Blame, Guilt and Punifhment. 

But if it fhould neverthelefs be faid, Suppofmg the Cafe fo, 
that God, when he had made Man, might fo order his Cir- 

cumftances, that from thefe Circumftances, together with his \ 

withholding further Aififtance and divine Influence, his Sin I 

would infallibly follow, Why might not God as well have iirll 'I 

made Man with a fixed prevailing Principle of Sin in hisHeart? ;' 

I anfwer, i. It was meet, if Sin did come into Exigence, | 

and appear in the World, it fhould arife from the Imperfecflion f 

which properly belongs to a Creature, as fuch, and fl^ould ap- j 

pear fo to do, that it might appear not to be from God as \ 

the Efficient or Fountain. But this could not have been, if ''\ 

Man had been made at firft with Sin in his Heart \ nor unlefs '■\ 

the abiding Principle and Habit of Sin were firft introduced j 

by an evil A6f of the Creature. If Sin had not arofe from the | 

Imperfection of the Creature, it would not have been fo vifible, i 

that it did not a ifc from God, as the pofitive Caufe, and real , 

Source of it. But it would require Room that can't be here j 

allowed, fully to confider all the Difficulties which have \ 

|?een fta^-ted. concerning the firft Entrance of Sin into the | 

World, . '■ ; 

Ani \ 

Sed. X. into the World. 269 

And therefore, 
2. I would obrerve, that Objecflions againft the Dodrine 
that has been laid down, in Oppolition to the Arminian Notion 
of Liberty, from thefe Difficulties, are altogether impertinent ; 
becaufe no additional Difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a 
Scheme in this Manner differing from theirs, and none would 
be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining 
theirs. Nothing that the Armimans fay, about the Contingence, 
or felf-determining Power of Man's Will, can ferve to explain 
■with lefsDifficuIty,how the hrft finfulVolition ofMankind could 
take Place, and IVlan be juftiy charged with the Blame of it. 
To fay, the Will was ielf-determined, or determined by free 
Choice, in that finful Volition ; which is to fay, that the firft 
iinfulVolition was determined by a foregoing finfulVolition ; is 
no .olution of the Difficulty. It is an odd Way of folving 
Difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To fay. Two 
and Two makes Nine ; or, that a Child begat his Father, 
folves no Difficulty : No more does it,, to fay. The firft finful 
A6t of Choice was before the firit finful A61 of Choice, and 
chofe and determined it, and brought it to pafs. Nor is it any 
better Solution, to fiy,The iirfc fmiul Volition chofe, determined 
and produced itfeif ; which is to fay. It was before it was. 
Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the Diffi- 
culty, to fay. The firft finful Volition arofe accidentally,. 
wiviicut any Caufe at all ; any more than it will folve that 
dirlicuit Quellion, Hgvj the World cciild be made out of Nothim f 
to fay, It came into Being out of Nothing, without any 
Cauie ; as has been already obferved. And if we fhould allow 
that That could be, that the firft evil Volition fhould arife by 
perfect Accident, without any Caufe, it would relieve no Diffi- 
culty, about God's laying the Blame of it to Man. For how 
was Man to Blame for perfe6t Accident, which had no Caufe, 
and which therefore, he (to be fure) was not the Caufe of, any 
more than if it came by feme external Caufe ?— Such Kind of 
Solutions are no better, than if fome Perfon, going about to 
folve fome of the ftrange mtithematical Paradoxes, about infi- 
nitely great and fmall Quantities ; as, that fome infinitely great 
Quantities are infinitely greater than fome other infinitely 
great Quantities ; and alfo that fome infinitely fhiall Qiiantlties 
are infinitely lefs than others, which yet arc infinitely little ; 
in order to a Solution, fho ild fay. That Mankind have been 
under a Miflake, in fuppofing a greater Quantity to exceed a 
fmaller ; and that a Hundred multiplied by Ten, makes but 
SI f^igle Unit. 


270 Of the Objeaion Part IV. 

Section XL 

Of a fuppofed Inconfijlence of thefe Pri7t- 
ciplesy wiih GOD's moral Charader. 

THE Things which have been already obferved, may be 
fufficient to anfwer moil of the Objedlions, and filence 
the great Exclamations of Armitiians againft XhtCahiniJisy 
from the fvippofed Inconfiftence of CcihimJIk Principles with 
the moral Perfedions of God, as exercifed in his Government 
of Mankind. The Confiftence of fuch a Do61rine of Neceffity 
as has been maintained, with the Fitnefs and Reafonableneis 
of God's Com.mands, Promifes and Threatnings, Reward-s 
and Eunifhments, has been particularly confidered : TheCavils 
of our Opponents, as tho' our Doarine of Neceffity made 
God the Author of Sin, have been anlwered ; and alfo their 
Objedion-againft thefe Principles, as inconiiftent with God's 
Sincerity, in his Counfels, Invitations and Perfwafions, has 
been already obviated, in what has been cbferved, refpeding 
the Ccnfiftence of what Cahini/h fuppofe concerning the fecret 
and revealed Will of God : By that it appears, there is no 
Repugnance in 'fuppofmg it may be the fecret Will of God, 
that his Ordination and Permiffion of Events Ihould be fuch 
that it fhall be a certain Ccniequence, that a Thing never will 
com.e to pafs ; which yet it isMan's Duty to do, and fo God's 
preceptive Will, that he fhould do ; and this is the fame 
Thing as to fay, God m.ay iincerely command and require him 
to do it. And if he m.ay be fmcere in commanding him, he 
may for the fam.e Reafon be fmcere in counfelling, inviting 
and ufing Perfuafions with him to do it. Counfels and Invi- 
tations are Manife Rations of God's preceptive Will, or of what 
God loves, and v/hat is in it Mf, and as Man's Acl:,agreable to 
his Heart ; and not of his difpofmg Will, and what Tie chufes 
as a Part of his own infinite Scheme of Things. It has been 
particularly (hewn. Part III. Sedion IV. that fuch a Neceffity 
as has been maintained, is not inconfiftent with the Propriety 
and Fitnefs of divine Commands ; and for the fame Reafon, 
not incoafiftent vyith the Sincerity of Invitations and Counfels, 
in the Corollary at the End of that Sedion. Yea, it hath been 
Ihewn, Part III. Sed. 7. Coral, j. that this Objeaion of Jr- 

. tninianSf 

Sed. XL from Gois moral Charader. 271 

mlnihus^ concerning the Sincerity and Ufe of divine Exhortati-* 
ons, Invitations and Counfels, '\% demonftrably againil them- 


Notwithftanding, 1 vc^ould further obferve, that the Diffi-» 
culty of reconciling the Sincerity of Counfels, Invitations and 
Perluafions, with fuch an antecedent known Fixednefs of 
all Events, as has been fuppofed, is not peculiar to thisScheme, 
as diftinguiflied from that of the General ;ty of Jrmmians, which 
acknowledge the abfolute Foreknowledge of God : And there- 
fore, it would be unreafonably brought as an Objection againft" 
my differing from them. The mam feeming Difficulty in the 
Cafe is this : That God in counfelling, inviting and perfuad^ 
ing, makes a Shew of aiming at, feeking and uiing Endeavours 
for the Thing exhorted and perfuaded to ; whereas, 'tis im- 
pofTible for any intelligent Being truly to feek, or ufe Endea- 
vours for a Thing, which he at the fame Time knows mod 
perfedly will not" come to pafs ; and tliat it is abfurd to fup- 
^ofe, he makes the obtaining of a Thing his End, in his 
.Calls and Counfels, which he at the fame Time infallibly 
knows will not be obtain'd by thefe Means. Novv^, if God 
knows this, in the utmoft Certainty and Perfedion, the Way 
by which he comes by this Knowledge makes no Difference, 
If he knows it by the Neceffity which he fees in Things, or 
by fome other Means ; it alters not the Cafe. ' But it is in 
Effed: allowed by Jrminians themfelves, that God's inviting^ 
and perfuading Men to do Things, w^hich he at the fameTime 
certainly knows will not be done, is noEvidence of Infmcerity; 
Isecaufe they allow, that Gcd has a certain Foreknowledge of 
all Aden's fmful Adions and Omiffions. And as.this is thus 
implicitly allowed by mod Jrmmia??s^ (o all that pretend to 
own the Scriptures to be the Word of God,mufl: be conftrained 
.to allow it.— God commanded and counfei'd Pharaoh to let 
his People go, and ufed Arguments and Perfuafions to induce 
him to it ; he laid before him Arguments taken from his infi- 
nite Greatnefs and almighty Power (Exod. vii. i6.) and fore- 
warned him of the fatal Confequences of his Refufal, from 

Time to Time ; (Chap. viii. i, 2, 20, 21. Chap. ix. 1 5. 

X3— 17. and X. 3, 6.) He commanded Mofes^ and the Elders 
a^ Ifraely to go and befeech Pharaoh to let the People go ; and 
at the fame Time told 'em, he knew furely that he would not 
comply to it. Exod. iii. 18, 19. And thou /halt come., thou and the 
Elders of Ifrael, unto the King of Egypt, and you fnall fay unto him ; 
^iTeLordQod of /Mlebjews hath met with us j .and new let us go^we- 

• _ " befeech 

fj 20f Ohf fromGod' $ mor.Characler.P.IV. 

hefeech thee^ three Days journey into the Wildernefs^ that we may 
Sacrifice unto the Lord cur God : And, I am fare that the King of 
Egypt will not let you go. So our bleffed Saviour, the Evening 
wherein he was betrayed, knew that Peter would (hametuliy 
deny him, before the Morning ; fc3r he declares it to him w th 
AlTeverations, to fliew the Certainty of it ; and tells the Difci-' 
pies, that all of them fhould be ohended becaufe of him that 
Night; Matt. xxvi. 31,-— 35- Joh. xiii. 38. Luk. xxii. 31,-34. 
^oh. xvi. 32. And yet it was their Duty to avoid thefeThings ; 
they were very fmful Things, which God had forbidden, and 
which it was their Duty to watch and pray againil: ; and they 
were obliged to do fo from the Counfels and Perjuafions Chrift 
ufed with them, at that very Time, lo to do ; Matt. xxvi. 41. 
Watch and pray,, that ye enter not intoTemptation. So that whatever 
Difficulty there can be in this Matter, it can be no Objection- 
againft any Principles which have been maintain'd in Oppoii- 
tion to the Principles of Arminians ; nor does it any more con- 
cern me tc remove the Difficulty, than it does ihem, or indeed 
all that call themfelves Chriftians, and acknowledge the divine 

Authority of the Scriptures. Neverthelefs, this Matter may 

poffibly (God allowing) be m.ore particularly and largely con- 
fideredj in fome future Difcourfe, on the Dodrine of FredejH- 

But I would, here obferve, that however the Defenders of 
that Notion of Liberty of Will, which I have oppofed, exclaim 
againftthe Dodrine 01 Caknni/Is^ as teiiding to bring Men into 
Doubts, concerning the moral P^irfedions of God ; it is their ^ 
Scheme, and not the Scheme of Cahini/ls, that indeed is jufily 
chargeable with this. For 'tis one of the m.oft fundamental 
Points of their Scheme of Things, that a Freedom of Will, 
confiding in felf-determination, without all Neceffity, is effen- 
tial to Moral Agency. This is the fame Thing as to fay, that 
fuch a Determination of the V/iU without all Neceffity, muft 
be in all intelligent Beings, in thofe Things, wherein they are 
tnoral Agents^ or in their moral A^s : And from this it will fol- 
low, that God's Will is not neceffiarily determined, in any 
Thing he does, as a moral Agent ^ or in any of his AS^s that are 
of a moral Nature. So that in all Things, wherein he a6ls 
holily^ jufily and truly^ he don't act neceffiarily ; or his Will is 
not neceiTarily determined to adl: holily and juftly ; becaufe if 
it were necellarily determined, he would not be a moral Agent 
in thus aaing : His Will would be attended with Neceffity ; 
Hfhich they fay is inconfiftent with maral Agencf : *' He can a(5t 

Se.XL 0/" Arm"^ u^r^'^yr^;^ Scripture. 273 

" no otherwife ; He is at no Liberty in the Affair ; He id 
♦' determined by unavoidable invincible Neceflity : Therefore 
*' ruch Agency is no moral Agency ; yea, no Agency at all, 
" properly fpeaking : A neceiTary Agent is no Agent : He 
" being pallive, and fubjed to Neceffity, what He does is no 
*' A61 of his, but an Effe6l of a Neceflity prior to any Act of 
*^ his." This is agreable to their Manner of arguing. Now 
then what is become of all our Proof of the moral PerfecSlions 
of God ? How can we provcj that God certainly will in .any 
one Inftance do- that which is juft and holy ; feeing hisWill is 
determin'd in the Matter by no Neceflity ? We have no other 
Way of proving that any Thing certainly will be, but only by 
the Neceflity of the Event. Where we can fee no Neceflity, 
but that the Thing may be, or may not be, there we are un- 
avoidably left at a Lofs. We have no other Way properly 
and truly to demonfl:rate the moral Perfections of God, but 
the Way that Mr. Chubb proves them, in P. 252, 261, 262, 
263. of his Tracts ; viz. That God mufl: neceflJarily perfedly 
know what is mofl v/orthy and valuable in it felf,which in the 
Nature of Things is beft and fitteft: to be done. And as this 
is moft eligible in it felf, He being omnifcient, mufl: fee it to 

. be fo ; and being both omnifcient and felf-fuflicient, cannot 
have any Temptation to rejedt it ; and fo mufl neceflarily will 

*that which is beft. And thus, by this Neceflity of the De- 
termination of God's Will to what is good and beft^ we de- 
monftrably eftablifli God's moral Character. 

Corol. From Things which have been obferved, it appears, 
that mofl: of the Arguments from Scripture, which Ar?mmcms 
make ufe of to fupport their Scheme, are no other than begging 
the ^ejlion. For in thefe their Arguments they determine in 
the tirfl: Place, that without fuch a Freedom of Will as 
they hold. Men can't be proper moral Agents, nor the Sub- 
lets of Command, Counfel, Perfuafion, Invitation, Promifes, 
Threatnings, Expoftulations, Rewards and Punifhments ; and 
that without fuch a Freedom 'tis to no Purpofe for Men to 
take any Care, or ufe any Diligence, Endeavours or Means, in 
order to their avoiding Sm, or becoming holy, efcaping Punifli- 
liient or obtaining Happinefs : and having fuppofed thefe 
'Things, which are grand Things in Queftion in the Debate, 
then they heap up Scriptures containingCommands, Counfeis, 
Calls, Warnings, Perfuaflons, Expoftulations, Promifes and 
Threatnings ; (as doubtlefs they may find enough fuch ; the 
Bible is confeflT^diy full of them, from the Be^inniti;; to tha 

M m £nii ) 

2 74 Whether thefe Principles Part IV. 

End ) arid then they glory, how full the Scripture is on their 
Side, how many more Texts there are that evidently favour 
theirScheme,than fuch as feem to favour the contrary. But let 
them firft make manifeft the Things in -Queftion, which they 
fuppofe and take for granted, ^nd (hew them to be confident 
with themfelves, and produce clear Evidence of their Truth j 
and they have gain'd their Point, as all will confefs, without 
bringing one Scripture. For none denies,that there are Com- 
mands, Counfels, Promifes, Threatnings, &c. in the Bible. 
But unlefs they do thefe Things, their multiplying fuch Texts 
of Scripture is infignificant and vain. 

It may further be obferved, that fuch Scriptures as they 
bnng,are really againft them, and not for them. As it has been 
demonftrated, that 'tis their Scheme, and not ours, that is in- 
confiftent with the Ufe of Motives and Perfuafives, or any 
moral Means whatfoever, to induce Men to the Pra6lice of 
Vertue, or abftaining fromWickednefs : Their Principles, and 
not ours, are repugnant to moral Agency, and inconfiftent with 
moral Government, with Law or Precept, with the Nature of 
Vertue or Vice, Reward or Punifliment, and with every 
Thing whatfoever of a moral Nature, either on the Part of 
the moral Governor, or in the State, Adions or Condudt of 
the Subject * 

Section XII. 

Of a fupfofed Tendeitcy of thefe Principles 
to Atheifm and Licentioufnefs^ 

IF any objed againft what has been maintained, that it 
tends to Atheifm ; I know not on what Grounds fuch an 
Objection can be raifed, unlefs it be that fome Atheifts 
have held a Dodrine of Necelhty which they fuppofe to be like 
this. But if it be fo, I am perfuaded the Jrminians would not 
look upon it juft, that their Notion of Freedom and Contin- 
gence ihould be charged with a Tendency to all the Errors 
that ever any embraced, who have held fuch Opinions, Thc> 


Sedl. XII. tend to Atheifm. 275 

,5/<?;VPhilorophers,whom the Cahinlfls are charged with agreeing 
with, were no Atheiils, but the greateft Theifts, and neareft 
a-kin to Chriftians in their Opinions concerning the Unity 
and the Perfedions of the (jodhead, of all the Heathen Philo- 
fophers. And jS'/>/V«rtti, that chief Father of Atheifm, main- 
tain'd no fuch Dodtrine of Neceffity, but was the greateft 
Maintainer of Contingence. 

The Doctrine of NecefTity, which fuppofes a neceflary Con- 
;ne6tion of all Events, on fome antecedent Ground and Reafon 
of their Exigence, is the only Medium we have to prove the 
Being of God. And the contrary Do6lrine of Contingence, 
even as maintain'd by Annmans (which certainly implies or 
infers, that Events may come into Exiftence, or begin to be, 
without Dependence on any Thing foregoing, as their Caufe, 
Ground or Reafon) takes away all Proof of the Being of God; 
which Proof is fum manly exprefs'd by theApoIlle, in Rom. i. 20. 
And this is a Tendency toy/r/6^//;/i with aWitnefs. Sothat indeed 
it is tht:Do6irine of Arminians^ and not of the Calvlnijis^ that is 
juftly charged with a Tendency to Atheifm ; it being built on 
a Foundation that is the utter Subverfion of every demonltra- . 
tive Argument for the Proof of a Deity ; as has been (hown, 
Part II. Sea. 3d. 

And whereas it has often been faid, that the Cahintjlic Doc- 
trine of Ncceffity, faps the Foundations of all Religion and 
Vertue, and tends to the greateft Licentioufnefs of Pra(5lice : 
This Objedion is built on the Pretence, that ourDo6lrine ren- 
ders vain all Means and Endeavours, in order to be vertuous 
and religious. Which Pretence has been already particularly 
confidered in the 5th SeSiion of this Part ; where it has been 
demonftrated, that this Dodrine has no fuch Tendency ; but 
that fuch a Tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary 
Dodrine : inafmuch as the Notion of Contingence, . which. 
, their Do6trine implies, in its certain Confequences, overthrows 
all Connexion, in every Degree, between Endeavour and 
Event, Means and End. 

And befides, if many other Things which have been ob- 
ferved to belong to the Arminian Doctrine, or to be plain Con- 
fequences of it, be confidered, there will appear juft Reafon 
to fuppofe that it is that^ which muft rather tend to Licenti- 
' oiifnefs. Their Docflrine excufes all evil Inclinations, which 
. Men find to be natural ; becaufe in fuch Inclinations., they 
" : M m 2 arc 

276 Whether thefe Principles Part IV. 

are not felf-dctermined, as fuch Inclinations are not owing \jo^ 
anyChoice orDetermination of their ownWills. . Which lead? . 
Men wholly tojuftify themfelves in all their witked Aaions,fQ '] 
far as natural Inclination has had a Hand in determining their 4 
Wills, to the Commiirion of 'em. Yea, thefe Notions which / 
fuppofe moral Neceffity and Inability to be inconfiftent with /. 
Blame or moral Obligation, will direcE^ly lead Men to juftify 
the vileft Adts and Pradtices, from the Strength ofjheir wicked 
Inclinations of all Sorts ; ftrong Inclinations inducing a moral 
Neceffity ; yea, to excufe every Degree of evil Inclination, fo 
far as this has evidently prevailed, and been the Thing which 
has determined their Wills : Becaufe, £b far as antecedent; 
inclination deterrhined the Will, fo far the Will was without 
Liberty of Indifference and Self-determination. Which at laft ■ 
will come to this, that Men will juftify themfelyes in all the 
Wickednefs they commit. It has been obferved already, that 
this Scheme of Things does exceedingly diminifh the Guilt of . 
Sin, and the Difference between the greateft and fmalleft Of- 
fences : * And if it be purfued in its real Confequences, it 
leaves Room for no fuch Thing, as either Vertue or Vice, 
Blame or Praife in the World, f And then again, how natur 
rally does this Notion of the fovereign felf-determining Power 
of the Will, in all Things, vertuous or vicious, and whatfoever 
deferves either Reward or Punifhment, tend to encourage Merj 
to put off the Work of Religion and Vertue, and turning from' 
Sin to God J it being that which they have a fovereign Power 
to determine themfelves to, juft when they pleafe ; or if not, 
they are wholly excufeablc in goir^g on in Sm, becaufe of their 
Inability to do any other. 

If it fhonld be faid, that the Tendency of this Do6lrine of 
Neceffity, to Licentioufnefs, appears by the Improvement many 
at this Day a6tually make of it, to juftify themfelves in their 
diffolute Courfes j I will not deny that fome Men do unrea- 
fonably abufe this Dodrine, as they do many other Things 
which are true and excellent in their own Nature : But I deny 
that this proves, the Do6trine itfelf has any Tendency to 
Licentioufnefs. I think, the Tendency of Dodrines, by what 
now appears in the World, and in our Nation in particular, 
may much more juftly be argued from the general Effed which 


* Part IIT. Sta. 6. 

i Part in. Sea. 6. Ib'd. Sert. 7. Part IV. Se^. ?. Part Il{. 
S«a. 3. Cor.<*l. I. afi^r ih^ firilHead, 


Se(9:. XII. fend to hiccntioufncfs. 277 

has been feen to attend the prevailing o^ t^ne Principles of Jr^ 
tniniam^ and the contrary Principles ; as both have had their 
Turn of general Prevalence in our Nation. If it be indeed, 
as is pretended, that Calvimftic Dodrines undermine the very 
Foundation of all Religion and Morality, and enervate and 
difannul all rational Motives, to holy and vertuous, Pradlice ; 
and that the contrary Do6trines give the Inducements to Ver- 
tue and Goodnefs their proper Force, and exhibit Religion in 
a rational Light, tending to recommend it to the Reafon of 
Mankind, and enforce it in a Manner that is agreable to their 
natural Notions of Things : I fay,if it be thus, 'tis remarkable, 
that Vertue and religious Practice fnould prevail moft, when 
the former Dodrines, fo inconfiftent with it, prevailed almoft 
univerfally : And that ever lince the latter Doctrines, fo hap- 
pily agreeing with it, and of fo proper & excellent a Tendency 
to promote it, have been gradually prevailing,Vice, Prophane- 
nefs. Luxury and Wickednefs of all Sorts, and Contempt of 
all Religion, and of every Kind of Serioufnefs and Stridnefs 
of Converfation, rfiotild proportionabiy prevail ; and that thefe 
Things (hould thus accompany one another, and rife and pre- 
vail one with another, now for a whole Age together. 'Tis 
remarkable, that this happy Remedy (difcover'd by the free 
Enquiries,and fuperior Senfe and Wiidom of this Age) againft 
the perniciousEffeds of Cahiriifm-, fo inconiiftent withReligion, 
and tending fo much to banifli all Vertue from the Earth, (hould 
on fo long a Trial, be attended with no good EfFed ; but that 
the Confequence (l^iould be tiie Reverfe of Amendment ; that 
in Proportion, as the Remedy takes Place, and is thoroughly 
applied, fo the Difeafe fb.ould prevail ; and the very fame dif- 
jnal Eifed take Place, to the higheft Degree, which Calvinijiic 
Dodrines are fuppofed to have io great a Tendency to ; even 
the banifhing of Religion and Vertue, and the prevailing of 
unbounded Licentioufnefs of Manners. If thefe Things are 
truly fo, they are very remarkable, and Matter of very curious 
Speculation I 


278 Of Metaphyfical Part IV, 

, Section XIIL 

Cmcermng that ObjeSlion again/l the Rea- 
ibning, by which the Calviniftic DoEirine 
is fupportedy that it is Metaphyfical 
and Abftrufe, 

IT has often been objected againfl the Defenders of Calvin 
nijlic Princples, that in their Reafonings, they run into 
nice Schalaftic Diftin6tions, and abi'trufe metaphyfical 
Subtihies, and fet thefe in Oppofition to common Senfe. And 
,'tis poflible, that after the former Manner it may be alledged 
againft the Reafoning by which I have endeavoured to contute 
the Arminian Scheme of Liberty and moral Agency, that it is 
very abftra^led and metaphyficaL — Concerning this, I would 
obferve the following Things. 

L If that be made an Obje6lion againft the foregoing Rea- 
foning, that it is metaphyfical^ or may properly be reduced to the 
Science of Metaphyficks, it is a very impertinent Objection ; 
whether it be fo or no, is not worthy of any Difpute or Con- 
troverfy. If the Reaibning be good, 'tis as frivolous to en- 
quire what Science it is properly reduc'd to, as what Language 
it is delivered in : And for a Man to go about to confute the 
Arguments of his Opponent, by telling him, his Arguments 
are Metaphyfical^ would be as weak as to tell him, his Arguments 
could not be fubftantiai, becaufe they were written in French or 
Latin. The Queftion is not. Whether what is faid be Meta- 
phyficks, Phyficks, Lugick, or Mathematicks, Latin, French, 
Englilh, or Mohawk ? But, Whether the ReaConing be good, 
and theArguments truly conclufive ? The foregoingArguments 
are no more metaphyfical, than thofe which vv^e ufe againll the 
Papifts, to difprove their DocStrine of Tranfubftantiation ; al- 
jedging, it is inconfiftent with the Notion of corporeal 
Identity, that it fliould be in ten Thoufand Places at the fame 
Time. 'Tis by metaphyfical Arguments only we are 
able to provQ,that the rational Soul is not corporeal ; thatLead 
or Sand can't think ; that Thoughts are not fquare or round, 
©r doh*t weigh a Pound* The Arguments by whi<;h we prove 


Sed* XIII. and abftrufe Reafotiing- 279 

the Being of God, if handled clofely and diftincftly, fo as to 
{hew their dear and demonftrative Evidence, muft be meta- 
phyikally treated. 'Tis by Metaphyficks only, that we 
can demonftrate, that God is not limited to a Place, or is not 
mutable ; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful ; that it is im- 
pofTible for him to lie,or be unjuft j and that there is one God 
only, and not Hundreds or Thoufands. And indeed we have 
no ftria Demonftration of any Thing, excepting mathematical 
Truths, but by Metaphyficks. We can have no Proof, that is 
properly demonftrative, of any one Proportion, relating to the 
Being and Nature of God, his Creation of the World, the 
Dependence of all Things on him, the Nature of Bodies or 
SpiritSjthe Nature of our own Souls, or any of the greatTruths 
of Morality and natural Religion, but what is metaphyfical. 
I am willing, my Arguments (hould be brought to the Teft of 
the ft:ri6teft and jufteft Reafon, and that a clear, diftin^t and 
determinate Meaning of the Terms I ufe, ihould be infifted 
on ; but let not the Whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, 
by fixing on it the Epithet MetaphyficaL 

II. If the Reafoning v\ihich has been made ufe of, be ill 
fome Senfe Metaphyfical, it will not follow, that therefore it 
muft needs be abftrufe, unintelligible,and a-kin to the Jargon 
of the Schools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing Reafoning, 
at leaft as to thofe Things which are moft material belonging 
to it, depends on no abftrufe Definitions or Diftindlions, or 
Terms without a Meaning, or of very ambiguous and unde- 
termined Signification, or any Points of fuch Abftra<5tion and 
Subtilty, as tends to involve the attentive Underftanding in 
Clouds and Darknefs. There is no high Degree of Refine- 
ment and abftrufe Speculation, in determining, that a Thing is 
not before it is, and fo can't be the Caufe of itfelf ; or that the 
firft A61 of free Choice, has not another A&i of free Choice 
going before that,to excite or dire<5l it 5 or in determining, that 
no Choice is made, while the Mind remains in a State of 
abfolute Indifference ; that Preference and Equilibrium never 
co-exift ; and that therefore no Choice is made in a State of 
Liberty, confifting in Indifference : And that fo far as theWill 
is determined by Motives, exhibited and operating previous to 
i the A6t of the Will, fo far it is not determined by the Ad of 
I the Will itfelf ; that nothing can begin to be, which before 
was not, without a Caufe, or fome antecedent Ground or Rea- 
ibn, why it then begins to be ; that Effeds depend on their 
Caufes, and are connected with them i that Vertue is not the 


2 8o Of Metaphyfical Part IV. 


worfe, nor Sin the better, for the Strength of Inclination, with 
which it is praclifed, and the Difficulty which thence arifes of 
doing otherwife ; that when it is already infallibly known,that | 
aThing will be, it is not aThing contingent whether it will ever \ 
be or no j or that it can be truly faid, notwithftanding, that \ 
it is not neceiTary it (hould be, but it either may be, or may | 
not be. And the like might be obferved of many otherThing* * 
which belong to the foregoing Reafoning.^ 

If any (hall ftill ftand fo ,it, that the foregoing Reafoning i» | 
nothing but metaphyfical Sophiftry ; and that it myft be fo, % 
that the feeming Force of the Arguments all depends on fomef > 
Fallacy and Wile that is hid in the Obfcurity, which always 
attends a great Degree of metaphyfical Abrtra^tion and Re- 
finement ; and fliall be ready to fay, " Here is indeed fome- 
*' thing that tends to confound the Mind, but not to fatisfy it : 
•' For who can ever be truly fatisfied in it, that Men are iitly 
*' blamed or commended, punifhed or rewarded, for thofe 
" Volitions which are not from themfel,es, and of whofe Ex- 
*' iftence they are not the Caufes. Men may refine, as much 
*' as they pleafe, and advance their abftrac^ Notions, and make 
•« out a Thoufand feeming Contradidions, to puzzle our Un- 
*' derftandings ; yet there can be noSatisfadion in fuchDodrine 
«' as this : The natural Senfeof the Mind of Man will always 
'«* refill it." * I humbly conceive, that fuch an Objedtor, if he 


* A certain noted Author, of the prefent Age, fays, The Argument* 
for NeceJ/ity are nodiing but Quibbling, cr Logomachy, ujing Wordi ; 
nvithout a Meanings or Begging the ^ef ion. — 1 don't know what' 
K-ind of Necefiiiy any Authors He may have Reference to, arc 
Advocates for ; or whether they have managed their Arguments 
well, or ill. As to the Arguments I have made ufe of, if tney are ' 
Nibbles, they may be (hewn to be fo ; fuch Knots are capable of ' 
being untied, and the Trick and Cheat may be detefled and plainly 
laid open. If this be fairly done, with Refpeft to the Grounds and 
Reafons I have relied upon, I lliall have juft Occafion for the 
future to be filent, if not to be alhamed of my Argumentations. , 
I am willing, my Proofs fhould be thoro'ly examined ; and if there 
be nothing but Begging the ^uejiiorty or m^tx Logomachy, or Difpute of 
Words, let it be madij manifcft,and ftiewn how the feeming Strength 
of the Argument depends on my vftng Words ^without a Meanings or 
sirifes from the Ambiguity of Terms, or my making ufe of Words ii 
an indeterminate and unfteady Manner ; and that the Weight of 
my Reafons relt mainly oa fuch a Foundation : And then, I fhall 
either be readv to r^usa what X have urged, and thank the Mait 
' that, 

Sea. XHI. ^«a^ abftrufe Reafohing. 2 Sir 

has Capacity and Humility and Calmnefs of Spirit, Efficient 
impartially and thoroughly to examine himfelf, will find that 
he knows not really what he would be at j and that indeed 
his Difficulty is nothing but a meer Prejudice, from an inad- 
vertent cuftomary Ufe of Words, in a Meaning that is not 

clearly underftood, nor carefully refleded upon. Let the 

Objector refled again, if he has Candor and Patience enough, 
and don't fcorn to be at the Trouble of clofe Attention in the 

Affair. He would have a Man's Volition ht from himfclf. 

Let it hQfrom himfelf moft primarily and originally of any Way 

N n conceivable ; 

that has done the kind Part, or fhall be juftly expofed for my 
,The fame Author is abundant in appealing, in this Affair, from what 
he calls Logomachy and Sophijiry^ to Experience.'^' ' A Perfon can 

experience only what palfes in his own Mind. But yet, as we 
may well fuppofe, that all Men have the fame human Faculties ; 
fo a Man may well argue from his own Experience to that of 
Others, in Things that fhew the Nature of thofe Faculties, and the 
^^"" Manner of their Operation. But then one has as good Right to 
alledge his Experience, as another. As to my own Experience, I 
find, that ia innumerable Things I can do as I will ; that the Mo- 
tions of my Body, in many Refpeds, inftantaneoufly follow the 
A6ts of my Will concerning thofe Motions ; and that my Will has 
fome Command of my Thoughts i and that the A6ls of my Will 
are my own, /. e. that they are Ads of my Will, the Volitions of 
my own Mind ; or in other Words, that what I will, I will. 
Which, I prefame, is the Sum of what others experience in this 
Affair. But as to finding by Experience, that my Will is originally 
determined by it felf ; or that my Will firfl chufing what Volitioa 
there fhall be, the ehofen Volition accordingly follows ; and thac 
this is the firft Rife of the Determination of my Will in any 
Affair; or that any Volinon arifes in my Mind contingently; I 
declare, I know nothing in my felf, by Experience, of this Nature ^ 
and nothing that ever 1 experienced, carries the leafl Appearance 
;. or Shadow of any fuch Thing, or gives me any more Reafon to 
, fuppofe or fufpedt any fuch Thing, t'.an to fuppofe that my Volj- 
» tions exiiled twenty Years before they exifled. 'Tis true, I find 
my felf poffefs'd of my Volitions before I can fee the efFeftuSl 
Power of any Caufe to produce them (for the Power and Efficacy 
of theCaufe is not feen but by the Effedjand this, for ought I know, 
may make fome imagine, that Volition has no Caufe, or that it 
produces itfelf But 1 have no moreReafon from hence to determine 
any fuchThing.than I have to determine that I gave my felf myowix 
Being, or that I came into Being accidentally without a <-^aic, 
becaufe 1 firfl found my felf pofTsfled ©f Being, befQre I had K-a.ov^?- 
.. $&dge of a Caufe of my Bsing. 

« 8 2 Of Mdtaphyfical Reafoning.. Part IV. ^ 

conceivable ; tMt is, from his' own Choice : How will that 
help the Matter, as to his being juftly blamed or praifed, un- | 
lefs that Choice itfelf be blame or praife-worthy ? And how is 
the Choice itfelf (an ill Choice,^ for Inftance) blame-worthy, j 
according to thefe Principles, urdefs that be from himfelf too, \ 
in the fame Manner ; that is, from his own Choice ? But the \ 
original and firft determining Choice in the Affair is not \ 
from his Choice : His Choice is not the Caufe of it.— And if \ 
it be from hirrifelf fome other Way, and not from his Choice, 
furely that will not help the Matter : If it ben't from himfelf 
of Choice, then it is not from himfelf voluntarily ; and if fo, 
he is furely no more to Blame, than if it were not from him- 
felf at all. It is a Vanity, to pretend it is a fufficient An- 
fvver to this," to fay, that it is nothing but metaphyseal Refine- 
ment and Subtilty, and fo attended with Obfcurity and Uncer- 

If it be the natural Senfe of bur Minds, that what is blartie- 
worthy in aMan muft be from himfelf,then it doubtlefs is alfo, 
that it muft be from fomething bad in himfelf, a bad Choice^ or 
bad Difpofition. But then our natural Senfe is, that this bad 
Choice or Difpofition is evil in it felf^ and the Man blame- 
worthy for it, on ifs own Account^ without taking into our Notion 
of it's Blame-worthinefs, another bad Choice, or Difpofition 
going before this, from whence this arifes : for that is a ridi- 
culous Abfurdity, running us into an immediate Contradidlion, 
which our natural Senfe of Blame-worthinefs has nothing to 
do with,and never comes into theMind, nor is fuppofed in the 
Judgment we naturally^ make of the Affair. As was demon- 
ftrated before, natural Senfe don't place the moral Evil of j^ 
Volitions and Difpofitions in the Caufe of them, but the Na- 
ture of them. An evil Thing's being FROM a Man, or 
from fomething antecedent in him, is not eflential to the 
original Notion we have of Blame-worthinefs : But 'tis it's 
being the Choice of the Heart ; as appears by this, that if a 
Thing be/r^/Arus, and not from our Choice, it has not th»- 
Nature of Blame-worthinefs or Ill-defert, according to our 
natural Senfe. When a Thing is from a Man, in that Senfe, 
that it is from his Will or Choice, he is to Blame for it, be- , 
caufe his Will is IN IT : So far as the Will is in it^ Blame is 
%n it^ and no further. Neither do we go any further in our 
Notion of Blame, to enquire whether the bad Will be FROM 
a bad Will : There is no Confideration of the Original of 
that bad Willi, becaufe according to our natural Apprehenfion, ^ , 


Sea.XIII. ^F««/if o/ Armin" Writers. 283 

Blame originally conftjh in it. Therefore a Thing's being /r^m a 
Man, is a fecondary Coniideration, in the Notion of Blame or 
lU-defert. Becaufe thofe Things in our external Actions, arc 
«ioft properly faid to beyr(?/?2 us, which are from our Choice 5 
and no other external kdi\ow% but thofe that are from us in this 
Senfe, have the Nature of Blame ; and they indeed,, not lb- 
properly becaufe they "sxzfrom us, as becaufe we are in the?n^ 
i, e. our Wills are in them ; not fo much becaufe they are 
from fome Property of ours, as becaufe they are our Properties, 
However, all thefe external Adions being truly from us^ as 
their Caufe j and we being fo ufed, in ordinary Speech, and 
in the common Affairs of Life, to fpeak of Men's Actions and 
Conduit that we fee, and that affed human Society, as delerv- 
ing 111 or Well, as worthy of Blame orPraife ; hence it is come 
to pafs, that Philofophers have incautioufly taken all their 
Meafures of Good and Evil, Praife and Blame, from the 
' Dictates of common Senfe, about thefe overt A£ts of Men ; to 
the running qf every Thing into the moft lamentable and 
dreadful Confufion. And therefore I obferve, 

III. ^Tis fo far from being true (whatever may be pretended) 
that the Proof of the Do6trine which has been maintain'd, 
depends on certain abftrufe, unintelligible, metaphyiical Terms 
and Notions ; and that the Arrninian Scheme, without needing 
" fuch Clouds and Darknefs, for it's Defence, is fupported by 
the plain Dictates of common Senfe ; that the very Ps.everfe is 
moft certainly true, and that to a greatDegree. 'Tis Fact, that 
they, and not we, have confounded Things with metaphyiical, 
unintelligible Notions and Phrafes, and have 4rawn them from 
the Light of plain Truth, into the grofs Darknefs of abftrufe 
metaphyfical Propofitions, and Words without a Meaning. 
Their pretended Demonftrations depend very much on fuch 
unintelligible, metaphyfical Phrafes, as Self-determination and 
Sovereignty of the JVill ; and the metaphyfical Senfe they put oil 
fuch Terms, as Necejjity^ Contingency^ J^ion^ Agency^ &c. quite 
diverfe from their Meaning as ufed in common Speech ; and 
which, as they ufe them, are without any consent Meaning, 
or any Manner of diftin6t confident Ideas ; as far from it as 
any of the abftrufe Terms and perplexed Phrafes of the Peri- 
patetick Philofophers, or the moft unintelligible Jargon of thd 
Schools, or the Cant of the wiideft Fanaticks. Yea, we may 
be bold to fay, thefe metaphyfical Terms, on which they build 
fo much, are what they uie without knov^ing what they mean 
t^ieaiielvcs i they ai'e pure metaphyfical Sounds, without any 

N n 2 Wcas 

284 Armlnians too metaphyftcaL Part IV. 

Ideas whatfoever in their Minds to anfwer them ; in-as-much 
as it has been demonftrated, that there cannot be any Notion 1 
in the Mind confiftent with thefe Expreflions, as they pretend 
to explain them ; becaufe their Explanations deftroy them- 
felves. No fuch Notions as imply Self-contradidion, and 
^elf-abolition, and this a great many Ways, can fubfift in the 
Mind J as there can be no Idea of a Whole which is lefs than 
any of it's Parts, or of folid Extenfion without Dimenfions, or 

of an EfFe6t which is before it's Caufe. Arminians improve 

thefe Terms, as Terms of Art, and in their metaphyseal , 
Meaning, to advance and eftablifh thofe Things which are 
contrary to common Senfe, in a high Degree, Thus, inftead 
of the plain vulgar Notion of Liberty, which all Mankind, in 
every Part of the Face of the Earth, and in all Ages, have ; 
confifting in Opportunity to do as one pleafes ; they have in- 
troduced a new ftrange Liberty, confifting in Indifference, 
Contingence, and Self-determination ; by which they involve 
themfelves and others in great Obfcurity, and manifold grofs j 
Jnconfiftence. So, inftead of placing Vertue and Vice, as"; 
common Senfe places them very much, in fix'd Bias and In- j 
clination, and greater Vertue and Vice in ftronger and more 
eftablilh'd Inclination ; thefe,thro' their Refinings and abftrufe 
Notions, fuppofe a Liberty confifting in Indifference, to be 
eftential to all Vertue and Vice. So they have reafoned them* 
felves, not by metaphyfical Diftindtions, but metaphyseal 
Confufion, into many Principles about moral Agency, Blame, 
Praife, Reward and Punifliment, which are, as has been (hewn, 
exceeding contrary to the common Senfe of Mankind ; and . 
perhaps to their own Senfe, which gover^is them in common 
Lit>o' ^ ■ 


( 285 ) 

*Vfr* 'UV "A* "Nft^ %V '\i5''* ""tJIV "Ji^ ^fl^ '^ft'* '><V* "^O^" '\jO/* *UV* "UV 'NiV •\fl/* D 



WHETHER the Things which have been alledged, ar6 
liable to any tolerable Anfwer in the Ways of calm, 
intelligible and fi:ri(5l Reafoning, I muft leave others to 
judge : But I am fenfible they are liable to one Sort of Anfwer. 
* Tis not unlikely, that fome wiio value themfelves on the 
fuppofed rational and generous Principles of the modern 
fafhionable Divinity, will have their Indignation and Difdain 
raifed at the Sight of this Difcourfe, and on perceiving what 
Things are pretended to be proved in it. And if they think 
it worthy of being read, or of fo much Notice as to fay much 
about it, they may probably renew the ufual Exclamations, 
with additional Vehemence and Contempt, about the Fate of 
the Heathen^ Hobbes's ISlecefftty^ and making Men meer Machines ; 
accumulating the ternble Epithets oi fatal ^ unfrujirable, inevita^ 
hle^ irrefijlible^ &c. and it may be, with the Addition of horrid 
and blajphemous ; and perhaps much Skill may be ufed to fet 
forth Things which have been faid, in Colours which fhall be 
fhocking to the Imaginations, and moving to the Paflions of 
thofe who have either too little Capacity, or too much Con- 
fidence of the Opinions they have imbibed, and Contempt of 
the contrary, to try the Matter by any ferious and circumfpedt 
Examination, f Or Difficulties may be ftarted and infilled oa 


f A Writer, of the prefent Age, whom I have feveral Times had 
Occafion to mention, fpeaks once and ag^iin of thofe who hold the 
Doftrine of Neceffitx^ as fcarcely worthy of the Name of Philofo^ 

phers. 1 don'c know, whether he has refpetfl to any particulaf 

Notion of Neceifity, that fome may have maintain'd ; and if (o, 

what Doftrine of NeceiTity it is that He means. Whether I am 

worthy of the Name of a Philofopher, or nor, would be a Quellion 
litde to the prelent Purpofe. Jf any, and ever fo many, fhould 
deny it., I fhould not think it worth the while to enter into a Dif- 
Jpute oa \^ Quofticn ; tho' at the fame Time 1 might exped, 



which don't belong to the Controverfy ; becaufe, let them be 
more or lefs real, and hard to be refolved, they are not what 
are owing to any Thing diftinguifhing of this Scheme froni 
that of the Ay-minians^ and would not be removed nor dimi- 
nifhed by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. 
Or fome particular Things may be pick'd out, which they 
may think will found harfhcft in the Ears of the Generality ; 
and thefe may be glofs'd and defcanted on, with tart and con- 
temptuous Words ; and from thence^ the whole treated with 
Triumph and Infult. 

"'TIS eafy to fee how the Decifion * of moH: of the Points in 
Controverfy, between Calvimjh and Arminians^ depends on the 
Determination of this grand Article concerning the Freedom of 
the Will reqmfite to moral Agency ; and that by clearing and eftab' 
lifhing the Cahinijlic Dodrine in this Point, the chief Argu- 
ments are obviated, by which Armlman Dodlrines in general 
are fupported, and the contrary Docflrines demonftratively 
confirmed, Hereby it becomes manifeft, that God's moral 
Government over Mankind, his treating them as moralAgents, 
making them the Objeds of his Commands, Counfels, Calls, 
Warnings, Expoftulations, Promifes, Threatnings, Rewards 
and Punifhments, is not inconfiftent with a determining Dijpofal 
of all Events, of every Kind, throughout the Univerfe,^ in his. 
Providence , either by poiitive Efficiency,or Permiffion. Indeed 
fuch an univerfal^ determining Providence^ infers fome Kind of 
Neceflity of all Events ; fuch aNecelTity as implies an infallible 
previous Fixednefs of the Futurity of the Event : But no other 
Neceffiiy of moral Events, or Volitions of intelligent Agents, 
is needful in order to this, than moral Neceffity \ which does as 
much afcertain the Futurity of the Event, as any othef 
Neceffity. But, as has been demonftratcd, fuch a Neceffity is 
not at all repugnant to moral Agency, and the reafonable Ufe 
of Commands, Calls, Rewards, Punifhments, &c: Yea, not 
only are Objedions of this Kind againfl the Do(5lrine of an 
univerfal determining Providence^ removed by what has been 
iaid s but the Truth of fuch a Dodrine is demonflrated. A^ 


fome better Anfwer fliould be given to the Arguments brought for 
the Truth of the Do<arine I maintain ; and I might further reafo- 
rably defire, that it might be confidered, whether it don't become 
thofe who are truly ^worthy of the Name of Philofophers, to be 
(enfible, that there is a Difference between Argument and Contempt ;. 
yea, and a Difference between the Con tern ptiblenefs of the Perfom 
that argues, and the Inconcl^AY€jJefs of th« Ar^umenti he oSer^ 


it has been demonftrated, that the Futurity of all futureEventS 
is eftablifhed by previous Neceffity, either natural or moral ; 
fo 'tis manifeft, that the fovereign Creator and Difpofer of the 
World has ordered this NecelTity, by ordering his own Con- 
dud:, either in defignedly acting, or forbearing to ad. For, as 
the Being of the World is from God, fo the Circumftances in 
which it had it's Being at firft, both negative and pofitive, muft 
be ordered by him, in one of thefe Ways ; and all the necef- 
fary Confequences of thefe Circumftances, muft be ordered by 
him. And God's a<5live and pofitive Interpofitions, after the 
World was created, and the Confequences of thefe Interpofiti- 
ons ; alfo every Inftance of his forbearing to interpofe, and the 
Aire Confequences of this Forbearance, muft all be determined 
according to his Pleafure. And therefore every Event which 
is the Confeguence of any Thing whatfoever, or that is con- 
neded with any foregoing Thing or Circumftance, either po- 
fitive or negative, as the Ground or Reafon of its Exiftence, 
muft be ordered of God ; either by a defigned Efficiency and 
Interpofition, or a defigned forbearing to operate or interpofe. 
But, as has been proved, all Events whatfoever are neceffarily 
conne6ted with fomething foregoing,either pofitive or negative, 
w hich is the Ground of its Exiftence. It follows therefore, that 
the whole Series of Events is thus connecSted with fomething 
in the State of Things, either pofitive or negative, which is 
criginal in the Series ; /'. e. fomething which is connected with 
nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate Condud, 
either his ading or forbearing to ad. From whence it follows, 
that as God designedly orders his own Condud, and its con- 
neded Confequences, it muft neceflarily be, that he defignedly 
orders all Things. 

The Things which have been faid, obviate fome of the chief 
Objedions of Anninians againft the Calv'inijiic Do6h'ine of the 
total Depravity and Corruption of Man's Nature, whereby his 
Heart is wholly under the Power of Sin, and he is utterly un- 
able, without the Interpofition of fovereign Grace, favingly to 
love God, believe in Chrift, or do any Thing that is truly- 
good and acceptable in God's Sight. For the main Objedion 
againft this Dodrine is, that it is inconfiftent with theFreedom 
of Man's Will, confifting in Indifference and felf-determining 
Power ; becaufe it fuppofes Man to be under a Neceffity of 
Sinning, and that God requires Things of him, in order to 
his avoiding eternal Damnation, which he is unable to do ; 
and tliat this Dodrine is wholly inconfiftent with the Sincerity 



©f Counfels, Invitations, &:c. Now this Do(5lrine fuppofes nt 
sther NeceJJity of Sinning, than a moral Neceffity ; which, as 
has been fhewn, don't at all excufe Sin j and fuppofes no other 
Jnability to obey any Command, or perform any Dut\\ even the 
moft fpiritual and exalted, but a moral Inabiiiry, which, as has 
been proved, don't excufe Perfons in the Non-ptrformance of 
any good Thing, or make 'em not to be the proper ObjecSts of 
Commands, Counfels and Invitations. And moreover, it 
has been fhewn, that there is not, and never can be, either in 
Exiflence, or fo much as in Idea, any fuch Freedom of Will, 
confiftingin Indifference and Self-determination, for the Sake 
of which, this Do6trine of priginal Sin is caft out ; and that no 
fuch Freedom is neceffary, in order to the Nature of Sin, and 
a jufl Defert of Punifhment. 

The Things which have been obferved, ^o alfo take off 
the main Objedions of Arminians againfl the Doctrine oi effca- 
iious Grace ; and at the fame Time, prove the Grace of God 
in a Sinner's Converfion (if there be any Grace or divine In- 
fluence in the Affair) to be efficacious^ yea, and irrejifiihle too, 
if by irrefiflible is meant, that which is attended with a moral 
Isfeceflity, which it is impofUble Ihould ever be violated by any 
Refiftence. The main Obje(5tion of Arminians agamft this 
Do(5lrine is, that it is inconfifient with their felf-determining 
Freedom of Will; and that it is repugnant to the Nature of 
Vertue, that it fliould be wrought in the Heart by the deter- 
mining Efhcacy and Power of another, infiead of its being 
owing to a felf-moving Povv^er ; that in that Cafe, the Good 
which is wrought, would not be our V ertue, but rather God\ 
Vertue ; becaufe it is not the Perfon in whom it is wrought, 
that is the determining Author of it, but God that wrought it 
in him.— But the Things which are the Foundatfon of thefe 
Obje(5tions, have been coniidered ; and it has been demons 
ftrated, that the Liberty of moral Agents does not confifl in 
felf-determining Power j and that there is noNeed of any fuch 
Liberty, in order to the Nature of Vertue ; nor does it at all 
hinder, but that the State or A(5l of the Will may be the 
Vertue of the Subject, though it be not from Self-determina- 
tion, but the Determination of an extrinfic Caufe ; even fo as 
to caufe the Event to be morally necefTary to the Subje(5t of it, 
Arwi as it has been proved, that nothing in the State or A(Sts 
of the Will of Man is contingent ; but that on the contrary, 
every Event of this Kind is necefTary, by a moral NecefTity ; 
and has a]|9 been now demonflrated^ that the Dodrine of am 



tiiiiverfal determining Providence, follows from that Do<5lrine 
of NecefTity, which was proved before : And To, that God does 
decifively, in his Providence, order all the Volitions of moral 
Agents, either by poiitive Influence or Permiflion : And it 
being allowed o\\ all Flands, that what God does in theAffair of 
Man's vertuous Volitions, whether it be more or lefs, is by Ibmo 
pofitive Influence, and not by meer PermifTion, as in the Affair 
of a fmful Volition : If we put thefe Things together, it will 
follow, that God's Aflift:ance or Influence, muft be determin- 
ing and decifive, or muft be attended with a moral Neceflity 
of the Event ; and fo, that God gives Vertue, Holinefs and 
Converfion to Sinners, by an Influence which determines the 
Efteift, in fuch a Manner, that the Effe6t will itifallibly follow 
by a moral Necefllty ; which is what Calvinifls mean by effi- 
cacious and irrefiftible Grace. 

The Things which have been faid, Ao likewifc anfwer the 
chief Obje6tions againft the Do^lrine of God's unlverfal and 
abfolute Decree^ and aff'ord infallible Proof of that Dodrine % 
and of the Do6trine of ahfolute^ eteynal^ perfonal Ele^iion in parti- 
cular. The main Obje6tions againft thefe Do6trincs are, that 
they infer a Necefllty of the Volitions of moral Agents, and of 
the future moral State and A6ts of Men ; and fo are not con- 
fiftent with thofe eternal Rewards and Punifhments, which arc 
conneded with Converfion and Impenitence 5 nor can be made 
jto agree w^ith the Reafonablenefs and Sincerity of thePrecepts, 
Calls, Counfels, Warnings and Expoftulations of the Word of 
God -J or with the variousMethods andMeans of Grace,which 
God ufes with Sinners, td bring 'em to Repentance ; and the 
whole of that moral Government, which God exercifes towards 
Mankind : And that they infer an Inconfiftence between the 
Jecret and revealed Will of God ; and make God the Author of 
Sin. But all thefe Things have been obviated in the preceed- 
ing Difcourfe. And the certain Truth of thefe Do6lrines, 
concerning God's eternal Purpofes, will follow from what wa§ 
jufl: nowobferved concerning God's univerfal Providence j how 
it infallibly follows from what has been proved, that God, 
orders all Events, and the Volitions of moral Agents amongft 
others, by fuch a decifive Difpofal, that the Events are infaj- 
Jibly connected with his Difpofal. For if God difpofes all 
Events, fo that the infallible Exiftence of the Events is decided 
,by his Providence, then he doubtlefs thus orders and decides 
Things knowingly^ and on Defign. God don't do what he does^ 
. »cr order what h« orders, accidentally and unawares j either 
t O o mthout 

290 t:^^ CONCLUSION. 

without^ or hefide his Intention. And if there be a foregoing 
Defign of _doing and ordering as he does, this is the fame with 
a Pitrpofe or Decree. And as it has been fliewn, that nothing 
is new to God, in any Refpedl, but all Things are perfe6lly 
and equally in his View from Eternity ; hence it will follow, 
that his Defigns or Purpofes are not Things formed anew, 
founded on any new Views or Appearances, but are all eternal 
Purpofes. And as it has been now Ihewn, how the Do6!rine 
of determining efficacious Grace certainly follows from" 
Things proved in the foregoing Difcourfe ; hence will necef- 
farily follow the DocStrine of particular^ eternal^ abfolute Eleffion, '\ 
For if Men are made true Saints, no otherwife than as God 
makes 'em fo, and diftinguidies 'em from others, by an effica- 
cious Power and Influence of his, that decides and fixes the 
Event J and God thus makes fome Saints, and not others, oa 
Defign or Purpofe, and (as has been now obferved) no Defigns 
of God are new ; it follows, that God thus diftinguifhed from 
others, all that ever become true Saints, by his eternal Defign 
or Decree.-— I might alfo fliew, how God's certain Foreknow- 
ledge muft fuppofe an abfolute Decree, and how fuch a Decree 
can be proved to a Demonftration from it : But that this Dif- 
courfe mayn't be lengthen'd out too much, that muft be omit- 
ted for the prefcnt. 

From thefe Things it will inevitably follow, that however 
Chrift in fome Senfe may be faid to die for all^ and to redeem 
all vifible Chriftians, yea the whole World by his Death ; yet 
there muft be fomething particular in the Defign of his Death, 
with Refpe6l to fuch as He intended Ihould adually be faved 
thereby. As appears by what has-been now ftiewn, God has 
the adual Salvation or Redemption of a certain Number in J 
his proper abfolute Defign, and of a certain Number only y 
and therefore fuch a Defign only can be profecuted in any.; 
Thing God does, in order to the Salvation of Men. God. 
purfues a proper Defign of the Salvation of the Ele6t in giving 
Chrift to die, and profecutes fuch a Defign with Refped to no 
other, moft ftricftly Ipeaking j for 'tis impoffible, that God 
fliould profecute any other Defign than only fuch as He has : 
Ke certainly don't, in the higheft Propriety and Stridnefs of 

•Speech, purfue a Defign that He has not. And indeed fuch 

a Particularity and Limitation of Redemption will as infallibly 

follow from the Do6^rine of God's Foreknowledge, as from 

that of the Decree. For 'tis as impoffible, in StricStnefs of 

• Speech, > that Gcd ftiould profecute a Defign or Aim at a 



Thing, which He at the fame Time moft perfectly knows will 
not be accomplifhed, as that he (hould uie Endeavours for 
that which is befide his Decree. 

By the Things which have been proved, are obviated fomc 
of the mainObjeaions againft theDo6trine of the infallible and 
neceiTary Perfeverance of Saints, and fome of the main lounda- 
tions of this Do(5trine are eftabiilhed. The main Prejudices 
of Arminians againft this Dodrine feem to be thefe j they lup- 
pofe fuch a neceffary, infallible Perfeverance to be repugnant 
to the Freedom of the Will ; that it mull be owing tc Man's 
own felf-determining Power, that he /r// beco??ies vertuous and 
holy ; and (o in like Manner, it muft be left a Thing contin- 
gent, to be determin'd by the fame Freedom of \^ ill, whether 
he vv^ill perfevere in Vertue and Holinefs ; and that otherwife 
his continuing ftedfaft in Faith and Obedience would not be 
his Vertue, or at ail Praife-worthy and Rewardable ; nor cculd 
his Perfeverance be properly the Matter of divine Commands, 
Counfels & Promifes, nor his Apoftacy be properly threaten'd, 
and Men warned againil it. Whereas we find all thefe Thmgs 
in Scripture : There we find Stedfaftnefs and Perfeverance in 
trus Chriftianity, reprefented as the Vertue of the Saints, 
fpoken of as Praife-v/orthy in them, and glorious Rewards 
: promifed to it ; and alfo find,that God makes it the Subjed of 
his Commands, Counfels and Promifes ; and the contrary, of 
Threatnings and Warnings. But the Foundation of thefe 
..Objections has been removed, in it's being (hewn that moral 
Neceility and infallible Certainty of Events is not inconfiftent 
with thefe Things ; and that, as to Freedom of Will lying in 
the Power of the Will tp determine it felf, there neither is any 
fuch Thing, nor any Need of it, in order to Vertue, Reward, 
Commands, Counfels, &c. 

And as the Doctrines of efficacious Grace and abfolute 
Ele6lion do certainly follow from Things which have been 
proved in the preceeding Difcourfe ; fo fome of the main 
. Foundations of the Do6lrine of Perfeverance are thereby efta- 
biilhed. If the Beginning of true Faith and Holine's, and a 
Man's becoming a true Saint at firft, don't depend on the 
felf-determining Power of the Will, but on the deter- 
mining efficacious Grace of God ; it may well be argued, 
that it is fo alfo with Refpec^ to Men's being continued Saints, 
or perfevering in Faith and Holinefs. The ConverfiOn of a 
Sinner being not owing to a Man's Self-determination, but 
' to God's DeterminatioHj and eternal EleiVioa, which in abfo- 

O o 2 Ivitv, 


lute, and depending on the fovereign Will of God, and not 
on the free Will of Man ; as is evident from what has been 
faid : And it being very evident from the Scriptures, that the 
eternal Eledlion which there is of Saints to Faith and Holinefs, 
is alfo an Eledion of them to- eternal Salvation ; hence their 
Appointment to S,alvation muft alfo be abfolute, and not de- 
pending on their contingent, felf-determining Will. From 
all which it follows, that it is abfolutely fix'd in God's Decree, 
that all true Saints (hail perfevere to adual eternal Salvation. 

But I muO: leave all thefe Things to the Confiderafion of 
the fair and impartial Reader ; and vv'hen he has maturely 
weighed them, I would propofe it to his Conlideration, whe- 
ther many of the tiril Reformers, and others that fucceeded 
them, whom God in their Day made the chief Pillars of his 
Church, and greateft Inftruments of their Deliverance from 
Error and Darknefs, and of the Support of the Caufe of 
Piety among them, have not been injured, in the Contempt 
with which they have been treated by many late Writers, for 
their teaching and maintaining fuch Dcdtrines as are com- 
monly called Cahinijuc. Indeed fome of thefe new Writers, 
at the fame Time that they have reprefented the Do6trines of 
thefe antient and eminent Divines, as in the higheft Degree 
ridiculous, and contrary to common Senfe, in an Oftentation 
of a very generoqs Charity, have allowed that they were honeil: 
well-meaning Men : Yea, it may be fome of them, as tho' it 
were in great Condefcenfion and Compaflion to them, have 
allowed that they did pretty well for the Day which they lived 
3n, and confidering the great Difadvantages they laboured un- 
der : When at the fame Time, their Manner of Specking has 
naturally and plainly faggefted to the Mipds of their Readers, 
that they were Perfons, who through the Lownefs of their 
Genius, and Greatnefs of the Bigotry, with which their Minds 
Vv'ere Ihackled, and Thoughts coniined, living in the gloomy 
Caves of Superftition, fondly embraced, and demurely and zea-^ 
loufly taught the moft abiurd, filly and monilrous Opinions, 
worthy of the greateil: Contempt of Gentlemen poffefied of 
that noble and generous Freedom of Thought, which happily 
prevails in this Age of Light and Enquiry. When indeed fuch 
is the Cafe, that we might, if fo difpofed, fpeak as big Words, 
as they, and on far better Grounds. And really all the Ar^ 
•miniam on Earth might be challenged without Arrogance or 
Vanity, tc make thefe Principles of theirs wherein they mainly 
4iftr froci their fathiys, whom tl>ey fo Xiiuch defpife? con* 

^ fiftent 

r/^^ CONCLUSION. 29s 

fiftent with common Seiife j yea, and perhaps to produce any 
Dodrine ever embraced by the bhndeft Bigot of theChurch of 
Rome^ov the moft ignorant M.ujfulman^ or extravagant Enthufiaft, 
that might be reduced to more, and more demonllrable Incon- 
fiftencics, & Repugnancies to c*mmonSenre,and to themfelves ; 
tho' their Inconfiftencies mdeed may not he fo deep, or be {6 
artfully vail'd by a deceitful Ambiguity of Words, and an in- 
determinate Signification of Phrafes. I will not deny, that 

thefe Gentlemen, many of them, are Men of great Abilities, 
and have been, helped to higher Attainments in Philofophy, 
than thofe antient Divines^ and have done great Service to the 
Church of God in fome Refpeds : But I humbly conceive, 
that their differing from their Fathers with fuch magifterial 
AlTurance, in thefe Points in Divinity, muil be owing to fome 
other Caufe than fuperiour Wifdom. 

It may alfo be worthy of Confideration, whether the great 
^Iteration which has been made in the State of Things in our 
Nation, and fome other Parts of the Proteftant World, in 
this and the pad Age, by the exploding fo generally CahinijVic 
Dodrines, that is fo often fpoken of as worthy to be greatly 
Tejoyced in by the Friends of Truth, Learning and Vertue, as 
an Inftance of the great Increafe of Light in the Chriftian 
Church ; 1 fay, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether 
this be indeed a happy Change, owing to any fuch Caufe as 
an Increafe of true Knov^lege and Underftanding in Things 
of Religion ; or whether there is not Reafbn to fear, that it 
may be owing to fome worfe Caufe. 

And I deiire it may be confidered, whether the Boldnefs 
of fome Writers may not be worthy to be refle6led on, who 
have not fcrupled to fay, That if thefe and thofe Things are 
true (which yet appear to be the demonftrable* Dilates of 
Reafon, as well as the certain Dictates of the Mouth of the 
moft High) then God is unjull: and cruel, and guilty of manifeft 
Deceit and double-dealing, and the like. Yea, fome have 
gone fo far,as confidently to afrert,That if anyBook which pre- 
tends to be Scripture, teaches fuch Dodrines, that alone is fuf- 
ficient Warrant for Mankind to reject it, as what cannot be 
the Word of God. Some who have not gone fo far, have 
faid, That if the Scripture feems to teach any fuch Do6trines,fa 
contrary to Reafon, we are obliged to find out fome other In- 
^pretation of thofe Texts, where fuch DocSlrines feem to be 
exhibited. Others exprefs themfelves yet more modefily : They 
exprefs a Tendernefs and religious Fear, left they Paould re-* 
•civp zuid teach any Thing that ihould feem to refle<5l oaGod's 


294 ^^^ CONCLUSION. 

inoral CharacfVer, or be a Difparagement to his Methods of 
Adminiftration, in his moral Government ; and therefore ex- 
prefs themfelves as not daring to embrace fome Do6lrines, 
though they feem to be deHvered in Scripture, according to 
the more obvious and natural Conftru(ftion of the Words* 
But indeed it would (hew a truer Modefty and Humility, 
if they would more entirely rely on God's Wifdom and Dif- 
cerning, who knows infinitely better than we, what is agreable 
to his own Perfecflions, and never intended to leave thefe Mat- 
ters to the Decifion of the Wifdom and Difcerning of Men ; 
but by his own unerring Inftruclion, to determine for us what 
the Truth is ; knowing how little our Judgment is to be de- 
pended on, and how extremely prone, vain and blind Men are, 
to err in fuch Matters. 

The Truth of the Cafe is, that if the Scripture plainly 
taught the oppofite Dodrines, to thofe that are fo much ftum- 
bled at, viz, the Jrminian Do61rine of Free-Will, and others 
depending thereon, it would be the greateft of all Difficulties 
that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its con- 
taining any, even the moft myfterious of thofe Dodrines of the 
firft Reformers, which our late Free-thinkers have fo fuperci- 
lioufly exploded.— Indeed it is a glorious Argument of the 
Pivinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach fuchDo6trines, 
which in one Age and another, thro' the Blindnefs of Men's 
Minds, and ftrong Prejudices of their Hearts, are rejeded, as 
moft abfurd and unreafonable, by the wife and great Men of 
the World ; which yet, when they are moft carefully and 
ftridly examined, appear to be exactly agreable to the moft 
demonftrable, certain, and natural Dictates of Reafon. By 
fuch Things it appears, that the Foolijhnefs of God is wifir than 
Meriy and God does as is faid in i Cor. i. 19, 20. For it is 
written^ I will deftroy the Wifdoin of the Wife ; / will bring to no^ 
thing the Und^rjianding of the Prudent. Where is the Wife I Where 
is the Scribe f Where is the Difputer of this World ! Hath not God 
piadefoolijh the Wifdom of this World ? And as it ufed to be in 
Time paft, fo it is probable it will be in Time to come, as it 
is there written, in ver. 27,28,29. But God hath chofen the foolijh 
Things of the Worlds to confound the Wife : And God hath chofen the 
weak Things of the World, to confound the Things thai are mighty : 
And bafe Tlnngs of the World, and Things which are defpifed, hath 
God chofen : Tea, and Things which are not, to bring to noughtThingf 
that are ; thai no Flejh Jhould glory in hisPrefence, Amen. 

F I N I S, 



{N. B. The Capital P. fignifies the Part\ this Mark, §, the 
Section ; ConcL the Conclufton ; and the fmall p. the P^^^ ; 
where the Things here rpeciiied, are to be found.] 

yfBftranidox Ahjirufe Rea- 

\j^ foning, whether juftly 

objeded againft Calvi- 

■nijis, P. 4. § 13. p. 278. 

\ ASiion^ Inconfiftence of the 

dency to fuperfede all Ufe of 
Means, and make Endeavours 
vain, P. 4. § 5. p. 222. and in 
EfFed, to exclude all Vertuc 
and Vice out of the World, 

■:<^r;w/m'^«Notionofit, P.4. §2. P. 3. §4. p. 161, 167. Ibid. 

199. and whence this arofe, 

204. what it is in the com- 
"mon Notion of it, Ibid. p. 201. 
—and how diftinguifh'd from 
^Pajfion^ Ibid. p. 203. 
• ASiivity of the Nature of the 
Soul, whether thro' this. Voli- 
tion can arife without aCaufe, 
t. 2. § 4. p. 47. 

Apparent Good, the greateft, 
'in what Senfe it determines 
•the Will, P. I. § 2. p. 7. 

Arminians, obliged to talk 
inconfiftently, P. 2. § 5. p. 53. 
^Ibid. § 7. p. 70. §. 9. p. 77. 
where the main Strength of 
their pretendedDemonftrations 
^lies, P. 4. § 4. p. 219. Their 
Obje6tion from God's moral 
'■Chara6ler, confider'd and re- 
torted. Ibid. § II. p. 271,2. 

Armhmn Do^rine^ its Tcn- 

§ 6. p. 184. and § 7. p. 190. 
p. 276. 

4. § I. p. 196,7. Ibid. § 12 

,7. It 

Atheifm, the fuppofed Ten- 
dency of C^/ww/Z^/VPrinciples to 
it, P. 4. § 12. p. 274. How 
Arnilnian Principles tend to it. 
Ibid. p. 275, 

Attending to Motives, of Li- 
berty's being fuppofed to con- 
fift in an Ability for it, P. 2. 
§ 9. p. 80. 

Atonement, See Christ. 

Author of Sin, whether it 
would follow from the Doc- 
trine here maintain'd, that 
God is fo, P. 4. § 9. p. 252. 

jnLam.e-worthinefs, wherein it 
•^ confifts, according to com- 
mon Senfe, P. 4. § 4. p. 212. 



I N D E X 

f^Alifhiifm^ confiftent with 
^ common Senfe, P. 4. § 3. 
p. 2g6. 

Cauje^ how the Word is 
tifed in this Difcourfe, P. 2. 
§ 3. p. 41. No Event without 
one, P. 2. § 3. p. 42.— and 
Effe^y a neceiTary Conneoflon 
between them,P.2. § 8. p. 73.- 
This refpedts morale as well as 
naturalCaufes, P. 2. § 3. p. 41. 

Chrtji^ his Obedience necel- 
fary, yet vertuous and praife- 
tvorthy, P. 3. § i. p. 139. His 
Atonement excluded in Con- 
fequence of Arminian Princi- 
ples, P. 3. § 3- P- 158. 

Chubb (Mr.) the Inconfift- 
rnce of his Scheme of Liberty^ 
&c. P. 2. § 9. p. 85,-98. 

Commands^ confiftent with 
moral Neceftity and Inability, 


270. Inconfiftent vj'nhArminian 

Principles,. P. 3. § 4- P- i^i- 

Common SenJ^, why the Prin- 
ciples maintain'd in this Dif- 
courfe,appear to fome contrary 
to it, P. 4. § 3. p. 206. Ne- 
ceiTary Vertue &Vice agreable 
to it, P. 4. § 4. p. 212. — Jr~ 
minlan Tenets oppofite to it, 
P. 3. § 6. p. 178. Ibid. § 7. 
p. 187. 

Co7itingcnce^ P. I. § 3. p. 20. 
thelnconfiftence of theNotion, 
P. 2. § 3. p. 45. Whether ne- 
ceflary in order to Liberty, P. 

2. § 8. p. 73. implied in 

Jrtninian Liberty, and yet in- 
confiftent with It, P. 2. § 13. 
p. 132. Epicurus the greateit 
Maintainer of it, P. 4. § 6. p. 
aa8. Ibid. § 12. p. 275. 

Corruption of Man^t Nature, 

CONCL. p. 287. 

Creation of the Worlds at fuch 
a particular Time and Flace^ P. 
4. § 8. p. 240* 

T\Ecree abfolute^notitikrnng 
-*-^ Neceffity, any more than 
certain Fore-knowledge does, 
P. 2. § 12. p. 122. How it fol- 
lows from Things proved in 
thisDifcour.e. Concl. p. 289. 

Dcfsrminatior,. See IVill. 

Dictates. See Vnderftanding, 

'T'FfeSf, See Caufe. 

■^ Ej/icaciousGrace,Qot^.^.2^^*, 
EleSiion pcrfonaL See Decree, 
Endeavours^ what it is for 

them to be in vain^ P. 4. § 5. 

p. 220. Render'd vain by, 

Anninian Principles, Ibid. p. 

222. But not fo by Calvinifmy 

Ibid. p. 224. — See Sincerity, 
Entrance of Sin into the 

World, P. 4. § 10. p. 268. 
Equilibrium. See Indifference, 
Exhortation. See Invitation, 

T^AIIen Man, See Inability. 
-^ Fatefioical, P. 4. § 6. p.228.!^ 

Fatality., the Principles of 
Arminians inferring that which '; 
is mofl: {hocking, P. 4.. § 8-. p. 

Foreknowledge of God, of Vo* 
litions of moral Agents,proved 
P, 2. § 1 1, p. 98.— Inconfift- 
ent with Contingence, P. 2. 
§ 12. p, I ij7\ Proves Neceffity, 
as much as a Decree, Ibid, p. 
122. The feeming Difficulty 
of reconciling it with the Sin- 
cerity of hisPrtcepts^Counfelsp 


I N D EX. 

&c. not peculiar to thtCalvlnifik 
Scheme, P. 4. 5 ii. p. 271. 

f^OD^ his Being how known, 
^ P.2. §3,p.43. P.4.§i2. 
p. 275. His moral Excellencies 
neceffary, yet vertuous and 
praife-worthy,P. 3. M- P-^SS- 
P. 4. § 4. p. 219. The Ne- 
ceffity of his Volitions, P. 4. § 
7. p. 230. Whether the Prin- 
ciples maintain'd in this Dif- 
courfe are inconfiftent with his 
moral Character, P. 4. § 11. 
p. 270. How Armmiamjm de- 
stroys the Evidence of his mo- 
ral rerfe(5tions. Ibid p. 272. 

Grace of the Spirit^ excluded 
by Jrmiman Principles, P. 3. § 

3. p. 159. 

Grace^ii^s Freenefs confident 
with the moral NecefRty of 
God's Will, P. 4. § 8. p. 249. 

TTJhitSy vertuous & vicious, 
"^-^ inconfiftent withv^rw/«/^« 
Principles, P. 3. § 6. p. 181. 

Heathen, of their Salvation, 
P. 3. § 5. p. 177. 

Hobbes^ his Doctrine of Ne- 
cefTity, P. 4. S 6. p. 229. 

jMpofibility, the fame as ne- 
■* gativeNeceffity,P.i.53.p.i9. 
Inability^ how the Word is 
iifed in common Speech, and 
how by Metaphyficians and Jr~ 
miniansy P. i. § 4. p. 14, 17. 
P. 4. § 3. p. 207. Natural and 
moral, P. i. § 4. p. 20. Moral, 
the feveral Kinds of it, P. i. § 

4. p. 25. P. 3. § 4. p. 165. 
— of fallen Man to perform 
perfcv^ Obedience, P. 3- § 3 

p. 157, What does, and what 
does not excufeMenj P. 3. § 3, 
p. 155. Ibid. §4. p. 167. P. 4. 
$ 3. p. 206. 

Inclinatlom ; fee Habits, 

Indifference, whether Liberty 

confifts in it, P. 2. § 7. p. 63. 

-—Not necefTary to Vertue,but 

inconfiftent with it, P. 3. § 6, 

p. 178. 

IndifferentThings, thoio. which 
appear fo, never the Objecfts of 
Volition, P. I. & 2. p. 7. P. 2. 
§ 6. p. 56. Whether the Will 
can determine it {qM in chufing 
among fuch Things, P. 2. § 6» 

p. SI', 

Invitations, confif^ent with 
moral Neceffity and Inability. 
P. 3. §4. p. 169. P. 4. § II. 
p. 270. But not connftent with 
Arminian Principles, P. 2. § 9. 
p. 8r. P. 3. § 7. p. 188. P4. 
S II. p. 272. 

T Aws, the End whereof is to 
-^ bind to one Side, render'd 
ufelefs by Arminian Principles, 
P. 3. § 4. p. 162. 

Liberty, tht Natur^of it,P. i. 
h 5. p. 27, ■ The Arminian No^ 
tion of it, . Ibid. p. 28. This 
inconfiftent with other Armz 
iiian Notions, P. 2. § 9. p, 77, 

Licentiotijhefs, whether the 
Calvinifiic Dodtrine tends to it, 
P. 4. § 12. p. 275. — See£«- 

l\jrAchineSy whether Cahinifm 
•^'^ makes Men fuch. P. 4. 
§ 5. p. 226. 

Meansy fee Endeavours, 
P p Mita^hyfi^i 

I N D E X. 

Metaphyseal Reafoning ; fee 
Ahfiraaed.-'-To be juftly ob- 
jected againft the Armmian 
Scheme, P. 4. S 13. p. 283. 

Moral Agency^ it*s Nature, 

P. I. s 5. p, 29. 

Motives^ what they are, P. i, 
§ 2. p. 5, 6, The ftrongeft 
determining the Will, Ibid, 
p. 6. P. 2. S 10. p. 88» A- 
mtnian Principles inconliftent 
with their Influence and Ufe 
in moral A6tions, P. 3. § 7. p. 
185. P. 4. § II. p. 273. 


Atural Notions ', fee common 

Necejftty^ how the Term is 
ufed in common Speech, and 
how by Philofophers, P. 1. 
§3. p. 13. P. 4. ! 3. p. 207. 

Philofophical, of various 

Kinds, Ibid. p. 210. Natural 
and moral, P. i. § 4. p. 20. 
P. 4. §4. p. 217.— No Liberty 
without moral Necefiity, P. 2. 
§ 8. p. 73. Neccflity andGon- 
tingence,both inconfiftentwith 
Ahmman Liberty, P. 2. § 13. 
p. 131.— Neceflity of God's 
Volition, P. 3. § I. p. 135. 
P. 4. § 7. p. 230. This con- 
iiftent v/ith the Freenefs of his 
Grace, Ibid. § 8. p. 249.— Ne- 
ccfTity, of Chrift's Obedience, 
^^•' ^' 3* § 2.' p. 140. — of fhe 
Sin of fuch as are given up to 
jSin, P. 3: § 3. p. 153.—— of 
fallen Man, in general, P.3. § 
3. p. 157. What Neceffity 
•wholly excufes Men, P. 3 § 4. 
jp. 168, P. 4. §. 3. p. 206. and 
§4. p. 215. 

/\Bedience ; fe? Chrift^ Com^ 
^-^. mandsy Neceffity, 

"p Articles perfe^ly alike , of the 
^ Creator's placing fuch dif-i 
ferently, P. 4. § 8. p. 242. 
Perfeverance of Saints ^ CoNr 

CLUS. p, 291. 

Promifes^ \vh ether any are. 
made to the Endeavours of 
iinregenerate Sinners, P. 3.- 
§ 5. p. 176.. 

Providenecy univerfal and de- 
cifive. CoNCL. p. 286. 
T^Edemption partiaular. CoN- 
•^ CLUS. p. 290. 

Refor7ners ^/>^/r/?,how treated 
by many late Writers. Con- 
CLus. p. 292. ' 

Qjints in Heaven^ their Li- 
"^ berty, P. 4. § 4. p. 219. 

Scripture^ of, the Ar?ninians 
Arguments from thence, P. 4. 
§ II. p. 273. 

Self- deter ?nming Power of the 
Willy it's Inconliftence, P. 2. 
§ I. p.31. Evafwns of the Ar- 
guments againft it confidered, 
P. 2. § 2. p. 35. fliewn to be 
impertinent. Ibid. § 5. p. 51. 

Sin ; fee Author y Entrance', 

Sincerity of Defires and En- 
deavours y-v^hit is no juft Excufe, 
P. 3. § 5. p. 170. The different 
Sorts ot Sincerityy lb. p. 175. 

Shthy not encouraged by 
Calvinifm^ P. 4. $ 5. p. 224. 

Stoic Phikfophersy great The- 
ifls,P. 4. § 12. p. 2y4..~SeeFate. 

Stfpending Vclitiony of the 
Liberty of the Will fuppofed 
to coniift in an Ability for it, 

P. 2. S 7- P- 70. P. 3- § 4- 
p. 164. Ibid. § 7. p. 186. 


I N D E X. 

CJ^Endency of the Principles 
-^ here maintairi'djtoAtheifm 
and Licentioufneii^, the Ob- 
jcition confider'd and retorted^ 
P. 4. § 12. p. 274. 

T/'Ertue and pke, the Being 
^ of neither of 'em confid- 
ent with Jrm'mia?i Principles ; 
•See Arminian Doctrine, Their 
Eflence, not lying in their 
Caufe, but their Nature, P. 4. 

I. p. 192. 

Underjianding, how it deter- 
mines the Wilj, P. I. § 2. p. 
12. P. 2. § 9. p. 76. Dictates 
©f thellnderftanding asidW^ili,. 
as luppofed by fome, the fame, 
P. 2. §Q. p. 81. 

Uneajinefsy as fuppoffed to 

determine the Will, P. i. § 2. 

VoUfion^ not wiDhout aCaufe, 
P.2.§3.p.46. P.2.§4. p.50. 

•rrrlLLy it's. Nature, P. r. 
§ I. Pj, i,^r. Its Deterr 
mination, rT i. § 2. p. 5, is^c. 
The very Being of fuch a Fa- 
culty inconfifteiU with Armi- 
nian Principles, P. 3. § 7. p. 
190.— Of God, Jecrct and 
revealed^ P. 4. § 9. p. 262. Ar- 
minians themfclves oblig'd to 
allow fuch a Diftlndion, Ibid, 
p. 264. 

WUlingnefs to Duty, what is 
no Excufe for the Negle6t of 
it. See Binarity, 


E R R A T A. ^^ ; 

pAge 26. line,c:^;^^^r/wzg'.-— p.34l.i.r.6't'/7'*-^'^— p.37, 
■* 1. 27. r. eicciie that— p. 65. 1. 2. from Bot.r.and (2^7 the-— 
p. 82. 1. laft, r. Notion of Liberty he jujl^ then all Liberty — 
p. 91. L 12. r. Thus^ if— Ibid. 1. 37. for (7r,r. <?«— p. 115.L 
3C.r. their wziT^?/— p. 132.1. 3.dele «^/— -p.183. 1. i. dele //;.—= 
ibid, 1, 3a, x.Jh^withey are not—-p. 2^0,1. 37,8. x.meafurallcc 

P P 2 




in Alphabetical Order. 

REv. Mr. John Adams, Bahkirkf Scotland, 
Mr. John Adams, Milton^ Majpichufetts, 
Mrs, Sarah Alexander, New-Tork, 
The Hon. John Alford, Efq; Charlejlown^ Majfachufettu 
Mr. Samuel Allis, Somers^ ditto. 
Mr. Samuel Allen, Newarky New-Jerfey. 


MR. Jonathan Badger, Tutor of New-Jerfey College, 
,.. Mr. Jonathan Baldwin, Student at ditto. 
Mr. Nehemiah Baldwin, Newark^ New-Jerfey. 
Mr. Jofeph Baldwin, Newark^ ditto. 
Mr. Eiiflia Baker, Student at Tale-College. 
Deacon Raham Bancroft, Readings Majfachujefts. ^j 

Mr. Samuel Bancroft, Readings ditto. 
]^Jr. Abner Barnard, Hampjbire County^ ditto. 
Mr. Abel Barnes, Beihlem, ConneSiicut. 
Lieut. David Barnum, JVcodbury^ ditto. 
Mr. Joel Bardwell, Student at Yale College, 
Mr. Charles Beaty, New-Tcrk Government, 
Rev. Mr. James Bcebe, North-Stratford^ CotineSficuty 6 Bookf*- 
Rev. Mr. Jofeph Bellamy, Bethletn., ditto. * 6 Books- 

Rev. Mr. Bellingal, Cupor^ Scotland. 

Rev. Mr. Hugh Blair, Minifter in the Canongatc, of Edinburg. 
Rev. Mr. David Blifs, Concord, Maffachufdts . 6 Books. 

Rev. Mr. Bonner, Cockpen, Scotland. 
Rev. Mr. David Boftwick, Long-IJkindy NrM-York. 
Rev, Mr. John Brainerd, Miflionary among the Indians. 
Mr, Bcnoni Bradner, Student at l^ew-Jtrfey Csllege, 



Rev. Mr. John Brown, Augujia^ Virginia, \^ Books, 

Mr. George Brown, Merchant, Glafgow^ Scotland, 

Mr. Thomas Brown, Newark^ J^ew-Jerfey, 

Mr. Thomas Brooks, Concord, MaJJachufetts, 

Rev. Mr. James Brown, Bridge-Hampton^ Long-IJland. 

Capt. Obadiah Bruen, Newark^ New-Jerfey, 

Mr. Daniel Bull, Hartford^ ConneSficut, 

Rev.Mr.AaronBurr,Preiident of theCollege mNetu-Jcr/ey^SBo, 

Mr. Thaddeus Burr, Student at ditto, 

Mr. Julius KingBurh'idge^CharleS'City'CountyyFirginia, 1 2 Books. 

Mr. Ebenezer Burt, Northampton, Ma£achufettSy 6 Books. 

REv. Mr. Thomas Canfield, Roxhury, ConneSficut, 
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MT.WiWhmCrsiige, New-Tork. 

Mr. Benjamin Crocker, Ipfwich, MaJJachufetts, 

B-ev. Mr. Alexander Cummings,, New-York, 

Mr. Garwoid Cunningham, Woodbury, Connecticut, 


(T^ Eorge Daffield, A. B. Newark, New-Jerfey, 

^^ Mr. Jofeph Dana, Majfachufeits, 

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Ilev. Mr. Davidlon, Galafhields, Scotland, 



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Mr. JohnDowne, Bojion, 

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T^R. John Ells, Student at Tak-Colkge. 

^^ Mr. John Ely, Jun. Springfield^ Majfachufsttu 

Rev. Mr. Jofeph Emerfon, Maiden^ ditto, 

Mr. Brown Emerfon, Readings ditto. 

Rev. Mr. John Erficine, Culrofi., Scotland. \ 

F j 

TS Ev. Mr. Daniel Farrand, Canaan^ Connecticut., 6 Books. j 

•*^ Samuel Payer weather, A. M. Boflon^ Majfachufetts^ \ 

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Mr. John Forred, JSlrw-Tork, j 
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Rev. Mr. John Frelinghayfen, Rariton,. Wejl-Neiv-Jerjey. 


A Lexander Gait, Efq; Secretary to^the ^'i/w/'wrg- Infurance- 

"^^ Office againft Fire, Scotland, \ 

Mr. Gibfon, Preacher at Edinburg. j 
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Mr. Francis Gitteau, Betblem, ConncCiicut., 36 Books. j 

Mr. Jofhua Gitteau, Beihlemy ditto, 6 Books. I 

Mr. John Gordon, A. M. \ 

Rev. Mr. Jofeph Gowdie, ProfefTor of Divinity, Edinburg, \ 

. Rev. ProfeiTor Gowdie, for the Divinity-Ilall-Library, at \ 

Edinburg. ' \ 

Rev. Mr. John Graham, Southbury., Conne^icut^ 36 Books. j 

Rev. Mr. Chauncy Graham, Rumbout., New-York. \ 

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. Rev. Mr. Jacob Green, Raway., New-Jerfey., 6 Books. \ 

Mr. William Greenough, Student at Tale-Collcgs. j 
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MR. Benjamin Haiden, Braintrec, M^Jjachufetts^ 
Mr. Samuel Haiden, Mcdford^ ditto. 6Books, John 


John Halt, Efq; New-Tork, 

Benjamin Hait, A. B. 

Rev. Mr.' Mofes Hale, Newbury y Majfachufetu. 

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Mr. Willis Hall, Bopn, Maffachufetts , 

Deacon Eleazer Hamlin,— *-A^^iy-3^fir^. 

Rev. Mr. John Hamilton, Glafgow^ Scotland. 

Mr. Baily Gawio Hamilton, Bookfeller, Edinburgh ditta, 

Mr. Jolias Hammond, Majfachufetts. 

Mr. Robert Hannah, Bethlem^ ConneSlkut. 

Mr. Benjamin Haftings, Deerfieldy Majfachufetts » 

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Mr. Jofiah Hathway, ditto. 

Rev. Mr. Gideon Hawley, MiiTionary among tlie Indiansy oa 

the*Weftern Borders. 
Mr. Nathaniel Hazzard, New-York. 

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Rev. Mr. Lawrence Hill, of the Barony Parlft) at Glafgow^ in 


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Ezra Horton, A. B. 

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3ivTR. William Jackfon, New-Tork, 

^y^ Rev. Mr. Jedidiah Jewett, Rowley ^ Majfachufetts 

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Mr. Matthias Johnfon, Province of Neiv-Tork. 

Rev. Mr. Jonathan Judd, Northampton^ Majfachufetts* 

x^. Elnathan JudiQU^ J^'^fudbury, Cmmiiu:ut, 

s Rev. 



REv. Mr. James Kafton, Woodbury, ConneSitcut» 6 Books, 
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Hugh Knox, A. M. 


MR. Benjamin Lawrence, Newton^ New-York. 
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Mr, Samuel Lowdon, New-Tork, 
Mr. John Lyon, Newark, New-Jerfey, 
Mr. Phineas Lyman, Northampton, Maffachufetts, 
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Rev. Mr, Lawrence Hill, of the Barony Parifh, in Glafgow. 
Mr. Logan, Preacher at Edinhurg, Scotland, 24 Books. 


M. j 

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Samuel McClintock, A. B. j 

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Mr. Jofeph Miller, Majfachufetts, 

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Rev. Mr. John McLaurin, Glafgow^ Scotland. 

Rev. Mr. William McCullock, Cambkflang., Scotland, 

Mr. John Munn, Deerfield., Majfachufetts. 

Mr. John Murdock, late Baily of Glafgow., Scotland. 

Mx, Peter Murdock, Student at TaU-CoUege. 


V/l R, Thomas Naprefs, late Bailie of Glafgotv., Scotland. 
^^ Rev. Mr. Samuel Newell, New-Cambridge., Farmijigtdfi^ 
Conneaicut. 6 Books. 

Ebenezer Nichols,Efq; Reading., Majfachufetts. 
ReVi Mr. Samuel Niles, Braintrce^ ditto ^ 2 Books. 

Mr. • Nimmo, Receiver-General of the Excife, Scotland, 

Mr. Gideon Noble, Student at Tale- College. 

Mr. Garrat Noel, Bookfeller, New-Torky 2^ Books. 


MR. Thomas Ogden, New-York. 
Mr. John Old, Majfachufetts, 


"D Ev. Mr. Jonathan V^ccionsyNewhuryyMaJfachufdts. 6 Books, 

-■^ Rev. Mr. Mofes Parfons, ditto. 

Mr. Nathaniel Parker, Readings ditto. 

Mr. Samuel Parkhurft, Newark., Ncw-Jerfey. 

Rev. Mr. Ebenezer Pemberton, Bojhn^ Majfachufetts,. 

Mr. Nathaniel Phelps, , ditto. 

Rev. Mr. James Pike, Somerswcrth, New-Hji-mpfjirc. 

Rev. Mr. Timothy Pitkin, Farmington^ Conned icut, 6 Book*. 


Mr. Afhbell Pitkin, Student at rde'Cellege, 
Rev. Mr. Thomas YxincQ^ Bojion^ MaJj'achufetU, 
ilev. Mr. Ebenezer Prime, Long-Ifiand, 

Mr. John Prout, , CmneSiicnt. 

Mr. Abraham Purdy, Hanover^ Nevj-Torky 
Hon. Jofeph Pynchon, Efq; Bofton^ Majfachufetts, 


6 Books. 
6 Books* 

MR. Wilham Rainfey, Student ^.tNew-Jerfey College. 
Rev. Mr. Randal, Inckture^\Scotland. 

Mr. James Reeves, Student at New-Jerfey College. 

Rev. Mr. Aaron Richards, Raivay^ New^JerJey. 

Mr. Jofeph Riggs, Newark^ ditto, 

Mr. Arthur Robertfon, Merchant, Glafgow^ Scotland, 

Rev. Mr. Philemon Robins, Branfardy Conne^icut^ 2 Bjoks, 

Mr. Chandler Robins, Student at Tale-College, 

Mr. Philemon Robins, Jun. Student at ditio. 

Rev. Mr. Nathaniel Rogers, Ipfwich, Maffacbujdts, 

Mr. JefTe Roots, Woodbury^ Conne^kut, 

Ecnajah Roots, A. B, 

Mr. Robert Rofs, Strr.tfald,, Connefflcut, 2 Books. 

Mr. Timothy Rofe, Bcthlem^ Conne^ffcut, 


MR. David Sanford, Student at Tale-College, 
^Mr. Edmund Sawyer, Newbury , MaJJhchufctts. 
Mr. Samuel Sawyer, ditto. 
Mr. Robert Scot, Jun. Merchant in Glafgciu, 

Mr. John Se^rle, MaJJachufetts. 

Rev. Jofeph Sewall, D. D. Bojion^ Mcjadmfeits, 

Mr. Jofeph '^^^{^xons^—MaJfachufetts. 

Mr. Thomas Seymour,— -^/V/^, 

Mr. Thomas Seymour, Student at Tale-College, 

Mr. Thorqas Shelden, Suffieldy ditto. 

Mr. Reuben Sherman, JVoodlniry^ Conne£lici'i » 

Mr. David Shipman, Neivark^ Nevj^Jerfey. 

Mr. Jofeph Shippen, Jun. A. B. 

Rtv, Mr. Robert Siiliman, Norwalk^ Conne£licut, 

Mr. Ebenezer Smeads, Deerfeld., Majfaclmfeits. 

P'Tr. Smibcrt, at Kihncnie., Scotland. 

f/lr. The Hon. WiDiam Sm.ith, Efqj Nciv-Tork. 

Mr. WiJliarn Smith, Jun. ditto. 

}Ax. Jpnathnn Smith, Bethlem^ Cor.nepicni, 

6 Books. 

6 Books. 


Ivcv. Mr. Smith, Newhurn^ Scotland. 2 Books^ 

Mr. Daniel Smith, Woodbury ^ Connecticut. 12 Books. 

'Mr. Ephraim Starkweather, ^tudent at Tale-College. 
,!Rev. Mr. James Stirling, Glafgow^ Scotland. 
Mr. Simeon Stoddard, Student at Tale College. 
Mr. Smith Stratten, Student at New-Jerfey College, 
Mr. John Strong, Student at Tale College. 2 Books. 

Rev. Mr. Strong, New- Marlborough ., MaJJhchufetts 

Mr. Nehemiah Strong, Student at 1[ ale-College. 

Mr. Nicholas Street, Majfachujetts. 

.Mr. James Stuart,- Receiver-General of the Widow's Annuity 


in Ev. Mr. Nathan Tayler, New-MUford., Conneaictet. 
''"^ Mr. John Temple, Readings Majfachufetts. 

Mr. Thomas Tiffany, ditto. 

Mr, Gerfhom Tinney, Bofton., Majfachufetts, 

Lieut. Richard Thayer, Braintree., ditto. 2 Books. 

William Thompfon, A. B. 

Rev. Mr. Samuel Todd, Northbinjy ConneSlicut. 

Mr. John Tompfon, New-Tork. 

Mr, Jeremiah Townfend, New-Haven., ConneBicut. 

Mr. Ifaac Townfend, Student at N^w-y^r/^_y College. 

Mr. Traill, Bookfeller, Edinburgh Scotland. 6 "Books., 

Rev. Mr. Henry True, Hamp/lead, New-Hat?ipfjir^. 
Rev. Mr. John Trumhle ,. IFaterbury, ConneSlicut, 
Rev. Mr. Turnbell, Denny, Scotland. 

I^Aptain James Utley, Majfachufetts. 


MR. Noah Waddam, A. B. 
Rev. Mr. Walker, South-Lleth, Scotland. 
Rev. Mr. Thomas Walker, at Dundonnald, Scotland. 
R.ev. Mr. Robert Wallis, Edinburgh, Scotland. 
Mr. John Walton, Jun. Reading, Maj/aclmfetts. 
Mr. Jofiah Walton, ditto. 
Rev. Mr. Wandrope, Bathgate, Scotland. 
Rev. Mr. Alexander Webiter, Edinburgh, Scotland. 
Robert Wei wood, Elq; Gelloi, Scotland. 
Mr. Samuel Wellea, Deerficld, MaJJachufetts. 
Mr. Stephen Weil:, Student at Tale-College. 


Mr. Nath. Whittaker, Bafking-Ridge^ New-Jeifey, 2 Books, 

Deacon Jabe^^Whittlefey, Bethlem^ ConneSiicut. 

Rev. Mr. Stephen Williams, Springfield^ Majfachufctts, 6Book^, 

Mr. Samuel Williams, Ipfwichy MaJJachufetts. 

Rev. Mr. George W\ih.2.n^ Edinburgh Scotland. 

Rev. Mr. Jeremiah Wife, Berwick^ Maffachufetts, 

Rev. Mr. John Witherfpoon, Beath^ Scotland. 

Timothy Woodbridge, Efq; Maffachufetts. 

John Wright, A. M. Hanover ^ Virginia^ 12 Books. 

Mr. Philip Freeman, Bofton^ Majfachufetts, 

Mr. William Hyflup Bojign, Merchant, MaJJachufetts. 

Mr. Ebenezer Little, Neivbury^ Majfachufetts. 


N. B. 7/* there Jhould be any of the Names in the foregoing Lift 
without their proper Titles ., wrong^pelt^ or Places of Abode 
not right inferted^ wi deftre the fame ma-^ he excufedy as done 
thro' Mijlake,